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Abstract 
This is an analysis of the relationship between language contained in political 
documents and the exercise of power and authority from the Cultural Revolution in 
the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China from 
1967 to 1969. It is based on analytic meihods found in the works of Foucault, 
Bourdieu, Gramsci and others. The material analysed falls into four periods. The 
first phase in 1967 saw the initial impact of the CR manifesting itself locally by 
causing conflict between two key entities in the IMAR - the army and student 
rebellion groups. The response by the Centre to this was the conduct of dialogues 
with the local groups, resulting in the issuing of a key document, the '13th April 
Decision, ' to 'resolve' the local problems and impose hegemony from the Centre, 
through promoting standardised narratives and a specific ideology - CR Maoism. 
The -second phase from 1967 to 1968 saw the implementation of this strategy 
through the attack on the local leader, Ulanfu. During this period the discourse to 
'handle' the region was articu lated promoting a narrative and ideology from the 
Centre in Beijing of power based on class, excluding any assertions of the primacy 
of ethnicity and nationality locally. The third phase from 1968 to 1969 saw the 
promotion by the Centre of the newly installed leader, Teng Haiqing, using this new 
discourse. In this period, a local enemy - the Inner Mongolian People's Party - was 
gradually articulated. The final phase in 1969 saw the social turmoil and violence 
caused by the purge of those claimed to be members of this party, and the 
withdrawal of support from the Centre for Teng Haiqing, resulting in his use of a 
self-critical language, the creation of an adapted narrative and ideology, conveyed 
through a new discourse in which the key issues of class and ethnicity/nationality 
were approached in different ways. I 
The focus of this thesis is the signification of power in language and discourse 
through this period, and the techniques by which to describe and understand this. 
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Note on the Text 
In this text I have used the standard Pinyin system, as set out in the 'Basic Rules for 
Hanyu Pinyin Orthography' issued by the Commission for Pinyin Orthography, 
State Language Commission PRC in 1988. For place names I have used the 
Mandarin Chinese version of Mongolian names, apart from Hohhot (Huhehaote in 
Chinese), due to its wide use in literature in English related to Inner Mongolia. 
Where possible I have indicated the Mongolian version of place names in footnotes. 
Inner Mongolia has a unique structure and was divided into seven Leagues (meng - 
equivalent of the adminstrative unit of a prefecture elsewhere in the PRQ and 49 
Banners (qi - equivalent of a county). Due to the primary source material being in 
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Mandarin Chinese, proper names are either the Chinese names, or pinyin versions of 
transliterations from Mongolian into Chinese. 
Because of the disparate primary source material used in this thesis, I have adopted 
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TEXT BOUND INTO 
THE SPINE 
CD w CD 0w =- cu =1 (D 
z 
9L 
0 0 
a-30 Im U 0 0 . Cl) 0 , o ýý 00 co 
0c 
=1 a- 03 co 
cl (D 00 0 
1ýý -0 w --c c S; : 7r ý a- cl 0w - CD co )> 7fý 
-CO 0 II , -, r )ý- 
V. 
. z 
. 
r 
F 
;K 
3 
000< so 
< 
0> (92 
Z DIA 
z E. oc 
F 
"a 
z 
M 
CA 
0 
z Q. 
V, 
x 
cn 
(t), L y 
P 
. "' oo. -< rT, ; 11 N 
cn 
co 
11"A cn 
CD 
, 8ý5ý 
Z 
5 18 
o co C: 
ul 
n 
A: 
ZN 
si. 
Ido 
lcý 
0ý "M 2 =T 
CL 
=r :3 C/) 
2L (D 
00 U3 - 
Cl) io, Zý I =T 
,- 
-0 ,; 
=r 
0 =3 ý31 c -- 
xz 
C- . cn \, a, 0\0 10 cr ýý am 
d 
> Mý- z 
XMIO C) M -4 
0c z Or- 
0mCz cn M C) 1ý 
> 
. =r z > 
C-) 
I 
2 
16- 
(P 
'I' 
-i it 
0 
C 
13 
Chapter One 
A Framework within which to Understand the 
Relationship between, the Exercise of Political Power 
and Language during the Cultural Revolution in 
Inner Mongolia - 1967 to 1969 
This thesis addresses the question of the relationship between language and power 
by looking at selected documents from the campaign waged in the Inner Mongolian 
Autonomous Region as part of the Cultural Revolution in the People ý Republic of 
Chinafrom 1967 to 1969 against what was claimed to be the New Inner Mongolian 
People ý Party. Understanding of the promotion of power interests is achieved 
through analysis of the discourses used by participants in the Cultural Revolution at 
the time. Because discourse is socially rooted, details of the organisational and 
social context in which public language waS produced during this period are 
presented. In the document types here - documents intimately related to the 
promotion offorms ofpolitical power - language is viewed as containing elements 
traded in a market in which certain expressions and keywords have capital, and 
others do not. Part of this process is constant negotiation and bargaining for this 
symbolic value. Another part is the role played by narratives and ideologies (with 
those santioned and those delegitimised) and the attempt to recruit these by groups 
and individuals. The overall objective is to reach a richer understanding of the 
pursuit andfuYllment of claims to power and the means to attain these through use 
of language. 
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1.1 The CR Nationally and the Situation in IMAR 
The Cultural Revolution (CR) in the People's Republic of China (PRC) (usually 
seen as having started in 1966) was a complex movement. It varied from region to 
region. The general impetus for the movement came from a power struggle between 
national leaders and their supporters, ' but how this was translated to the dynamics 
and priorities of China's various provincial centres varied greatl Y. 2 The one feature 
uniting these regional versions of the CR with that of the Centre (in Beijing, the seat 
of Party and state institutions) was the pursuit between competing blocks and groups 
for power and influence. Part of the CR's complexity derived from the erosion and 
destruction of the Chinese state. Established forms of authority were subverted, 
challenged and swept away, while new ones were created and promoted. This battle 
between the old and new order caused chaos. This is a characteristic of the CR as a 
whole. 
The CR in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR) offers a dramatic 
example of this disjuncture between the movement's central course and its regional 
variations. While the Centre issued orders, gýidance and regulations which shaped 
the course of the CR in the provinces there was great variation in the ways in which 
local power holders and faction leaders pursued their specific political aims, shaping 
them according to local priorities and preoccupations. 3 The CR in IMAR, because of 
the region's particular geographical location and ethnic composition, was to take a 
unique course (see following section). The CR's exacerbating of unresolved tensions 
between ethno-political groups culminated in a bloody conflict which resulted in the 
I The best general English language history of the CR remains Barnouin and Yu 
1993. See for background to the origins of the CR MacFarquhar 1974,1983,1998. 
The most comprehensive (albeit controversial) Chinese language history of the CR 
is Yan and Gao 1986. 
2A good account of the CR in Shanghai can be found in Perry and Li 1997. 3 This is not to claim that there was something monolithic or preordained about the 
Centre. In this thesis, the Centre is merely shorthand for a selected collection of 
recognised institutions, leaders and administrative structures and procedures and the 
public acceptanceof specific political programmes these were seen as implementing 
and embodying. But obviously the concept of the Centre is changeable. Wherever 
'Centre' appears beginning with a capital 'C, ' this should be taken to the very 
specific meaning of Centre in the context of the main leadership base of the PRC at 
this period - Beijing, and the figures and organisations located there. 
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loss of (according to official figures) over 16,000 lives. 4 The CR in IMAR, 
therefore, involved many of the issues of the impact of central practice and ideology 
on a region. It shows clearly how this power operated. 
In this thesis, I plot this through its manifestations in language seen as discourse. 
The documents I look at show the main power-brokers in this conflict 'exercising' 
power, gaining power, and losing power. The key objective for this study is to show 
how, in written documents, one can track evidence of the exercise and promotion of 
types of power, and the dynamics between them through the evidence of language. 
1.2 A History of the CR in IMAR 
There were three key features of the CR in IMAR, serving to distinguish it from 
events in other provincial centres. These were: a combination of high levels of 
violence and social disruption, exceptional even in a time of violence like the CR; 
ethnic conflict, albeit expressed in a highly idiosyncratic manner (this is a key issue 
in this thesis); and the identification, as the CR proceeded, of a specific 'hidden 
enemy' unique to IMAR - the New Inner Mongolian People's Party ( IMPP - Nei 
5 Ren Dang - labelled later in the CR campaign). 
While the Inner Mongolian area saw the earliest 'autonomous government' to 
operate within territory gained by the Chinese Communists in 1947 (two years 
before the founding of the PRC and of the IMAR) its previous history had been 
complicated by its relationship with the Mongolian People's Republic, created under 
Soviet patronage 26 years earlier. 6 In the 1920s, the Inner Mongolian area was a site 
4 Full figures and source given in next section. 
5 It is important to make clear that there were in fact two 'IMPPs. 'The 'old'IMPP 
was the one that existed in the I 920s. The 'new' party was claimed to have continued 
to exist underground after the establishment of IMAR in 1949. It was this latter 
entity which the campaign in the CR focussed on. In this thesis, IMPP refers to the 
I new' party. If I am referring to the 'old' one, I will make this clear. 
6 When referring to the entity that existed prior to 1947,1 use the full form 'Inner 
Mongolia. ' I use the acronym 'IMAR' (for 'Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region') 
for the entity that came into existence in 1947. The history of Inner Mongolia in the 
early 20th Century and the impact of the establishment of the Mongolian People's 
Republic can be found in Mei-hua Lan, 'China's New Administration in Mongolia' 
in Kotkin and Elleman 1999. 
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of conflict between various parties: the Soviets, Japanese, and the Chinese (split into 
the Nationalist and the Communists). The Mongolian population formed various 
parties and movements under the influence of these other larger groups. The most 
prominent was the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia (the 'old' 
IMPP), which held congresses from 1924 to 1926 and was closely affiliated to the 
Mongolian People's Party of the Mongolian People's Republic, and eventually to 
the Chinese Communists. This party's activities effectively ended in 1930, but it was 
to re-form briefly in 1945, to give expression to Inner Mongolian desires for 
autonomy, or a pan-Mongolian state. 7 These ambitions were changed in 1947, when 
the political programmes of this party were superseded by the CCP. But the question 
in IMAR of political allegiance being based on ethnic identity, (which the existence 
of these parties raised) did not go away. They lay at the heart of the causes of the 
8 purges of cadres and people of Mongolian ethnicity in IMAR from 1967. 
Whether or not these organizations ever actually existed in the form claimed, their 
history was to return powerfully in 1967, both for individuals and groups. Political 
allegiance was a key issue during the CR. It was framed nationally in terms of 
loyalty to rightist or leftist parties, to the 'bad' Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping (the 
two main national 'enemies' of the CR) along with the Nationalists and Japanese 
invaders, as opposed to the 'good' Mao Zedong and the Communists. In IMAF, 
there was another kind of 'bad' allegiance, to a group whose political programme 
was labelled as splittist and treacherous. The membership of this group was based on 
ethnic identity. 
Ethnicity was a central factor in this conflict, but ethnicity mediated through the 
PRC's very specific discourse of national minorities. This is a key issue in 
understanding the discourse of power analysed in this thesis. During the CR the 
dominant ideology proclaimed equality to all China's national minorities. In IMAR, 
there was an ethnic mix (approx 10% of the local population were ethnically 
Mongolian; the vast majority of the remainder were Han Chinese). 9 Accusations of 
7 This was the 'East Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. ' See Tumen and Wang 
1995, and Ulanfii's autobiography for the history of this. 8 This history is dealt with exhaustively by Atwood 2002. 9 Full statistics from 1570 to 1990 can be found in Hurelbaatar, 'A Survey of 
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loyalty to a political party like the IMPP with pan-Mongolian ambitions played on 
ethnic divisions that already existed. It is a fact that the majority of those accused of 
supporting IMPP were Mongolian. ' 0 The resurrected history of the IMPP served as a 
means, be it deliberate or subliminal, to attack Mongolians and to accuse them of 
disloyalty, but to do this without explicitly mentioning ethnicity. This remains the 
most sensitive aspect of the CR in IMAR. Much of this thesis examines the complex 
code by which this was achieved. 
The CR in IMAR formally started with an attack on the local IMAR Party secretary, 
Ulanfu (a Mongolian) from May to June in 1966 at the Qiamnen Hotel meeting in 
Beijing. He was dismissed from his post the following month. In 1967, an IMAR 
CR Standing Committee was set up as a result of discussions in Beijing between 
CCP leaders and key local groups. The deputy commander of the Beijing Military 
District, Teng Haiqing, was brought in to head this and the IMAR Military Region. 
In effect Teng became the leading power-holder in IMAR during the early to middle 
CR period. Following speeches by, among others, Jiang Qing, one of the key 
persons on the Central CR Committee in Beijing in late 1967, on the need to 'dig 
and uproot class enemies' Teng Haiqing was eventually converted to the idea that 
the IMPP had continued its activity after 1949. This led to violent purges during the 
'Party rectification' campaign from 1967 into early 1969. According to official 
figures, 16,222 people died as a result of the campaign, and 342,000 suffered 
injury. 
Mongols in Present Day China: Perspectives in Demography and Cultural Change, ' 
Kotkin and Elleman 1999,194-7. 
10 'Mongols were the victims, and it was largely Han Chinese who organised their 
suffering' (Sneath 1994,429). 
11 See Turnen and Zhu 1995,1. Such 'official' figures are disputable. Jankowiak 
1988 referred to local government internal estimates in 1976 putting the figure of 
those who died as a result of the purge closer to 50,000, and argued that this could 
be as high as 100,000. He also argued, based on field research he conducted in 
Hohhot in the mid-1980s, that the vast majority of these were Mongolian (Ibid, 276). 
Similar figures are given b TsengeItGonchigsureninwww. taklam, -tkaii. oriz/tiip 
I/archive/4 03 Lhtml, 261 November 1998, in this case based on population ., 
hur- 
growth rate statistics, and the fact that the Mongolian population in IMAR from 
1965 to 1981 showed a shortfall of over 280,000 people. 
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The chaotic situation in the region caused the issuing of a Notice on the 22 nd May to 
'Rectify Mistakes and Thoroughly Implement Measures Concerning Inner 
Mongolia' after the Ninth Party Congress of the CCP in Beijing in April 1969. ' 
Teng Haiqing was removed from his post. The most violent period of the CR in 
IMAR was over, something confirmed by the symboli6 reduction of IMAR's area by 
shaving off huge tracts of land to three bordering provinces (a measure reversed in 
1979). The remainder of IMAR was placed under the control of the 65th PLA Corps 
from Beijing. 12 
1.3 The CR in IMAR and its Relationship to the CR at the Centre. 
As in other provinces and autonomous regions, the CR in IMAR was crucially 
influenced by directives and commands from the Centre. This influence either took 
the forrn of directives from the Centre which were specifically aimed at IMAR (e. g., 
the 'Decision of the Centre on How to Handle the Problem of IMAR' issued on 130, 
April 1967) or more general prescriptive documents aimed at the country as a whole 
which needing implementing in IMAR. The issuing of the '16 Ih May Circular' by the 
Centre setting up the CR Group in 1966, for instance, had an immediate impact on 
IMAR, directly causing the Qianmen Hotel meeting held from May to June 1966 
(already referred to). During this meeting Ulanfu and other local leaders were 
accused and then labelled using condemned ('rightist, ' 'capitalist') categories from 
the discourse of the Centre. The most destructive period of the CR in IMAR was 
terminated by central leaders after the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969. The 
temporal parameters of the CR in IMAR, and the instigation for its most critical 
12 More details on the CR in IMAR can be found in Woody 1993, and a Chinese 
version using some of the same material in Song 2002. Tumen and Zhu 1995 is a 
comprehensive Chinese language version, albeit issued within the framework of 
Mainland China political orthodoxy on the CR and its interpretation and meaning. It 
ascribes the excesses of the CR in IMAR wholly to the influence of Kang Sheng. Its 
authors interviewed key participants, and also have full access to the Chinese 
archives. A contemporary account of the CR in IMAR can be found in Hyer and 
Heaton 1968, though here Ulanfu is credited with an active role in the region until 
well into 1967, and much greater credence is given to the actual existence of an 
underground 'nationalist' pan-Mongolian party. Both these claims have grown less 
tenable as more evidence about this period has appeared. See also Sneath 1994. 
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moments, therefore, were all directly rel 
' 
ated to events at the Centre. 13 The CR in 
IMAR is impossible to understand outside the national'context. 
A manifestation of this is the fact that, the CR both in IMAR and nationally was a 
movement with a literary aspect characterised by use of a particular language (see 
next section). The CR started with a dispute over literary texts - interpretations of 
Beijing Deputy Mayor Wu Han's play about a Ming official, Hai Rui, and its 
possible reference to Mao Zedong's dismissal of his Defence Minister Peng Dehuai 
in 1959. Language was central to the CR movement, both in directing and inciting 
participants, and in the creation of a specific discourse, a part of which is described 
in this thesis. To map this literary aspect, it is important to set out clear categories 
for the kinds of documents produced in the CR - notices, news-sheets, reports, along 
with a description of the organisational and institutional apparatus required to 
produce these. Only some organisations were authorised and resourced to produce 
reports. 14 Plotting the similarities and differences between documents produced and 
the language they contained locally with material from the Centre shows much about 
the specifics of power and the use of language to promote this in the IMAR and the 
dynamics of the movement there. 
1.4 The Language of the Centre in the CR 
The special characteristics of language used during the CR has been noted: its 
violence, dogmatism, hyperbole, the use of specific metaphors and the reliance on an 
ideology of conflict between those labelled good and bad. 15 Franz Schurmann wrote 
in his early study, Ideology and Organization in Communist China: 
13 Mao had set down the canonical statement on the relationship between the 
provinces and the Centre in his 1956 essay, 'On the Ten Major Relationships: 'To 
build a powerful socialist country it is imperative to have strong and unified 
planning and discipline throughout the country; disruption of this indispensable 
unity is impermissible' (Mao 1977, vol 5 294). 
14 During the most chaotic periods of the CR the issue of authority was challenged to 
such an extent that it became largely a matter of which group had resources to 
P roduce materials containing ideology it supported. 
5 Simon Leys noted this in 1973 when he wrote that 'one may say that in China 
people have at their disposal two levels of language, one human and natural, which 
allows them to speak in their own voice... and another one, mechanical and shrill, to 
talk about politics' (Leys 1978,168). 
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'The Chinese Communists have developed a rich vocabulary which has in many 
ways changed the Chinese language. Ideas and terms have come into popular 
usage which never existed before... One of the major contributions of the 
practical ideology of the Chinese Communists has been the generation of these 
many new and useful categories and language. It has also given the Chinese a 
new manner of thinking. ' 16 
Schurmann's study just predated the beginning of the CR. It indicates awareness of a 
specific use of language and its relation to a new ideology imported and adapted by 
the Communists. 17 As part of the Studies in Communist Chinese Terminology issued 
from the late 1950s from the University of Berkeley, HC Chuang wrote The Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution: A Terminological Study and The Little Red Book 
and Current Chinese Language. 18 These were the earliest systematic attempts to 
describe the impact of the CR movement on the contemporary language of the PRC. 
Chuang isolated some of the most striking features of language used in publications 
at the Centre like the People's Daily and Red Flag magazine. Use of colour 
categorization (black for bad versus red for good), for instance, and popular 
derogatory terms based on animals and superstitions. He also identified the 
manipulation of historical terms, and the metaphors and set phrases densely used in 
this new material. 
A decade later, when the CR was already completed, Lowell Dittmer and Chen 
Ruoxi produced a systematic, broader treatment of language used during the CR. 
They looked at its distinctive rhetorical patterns, and at its use of colloquialisms and 
demotic language forms. They'also identified the influence of key organizations and 
figures (such as Mao and Lin Biao) and the duplication of their styles in other 
documents. 19 
16 Schurmann 1966,61-2. 
17 Mao was very conscious of the need for a new kind of writing, especially in the 
1942 essay, 'Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing. ' Here he quoted Dimitrov: 'The 
masses cannot assimilate our decisions unless we learn to speak the language which 
the masses understand' (Mao 1965, vol 3 65). 
18 Chuang 1967 and 1968. 
19 Dittmer and Chen 1981. 
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In the last decade, several studies have used more sophisticated analytic techniques 
to examine CR documents. Shaorong Huang's To Rebel is Justified: A Rhetorical 
Study of China's Cultural Revolution Movement, 1966-1969 used WR Brown's 
theory of social intervention to argue that the CR was a rhetorical, rather than a 
political movement, and that its rhetoric was dominated by the ideology of rebellion. 
Huang looked at the main articles of the movement which appeared in the People's 
Daily and speeches by leaders such as Lin Biao and Jiang Qing to plot this rhetoric 
of rebellion, and the fund of symbols on which it was constructed. He analysed the 
rhetoric of polemics, the rhetoric of exposure and the element of ritual both in the 
contexts and contents of written material from the CR period. 20 
Mobo CF Gao, in his article, 'Maoist Discourse and a Critique of the Present 
Assessments of the Cultural Revolution, 21 dealt with the relationship between Mao- 
speak, as it was manifested in the CR, and post-CR accounts, in both Chinese and 
English, which, in a sense, struggle against this primary language. Gao argued that 
there is such a thing as Maoist discourse, and described some of its fundamental 
features (the division, for instance, between 'public' (gong) and 'private' (si)) which 
ran throughout the CR. As Gao stated: 'Maoist discourse was composed not only of 
values and policies, but also an organizational apparatus and disciplinary 
technology. 22 
The Indiana East Asian Working Paper Series on Language and Politics in Modern 
China contained articles on the language of Red Guards, government cadres, and the 
role of impoliteness in struggle discourse in the CR. 23 The most pertinent of these 
papers to my current study, although it did not relate specifically to the CR period, 
was Christopher Atwood's 'National Questions and National Answers in the 
Chinese Revolution: Or How Do You Say Minzu in Mongolian. ' This dealt with the 
20 Huang 1996. 
21 Bulletin of ConcernedAsian Scholars 1996, vol 26, no 3,13-33. 
22 Ibid 14. 
23 Available at www. easc. indiana. ed/Pau ges/Ease/working papers/. The works include: Michael Schoenhals, "Talk About a Revolution: Red Guards, Government 
Cadres and the Language of Political Discourse, " Elizabeth J Perry and Li X1111, 
"Revolutionary Rudeness: Notes on Red Guard and Rebel Worker Language in 
China's Cultural Revolution"; Michael Schoenhals, "Non-People in the People's 
Republic of China: A Chronicle of Terminological Ambiguity. " 
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discrepancies between language of ethnicity and nationality in Mandarin (Han) 
Chinese, and Mongolian, and the problems this presents to ethnic Mongolians in the 
PRC. One final study that took a limited corpus of material, and performed detailed 
analysis on it, was Xiaoming Yang's The Rhetoric of Propaganda: A Tagmemic 
Analysis of Selected Documents of the Cultural Revolution in China Yang used an 
idiosyncratic form of discourse theory, dividing the texts he looked at into particles, 
waves and fields. He used the distinction of emic (texts as seen from the producer's 
point of view) and etic (texts from the receiver's point of view) treatments to gauge 
how language-creators tailor their words to their audience. 24 
While there is limited material in English on the language of the CR, there has been 
even less in Chinese. This is partially connected to scepticism in China about the 
sort of theoretical premises the practice of discourse analysis is based on. It may also 
simply be because the major theoretical works setting out types of discourse analysis 
methodology have only recently become available in China. There is some interest 
in the distinctiveness of CR language, attested to by the collection of CR phrases and 
slogans in the 1989 Strange Events and Language ftom the Cultural Revolution. 25 
Beyond this there is, to the best of my knowledge, no analysis in Chinese of the 
language of the CR. 26 
Michael Schoenhals admitted in the foreword to Doing Things with Words in 
Chinese Politics that 'the existing literature on China turned out to have little to say 
about the political uses of language, and the literature on the language of politics 
was rarely, if ever, about China. 27 This militated against a good understanding of 
the language contained in documents from a specific period of modem Chinese 
24 Yang 1994. 
25 See Jin and Chang 1989. 
26 The Hong Kong magazine Ming Pao Monthly published in April 2001 an analysis 
of 'The Theory of Violent Language' by Liu Zaihou of the Hong Kong City 
University Chinese and Translations Department, which covered the CR. This linked 
autocracy and violent language, looking at the increasingly slanderous language 
used in CR public speech, and at the construction, as the CR proceeded, of more 
elaborate labels for enemies from simple roots. It linked this 'violent' language to 
campaigns after the CR, and the general low credibility Mainland Chinese political 
language has to this day (Ming Pao, April 2001,22-28). 
27 Schoenhals 1992,1. 
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history like the CR. 28 One helpful insight contained in some of the studies listed 
above (and Schoenhals's own) is the intimate link between the means of producing 
documents (their authors, institutions, publishers, their generic status, and the 
audience they were aimed at), the kind of language they used and the ideology they 
promoted. Another is to understand the importance of power during this period and 
the fact that documents and the language they contained occurred in a highly 
politicised context in which they contributed to struggles between separate forces 
and factions. 
1.5 Power: Definitions and Context 
The notion of power lies at the heart of the CR. The exercise of it, the claiming of it, 
the legitimization of some forms of power, and the institutions through which and by 
which power was expressed and its exercise facilitated. At one level, the CR can be 
described as a power struggle between Centre leaders (Mao Zedong on one side and 
Liu Shaoqi on the other), and between the factions from which they derived support 
and which they in turn supported. It involved claims on power between parties in 
specific localities where the Centre's struggle was duplicated. At another level, it 
involved conflicting claims to authority between families, and individuals in 
families. 
This works at a fundamental level. Language (in texts or speeches) was a critical 
part of the negotiation for who had power and influence. An editorial in the People's 
Daily on 5h September 1966 famously described the CR as being a war where words 
were weapons. It was also described as a 'battle to touch the soul, ' an ideological 
rather than a physical war. 29 CR documents of various genres (these are listed in 
Section 1.10) were produced with the aim of making a contribution to this power 
struggle. They were influential elements in a complicated struggle, a part of the 
promotion of ideological variants and power groups over others. 
28 In his own study Schoenhals used techniques from 'speech act' philosophers Grice 
and Searle, and applied them to a wider variety of CCP documents from 1949 
onwards. 
29 People ý Daily, 2 nd June 1966 editorial. 
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A central part of this thesis is the identification of key terms in the discourse of the 
CR, and the way they can be shown to support the power claims of organisations, 
individuals and institutions, and how control of them functioned in the negotiation 
for authority and influence. 'Power' itself was actually a key term. 'in the CR 
frequent reference was made to 'seizing power' (duoquan - see Chapter Two, 2.1.9 
for examples of this term in use) and its object, 'political power' (zhengquan - used 
for instance in the Maoist formulation: 'The fundamental issue of revolution is that 
of political power' (Geming de genben wenti shi zhengquan de wenti)). There is the 
related discourse of 'authority' (quanwei) and those who possess, or lack, the correct 
credentials to exercise this (an understanding of this is given in the negative label 
fixed to obliquely attack Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping at the beginning of the CR: 
'Those in authority who take the capitalist road' ). 30 Power related to the movements 
of 'struggle' (douzheng) and upheaval that were declared to be parts of the process 
of rebellion and revolution within the discourse of the CR. It also related to the other 
key term imported into Chinese political discourse from Marxism - 'dictatorship' 
(zhuanzheng). If 'power' is cited as a keyword within the lexical universe that 
existed in the CR, was it one of what Griggs and Howarth called, in their 
contribution to Discourse Theory and Critical Analysis an 'empty signifier, ' a 
I means of representation that enable the welding together of internal differences' ? 31 
Something that is meaningful because its edges are bluffed; it can have packed into 
it whatever language users of the time wish to put. 
The thinking of Michel Foucault gives insight into how power can be described and 
analysed, how its promotion is achieved and what part language plays in this. To 
Foucault, power was not an abstract entity, but an 'extremely complex configuration 
of realities 32 In his 1982 essay, "The Subject and Power" he outlined an 
understanding of how power operates: 
'The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between "partners, " 
individual or collective; it is a way in which some act on others. Which is to 
say, of course, that there is no such entity as power, with or without a capital 
letter; global, massive, or diffused; concentrated or distributed. Power exists 
30 There is also the related tenn, 'leadership power' gingdao quan). 31 Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000,56. 32 Foucault 2000,336. 
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only as exercised by some on others, only when it is put into action, even 
though, of course, it is inscribed in a field of sparse available possibilities 
underpinned by permanent structures... A power relationship... can only be 
articulated on the basis of two elements that are indispensable if it is to be a 
power relationship: that "the other" (the one over whom power is exercised) is 
recognised and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts; and that, faced 
with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and 
possible interventions may open UP. 03 
A superficial understanding of power would equate it with a relationship of deep 
inequality between an actor and a passive sufferer, something along the lines of an 
act of violence under coercive regimes where one demands and the other complies. 
Poucault did not use this definition. In his understanding, power is not a 
confrontation, but a question of 'government, ' - government here used in the sense 
of two parties seeking a modus operandi, a contract whereby they can pursue their 
interests, and negotiate: '... There is not a face-to-face confrontation of power and 
freedom as mutually exclusive facts (freedom disappearing everywhere power is 
exercised) but a much more complicated interplay. 34 Here, the strategy of the 
power-holder is to use methods to convince the target of their power that they should 
perform certain actions, because they are in their interests, or they have no other 
option (even when they do). It is not a case of blankly demanding something, but of 
producing commands that 'key in' with specific preoccupations, fears, or needs of 
the audience. On this model, power is much more a duality or balance between 
competing forces rather than a function in a monolithic, settled structure. 
Foucault stressed in his writings the need to appreciate how important institutions 
were in the establishment of power relations: 'Power relations are rooted deep in the 
social nexus, not a supplementary structure over and above "society" ... ' 
35 Foucault 
admitted that this model of power was derived from the Western background of the 
state and its influence, which in turn had its roots in the Christian ideology of the 
ruler as a pastoral figure, placing their exercise of power within a framework in 
which they were seen- as teachers trying to bring about improvements and moral 
, godliness. ' In this history, the state individualized power - relating it to citizens 
who had a personal relationship with God and a responsibility to safeguard the 
33 Ibid 340. 
34 Ibid 342. 
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salvation of their soul. In this sort of context, the exercise of power was also deeply 
personal. Foucault argued for the development of this 'caring' deployment of power 
and process of individuation into the various 'regimes' of discipline and regulation 
for the self which came into existence from the 15'h century onwards - medicine, the 
treatment of the insane, and of criminals, psychiatry, and finally a deeply 
individuated discourse of sexual identity, inscribing a specific form of subjectivity 
on the most private regions of the self. 
This connects to Foucault's understanding of the role of knowledge in power 
relations. Foucault stated that 'it is not possible for power to be exercised without 
knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power. 36 The disciplines 
and institutions created in the last 200 years in Foucault's work. were connected to 
producing ways of knowing things, forms of knowledge, conventions, whereby 
certain practices and views are sanctioned and authorised and others excluded. To 
know, therefore, is not just to know something is the case, but to do this in a system, 
and knowing is to be empowered and enabled in that system. In producing 
knowledge, as Sara Mills says, one is also 'making a claim to power. 37 
The issue of power and its exercise had a historical geneology. The state and its 
relationship to individuals along with their experience of forms of control in China 
developed differently to the West. Foucault's approach allows space for the 
recognition of this, but also acknowledgement of the principle that regardless of 
cultural context power is mediated through structures - institutions and organisations 
- and that it is exercised in ways that are visible and can be described. There is no 
mysterious ineffable entity called power, empowering those with access to it, lying 
outside the reach of rational investigation. This 'demystifying of power' is an 
attractive element in Foucault's apprach. Even though the CR occurred in a culture 
where huge, powers seemed to reside in certain actors and entities (particularly Mao 
and members of the CR Committee), these were operating in an environment in 
which there was competition from other groups and figures. The CR was not a 
35 Ibid 343. 
36 Foucault 1980,52. 
37 Mills 2003,69. 
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monolithic movement with a clear-cut direction from the beginning. It was a 
movement made up of different groups promoting different aims. 38 
Foucault's understanding of power allows insight to a key component of the CR 
power struggle - the masses , or audience, who played an essential part in the 
negotiation and distribution of power, and were themselves significant power 
holders. No matter how rigid the context, speakers, those ostensibly exercising 
power, had to speak or act in such a way that could gain support from and enhance 
their power with the audience. In Foucault's work the audience is not a passive 
entity to be acted upon. Their reactions and judgements of their preoccupations and 
priorities shape the 'power' discourse and set its agenda. 
Power in the CR, as in any other historical movement, can only be understood as the 
expression of certain aims, either by individuals or groups or factions, through an 
institutional and social framework towards an audience, whether of one person or a 
whole nation. There were means to compound and propagate this power through the 
generation of a specific language, or organisational structure. The techniques for the 
promotion of power are looked at in more detail below. The combination of 
language and the organisational context is the 'discourse. ' 
1.6 Bourdieu and the 'Market Place of Power' 
Foucault provides a framework within which power is understood through the 
actions by which it is promoted - the actions by which one group or individual 
attains authority or influence over other groups. To paraphrase Barthes' comment on 
meaning, power is manufactured - created, contained and exercised by material 
institutions and recognised conventions and processes, and manifested through 
38 See Oksenberg's analysis of the varied sources of Mao's power in 'The 
Politician, ' in Wilson (ed) 1977, Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales ofHistory esp 81 ff. 
Oksenberg located much of Mao's administrative power in his control of the 
communication process, but also his understanding of the 'duality' of power: 'For 
Mao, the keys to power were knowledge and popular support derived from the 
people's faith in the essential goodness and virtue of their rulers. ' See also Pye 1992, 
13 on the Chinese concept of power. 
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these. Power is signified, and visible. The work of Pierre Bourdieu offers further 
insight into the operations of power, and the part that language plays in this. 
For Bourdieu, language's key part in the strategies of control and the negotiations 
between parties which are central to the exercise of power is self-evident. He makes 
clear that there is no such thing as a 'power' language, but that this very language is 
itself up for negotiation. There are a variety of different languages, all claiming their 
39 rights to power, operating in what Bourdieu metaphorically called a market. In 
this market, 'speakers take into account - in varying ways and to different extents - 
the market conditions within which their products will be received and valued by 
others. 940 There is not an 'official' language per se, but a language that has become 
official, and the speakers of which have been empowered by a process of 
competition and elimination. Such language, Bourdieu states, serves both 'internal 
and external markets. At It has to be aimed both at achieving influence within the 
political elite - effective power actors within specific societies - and recruiting 
power from the general society, where it aims to have effect. Finally, any language 
can only be empowered if there are institutions, processes, frameworks that back it 
up. The combination of these creates a" power discourse. Bourdieu cites the 
statement of a judge passing sentence, which only has illocutionary force within the 
context of a court, with officials to carry out the sentence, and institutions within 
which the sentence can be implemented. 42 Without these, the sentence would remain 
4mere words. ' Political language, too, relies on organizations, social structures and 
personnel to attain and maintain power. 
If centres of power are dispersed, and language operates in a market, with certain 
forms of it acquiring status and influence while others are denigrated, then this also 
impacts on the producers of the language - the speakers and users, who seek to 
manipulate and recruit language to their specific agendas, and who therefore need to 
supplement and acquire political capital. Text assessment involves an understanding 
of the status of both the issuer of the text (e. g., the writer or issuing bodies) and the 
39 Bourdieu 1991,57. 
40 Ibid editor's introduction, 18. 
41 Ibid 183. 
42 Ibid 75. 
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speaker of it (who is the speaker, from where, on whose authority are they 
speaking? ) But this is not a one-way process. Texts do not acquire power because 
they are issued by power-holders. They also supplement and increase, or decrease 
that power. Speakers of high status have this supplemented by the use of language 
considered authoritative and persuasive. Speakers need to know which forms work 
best, and avoid those that do not. They need to know what can and cannot be said 
and where a society has set the verbal political habitus, just as an understanding of 
what goods are desired, and what not, is crucial to an understanding of a society's 
economy. 
Language is also controlled through the material means of its dissemination, the 
I media. ' Bourdieu's metaphor of a 'market' is useful in understanding how a 
combination of control of the different means of dissemination and the meanings 
and structures within language contribute to the victory and legitimisation of certain 
language forms over others, and how this constitutes a discourse of power. 
1.7 Hegemony, Narrative and IdeoIogy 
More fundamentally, power is delivered through control of the ideology - through 
the promotion, conveyed through conventionaliased language forms, of certain 
thought-patterns and belief systems, with the assertion of these being 'truths, ' along 
with the elevation of their associated vocabularies, and the concentration of capital 
in these areas. A second factor is in the promotion of narratives, presenting 
privileged versions of 'history. ' Figures are placed in this narrative, legitimising 
their claims to influence, or vilifying them. Strategies are created whereby such 
'histories' are either accepted or discredited. Once more, vocabularies are associated 
with specific (hi)stories, to convey them. 
In the PRC, there was a state ideology of Marxism-Leninism, with very specific 
sources, a literature, practices and vocabulary, promoted from the Centre. The 
transportation of this to a provincial region like IMAR involved the issue of how 
much such central ideology was modificed and changed to suit local circumstances. 
Such modification that happened occurred through a process of negotiation and 
contestation. In the material analysed in this thesis it is clear that there was perceived 
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to be a contending local ideology based on support for issues around ethnicity or 
national minorities in IMAR, opposed to the Centre's ideology predicated on the 
ultimate importance of class issues. This is dealt with in detail in Chapter Three. 
The objective for the control of both the ideological and narrative agendas was to 
attain hegemony. Gramsci's notion of hegemony, which I draw upon here, is 
complementary to the view of the operations of power mapped out above. For him; 
according to Eagleton, hegemony is 'a whole range of practical strategies by which a 
dominant power elicits consent to its rule from those it subjugates. To win 
hegemony... is to establish moral, political and intellectual leadership in social life 
by diffusing one's own world view throughout the fabric of society as a whole, thus 
equating one's own interests with the interests of society at large. 43 Such 
hegemonies are created through the support and promotion of ideologies on the basis 
of appeal and benefit. In the words of Raymond Williams: 
'A lived hegemony is always a process... It is a realised complex of 
experiences, relationships and activities, with specific and changing pressures 
and limits. In practice, this hegemony can never be singular. Its internal 
structures are highly complex.... It has to be continually renewed, recreated, 
defended and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, 
challenged by pressures not all its own. 44 
Such a concept of hegemony is broad and inclusive enough to contain opposition to 
it: 'The reality of any hegemony, in the extended political and cultural sense, is that, 
while by definition it is always dominant, it is never either total or exclusive. At any 
time, forms of alternative or directly oppositional politics and culture exist as 
significant elements in the society. A5 When I talk of hegemony in this thesis, it will 
be in these terms: of a strategic promotion of ideological norms to negotiate 
acquiescence and agreement from an audience. A major means of achieving this is 
through the enlistment of 'keywords, ' terms and vocabularies and attempts to 
monopolise them. 'Class' and 'national minority' are the two most powerful cases in 
the IMAR context. 
43 Eagleton 1991,115-6. 
44 WilliaMS 1977,112. 
45 Ibid 113. 
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The support for ideologies comes partially from authorising narratives. This is well 
illustrated in the way the ideological system in the PRC was legitimised by appeals 
to a specific historical narrative which recounted the struggle for power by the 
Communists throughout the 1920s and 1930s, culminating in their success in 1949. 
It was a narrative which delivered control of moral terms *and knowledge by 
portraying conflict between parties clearly marked as good and bad, with the 
ultimate just victory of those signified as good because of their holding to 
ideological 'truths' conveying important messages about 'oppression' and Justice. ' 
It also involved the elevation of a language associated with this ideology, through 
which it was conveyed. The 'liberation' of 1949 entailed acceptance of a canonical 
version of the history that led to it, and a way of viewing events afterwards. Any 
discourse from 1949 that aspired to legitimacy needed to do this by buying into this 
narrative. Power also lay within the authority to interpret this master narrative. 
In practice narratives were not set in stone. They were available for contestation - 
sites of dispute in a similar 'market' of competing narratives claiming authority, just 
as 'power language' and ideologies were. During the CR there were many attempts 
to re-create the grand narrative of pre-1949 history, to redescribe the exploitation 
and struggle it contained, and to exploit these new narratives in legitimising groups 
and individuals participating in the new struggle, a struggle that was itself creating 
another, contemporary narrative. During the CR there was a re-evaluation of history 
after 1949, with intense conflict over areas deemed strategically necessary to 
legitimise claims to authority. The 'meaning' or interpretation of the mythical events 
prior to 1949 (mythical in the sense that they were seen as having symbolic 
importance far beyond their literal historical impact) was the key issue in this 
conflict. At the regional level, this process was manifested through competing 
parties 'buying in' to narratives they claimed were sanctioned by the Centre, fighting 
to claim some of the symbolic power by using what they saw as the signifiers of 
this. This became a route to acquire influence and power. In this thesis, I concentrate 
on how this happened in the IMAR - how the national narrative was framed locally, 
what were the key terms in this process, and how it was used to shape any local 
narratives available. 
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These issues also exist on the level of those who are authorised to speak, who are the 
key 'voices' in the texts looked at here. Many of these 'speakers' were engaged in a 
process of furthering their own aims or those of groups they supported and the 
ideologies that these represented. They were attempting to increase their own capital 
through the use of appropriate language, language that furthered their aims. The 
main speakers were leading members of the institutional framework which had been 
set up during the CR. But it is clear that they were placed in an ambiguous situation, 
leading a movement ostensibly to attack old sources and forms of authority and set 
up new processes, supporting a new ideology. How they negotiated this is important. 
They needed to use a lot of the signifiers and processes of the old authority, while at 
the same time attacking it. They needed to acquire status, and-position themselves 
against figures who were previously empowered. They needed to attempt to acquire 
legitimacy and credibility, in a new context where ostensibly the old forms and 
patterns of authority, and the language though which this was conveyed, was 
questioned and subverted. This question of the status of specific voices, of their right 
to say certain things, and be received in certain ways, is a key part of this study. The 
right' of certain figures to speak in specific fora, to have their words disseminated, 
to use certain forms of language, to 'authorise' ideological points, and how they 
could mark this authority (along with how it was marked for them) is a major 
process, as is the strategy used to delegitimise and relegate other voices, with their 
ideology (or what was claimed was their ideology) and the narratives they 
sponsored. In the context of IMAR this was particularly marked, simply because the 
new voices needed to localise as part of their means of acquiring authority locally, 
but they also needed to demonstrate this authority in ways that were unthreatening to 
the Centre. 
1.8 Techniques for the Analysis of Language 
Foucault devised techniques by which to view the specialist languages of medicine 
and penology as they have evolved over the last two centuries, viewing them within 
instutional. and social frameworks, the combination of which constituted discourse. 
Foucault was particularly sensitive to the means by which discourse related to social 
power, to claims to knowledge, and what part they played in power-relations and 
negotiations, and the signifiers for this. The school of critical discourse theory has 
i 
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developed these techniques. Like Foucault, this has looked at the means by which 
power is promoted through discourse, and the intimate relationship between the 
two. 46 And like Foucault, it has accepted the historicity of all forms of discourse - 
their being produced in a distinct context and social 'universe' which limits the form 
they can take and their structure. But critical discourse analysis has gone further in 
showing discourse as a type of social action, and highlighting the fundamental 
contribution analysis of discourse can make in understanding political and social 
power. 
Discourse analysis plots the means by which a combination of language forms and 
the social entities that create and are constituted by them promote ideologies and 
narratives in the interests of their objective of exercising hegemony. The means by 
which this is done and the outcomes are varied. Norman Fairclough referred in an 
analysis of contemporary English political discourse to methods of promotion and 
persuasion in place of assertion and coercion as being recognised as more likely to 
promote forms of hegemony in post-modem democratised societies. He cites the 
example of a consultation between a doctor and their patient as an example of a 
traditional exerciser of power now needing to demonstrate rather than assert their 
authority: 
'On the one hand, the doctor, as in traditional consultations, pursues an agenda 
which controls and determines the structure of the interaction, and this is 
manifest in the fact of the occurrence of the doctor's question, assessment and 
directive. On the other hand, the doctor like the counsellor, in a counselling 
session, appears to cede much of the control and leadership of the interaction to 
the patient. 07 
In the material in this thesis, authority was largely asserted rather than demonstrated. 
But the same techniques by which to spot the operations of power-enhancement and 
promotion are still valid. Siegfried Riger offered a suggested list of approaches to 
texts taken as example of discourse. 48 These can be summarised as characterizing 
the audience, and the institutional framework within which and through which a 
document is produced, (status of the organization or group publishing the piece, 
46 Van Dijk 1998,1. 
47 Fairclough 1995,101-102. 
48 In Wodak and Meyer 2001. 
34 
49 
etc). Overall assessment of any piece should also look at the material quality of the 
document. Well printed documents need good resources, good printing presses, 
paper (a scarce resource in the CR). In the CR, there was very limited access to this 
sort of equipment. Such access demonstrated influence and status. Assessment also 
includes what falls more traditionally into analysis of a piece's rhetorical 
components: its vocabulary and nomenclature, the keywords it contains (which give 
clues to the area of prime contestation), the authorities it names in the text explicitly, 
and those it implicitly relies on, its register (popular or specialist) and the voices it 
contains (mon'Ovocal or multivocal). 50 
Such documents did operate in an ideological and institutional market place. They 
were products of people or groups within organisations of varying degrees of size 
and influence. They demostrated closeness to conventional 'centres' of power either 
ideologically, through argument and appeal to sanction from the Centre, or 
institutional - through personal connection to the Centre. But the authority of the 
Centre was also often 'created' through these documents - they promoted its 
hegemony just as much as appealed to it to give them authority. They were parts of 
an attempt to accrue capital within this system, manufacturing influence by the use 
of designated and accepted speech forms, or by the appeal and exploitation of the 
symbolic capital of certain status figures or organisations (the Party, for instance). 
1.9 Sources 
Discourse analysis has largely been practiced on material texts, regardless of 
whether they are spoken or written in origin. This accepts that the vast bulk of 
discourse available for analysis from the past is in written rather than filmed or 
recorded form. The CR falls into this category. The examples of discourse analysed 
in this thesis actually exist in written documents. 
Overal, this material arose in a highly politicised context within which there was 
very little production of non-ideologically motivated material. Even the little fiction 
produced during this period carried specific political messages. Written material was 
49 Ibid 54-55. 
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not produced for its own sake, but to carry messages which had organisational. and 
institutional support. The ideological function of discourse was clearly set out in 
Mao's 'Forum on Literature and Art, ' a document that was reissued on various 
occasions in the CR, which promoted the orthodoxy that literature needed to have 
social purpose. The material in this thesis was therefore created in an atmosphere in 
which any symbols were coerced into a specific politicised context, where they were 
present to carry messages, and in which the audience were deft at interpreting the 
'true meaning' of texts beyond their literal meaning. 
The second general feature of the environment within which CR material was 
produced was the division into official and unofficial documents, and the competion 
for influence and sanction between document-issuing entities. The main genres of 
official material are set out in the following section. The unofficial material, 
especially in the CR, was a rich undergrowth of various genres produced by Red 
Guard (Rebellious) groups, factions, and individuals. 
The documents looked at in this thesis are ones that were inýended to impact on and 
influence events in the negotiation and campaign to acquire power between various 
groups in IMAR from 1967 to 1969. At the beginning of this period, the dialogues 
between the Centre and local leaders, issued in April 1967, along with the formal 
document that was issued from them (the '13th April Decision') had the clearest 
impact in the power structure in IMAR. This resulted in the open denunciation of the 
previous leader in the region, Ulanfu, and the imposition of a new group of leaders 
led by Teng Haiqing. It also set in process the creation of new organisations to 
represent authority in the region - the revolutionary committees. 
These documents prepared for the second grouping of material looked at, the various 
documents and speeches attacking Ulanfu and discrediting him locally. This is 
analysed in Chapter Three. The scope of this material is widest, ranging from 
I official' denunciations of Ulanfu in the local Centre-supported press to attacks on 
him issued by the largest rebellious, groups. But-there was a consistency in their 
approach to Ulanfu, and in the strategies they contain by which to disempower him. 
50 lbid 55-56. 
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Part of this material involved the use of Ulanfu's own statements from his period in 
power, and their location in a new context in which they were condemned and 
discredited. 
The third grouping of material from late 1967 to early 1969 analysed in Chapter 
Four takes as its basis public speeches by the newly appointed local leader of the 
Military District (and of the IMAR CRG), Teng Haiqing. The speeches were 
delivered at specific meetings which had strategic importance. Teng's language 
illustrated the voice of the key local power holder. They offer an opportunity both to 
describe the signifiers of this power, the relationship with an audience, and the 
impact that this language had on the course of the CR locally. It is also important in 
looking at the basis for Teng's authority evidenced in these texts, on what he based 
his right to speak on. These speeches coincide with the period of greatest violence 
and disruption in IMAR. 
The final period from April 1969 onwards covered by Chapter Five shows the 
impact of the edict from the Centre after the Ninth Party Congress to calm things 
down in IMAR. In this material documents attacking Teng Haiqing are set beside 
his own self-confessions, to plot the process of withdrawal of power both in the first 
person and externally, and to understand the management of this process whereby a 
person previously empowered became disempowered. 
The common feature of these documents is that they were all political documents, 
intended to play a part in the promotions of new forms and carriers of power, and the 
denigration of others. They were 'public' documents, in the sense either that they 
were transcripts of public speech occasions, or were printed for wide dissemination 
among groups to be used in meetings, study sessions, or other public forum. The 
idea of a 'private reader' (along with any strong sense of individual writers with 
their own style and voice) and an existence for these documents outside of a specific 
context for their reception is untenable. There were means both by which these 
documents were produced (through governmental organisations, or unofficial 
organisations with pretensions to 'governmental-type' power) and specific ways in 
which they were received. 
37 
1.10 Genre of Material: Context 
A principal means of understanding how CR literature was related to the exercise of 
types of power is to set out its generic categories and the status conferred them. Part 
of the project of discourse analysis has been to demonstrate the way that certain 
kinds of documents or speech acts might be seen to carry more formal authority and, 
power than others. This is closely related to the institutional framework within 
which such documents are produced, and the kinds of support, and sanction that they 
convey. Producers of texts (whether they be speakers or writers) are part of a social 
world, working within frameworks in which they exercise power, and are sanctioned 
and enabled to exercise such power. In the context of a totalitarian system like the 
PRC in 1967-1969, with tight state control of the central symbols and institutional 
delivery mechanisms of power, the relationship between the speaker or issuer of any 
text'and the institutional structure was highly managed. The enormous prestige 
conferred on the figure of Mao within this system is important to understand, along 
with the attempts to claim part of this prestige, to appropriate it and capitalise on it. 
The simplest strategy was merely to claim Mao's sanction by quoting his own 
words. But the symbolic power and the use of Mao was an issue of profound 
contestation. A similar principle applies to the canonical leaders around him - Lin 
Biao, Zhou Enlai, and the radical leaders of the CR, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, etc. 
There were strategies for enlisting these figures to sanction campaigns, to promote 
and strengthen them. But there was always the possibility that such attempts would 
backfire, as the symbolic capital of such figures, and their currency, either changed, 
or became devalued. Lin Biao is the clearest example of this, with his fall in 1971. - 
The CR did see a variety of organizations competing in a market and laying claim to 
the key power-conferring symbolic, figures and their words and language-forms. 
Entities came into existence outside the traditional organizations exercising social 
power and influence until then - the local Party organs, for instance, or work unit 
leadership structures. Rebellious groups, or revolutionary committees are the two 
clearest examples. These created their own documents. Underneath these more 
widely accepted new centres of authority were a host of lesser organizations, varying 
in size down to groups of only a few people, all claiming a form of authority, all 
LEEDS UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
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competing for sanction from the Centre. Such a market created a new context in 
which texts articulated strategies for power enhancement. 
Among this material, ostensibly the most 'official' material was produced by 
sanctioned and recognised Party organs. This usually had a very definite and good 
quality production (print and quality of paper for instance) and belonged to well- 
established generic categories. The record of an address by Lin Biao before a group 
of revolutionary cadres written in People's Daily, or an article by Yao Wenyuan, 
one of the chief architects of what can be called a CR ideology at the Centre in the 
Party magazine, Red Flag (Hong qi) can be located very close, if not at the dead 
centre, of socially recognised power production in the PRC at this time. These 
documents had established means to be disseminated through the country, and 
played a part in influencing the CR locally, through study in the various types of 
groups who were the target audience. The contents were generally taken as 
instructions, not to be questioned, but acted upon and implemented. They were used 
as sanction or support for activities and other forms of writing produced by lower 
level units and groups. 51 They therefore had an immediate basis for social impact. 
This 'power producing" material from the Centre was duplicated on a local level, 
with specific figures (either heads of revolutionary groups of influential factions) or 
groups able to produce 'mediating' material with a similar amount of clout locally. 
In IMAR, for instance, Teng Haiqing, as the leader endorsed by the Centre, was able 
to demonstrate a credibility based on his closeness to the most recognised leaders 
from the Centre, and his words (while he enjoyed this favour) carried a particular 
significance, conveying the Centre's instructions to the locality. In a similar way, but 
in an institutional context, the local newspaper, the ýIM Daily, was the established 
means of disseminating news and instruction through the IMAR, and was another 
authorised (and empowered) conduit through which the Centre's instructions 
reached down from Beijing to Hohhot, and from there to other localities in the 
province (reflected there in their own local papers, if they existed). 52 
51 On the function and layout of People ý Daily and its relation to provincial papers, 
see Schurmann 1966,58-68. 
52 The IMDaily was itself a site for struggle, being overtaken by rival factions in 
early 1968 (see Tumen and Zhu 1995,27 and Woody 1995, iii). 
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Beneath this 'elite' material (both in terms of quality and possession of the means 
and ability for wide dissemination) lay a raft of other types of material, some 
profoundly reliant on the higher material, some independent of it. The most 
parasitical material consisted of the verbatim reprintings of leaders' speeches issued 
by various groups. Mao's speeches existed in manifold (and sometimes variant) 
forms, reprinted in anything from news-sheets issued by rebellious groups to 
stencilled copies in the name of tiny groups. Locally, Teng Haiqing's speeches were 
issued individually by specific groups, or appeared in local news-sheets. 53 The 
variations were caused, sometimes, by one version being an 'official' one, issued 
after the speech had been delivered by the local newspaper or an arm of the new 
'formal' structures of organisation and power, and the other having been taken down 
by a group while the speech was delivered and, issued under the name of one of the 
various competing small groups. This illustrates the evident anxiety of different 
groups to make a claim on the words of recognised leaders and be empowered 
through them. 
Under this material lay what can be described as more personally sponsored, or 
individually authored material - attacks on specific figures, reports of local events, 
personal narratives. This material varied from well-printed issues to stencilled or 
even handwritten documents. At the bottom was the largely ephemeral 'big 
character posters' (dazibao) produced in one-off versions, posted publicly, 
occasionally collated and issued in printed versions, usually swiftly superceded by 
posters for newer campaigns. 54 
53 Summaries of his speeches appeared in the 'Red Guard Reference Material' news- 
sheets issued daily by the IMAR Party Standing Committee Red Flag Alliance, and 
the CR Reference Materials magazine (Wenge cankao), issued by the 8th 
Construction Bureau. Single speeches were also issued by the IMAR Military 
District Office (on 12'h July 1968), and the Hohhot Workers Union (13 th December 
1968). There were also stencilled copies of his speeches. 54 Collections of 'big character posters, ' largely originating from campaigns in 
Beijing, appeared in good printed copies for use by students. The impact of some of 
these posters was considerable. Leijonhufvud 1990 contains a comprehensive study 
of the history of 'big character posters, ' and an in-depth study of some taken from a 
campaign in Beijing in 1974, towards the end of the CR. Beyond a couple of 'big 
character posters' contained in printed material I have collected, it has not proved 
possible to obtain any first-hand examples from this genre in IMAR from 1966- 
40 
There is one final distinction in considering the genre of material, which relates 
more to written than spoken sources. This is the level of restrictedness imposed on 
the material by its issuers, and the constraints on who had access to it. Some of the 
material analysed in this thesis was aimed at as wide an audience as possible, and 
was powerful because of this potentially large dissemination. But there were also 
internal documents which had a different kind of power. In many ways,, these were 
the most typical power-documents, because they were disseminated amongst key 
decision-makers in the formation and execution of the CR movement, centrally and 
provincially. Such documents included the most restricted 'internal reference 
material' (neibu cankao), communications between leaders at the Centre, orders 
issued from them to other leaders, Party documents spread from the Centre down to 
Party members locally. Even in the 'chaos' of the CR these documents were 
influential. The summaries of talks between the Centre and provincial leaders in the 
early stages of the attack on Ulanfu in IMAR (analysed in Chapter Two) were very 
influential in the direction of the CR, though they only reached the wider public after 
several months. 
The genre of materials that occurs in the CR material looked at here breaks down 
into the following categories: 
* 'Speech' (flanghua): formal pronouncements, usually a record of a public 
announcement or exposition on a specific issue, often at high-profile 
meetings. 
* 'Discussion' (tanhua): indicating a meeting between a leader or leaders and a 
group - either an organization or a delegation from a locality. A more 
informal means of conveying central messages to those deemed important in 
carrying these out. 
'Formal report' (baogao): usually given at a high-profile meeting. 
'Personally authored letter' (xin): not common in material from this period, 
but used sometimes to give the leaders a more personal, intimate voice. 
'Opinion' (yyian): usually remarks noted down from a leader reflecting the 
Centre's prescriptions or ideology, but expressed more personally. 
1969. 
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e 'Instruction/direction' (zhiyi): formal announcement of prescriptive 
guidelines. 
9 'Formal discussion' (zuotan): used to record the content of meetings in 
'infonnal' situations between leaders and delegations, or groups. 
" 'Notice' (tongzhi): formal, impersonal announcement of policy. 
" 'Report' (huibao). 
" 'Intedection' (chahua): used to record less important utterances by leaders to 
local incidents or affairs. 
" 'Explanation' (shuoming): used for formal enunciations of central policy by 
leaders. 
'Selection' (zhaibian): common in collating incriminatory material to prove 
the guilt of someone - eg collections of Teng's speeches used in 1969 to 
condemn him in his own words. 
e 'Instruction/directive' (zhishi): used, for instance, applied to Mao Zedong's 
'directives. ' 
" 'Statement' or 'announcement' (shengming). 
" 'Minutes' (jiyao) or 'draft minutes' (jiyaogao), usually of 'talks' Uianghua). 
" 'Plan' (fangan). 
" 'News despatch' (tongxun): used as the title of periodicals issued by some 
rebellious groups. 
o Triticise and revise' (pifu): used in the campaign later in the CR in IMAR 
against Gao Jinming, a local leader initially felled and then reinstated during 
the course of the campaign. 
* 'Investigation' (diaocha): used in material from 1969 in which Teng Haiqing 
was felled, and then investigated. 
This presents a wide variety of material which fits into certain categories. Baogao, 
zhishi, shengming, huibao and tongzhi are the most formal. These followed specific 
conventions for textual organisation and presentation. Material issued under these 
headings was presented by their issuers as having particular claims on attention 
because of closeness to the formal institutions in which social power was located. 
Certainly, 'notices' (tongzhi) such as that issued from the Centre on 22 nd May 1969 
impacted critically on the resolution of the most violent period of conflict in the CR 
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in IMAR. These documents played a key part in the announcement and direction of 
various phases of the CR. Taken with the organisations and institutions detailed in 
the following section, and the various figures in authority and leaders of groups, 
these constitute the organisational mechanism of the CR. 55 
Huibao, yyian, jianghua, tanhua and chahua were more closely linked to speaking 
occasions, and to the specific formats of these events. Huibao for instance, was 
related in this material from this period to specific types of meetings (detailed in 
Chapter One, 1.12), the output of groupings like the IMAR Cultural Revolutionary 
Committees (IMAR CRQ formal meeting, held four times from 1967 (when it was 
established) to 1969. Jianghua is a more common title, but usually related to the 
utterances of specific speakers with high status. Chahua was less frequently used, 
usually in briefer material recording the reactions of marked power-holders to 
reports or remarks of lower-level groups. 
Zhaibian, jiyao, diaocha and pifu relate to a specific stage of the CR when new 
developments called for different types of material. Teng's fall, for instance, in mid- 
1969 after the Ninth Party Congress in Beijing meant that material was produced 
locally justifying his removal from power, either through collections of 
incriminating material (his speeche s), or through his own self-examinations (this is 
analysed in Chapter Five). These materials are more reflexive and reactive, referring 
to the resolution of a previous stage of the CR and a new narrative for the movement 
being promoted from the Centre. 
1.11 Sponsoring Organisations 
These genres of materials give little information if considered separately from the 
organisations which issued them. The institutional framework within which texts 
were produced and vie for power and influence can be treated in two ways. One is 
through looking at the organisations themselves and their status, membership, access 
"Almost all these were written, rather than spoken genres. The possible exception 
was 'report' (baogao) which could be verbally delivered. This says something about 
the greater acceptance of the authority of written rather than spoken words in the 
PRC at this time. 
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to senior leaders (in the new set up), etc. The second is through looking at the 
organisational framework within which this material was delivered (meetings, study 
sessions, struggle sessions). Both of these contributed to the extra-textual means by 
which texts created meaning, and in which they impacted on social activity and 
promoted certain interests above others. All of the text genres listed above were 
practical, and aimed at implementation, because of their profoundly political nature. 
The means by which they were implemented was therefore a major part of their 
I meaning' - their significance and practical value, and the ways in which they can 
be seen as discourse. 
The CR saw the creation of a host of vying organisations and entities in addition to 
those which had existed from the founding of the PRC in 1949. These longer 
established organisations (work units, government departments and ministries, law 
enforcement offices, etc) were the administrative framework by which the CCP had 
exercised power, and through which the Chinese people had experienced this power, 
interacted with it, and, to some extent, either collaborated with or adapted to it. From 
1966 onwards new entities were created which competed with these older forms, and 
in some areas diversified the means by which the population experienced and 
interacted with power, and social organisation. 
This paradigm change, both at the central and at Provincial level, is best seen by 
looking at the description of organisations before 1966 . 
56 In the pre-CR structure 
power was devolved from the National Party Congress into the Central Committee 
(divided into Plenary and Extraordinary Meetings). This elected the Politburo and 
the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the ultimate decision-making groups. The 
Central Committee itself was split into committees and departments. At the 
provincial level, the Annual Party Congress elected a Party Committee, and a 
Standing Committee. At the city level, power was exercised through the Central 
Committee. At the most basic level, there were units of production (factories, mines, 
56 Schurmann 1965,139,187 and 188 dealt with the Party apparatus, the military 
and the judicial. Barnett's study, Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in 
Communist China also devoted considerable space to setting out the structure of 
Party control, from the Central Committee and the State Council, down to the 
various committees and groups through which the CCP exercised power at the 
provincial and work unit level (Barnett 1967,18-38). 
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companies, co-operatives) or units of territory (streets, military regions, etc). All of 
these had a Party apparatus. 57 
From 1966 onwards, new organisations were set up, parasitical on, and often 
antagonistic, to the structures that had existed previously. In May 1966, as a result of 
the '16'h May Circular, ' the CCP set up the CR Group. The IMAR version of this 
was set up on 4h August - the IMAR Party Committee CR Group. In June 1967, the 
IMAR CR Standing Committee Preparatory Small Group was set up, which Teng 
Haiqing chaired. This set in motion the establishment of local revolutionary 
committees in September and October of the same year, and culminated in the 
founding of the IMAR CRC itself on Ist November, approved - by the Centre as the 
'highest power organ in IMAR. 08 This held plenary meetings in November 1967, 
and January, July and November 1968. In addition to this, an IMAR Revolutionary 
Committee Nucleus Group was also founded in February 1968. Parallel to this was 
the IMAR Military District and its various subdivisions and personnel (again with 
Teng Haiqing as leader). The fall of Ulanfu in 1967 effectively made a previously 
powerful CCP entity, the North East District Regional Bureau (of which he had been 
deputy secretary) defunct. Under the IMAR CRC were various work departments: a 
political department, a production and construction department, a political standing 
committee, PSB, transport section, agricultural section, etc. 59 The structure within 
the CRC was fluid. Some departments came into existence after 1967, some ceased 
functioning (e. g., the People's Courts). These were provincial level administrative 
organisations. There were also local versions. 60 
57 Schurmann 1966,139-148. These various power structures are shown in tabular 
form in Schoenhals 1996a, 358-360. 
58 See the official 'Nei Menggu zizhiqu, zhengzhi zhi' (Directory of the IMAR, 
Political Supplement), Beijing 2001,409. This recorded that supreme executive 
power passed to Beijing Military District IMAR in December 1969 after the splitting 
up of the area. See also Yellow Briefings 552, July 8th 1970, which showed that the 
IMAR CRC had three vice-chairs and 42 members, of which only two were 
Mongolian. 
59 For full list see 'Nei Menggu zizhiqu, zhengzhi zhi' (cited above) 412 ff. 60 Even within the IMAR region there were variations in the levels of violence and 
intensity of the CR. Tumen and Zhu 1995 stated that the Ulanchanben area Oust 
north of Hohhot) was the worst hit place, because of the large proportion of the 
population who were Mongolian. The CR in the industrial, Han-dominated city of 
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Parallel to these 'formal' CR organisations were the 'informal' ones - the Red 
Guard (or Rebellious) groups which started coming into existence in IMAR from 
August 1966 onwards. As Lynn White III explained in the context of Shanghai, 
there were numerous categories of such groups, from those who regarded 
themselves as legitimate because of their good class background (workers) to the 
more radical groups (generally founded later) which described themselves as 'rebel 
factions. ' 61 In IMAR there were the following groupings: 
" 'Combat division' (zhandoudui) 
" 'Combat column' (zongdui) 
" 'Liaison station' (lianluozhan) 
" 'Army' (bingtuan) 
" 'General headquarters' (silingbu) 
41 'Headquarters' (zongbu) 
'Small group' (xiaozu) 
'Materials group' (zillaozu) 
'Office' (bangongshl) 
'Headquarters' (zhihuibu) 
The hierarchy among these groups was rigid. The largest were the combat divisions, 
of which the two most powerful in IMAR were the conservative 'East is Red, ' 
'Llanshe' and 'Jinggangshan' groups. 62 These names acted like brands, with 
separate divisions set up as liaison stations in specific work units. One of the most 
active in the material analysed here was from the IM Teachers College. General 
headquarters were based on specific faction leaders, again spread over institutions 
like colleges, work units, factories. The Third Headquarters (san silingbu) was one 
of the powerful leftist factions active in Hohhot eventually supported by the Centre. 
Small groups were exactly that - gatherings of anything up to a few dozen people. 
Finally, the bias of these organisations was predominantly urban. They originated in 
Baotou was different to the more politicised centre of Hohhot. 
61 White 1989,14. 
62 'Lianshe' also included a group under the name 'Fighting Troops of Genghis 
Khan. ' See 'Yellow Briefings' 552,8"' July 1970, and Dreyer 1968,7. 
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Hohhot or Baotou, the two prime urban centres of IMAR, and spread through liaison 
stations to other remoter areas. 63 
These names were frequently tied to military style organisations, indicating the 
combative context within which they were created, and organisational closeness to 
other already-extant groups. Many of these rebellious groups were based in 
particular colleges or universities (IM University had a rich cluster of groups) or in 
specific work units, like the Railway Division. 
The organisational sponsorship of a publication indicated something about both the 
credibility jiven at the time to such material, and the kinds of audience they were 
aimed at. Material published by Third Headquarters, for instance, was disseminated 
more widely than that originating from smaller groups. The Third Headquarters had 
the material means to produce good quality texts, and to organise larger meetings 
and campaigns. 
Organisational sponsorship raises one final question, which concerns the place of 
authorship in CR documents. A feature of CR material in general and the material 
analysed in this thesis in particular, was their weak sense of individual authorship of 
specific texts. The recorders and writers were the functionaries of the specific 
power-holders speaking. Many texts were collectively authored. The style was not 
conducive to idiosyncratic or individualistic expressions. Generic, repetitive 
language was common. Appeals to authority - to Mao, or other central documents - 
were frequent. Authors, as such, were merely the means of transmission between a 
particular perforniance, and a wider audience, for whom they inscribed and 
broadcast their version of the speech-event. 64 
1.12 Organisational Setting 
Contributors to an early volume on discourse analysis stressed the importance of 
63 1 am grateful for information in this passage to a source in IMAR. 
64 See Li 1999,493 for a description of the ways in which the Red Flag magazine 
was used at meetings in the CR. 
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context in the analysis of spoken or written discourse. 65 Part of this drew inspiration 
from the school of linguistics founded by Grice, Austin and Searle where context of 
utterance was part of the integral meaning of a word ('F or 'now' for instance, the 
meaning content of which changes each time these words are used). Texts are 
'framed by the intentions and circumstances in which they are produced. 9 66 
Many of the documents analysed in this thesis were not just the product of the 
formal and informal organisations described above. They were also the result of 
specific public 'occasions' - meetings, rallies, conferences. Some of these were of a 
generic type with longstanding pedigree in post-1949 China - like Party meetings 
and study sessions. But there were also meetings created for the specific purpose of 
carrying the agitation the CR required forward - like struggle sessions and mass 
criticisms. These varied in size from small scale events, involving no more than a 
dozen people, to rallies with up to a 100,000 people participating. There were 
organisational formats for all of these, prescribing the sorts of speech act and 
appropriate discourse. The kinds of events at and for which this material was 
produced were more formal than, for instance, impromptu village level struggle 
sessions which, from eye-witness accounts, frequently descended into pure 
expressions of violence. The meetings between the Centre and local leaders in 1967 
were regulated from a distance, by order and in well-established formats of 
communication between leaders and their subordinates. Teng Haiqing's speeches in 
1968 were presented in 'important' local meetings, either within the context of the 
IMAR CRC, or to present Teng's ideas to as wide an audience of town and rural 
leaders as possible. Only in the material from 1969, during Teng's self-criticisms, 
was a voice placed in a context within which there was hostility and a demand for 
admissions of weakness. 
Schrank and Bernstein warn in their contribution to the volume mentioned above 
that students can sometimes idealise 'the organisational setting or social and 
psychological characteristics of participants' in supplying context to specific 
discourse through which to understand it. 67 As detailed a knowledge as possible of 
65 Van Dijk 1985. 
66 lbid vol 1,62. 67 Ibid 181. 
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the historical, and social context of a document, is necessary to avoid this. 
Unfortunately, such contextual evidence is not easy to find in this period. Beyond 
photographs displaying the physical layout of meetings (in, for instance, IM Daily) it 
has not been possible to trace or gain access to films or recordings of the 
performance of Teng at any of the meetings he addressed. There are some accounts 
of meetings written by participants. Wang Duo, one of the main targets of the 
campaign to unseat leaders in IMAR in 1967, the attack against whom is partly 
analysed in the next chapter, did refer to the meetings against him in his memoirs. 
But beyond referring to some of the participants, and the extreme 'tension' that was 
68 present in the atmosphere, he did not picture any meeting in great detail. There 
were indications, within the texts, of the generic format of the events the material 
originated from (audience reactions in brackets, indications of the time and place 
where a speech occurred, and the number and type of audience). One way of 
supplying this context is through hypothetical 'templates' - to build up a picture 
from material in Beijing and elsewhere in China of what a typical provincial 
gathering addressed by the local CRC leader was like. While this is an unsatisfactory 
option, it is the best available until more first hand material comes up (if it ever 
does) which allows meetings in the CR in IMAR to be understood better. For the 
material here, a conceptualisation is offered of the kind of meeting or context in 
which it might have happened (if this is appropriate). 69 
Sheila Fitzpatrick in her study, Everyday Stalinism attempted to understand the 
period of the Great Terror and the purges in 1930s USSR through depicting the sort 
of lives that most people were living then. But as she made clear 'the life these 
ordinary people lived was not, in their own understanding and probably ours, a 
normal life. For those who live in extraordinary times, normal life becomes a 
luxury. ' 70 A similar thing could be said of the CR, which saw major disruptions of 
everyday patterns of life and organisational forms, from the suspension of formal 
68 Wang Duo 1992,490 ff. 
69 It has proved virtually impossible to glean first hand accounts of such meetings in 
IMAR. During field research in April 2003, it was clear that the CR period was still 
too sensitive, and that virtually no one was willing to talk in any detail about their 
participation as activists. As in other regions of China, the CR in IMAR sometimes 
appears today to be a movement where there were only victims and no perpetuators. 
7 7 Fitzpatrick 1999,1. 
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schooling to the mass movements of rebellious groups making revolution throughout 
the country, to a form of enforced internal migration for urban 'sent down youths' to 
impoverished rural areas. The CR saw a process of an ideology (Maoism) 
penetrating and prescribing the most minute details of behaviour, from the ritualistic 
'daily readings' (tian tian du) from Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong to the 
dominant display of Mao iconography within the personal space of the home, to the 
annexation of everyday language by Maoist slogans and phrases. 
A study by Chinese historian Bai Ge set out in some detail the organisation and 
rituals of daily life in the CR for most people, and made it clear how central the sort 
of public meetings were both for the implementation of the CR, and for the 
fulfilment of its objectives. Meetings of various types were the vehicle through 
which the CR's main messages were disseminated to the mass audience the 
movement was aimed at. Bai Ge identifies several main generic types of such 
public occasions': 
" 'Daily readings and memorizing passages' (tian flan du - Han tian bei): these 
were small scale meetings devoted to the memorizing of passages from Mao, 
from an idea originally started in the PLA and then extended in the CR to 
civilian society. The format was for one person to lead the reading of the 
chosen text, and for a discussion of the meaning of the text to follow this. 71 
" 'Vigorously study and application lectures' (huoxue huoyongfiangyonghui): 
centred on the study of Mao's words and how these were applied to everyday 
life, ranging in size from three of four members of the same household, to 
people in a unit. 72 
" 'Struggle sessions' (pidouhui): perhaps the kind ofineeting most closely 
associated with the CR. The paraphernalia of struggle sessions included the 
daubing of the meeting place with slogans, the use of props like boards to 
hang round the necks of the struggle session victims with their names 
crossed out in red ink, and the use of specific forms of public humiliation - 
the 'airplane position, ' with the hands held behind the back of the victim 
71 Bai Ge 1993,106-108. 
72 Ibid 112-115. 
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while they were being denounced. Under their seeming chaos, struggle 
sessions followed a set format. They began with the victim being summoned, 
and placed on stage. There then followed a process where those that wished 
to denounce the target could stand up in the audience, or get on stage and 
speak. The target had to acknowledge what was being said by bowing their 
heads. It was common for such sessions to involve violence. 73 
e 'Study classes' ftuexiban): at a less dramatic level, there were the study 
classes, the fon-nal means through which announcements were disseminated 
in society. These were also implemented as a result of Mao's edict to 'start 
study classes to sort out all sorts of problems. ' Study classes split into: (1) 
cadre classes for the study of instructions from Mao' and other leaders, and 
Party documents; (2) work unit classes, where material considered relevant 
from cadre classes was passed down for wider study; (3) correctional classes, 
reserved for those with 'problems, ' offering a chance for them to correct their 
attitude and 'admit mistakes' (ren zui). These classes were usually held in 
small meeting rooms or offices of specific work units, and frequently 
involved violence. 74 
Further kinds of meetings are listed in an article from the IM Daily on I O'h February 
1968: 
* 'Discussion meetings' (zuotanhui) 
9 'Debates' (taolunhui) 
* 'Report meetings' (baogaohui) 
9 'Criticism meetings' (pipanhui) 
* 'Meetings to communicate experiences' 6ingyanflaoliuhui) 
o 'Meetings to remember past bitterness' (kusitianhui) 
Meetings and public occasions like those listed here were prime means in 
implementing the CR. Others were also closely related to the delivery and 
dissemination of certain kinds of documents - reports, investigations,, directives, etc. 
73 Ibid 115-117. 
74 lbid 126-129. 
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The relationship between the institutional support in the form of these meetings to 
the carrying out of the CR, and the documents and public language used, is an 
important element in this study. 
1.13 A Caveat 
In dealing with the CR, one is dealing with a movement about which there are still 
many unresolved questions. This strongly applies to the CR in IMAR. According to 
Woody, the key archival material related to the 1967-76 period in IMAR was moved 
to Beijing by the Central Discipline Inspection Committee in 1981 . 
75 The materials 
at university and college libraries relating to this period, and at the IMAR library, is 
still restricted. Most of the materials used in this study were collected from a 
bookseller in Hohhot. From experience of living in Hohhot working as a teacher 
from 1994 to 1996, and being married to a Mongolian brought up in the city, I know 
it is still difficult to talk about aspects of the CR openly. This partly touches on the 
sensitive issue of aspirations by some Mongolians, however unrealistic, for greater 
autonomy, even independence, from the PRC. It also reignites the bitter experiences 
of those who suffered, and those who inflicted suffering, in the CR period. IMAR 
was an area that saw the most violence and upheaval in the CR, with the turmoil 
reaching such magnitude that the province was reduced in size after intervention 
from the Centre (in 1969), and its leaders changed twice (in 1967 and 1969). The CR 
is a period which raises many unanswered questions. 76 This means that there is a 
greater level of provisionality about the historical context used -in analysis of 
documents in this thesis than there would be about many other areas of recent 
Chinese history. In the future, hopefully, more material for analysis will be released 
which adds to our knowledge of the interplay between specific leaders, and 
organisations, in the CR - and fill in the gaps about what happened in the more 
isolated areas of the province. 
This connects to one of the central arguments in this thesis, that control of the 
keywords and vocabulary in a discourse is one of the main means of controlling 
75 Woody 1993,34. 
76 Jankowiak 1988 referred to the continuing sense of grievance and anger at the CR 
in IMAR in the region two decades after it occurred. 
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narratives afterwards. At the moment, the material records of this movement are 
literally locked away, the source material hard to locate. This assists in the 
promotion of a specific 'official' history of the movement, without competition from 
other possible versions, and prevents a better understanding of the period. 
1.14 Conclusion 
Analysis of material from the CR in IMAR offers an opportunity within a highly 
distinctive context to see how political texts 'operated' in the competition between 
different centres of power, and how they contributed to strategies for power- 
enhancement. This involves three things: (1) the creation of new institutional 
vehicles through which to create texts, and organisational forms to deliver them 
(though capitalising on the authority and prestige of older forms); (2) competition 
over the hegemonic symbols conferring authority and legitimacy at this period, and 
the negotiation and struggle to acquire and demonstrate sanction from these among 
the newly created groups; (3) the process by which the speaker status of some 
privileged figures at the time was denigrated and devalued, while new ones 
attempted to promote their capital in the new Political environment. All of this 
occurred in a highly localised context, in which edicts from the Centre, language and 
symbols also had to appeal to regional particularities - specifically the unique ethnic 
context in IMAR. 
Analysis of this material shows that, at a time of seemingly rigidly hierarchical 
power structures and disciplines, a much richer geography of power was actually in 
place, with various figures and organisations playing to specific audiences. The 
political discourse of the CR is known for being highly ideological, strong in its 
exclusions and in labelling (married to a highly worked out form of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology) and emanating from clear power centres. In the IMAR material, one can 
work through the themes from the Centre of class and a narrative of class struggle 
with their associated terms, adapted to the local issues of national minority status 
(ethnicity) and a specific history of marginalisation. 
The analysis in this thesis addresses three main areas. First, the ideological and 
narrative superstructures within which the discourse in documents were created and 
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had meaning, and which assisted their claim to power and influence is described. 
Secondly, the material and organisational means by which this ideology and 
narrative was carried, and the social context in which they had meaning, is set out. 
Finally a descriptive framework is offered for the signification of power - how 
authority was marked in the texts analysed here, in the contol of key vocabularies, 
formal positions, and narratives. Analysis in these areas helps in understanding the 
larger issue of the relationship between the Centre's discourse and other areas of the 
PRC, the issue of the imputed hegemony of this discourse, and finally the 
relationship between politics and language in the PRC, with its specific authority 
structure. This issue feeds out into many areas, because the PRC is still a highly 
politicised culture where the need to maintain harmony and consensus between a 
complicated range of social and ethnic groups continues to this day. One could argue 
that the supreme challenge of Chinese politics has been to find an idiom tolerable to 
as many of these separate groups as possible. The CR used one option -a narrow, 
and in the end unsuccessful one, stressing conflict and struggle. One effect of the CR 
project has been a subsequent loss of faith in public authority discourse in the PRC - 
increasing cynicism and lack of belief in this public language. The issues discussed 
in this thesis, therefore, while they relate to what may seem a marginal, and esoteric 
campaign in a remote province of an (at the time) closed off country touch on the 
much wider issues of the attempts in the PRC to create a meaningful and believable 
public discourse - attempts which are ongoing to this day. 
54 
Chapter Two 
"How to Handle the Problem of IMARI: The Centre 
Speaks with the Region - 1967 
This chapter looks at dialogues between the Centre and local leadersfrom February 
to April 1967, which resulted in the issuing of the 'Decision of the Centre on How to 
Handle the Problem ofIAMR' on 13'h April 196Z This guided the course of the CR 
in LUAR until the Ninth Party Congress in 1969. The priorities of the Centre were 
articulated in this document and the dialogues leading to it. Together they show the 
Centre attempting to achieve ideological and political hegemony in IAMR by 
appropriating key terms to create a new authority' discourse, and by materially 
controlling the environment in which this discourse was deployed through the setting 
up of a new adminstrative and institutional framework The symbolic capital and 
influence of Centre leaders was distilled into the prescriptive Wth April Decision, 
issued as a mandatory, organising document defining the IAMR identity in the 
Centreý terms and thereby 'managing' and controlling it. The new 'authority' 
discourse achieved this management and control by excluding a key element of the 
local situation - the issue ofnational minorities - in the interests of the narrative and 
ideology of the Centre based on class. The promotion of this new discourse was 
partly achieved by the use ofthe status oftentralfigures, competing with local ones, 
and demonstrating a greater claim to speakfor the 'true'interests of the people of 
IAMR. 
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Section One: The Dialogues between the Central and Regional 
Leaders in Spring 1967 and the '13 th April Decision' 
2.1.1 Historical Context 
By February 1967, the CR was eight months old. Its main impact on IMAR so far 
had been the dismissal of Ulanfu from his Party posts after the Qianmen Hotel 
meeting in August 1966 and the appointment of a new group of leftist leaders - 
Wang Duo, Wang 'Yilun (whose own falls figure in Section Two of this chapter) and 
Qian Xingyuan. 77 This leadership change was accompanied by the creation of a raft 
of rebellious groups (the Third Headquarters, etc), paralleling a process that was 
occurring nationally. One of these seized the IM Daily in January 1967 . 
78 Tensions 
between competing groups culminated on 5h February in the shooting of Han Tong, 
a student from the IM Teachers College, by Liu Qing, deputy director of the IM MR 
Military Training Department. This was an event heavy with symbolic meaning as it 
showed the conflict between the revolutionary masses and the military, 
encapsulating the competing objectives these two key power entities were pursuing 
- something particularly problematic as both were classified as good in the moral 
vocabulary of the CR . 
79 This event in particular necessitated the initial dialogues 
between the Centre and local leaders analysed in this chapter. Zhou Enlai was the 
chief interlocutor for the Centre. 
%ile the situation in IMAR was starting to develop in unique ways, reflecting its 
border status, it shared in the chaos and turbulence of the country as a whole. The 
Shanghai 'January Revolution' had resulted in the setting up of some revolutionary 
committees. The 'February Counter-Current, ' partly a reaction to this, led some 
senior military and State Council leaders to criticise the whole CR project. The 
77 Woody 1993, ii. Background on the Qianmen Hotel meeting and its impact can be 
found in the recollections of one of its participants, Wang Duo 1992,493 onwards. 
See also Song 2002, '62-63, and Tumen and Zhu 1995, Chapter One. 78 See Yellow Briefs 55,8h July 1970: 'The Red Guard attack on Party machinery. 
throughout China reached a climax in January 1967... After a clash between pro- 
Maoist Red Guards and anti-Maoists at the IMDaily Offices... ordered troops 
stationed in Hohhot to surround the headquarters of the Red Guard organisations. ' 79 Tumen'and Zhu 1995,32. 
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ostensive apex of power in the PRC till then, the Politburo, was suspended, and 
informal briefing sessions (called 'central caucuses' or 'get togethers') chaired by 
Zhou Enlai and attended by members of the Central CR Group, and some of Lin 
Biao's generals, took its place. Revolutionary committees and mass organisations 
received official endorsement from the CR leadership in Beijing and ultimately from 
Mao. The setting up of alternative power structures sanctioned by these two events 
eventually resulted in a campaign to root out 'renegades' associated with Liu Shaoqi. 
It is against this background of restructuring and conflict that the IMAR situation 
80 must be viewed. 
Despite the turmoil nationally, the situation in IMAR was sufficiently unstable to 
merit Zhou Enlai's personal attention . 
81 The records of the meetings analysed in this 
chapter and the '13th April Decision' emanating from them captured at a critical 
moment key features of the relationship between the Centre and IMAR. They 
illustrated the dynamics of power at this time, and the strategy by which the Centre 
sought to impose hegemony on the region through the promotion of one discourse 
over others. 
2.1.2 Context of the Documents 
A 'Compilation of Relevant Central Documents and Speeches by Responsible 
Central Comrades in Charge Concerning the Handling of the IMAR Problem' 
(2hongyang guanyu chuli Neimeng wenti de youguan wenjian he zhongyang fuze 
tongzhifianghua huibian) was issued by a liaison headquarters of the Hohhot 
Revolutionary Rebels on the 13'h May 1967 in Hohhot. It was clea . rly marked as an 
internal document. The two page preface was issued in the name of IM Teachers 
Institute 'East is Red' Struggle Division, and the IMAR Party Organisation 
'Jinggangshan' Revolutionary Rebels. 82 The inscriptions at the front of the book 
80 The 'January Revolution' is described in Perry and Li 1997, Chapter Five. 
81 The situation in Sichuan, because of the national profile of the local leader, was 
also viewed as being particularly serious. There are also records of discussions in 
Henan, Jiangsu and Xinjiang (correspondence with Michael Schoenhals, 16'h July 
2003). 
82 Jinggangshan is a mountain in Jiangxi Province, Southern China, and an 
important location for CCP history. It was here that the CCP regrouped after the rift 
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from Mao stressed the primacy of the CCP, and the importance of Marxism- 
Leninism to unify thought. The contents of the dialogues pursued this theme, 
asserting control from the Centre, ideologically and organisationally, over the tense 
situation building up in IMAR. 
Of the two issuing groups, the first was named as a Hohhot-based organisation. The 
second was affiliated to a major educational institution in Hohhot implicated and 
involved in the events that precipitated the documents, the shooting of the IM 
Teachers College student Han Tong. Both therefore belonged to the new category of 
organisations that had been created as parallel power-structures during the CR. The 
fact that they were able to issue a well-printed lengthy document shows that they 
had access to considerable resources. This impression of influence is supported by 
the confident declarative tone of the foreword. 83 The. very issuing of such a 
document signified the organisations' ambitions to promote 
'themselves 
and increase 
their status. 
Although the formal '13th April Decision' by the Centre on how to handle the 
problem of IMAR (a two page document bearing the central number 126,1967) was 
placed at the front, this was the product of the process pursued throughout the 
dialogues and other documents. The '13th April Decision' formalised certain key 
appointments and policy announcements made during and as a result of this process. 
It was in an impersonal style, in numbered paragraphs, distilling the critical points 
that had come out of the dialogues. It was an expression of pure authoritative 
language - universalised, prescriptive, with mandatory force. 
These documents were collected within a context in which the situation in IMAR 
was 'problematised. ' There was an overt and powerful statement in both the title of 
the work, and in the decision produced from it, that the situation in IMAR was a 
I problem, ' implying therefore that it needed management. This accounts for the 
investigative tone of the material, and for the sense of urgency and of needing to 
with the Nationalists in 1927 and was the location for the first meeting between Mao 
Zedong and Zhou Enlai. 
83 An interviewee in Hohhot who had been an activist during the CR claimed that the 
documents were 'extremely credible' because they had been issued by the 'East is 
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issue prescriptive language with which to deal with this. How this was defined is an 
important issue which is looked at in 2.1.13.84 
2.1.3 Document Credibility 
The only indication of Principles of how the collection was made was contained in 
the foreword, in which the 'editors' from the IM Teachers College 'East is Red' 
Battle Division and the IMAR Party Organisation 'Jinggangshan' Revolutionary 
Rebels state that the collection 'has been taken down according to corrected records, 
85 mistakes are all our responsibility' (my italics). The principles according to which 
this process of 'correction' was carried out were not set out. 'Summary' indicates 
that the material was selective. No indication was given of who originally recorded 
the material, or when or how this was done. 
There are no indications of criterion for exclusion or inclusion, though it is evident 
that much material had been left out. A slow reading of each page of text takes three' 
minutes. With allowances for interruptions, the performance of each page can be 
extended to five minutes. Based on this, the following calculations can be made 
about the material presented here against the time indicated at the start of each text 
for its duration: 
Red' and Uinggangshan' groups, the two largest 'rebellious group' organisations. 84 ' Wenti' can be translated as meaning 'issue. ' However, Schoenhals 1993, iii also 
used'problem. ' This is consistent with the context of the 'Dialogues' and the 'I 3th 
April Decision, ' which deal with a situation of crisis in IMAR (the shooting of a 
student) and the sense of getting to the underlying causes of this. There had been a 
history of addressing'the 'Mongolian question/problem. ' In 1923, an early 
Mongolian activist under the name of Merse had written 'The Mongolian Question' 
(Mengu wenti) (Atwood 2002,15 6). 
85 Ibid IL 
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Table IA - AP April Decision' Dialogues: Comparison of Stated Length of Meetings against 
Calculated Length: 
Doc No* No of Pages of 
Text in 
Collection 
Time Indicated in Text Calculated Time for 
Performance of Material 
Actually Recorded 
Doc 1 10 2 hours 50 mins 
Doc 2 14 33 hours 20 mins I hour and 10 mins 
Doc 3 8 1 hour 40 mins 40 mins 
Doc 4 9 3 hours 10 mins 45 mins 
Doc 5 NA No time indicated NA 
Doc 6 8 3 hours 20 mins 40 nuns 
Doc 7 10 3 hours 40 mins 50 mins 
Doc 8 7 2 hours 30 mins 35 mins 
Doc 9 9 1 hour 55 rnins 45 mins 
Doc 10 27 3 hours 50 mins 2 hours and 25 mins 
(The numbering of the separate dialogues is set out fully in Section 2.1.4 below) 
Docs 4,6 and 7 show significant shortfalls between the calculated time and the time 
stated in the documents. On the basis of these calculations, only Doc 10 appears to 
be a reasonably complete record of a meeting. This was the meeting in which the 
Centre leaders issued judgement. Therefore it was the one with most prescriptive 
importance and power. Much of its language appeared in the formal '13"' April 
Decision. ' 
There is an important question of how credible these records are of internal meetings 
with restricted participation, in view of these gaps and lacunae? Material previously 
classified as 'restricted' was frequently issued by competing factions as a means to 
demonstrate closeness and privileged access to those who were perceived as the 
main leaders, thereby helping these groups acquire credibility during tile CR. But 
these publications varied greatly in quality and reliability. 96 
86 A common example is the innumerable copies of so-called internal speeches by 
leaders from the Centre that were stencilled or typed and issued by small groups. 
Many of these included material emanating from Mao Zedong, with versions of 
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Assessing these documents depends on a combination of finding supporting extra- 
textual evidence, either through witnesses or in other documents, and by looking at 
evidence supplied in the"docurnent itself (e. g., internal consistency). The credibility 
and status of the issuing organisation is also important. Material issued from the 
Centre by 'official' entities (e. g., People's Daily or the Party magazine, Red Flag) 
was closer to the sources of power, more under their management, and could 
demonstrate its claims to authority to an audience better than material issued locally, 
I by rebellious organisations. The material contained in documents was politically 
influential if it was supported by the 'symbolic power' of the organisations issuing 
it. In many cases, local organisations used the issuing of material ori&ating from 
the Centre to bolster their own credibility. 
It is certain that the meetings recorded in these documents did take place, at the 
times and places stated and with the people listed in the document present . 
87 This is 
supported by the reference made in other documents, for instance Wang Duo, a 
participant at the meetings in 1967, who recorded them in his 1992 memoirs. While 
by no means a comprehensive record, he at least confirmed the participation on each 
side, along with the location and broad atmosphere of the meetings. 88 The specific 
I voices' attributed to Centre leaders who spoke most - Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, 
Zhou Enlai - were also consistent with material attributed to them elsewhere. 
89 (For 
more on the expression of individual character allowed in these texts, see end of 
2.1.6 below. ) In addition, the documents followed events occurring at the time. So. 
speeches or utterances he had made. See Schram 1974,49 onwards on the existence 
of variant Red Guard versions of Mao-speak, and principles used to assess their 
reliability. 
87 Tumen and Zhu 1995,32-39 offers independent verification by historians based in 
China. 
88 Where there are differences these are minor. On page 511 of his memoirs, for 
instance, he recalled parts of the interrogation with Kang Sheng and Wang Li, 
adding words that were not recorded in the records contained here. In particular, he 
attributed a response by Wang Yilun to Kang Sheng's claims on page 63 of the 
dialogues that he had not known him being in Moscow in the 1930s. 'Yilun said, ' 
according to Wang Duo's memoirs, "'You didn't know me, and I didn't know you. "' 
In the 1967 record, Wang Yilun was not so robust and was recorded as saying 
nothing. 
89 For an example translated into English of Kang's style see Schoenhals 1996a, 116- 
122. This excerpt, according to Schoenhals' editorial comment, 'suggests a paranoid 
and truly evil mind' (ibid, 93), a judgement supported by Kang's contributions to 
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the documents contain nothing that is contradiced by external evidence. 
They are also internally consisitent. This collection was marked as 'the first' (di yi 
ji). It incorporated the six meetings Zhou was known to have had with the 
representatives from the IMAR factions and organisations. 90 There was a second 
collection which contained speeches that Zhou and 'other responsible cadres' (Kang 
and Chen Bodo et al) gave to representatives of the IMAR groups and military in 
late April and May on the implementation of the '13'h April Decision. ' These 
speeches were not in dialogue form. The information between the dialogues is not 
contradictory. A demand in the third meeting between Zhou and the IMAR 
representatives for an investigative team to go to Hohhot is supported by the record 
of that visit from page 51 onwards. Similar connections occurred at the end of the 
first dialogue where Zhou. requested more representatives come from IMAR to 
Beijing to offer evidence, and the second meeting, where they were shown as 
present. The combination of external and internal consistency would have been 
difficult to fabricate. 
The real significance of these documents lies in the insight they give to the key 
relationship between the Centre and local leaders at a time when this was going 
through a period of crisis and negotiation. These dialogues show the strategies by 
which the Centre leaders used key vocabularies, narratives and ideological norms, to 
promote a 'solution' to IMAR, and to create an administrative framework by which 
to implement this. I look first at the structure of these documents, and the 
organisational and formal means by which they created a discourse of management 
by the Centre over the locality, and then the ideological and narrative means that 
supported this. 
2.1.4 Contents: Document Types 
The collection of materials, in addition to the '13th April Decision' and Foreword, 
these dialogues. 
90 Wang 1992,5 11. There was a second collection which contained speeches that 
Zhou and 'other responsible cadres' (Kang and Chen Boda et al) gave to 
representatives of the IMAR groups and military in late April and May on the 
implementation of the '1301 April Decision. 'These speeches were not in dialogue 
form. 
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contained a copy of a telegram, issued by the State Council and the Central Military 
Commission, summoning the relevant IMAR parties to Beijing. The contents listed 
six 'minutes of speeches' (jianghuafiyao) and four 'minutes of discussions' (tanhua 
jiyao). In addition, it contained three 'instructions' (zhishi). These ranged from 6th 
February 1967, only one day after the shooting of the student Han Tong, the event 
which had precipitated the crisis, to 13th April, and the formal issuing of the 'Central 
Decision. ' 
The minutes of talks and speeches can be listed according to the place they were 
held, the time they took place, their length, and participants from the Centre and the 
local side: 
1. Minute of Talks at the First Meeting Between Premier Zhou and 
Representatives of the Four IMAR Groups: IOh Feb 1967, from 5: 50 PM 
to 7: 50 PM (2 hours), in a small meeting room in the Great Hall of the 
People, attended by Zhou Enlai and Xiao Hua from the Centre, and 
participants from IMAR Party Committee, IMAR Military District, Hohhot 
Third Group, and the Red Guard Amy (hongweyun). 91 
2. Minutes of Talks at the Second Meeting Between Premier Zhou and 
Representatives of the Four IMAR Groups: between 16-17th Feb 1967 
from 10: 25 PM to 1: 45 AM the next day (3 hours and 20 minutes) in the 
Great Hall of the People, attended by Zhou Enlai, Xiao Hua, and Zeng Shan 
from the Centre, and 25 representatives from the 'four organisations from 
IMAR involved in these talks' (listed above). 
3. Minutes of Talks Between Premier Zhou on his own and Representatives 
of Hohhot Third Headquarters: 9h March 1967 from 4: 50 PM to 6: 30 PM 
(I hour and 40 minutes) in the State Council Secretariat's Meeting Room, 
attended by Zhou Enlai, and representatives from his office, and personnel 
from the Hohhot Third Headquarters. 
4. Minutes of Talks at the Third Meeting Between Premier Zhou and 
Other Responsible Central Comrades and the Four IMAR Groups: 18 th 
March 1967 from 3: 20 AM to 6: 3 0 AM (3 hours and 10 minutes), in a small 
91 Hongweyun - according to Tumen and Zhu 1995,180 rebellious organisations 
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meeting room in the Great Hall of the People, attended by Zhou Enlai, Kang 
Sheng, Xiao Hua, Li Tianyou, Wang Li, Guan Feng, etc from the Centre, and 
the four IMAR groups (including Wu Tao and Gao Jinming, Wang Duo and 
Wang Yilun). 
5. Minutes of Talks Between the Director of the Central Investigation 
Delegation Comrade Li Tianyou and Representatives of the IM Teachers 
Institute Red Division: 18'h March 1967 from 7: 00 PM, in the Hohhot New 
Town Hotel, attended by Li Tianyou from the Centre, and Wu Tao, 
representatives from the Red Flag magazine, the PLA Daily, and from the 
Central CR Committee. Received locally by representatives of the IM 
Teachers Institute Red Division. 
6. Minutes of Talks Between Premier Zhou and Other Responsible Central 
Comrades Meeting on their own with Representatives of the IMAR 
Party Committee: 30-31" March 1967, from 9: 40 PM to 1: 00 AM (3 hours 
a nd 20 minutes) in the Fujian Room of the Great Hall of the People, attended 
by Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang 
Li, Guan Feng, Yao Wenyuan, and representatives of the 'Central CR 
Committee, the office of Zhou Enlai, and the State Council, and key 
representatives of the IMAR Party Committee Gao Jinming, Wang Zaitian, 
Li Shude, Kang Xiuming, Li Zhi, and Wang Yilun and Wang Duo. 
7. Minutes of Talks at the Fourth Meeting Between Premier Zhou and 
Other Responsible Central Comrades and Representatives of the Four 
IMAR Groups: 6 -7h April 1967 from 10: 32 PM to 2: 12 AM (3 hours and 
40 minutes) in the north east meeting room on the first floor of the Great Hall 
of the People, attended by Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, 
Xiao Hua, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Li, Ye Qun (Lin Biao's wife), Li Tianyou 
etc (a total of 25 people from the Centre), and Gao Jinming, Quan Xingyuan, 
Li Zhi, Zhang Lu, Wu Tao, etc from IMAR. (It is noted that Wang Duo and 
Wang Yilun were specifically excluded from this meeting). 
8. Minutes of Talks Between Comrades Chen Boda and Kang Sheng 
Meeting with Zhou Wenxi, Representative of the Hohhot 'East is Red' 
Peasant Rebellious Commune: 7"' April 1967 from 3: 00 PM to 5: 30 PM (2 
with military district support. 
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hours 30 minutes) at Zhongnanhai Central compound, attended by Chen 
Boda, Kang Sheng, and representatives from the Liaison office of the State 
Council, and from the Hohhot 'East is Red' Peasant Rebellious Commune. 
9. Minutes of Talks at the Fifth Meeting Between Premier Zhou and Other 
Responsible Central Comrades and Representatives of the Four IMAR 
Groups: 12 -13'h April 1967 from 11: 50 PM to 1: 45 AM (I hour and 55 
minutes), in the Anhui Room of the Great Hall of the People, attended by 
Zhou. Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Xiao Hua, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Li, 
Guan Feng, Yao Wenyuan etc from the Centre, and representatives from the 
IMAR Party Committee, the Military Region, the Hohhot Third 
Headquarters, and the 'Red Guard Army. ' 
10. Minutes of Talks at the Sixth Meeting Between Premier Zhou and Other 
Responsible Central Comrades and Representatives of the Four IMAR 
Groups: 13-14'h April 1967 from 11: 00 PM to 2: 50 AM (3 hours and 50 
minutes) in the East Meeting Room of the Great Hall of the People, attended 
by Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Xiao Hua, Wang Li, Li Tianyou 
and other leaders from the Centre, and the four groups from IMAR. 92 
For the timings of the meetings, five began in the late evening, and ended after 
midnight. One (Doc 4) took place from 3: 20 AM to 6: 30 AM. These timings are 
consistent with other testimony that the key participant, Zhou Enlai, maintained a 
ferocious time-table, holding meetings deep into the night, and that these specific 
talks were held to accommodate his other commitments. 93 Such anti-social hours 
also indicated a sense of urgency and crisis. 
Secondly, the setting for the meetings ranged over all the locations of centralised 
power - various meeting rooms in the Great Hall of the People, but also meeting 
92 Tbroughout this text the documents are referred to according to the numbers given 
in this list. 
93 Six years later, David Bruce, the first director of the US Liaison Office in Beijing, 
noted in his diary on 22 nd May that the American journalist visiting Beijing at the 
time, Marquis Childs, had been granted a meeting with Zhou after being summoned 
at 11: 00 PM at night. The meeting lasted till 2: 30 AM (Bruce 2001,74). The British 
diplomat Percy Craddock, then working at the Office of the British Chargd 
D'Affaires in Beijing, also testified that Zhou regularly worked till 3: 00 or 4: 00 AM 
(Craddock 1994,49). 
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rooms located in the Centre leaders' Zhongnanhai compound, and the State Council. 
The meetings occurred in the key power places at the Centre and dictated how they 
were structured, participation, and the conventions regulating what sorts of things 
were sayable. 
Thirdly, participation by Centre leaders at the meetings increased as they proceeded. 
Initially Zhou Enlai was on- his own. But he was subsequently joined in later 
dialogues by Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao, 
all key national figures in the CR. 
As already stated (see footnote 82 above) meetings between central and provincial 
leaders on 'handling' local problems were by no means confined to the case of 
IMAR. A 'Central Committee Decision on the Handling of the Sichuan Question' 
was issued on 7th May 1967, as a result of a 'late night meeting' the same day. This 
followed a very similar format to those dealing with IMAR, issued a month earlier, 
with the Centre leaders speaking in turn, culminating in Zhou Enlai's judgement. 94 
2.1.5 Numerical Analysis 
There were material, visible signs showing the power dynamics in these documents. 
The following table contains very approximate numerical information about the 
contents of this collection. This is executed on line rather than character count. It 
gives some quantitative information about collection contents, in particular the 
amount of language attributed to Zhou Enlai, -to all other Centre leaders (cited above, 
and indicated in the texts with bold typeface for names) and to local leaders from 
IMAR. The breakdown for each of these groups, in numbers of lines, and 
percentages, and for the collection overall, is as follows: 
94 English versions available in China Topics, Yellow Briefings 437 (Rectification - 
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Table I B: '13"' April Decision' Dialogues: Numerical Analysis of Lines Numbers/%, Attributed 
to Specific Speakers 
Document No Amount of Amount of Amount of Total Lines 
LinesPY0 for Lines/'Yo for Lines/0% for 
Zhou Enlai Other Central Local IMAR 
Leaders Leaders 
Doc 1 116 lines 1' )0 lines 246 lines 
47% 53% 
Doc 2 236 lines 135 lines 371 lines 
64% 36% 
Doc 3 84 lines 100 lines 184 lines 
46% 54% 
Doc 4 135 lines 66 lines 7 lines 208 lines 
65% 3) 2% -3 
% 
Doc 5* 60 lines 87 lines 147 lines 
41% 59% 
Doc 6 42 lines 147 lines 189 lines 
22% 78% 
Doc 7 119 lines 14 lines 119 lines 252 lines 
47% 6% 47% 
Doc 8 40 lines 135 lines 175 lines 
23% 77% 
Doc 9 95 lines II lines 103 lines 209 
45% 6% 49% 
Doc 10 468 lines 275 lines 7 lines 750 lines 
62% 37% 1% 
Total 1,295 lines 6l') lines 923 lines 2,73 1 lines 
47% 2 3) % 30% 
Total for 8 1,295 lines 513 lines 601 lines 2,409 lines 
ineetings Zhou 54% 21% 25% 
Enlai was 
present at 
23), 18"' August 1967. appendix B and C. 
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*This meeting was held in Hohhot, with Li Tianyou as the representative of the 
Centre. 
For these meetings the Centre leaders, including Zhou, take up from 70% to 75% of 
the text. This indicates which side had the power to speak, or at least, whose words 
the editors believed were worth recording. The final, summarising document (Doc 
10) is the most dramatic, with only 7 lines apportioned to the IMAR leaders. In 
previous documents (,. vIth the exception of Doc 4) the local leaders had been given 
reasonable opportunity to speak. Doc 10 represents the issuing of judgement, for the 
local leaders to silently accept. 
There are other quantitative indications of who has control in the construction of 
these dialogues. The person who, for instance, had the first word, setting the terms 
for the discussion and the last word, concluding it. This is indicated in the following 
table: 
Table 2: '13 Ih April Decision' Dialogues : First and Last Words 
Document First Words Last Words 
I Zhou Enlai Zhou Entai 
2 Zhou Enlai Zhou Enlai 
3 Zhou Enlai Local/Zhou 
4 Kang Sheng Zhou Entai 
5 Li Tianyou Local leaders 
6 Kang Sheng Zhou Enlai 
7 Zhou Enlai Zhou Enlai 
8 Kang Sheng Kang Sheng 
9 Zhou Enlai Zhou Enlai 
10 Zhou Enlai Zhou Enlai 
Zhou was not present for the meetings in Doc 5 and Doc 8. For all those at which lie 
was present. he closed the meeting, offering the final words. At the opening of 
meetings, apart from two occasions at which Kang Sheng spoke, Zhou Enlai also 
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offered the first comments. This bounding illustrates control, and the material means 
by which Centre leaders sought to regulate the contribution of local voices within 
this discourse, signifying their hegemony. 
This is supplemented by typography, which indicated the precedence given to Centre 
leaders by the placing of their names in bold type. Forms of address also indicate 
attitudes to heirarchy. Zhou Enlai was referred to throughout not by name but by his 
formal position, 'Premier' (Zongh). - Kang Sheng was referred to by the respectful 
appellation, Kang Lao. In terms of tum-taking, and the information it gives about 
hierarchy, Kang Sheng spoke the most after Zhou Enlai among the Centre leaders. 
Information about hierarchy was also contained in the listings of attenddes at the 
beginning of each dialogue, with the following composite order: 
Zhou Enlai 
Chen Boda 
Kang Sheng 
Jiang Qing 
Zhang Chunqiao 
Wang Li 
Guan Feng 
Yao Wenyuan 
Zhou heads this group because he was accepted as third in the CCP hierarchy - the 
traditional ranking of his position of Premier, following Mao Zedong as Party 
Chairman and Lin Biao as Vice-Chairman. The others were placed according to their 
ranking in the highest organisation in the CR, the CR Small Group, set up on 28 th 
May 1966 and listed in the 'Central Directive' in this order (with other members) on 
30'h August that year. 95 
A ftirther indication of power is contained in the way in which replies by local 
leaders in interrogations were sometimes embedded within the Centre leaders' 
statements. In Doc 6, for instance, during the interrogation by Kang Sheng of Wang 
95 Zhongguo gongchandang da cidian (Great Dictionary of the CCP) 199 1, Beijing, 
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Yilun, Wang's responses were placed within parentheses, and remained part of the 
lines allocated to Kang, signifying subordination to them. 96 
These documents contained language which contributed to a process that resulted in 
the issuing of the formal '13th April Decision. ' In this process, they moved from an 
investigatory register, through interrogation, to judgement. Doc I contained, from 
pages 5-8, mostly questions issued by Zhou Enlai, signifying his power to ask, and 
answers by the local leaders. By Doc 10 questions were no longer necessary. 
Certainty had been achieved. This was signified by the dommance of monovocal 
statement, with lengthy monologues by Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng and Chen Boda. 
2.1.6 Speaker Status: Zhou Enlai, the Locus of Power 
In addition to the material indications of Zhou's authority (the amount of time he 
was shown speaking, his ability to open and close meetings, and to set the terms for 
discussion), and the institutional power derived from his occupying the position of 
third highest-ranking person in the Party, he also derived authority from his role in 
the narrative of 'official' PRC history. In this, Zhou was the most widely admired of 
the Centre's leaders, someone accepted as a mediator between contending groups. 
97 He had enormous moral capital from his own role in the CCP history. Zhou 
derived the right to use certain vocabularies and forms of authority, therefore, from 
both his institutional status, and his personal role in a dominant narrative that 
415 has the full listing. 
96 Ibid 63. 
97 'It was common ground among the foreign community that if he [Zhou Enlai] fell 
it was time to leave' (Craddock 1994,49). In recent years this image has been dented 
by evidence that Zhou was fully aware of the full excesses of the CR, and that he 
actively encouraged and participated in them through his stewardship of, among 
other organisations, the CR Central Case Examination Group, responsible for 
selection of victims and evaluating interrogations of key CR targets: 'Kang [Sheng] 
and Jiang [Qing] were deeply involved [in the Central Case Examination Group] and 
no doubt had their own agendas, but in the strictest of organisational terms they were 
under andfor Zhou when they ordered people to be interrogated or to "ask for a 
vacation"' (Schoenhals 1996b, I 11: emphasis in original). Zhou is more widely 
recognised now as a faithful, almost slavish implementer of Mao's instructions. The 
image these documents convey of Zhou supports this. Zhou located his prescriptions 
firmly within the context of implementing and carrying out Mao's CR. His tone 
towards some of the IMAR leaders was savage, for instance his treatment in Doc 11, 
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promoted his own history being an integral part of the PRC's revolutionary genesis 
and development. 
In Zhou's own discourse, he located power in certain sources. In Doc 10 he set out 
the principal locations of power and guidance: 
'We must propagate Chairman Mao's instructions about trusting and relying 
on the masses, trusting and relying on the PLA, and majority of the cadres 
trusting and relying on the great masses of the people. '98 
Zhou repeated this formulation in the same order throughout his summary: Mao's 
instructions, and the 'three trusts. ' He offered another foundation for power in an 
earlier formulation: 
'The highest orders of the Party are in accordance with the supreme interests 
of the people. The interests of the Party are to represent the greatest interests 
of the majority of the people. '99 
The sources legitimising power for Zhou were 'Party' and 'people. ' But these terms 
only derived meaning from the discourse in which they operated-100 The 'people' in 
particular was a complex term. As Zhou used it here it was in fact not an all- 
inclusive term (thus the shift from 'people' to 'majority of the people' in the passage 
above). The 'majority of the people' evidently excluded the 'bad elements, ' the 
traitors and enemies that Zhou referred to elsewhere - those who have been termed 
the 'non-people. "Ol How could these be a basis for legitimate power? But it was the 
grounds for inclusion in the good 'majority' that mattered. Did inclusion allow 
articulations of an identity encompasing national minority status or was it an attempt 
to impose a unified identity to which this sort of assertion of specific identity was a 
threat? This is a critical question in this thesis. Zhou's use of the term 'people' here 
was therefore not as bald a statement as it appears. While no conditions for its 
application and membership were set out, underlying it was a view of unity, and 
condition s on who could and could not be included. Dictating who the 'majority of 
10 1 of the Wangs. 
98 lbid 112. 
99 lbid 99. 
100 See Chapter One, 1.5. 
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the people' were, and what terms were applied for membership was a key device for 
control in this discourse. 
Zhou offered one additional indication of his right to use 'authoritative' registers. 
This is inferred from the importance he placed on following the instructions of the 
Centre (zhongyang - coterminous with the Central Committee) and of him speaking 
on behalf of the Centre, with its sanction. Citing the Centre as a source of authority 
however was not straightforward. The Centre was not a monolithic, unchanging 
entity, but a collection of leaders, institutions, organisations, some of them newly 
created to implement the CR. There were conflicting and contending claims to 
authority and influence between these constituent parts. When Zhou spoke in the 
dialogues. of the need for IMAR leadership to implement the instructions from the 
Centre, he based the authority for this on the instructions of the Central CR Group, a 
key implementing entity from the CR period. 102 But this was authoritative because 
its power was based on 'the higher authorities' - Mao, the Party, and Party ideology 
(Mao Zedongihought). He stated at one point the various sources of authority: 
'What is revolutionary organisation? To accept the leadership of Chairman 
Mao, and the Central Committee of the CCP, to take the path of socialism, to 
follow the "1 6th May Notice. "' 103 
These can be arranged into the following categories: 
Personal: 
" Chairman Mao 
" Vice Chairman Lin Biao 
" The People 
Orizanisational 
101 Schoenhals 1994. 
102 Ibid 48. 
103 Ibid 22. The 'I 6th May Notice' was the launch document of the CR, resulting 
from a Politburo meeting at which Lin Biao had claimed a possible coup detat. The 
document declared war on the revisionists and bourgeoisie in the Party. The practical 
impact of the circular was the establishment of the Central CR Group. Full text of 
the notice can be found in Guoshi tongiian vol 3,445-447. 
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The Central Committee of the CCP. 
The Party 
The Central Revolutionary Committee 
The PLA - specifically the Central Military Commission 
The 'good cadres' 
Ideological 
Socialism 
e Mao Zedong Thought 
* Marxism-Leninism 
Textual 
The 'I 6h May Notice' 
The Centre's 'Principles on the Decision about the Problem of Qinghai. ' 
The Centre's 'Decision and Comments (piyu) on the Problem of Anhui' 
The Central Military Committee's 'Ten Orders' 
" The Central Party's '2 1" February Notice' 
" Tlie Central Military Commission's 'Eight Orders' 
(The last five of these documents are stipulated for wide dissemination in 
IMAR in the eighth article of the 'I 3th April D. ecision. 004 ) 
All of these were appealed to on separate occasions by Zhou and other Centre 
leaders to the local leaders as a basis for authority and authoritative utterance. Power 
during the CR in IMAR was materially manifested and carried by these separate 
entities and documents. They contained, in different ways, the symbolic capital and 
represented the market in which power and discourses competed. 
I 
There were dynamics and negotiations between these. The clearest statement on this 
question of the regulation of the relationship between these forces and the way in 
which power was negotiated between and through them came from Mao's chief 
propagandist, Chen Boda, who stated: 
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'Only with the great, glorious, correct CCP led by Chairman Mao, only with 
limitless faith in the masses, with the people full of faith in the CCP, can we 
then issue this kind of decision. This is a great victory for the proletarian CR 
path of Chairman Mao, a great victory for our proletarian CR! A great 
victory for the People! A great victory for the correct leadership of the Party! 
A great victory for all of the PLA! " 05 
The symbolic capital of Chairman Mao, the CCP, the 'majority of the people', and 
PLA were all interlinked, and made one systematic whole. This constituted a 
discourse of power, discourse in the Foucauldian sense of elements that make no 
sense in isolation but need to be put together, and understood together, in order to 
produce meaning, not just in terms of language, but organisationally, socially, and 
ideologically. 
One final aspect of power signfied within these texts concerns the methods used to 
indicate the dynamics between the various speakers and groups. This involved the 
order the speakers were given, and the length of time and kind of language they 
were allowed. It was also indicated by the deference shown to speakers with the 
implication of status and hierarchy among them - the register used towards Zhou 
Enlai for instance. In his remarks in Doc 10 Xiao Hua made statements grounded on 
what Zhou had previously said, marking clearly that his basis for authority was 
located in Zhou. 106 
In these documents power was not an abstract entity. It was something shown being 
used, felt and suffered. Power and authority were exercised through individuals, 
working within processes, institutions or systems which supported and promoted 
their strategies to influence and attain hegemony. 107 The sorts of authority listed 
above were only visible and effective through the personnel who voiced and 
articulated them, who 'represented' them and 'spoke on their behalf' At the heart of 
this system lay the status conferred on specific 'mouthpieces' - Zhou Enlai, Kang 
Sheng, Chen Boda. People whose position 'symbolised' the power accrued by the 
104 Ibid 2. 
105 Ibid 114. 
106 Ibid 117. 
107 QiU 1998 gives a privileged description of this 'culture of power' and the 
processes of personalisation. She was the daughter of one of the generals linked to 
Lin Biao, who was incarcerated after his death in 1972. 
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Centre, and who made its exercise of power visible and meaningful. These specific 
figures had authority, and spoke not just for themselves but on behalf of the 
collective enterprise of 'the. Centre. ' They existed in a context in which their very 
acts of saying something gave it importance beyond its literal meaning. That Zhou 
said something was as important as what he said. 
2.1.7 Local Participation 
The local organisations who participated in the documents worked in a different 
market, and a different value was conferred upon their voices. In organisational 
terms, the most formally prominent entity was the IMAR CCP, and the Military 
District. The Third Headquarters and the 'Red Guard Army' were recently set up 
rebellious organisations, whose influence was dependent on the CR movement. 
Within the Party, Gao Jinming as chair of the IMAR CRC, and Quan Xingyuan as 
vice chair were the key personnel, followed by Wang Zaitian, Li Shude and Tang 
Xiuming, all of whom held prominent positions within the IMAR CCP. Wang Yilun 
and Wang Duo were also prominent members, the first as secretary. These latter two, 
however, were removed from power during the course of these dialogues. They were 
explicitly excluded from the meetings from Oh April onwards during the critical 
judgement period, after accusations of being the chief followers of Ulanfu in IMAR. 
For the Military District, Wu Tao was the chief representative. None of these local 
figure5, however, made any significant statement recorded in these talks. 
The dynamics of power between these figures becomes clear in the material issued 
locally in IMAR, where they were given more voice (see Section Two in this 
chapter). Extra-textual evidence shows that these talks were also a negotiation in 
which IMAR groups vied with each other for sanction from the Centre, competing to 
claim the symbolic capital released when Ulanfu was felled, and which they felt it 
was in the Centre's gift to dispense. Wang Duo explained the general agendas 
pursued by the new informal loyalist and rebellious groups. 108 A complicated local 
geography of power was evident, with military, government, and rebellious groups 
involved. Viewing these texts as a negotiation means the Centre can be seen as 
108 Wang 1992,504-5., 
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acting like a judge, trying to -resolve these differences and imposing a solution, 
through a 'discourse of management. ' In these dialogues, the articulation of local 
interests was carefully managed. The language adopted by the local leaders and 
groups was subservient - offering evidence, serving as witnesses in a form of trial. 
Their voices therefore belonged overwhelmingly to the statement/answer registers. 
This signified their subordinate states, and their need to accept the terms of the 
discourse of the Centre, rather than presenting their own. 
2.1.8 Themes 
Each document in_ this collection pursued specific, discrete themes, framing the 
agenda of the discourse: 
Doc 1: Interrogative register, prompted by the death of the student Han Tong, 
on 5th February 1967, and a desire to ascertain the general features of the 
current situation in IMAR. 
Doc 2: Interrogation of representatives of 'Third Headquarters' and 'Red 
Guard Army' about their activities. Prescriptions on how the groups should 
continue to act. 
Doc 3: Questioning of the 'Third Headquarters. ' 
Doc 4: Statements by leaders from the Centre about the kidnapping of Red 
Flag and PLA Dailyjoumalists in IMAR. 
Doc 5: Visit by representatives of the Centre to IMAR to investigate these 
kidnappings, and assert central control in IMAR. 
Doc 6: Interrogation and denunciation by central leaders of Wang Yilun and 
Wang Duo. 
Doc 7: Testimony by members of the Third Headquarters of violence in 
IMAR. 
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Doc 8: Questioning of local peasant group. 
Doc 9: Final questioning of local groups, primarily about the reasons for 
their detaimnent of people. 
Doc 10: Issuing of '13'h April Decision. ' Statements from leaders from the 
Centre. 
The material fits into three broad categories: interrogation/questioning, statement (of 
evidence, etc) and finally judgements/issuing of decisions. The overall process of the 
documents was from questioning and statement/answer to judgement. This semi- 
legalistic process confered an element of credibility. This was supplemented by the 
inclusion, at the beginning, and after Docs I and 2, of telegrams, resulting from the 
meetings, and summoning more witnesses to Beijing to participate. It was 
strengthened further by the physical relocation of the meetings to IMAR in Doc 5, 
and by the kidnapping of Red Flag and PLA Daily journalists recorded there, 
symbolically important because of its illustrating blatant violations of central 
directives and loss of control by the Centre. This provoked the need to reassert this 
control. 
One element present throughout the dialogues was a sense of violence. The meetings 
in Beijing were necessitated by the shooting of the student, Han Tong. But the 
violence did not end there. Docs 7,8 and 9 contain testimony on violence and forced 
detainment practised by local groups, with comment from those that practiced it and 
those that suffered it. 109 A witness called Bao Changsheng gave evidence of 
suffering, before one of the representatives of a group that had detained him. ' 10 This 
direct confrontation with those who suffered brought the world of struggle and 
conflict which had prompted these documents into the texts themselves. Zhou in his 
final statements in Doc 10 explicitly outlawed violence: 
'The Preparatory Small Group should consider this, there should be no 
109 The lengthiest and most detailed testimony of violence is given by Zhou Wenxi 
in Doc 11,77. 
110 lbid 84 
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attacks. Without exception armed struggle is forbidden, and it is forbidden to 
hit, strike, rob, search houses, and seize people. ' 111 
Zhou's exact formulation of the forbidden acts of violence was formalised by. being 
incorporated into the '13tl' April Decision' under Article Six. This was an example 
of the words from the dialogues then being made into prescriptive, impersonalised 
rules - of the process of formalisation which the dialogues illustrated in their 
culmination into the articles set out in the '13th April Decision, ' and of the 
imposition of authority through and by them. 
The dialogues mirrored the violence of the context in which they were produced by 
the verbal violence they contained - the strong and intimidating denunciations, for 
instance, by Kang Sheng of Wang Yilun. 112 This also involved the violating act of 
Kang Sheng holding up what he claimed was a nude picture of Wang Yilun's lover, 
a Chinese working as a spy for the USSR. Such physical props were deployed in a 
context in which the maintenance of social 'face' and integrity was important for 
credibility, for having social value and influence. These verbal attacks effectively 
struck, 'as speech acts, at the 'face' of a person, defacing and destroying it. 
Undermining a subject's social position both to themselves and to an audience was 
one of the key objectives of struggle campaigns. Kang Sheng, in his aggressive and 
highly personalised language, pitted his own authority (which had higher currency 
as a leader from the Centre) against a local leader, questioning Wang's testimony of 
his activities in the USSR in the 1930s, and his contribution to the revolution. In 
Doc 10, Kang offered a lengthy account of his own time in the USSR during this 
period, contradicting Wang's own statement that he could not recall ever having met 
him despite being in charge of all CCP students studying in Moscow at that time. 
This irreparably damaged Wang's credibility, culminating in Kang labelling him 'a 
devil follower of the woman spy. ' Zhou compounded this by judging Wang to be "a 
bad man. ' 113 
Violence did not figure as prominently as in other CR documents which contained 
far higher incidences of verbal violence - the use, for instance, of derogatory and 
111 Ibid 110. 
112 Ibid 102-104. 
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dernotic terms, rudeness, and strategies of defamation of character. ' 14 But the real 
force behind these attacks came from their emanating from Centre leaders. Kang 
Sheng's denunciation of Wang Yilun placed the full authority of a high ranking 
Centre leader against a local one. Such unequal forces in this market meant that 
Kang's words acted as judgements on Wang, similar to those delivered in a court of 
law. ' 15 This itself was a form of violence, physically affecting someone's life. 
In addition, because the dialogues took place over a period of two months, they were 
also affected by, and reacted to, the situation as it evolved in IMAR. Events did not 
stop with the death of Han Tong in early February. As in other areas during the CR, 
they continued to develop, sometimes at bewildering speed. Indeed events in IMAR 
necessitated the investigation team led by Li Tianyou visiting there in March to look 
into receni problem of journalists being taken into custody by local factions. What 
had been the leaders' priorities when they first convened were superseded by other 
more pressing ones over the course of the two months. The initial priority 
(addressing local grievances over the death of Han Tong, and sorting out which 
factions should receive the support of the Centre) developed into a more urgent 
process of imposing central control and stability by the end-period of the dialogues 
by putting in place new personnel chosen by Beijing. 
2.1.9 Key Term 
Power and the signification of power among individuals was a crucial issue in these 
documents. The key terms used in the discourse they contained connected to issues 
involving the negotiation of power. The term 'seizure of power' (duoquan), for 
instance, indicated anxiety about the location of power, of who currently had control 
in the market of forces wherein the currency of powers was established and the role 
of the language in these documents negotiating this. 'Seizure of power' was a term 
with good pedigree in the CR. The Dictionary of Modern Colloquial Chinese notes 
113 Ibid 100. 
114 See IMDaily 29h March 1968,5, in which an associate of Ulanfu was called a 
I small pest, " chameleon, " Ulanfu's turtle bastard, " bastard, ' 'dog, ' etc. Red Guard 
use of rudeness in their material is dealt with by Perry and Li 1993, section two. - 115 Wang Duo even referred to the '13th April Decision'as 'the death sentence on 
Wang Yilun and me' (Wang 1992,517). 
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that the term was used frequently from 1967-68, during the setting up of CR 
committees to 'seize the power' of 'capitalist roaders. ' In that context it was used in 
Shanghai during the establishment of the commune in the 'January Revolution' of 
1967. Mao himself had said then that 'the leftists seizing power, this is a good 
direction (to go in). ' 116 An article in the IM Daily on 24 th January 1967 headed 
'Every Member of the Proletariat Must Immediately Take Action, Implement the 
Great Alliance, and Completely Seize All Power' (yiqie daq.! Lan tongtong duoguolai) 
had accelerated the push by the many factions recently set up in IMAR to move on 
the more traditionally accepted centres of power. ' 17 
'Seisure of power' is used in various formulations 47 times in these documents 
forming part of the accusation against the enemies in IMAR that were described and 
finally labelled. Sometimes members of the Third Headquarters and 'Red Guard 
Army' groups stated that this was their main aim, and that the CR legitimised their 
desire to 'seize power' from those who no longer had the mandate to use it: 
'Zeng Wensheng: ... Recently we were the ones seizing power. Zhou: Haven't others alread seized power? 
Zeng: They did it falsely... ' 
ýI 
8 
In Doc 2 another participant of the local factional struggles talked of 'seizing power 
from the Postal Bureau. ' 119 Later in his first lengthy monologue in Doc 2 Zhou 
Enlai talked of seizing power in the context of struggle: 'The struggle to seize power 
is a struggle that takes a long time. ' 120 Power, Zhou said, 'needs to be seized from 
the faction in the Party taking the capitalist road. ' This was part of the positive 
process of power seizure, but there was a negative aspect which Zhou moved on to 
in a later document in which he criticised members of the Hohhot factions during a 
lengthy summary and list of prescriptions: 
'Actually, holding big meetings to seize power... is seizing the power of the 
116 Xiong 1993,192. This infonnation is supported by the entry for duoquan in Chao 
1993,148. 
117 Tumen and Zhu 1995,320. 
118 Ibid 13. 
119 Ibid 19. 
120 Ibid 20. 
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Party Committee... Can you also dictate the nature of your regional Party 
Committee and the political division of the Military District? Can you pick 
names before the Centre does? Doesn't seizing [this] power equate to seizing 
power [overall]? Do you have so much powerT 121 
In this discourse there were legitimate and illegitimate ways to 'seize power. ' This 
was dependent on signifying separate centres from which power was seized and to 
which it was allocated, along with the process whereby this was done, and the 
evaluation of which of these were regarded as appropriate and legitimate. This 
necessitated a rich nomenclature of terms to map and describe this process - 
I grasp' (zhangwo), 'determine' (dingxin), and the single term %power' (quan). 
Zhou returned to this issue of legitimated 'power seizure' in a later dialogue with 
6ction leaders: 
'You continue to support one faction seizing power, forcing down another 
faction. You say seize power, and that the Centre then recognises this, but 
that's impossible. ' 122 
Parameters were set for the operations of power seizure, and for the spaces in which 
this term could be used within this discourse. The definition of the Centre was 
presented as the correct one. This exemplifies linguistic hegemony in a localised 
context. Zhou repeated the anxiety over local factions seizing power and assuming 
the Centre thereby immediately recognised this in the final document: 
'Do you believe... that just because you seize power the Centre will 
recognise it, but that is impossible. How could the Centre be like that? Only 
the Nationalists could do that. What do you think the Centre iS? g 123 
The term 'Seizing power' operated in a vocabulary rich with terms for struggle, 
conflict, and legitimacy. It assisted the imposition of hegemony from the Centre by 
legitimising certain means of gaining power within the discourse and outlawing 
others through giving an accepted conventionalised vocabulary to these processes. A 
similar process occurred in the labelling of enemies and the acts associated with 
them, thereby denoting a zone of acceptable and unacceptable acts, and statuses. 
121 Ibid 47. 
122 Ibid 73. 
123 Ibid 99. 
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2.1.10 The Labelling of Enemies and the Strategies for their Exclusion 
These dialogues plotted a process of enquiry and interrogation moving towards'the 
issuing of statement and prescription, accompanied by a refinement of certain terms 
to accord more closely with central usage. But they also saw a process of devising 
and applying conventionalised labels for enemies. The dialogues did not use the 
terms common at the time of 'hidden enemies' or 'enemies sleeping at our side' but 
the problem of who in IMAR was responsible for following the same line as Ulanfu 
and his masters, and the articulation of this in the discourse was important. 
The labels and nomenclature for enemies was meaningful within the context of the 
master narrative described in Chapter One 1.7. These dialogues showed this process 
in action, with the suppression of the role of some previous CCP personnel from the 
history of the Party's struggles in the 1920s and 1930s and the accentuation of that 
of others. As the CR proceeded, a narrative was articulated within which claims 
were made about a group of 'splittists' keen to link up with the Mongolian People's 
Republic. It claimed that these enemies had been actively working within IMAR 
since the 1920s, continuing their activity underground after 1949. There were close 
parallels between the story centrally promoted of Liu Shaoqi and his treachery, and 
this local version. After identifying who the specific leaders of this group were in 
IMAR, it was then a case of 're-evaluating' their history in terms of the new master 
narrative. 
While Kang Sheng did not specifically allude to Wang Yilun's harbouring splittist 
intentions at this -stage, 
he did hint that Wang's account of his own history of 
working for the Party while in Moscow, of coming back to the sacred revolutionary 
locus of Yan'an, of the key moments in the life of a revolutionary such as entering 
the Party (and who had been the member to have effected this) was fabricated. In 
Kang's final attack on Wang he proposed and authorised a new narrative. In this, 
Wang had not worked for the CCP in Russia, but had been investigated at Yan'an. 
The conclusion of this had been that his 'history was unclear. ' In the end, he 'was 
not a communist, not a revolutionary, not a leftist. ' 124 His history contained 
124 Ibid 104-105. 
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contradictions and hiddeness. Here lay the space for treachery. This was the first step 
towards a more explicit narrative used later in the campaign, towards the end of 
1967, when the existence of IMPP and its history -were articulated (first to a 
restricted audience, and then, from 1968 onwards, publicly). At this stage, the 
general accusation of following the USSR within the terms laid out by the Centre 
was deployed as a means to reduce the credibility and influence of targets like the 
Wangs. 
This process was supplemented by a 'moral/psychological' narrative, something that 
arose from the Manichean universe created by the ideology promoted during the CR. 
Chen Boda stated in the final dialogue: 
'Now there is this sort of situation occurring, of bad people doing bad things, 
and of the good doing bad. ' 125 
This passage implied that there are certain people who were irrevocably bad, and 
that their badness was an unchanging quality in their character. The good, however, 
sometimes commited bad actions, but this did not change their intrinsic character. 
The only issue was to establish why they made this mistake. Zhou supplemented this 
in his concluding judgements when, specifically about the problem in IMAR, he 
stated that 'if bad people were not stiffing things up, things wouldn't come to this 
pass. ' 126 The idea of a set amount of people in society who are 'bad' and who had to 
be attacked was enshrined as an objective of the CR since its announcement in the 
CCP Central Committee 'Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Revolution' on 
8ffi August 1966. This had divided people into four classes, wit h the good and 
comparatively good making up 'the vast majority. ' 127 The final objective of the CR 
was to unite this 95% of cadres into the 'revolutionary left. ' 128 
125 lbid 11 S. Chen Boda returned to this theme at the meeting on the 27h April when 
he talked of Wang Yilun being a 'bad person doing bad' and of other comrades in the 
PLA being 'good people making mistakes' (Doc IIb, 24). 126 Ibid 100, 
127 Schoenhals 1996a, 3 8-3 9. In fact, the '95% good, 5% bad' figure had a long 
history. Mao had referred to this in a speech made in 1959 (Schram 1974,148) 
harking back to a position articulated in the party in the 1920s and 1930s. 128 Schoenhals 1996a, 36. 
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These texts showed figures like Wang Yilun and Wang Duo clearly determined as 
enemies. There was a concurrent process of exclusion from participation in the 
discourse. In Doc 6, during the interrogation of Wang Yilun by Kang Sheng and 
Zhou Enlai, Wang's responses were not allocated specific lines, but either embedded 
in words attributed to the speakers from the Centre, or set apart in parentheses. 129 In 
Doc 7 and 9 both Wangs were specifically noted as being 'excluded' from the 
meeting. They did not figure in any of the lists for meetings after this, and it must be 
assumed that they were forbidden from attending. This textual indication of their 
I subjugation' paralleled their own fall from full representation in the text to 
parenthesised, marginalized presence, and finally absence. In the last document, they 
were talked of in the third person (Zhou: 'Wang 'Yilun represents this sort of 
person. ' 130) This journey from direct representation in theý text to one of being 
judged, without right to response or voice, in absentia symbolised the process of 
loss of power that those who were victims of the CR experienced. 131 
2.1.11 Impact on CR in IMAR from the'13'b April Decision': Sanction for 
Public Attack on Ulanfu 
On its title page, this document was marked as an 'internal' publication for restricted 
circulation. This gave its initial readership a privileged position. The access to the 
meetings themselves, indicated in the separate documents, was carefully controlled. 
Zhou stated at the end of Doc I that 'it is not necessary to bring your secretaries 
tomorrow. The Party Committee, Military District and other groups just need one 
worker, that's enough. ' 132 Apart from Wang Yilun and Wang Duo's overt and 
signalled exclusion, there were also cases (in Docs 3,5,6 and 8) of meetings held 
with specific groups to the exclusion of others. 
The attendance at the meetings is tabulated below. Asterisks indicate that the figure 
is approximate because of 'etc's in the text. Crosses indicate that only groups are , 
129 Ibid 62-64. 
130 Ibid, 105. 
131 It is represented most vividly in the CR martyr, Zhang Zhixin, who, it is 
recorded, before her execution in 1975 by firing squad, had her vocal chords cut so 
that she was unable to shout out before her death (see An 1993,9 1). 132 Doc 11,14. 
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listed as being in attendance without detailing specific numbers: 
Table 3: '13"' April Decision Dialogue%': I, Cý CIS 01"Attenda lice : 11 Mectings: 
Doe No Central Attendance Local Attendance 
2 3 25 
3 4 6* 
4 8* 23 
5 + 5 
6 9* 10 
7 36 76 
8 4 + 
9 14* 113 
10 6* + 
In purely numerical terms, local participants outnumbered those from the Centre at 
all these meetings. Docs 7 and 9 Indicate particularly large attendance. The other 
meetings, where figures or indications were given, were tightly restricted. There 
were criteria for the right to attend these meetings - permission to participate based 
on rank, on holding representative positions in organisations with objectives relevant 
to the Centre's agenda. The Centre had the right to set OLIt these criteria, to say who 
could and could not attend. This was material control over the context of' the 
meetings. 
Another reason why the attendance at these meetings was carefully managed was the 
sensitivity of one of the central objectives - the articulation of a strategy to openly 
attack UlantLi in IMAR. Although I lianfu had been effectively disempowered since 
the Qiannien Hotel meeting in 1966, and was t1ornially dismisscd trom Ills position 
as IMAR Party Secretary in August of that year, there had not as yet been any direct 
pLiblic attacks on him. This was changed by the simple announcement by Zhou in 
Doc 10 that 'the problem of Ulanfu, the capitalist roader in the Party should be 
openly cxposed in IMAR. '"3 Ulanfu was from this moment availabIc I'or public 
133 lbid 107. 
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attack. 
The result of this was the publication of 'Strike Down Ulanfu' in IM Daily on 29 th 
August, the first official attack to appear in the paper which named Ulanfu directly. 
From the publication of this article, Ulanfu became widely labelled as the symbolic 
and actual representative of Liu Shaoqi and the 'capitalist, anti-Party line' in IMAR. 
Attacks naming him had appeared before this date in IMAR, but only in local 
materials with limited circulation. 134 The IM Daily sanctioned further attacks of 
increasing levels of verbal ferocity, and greatly increased the scope of the anti- 
Ulanfu campaign. The Centre's dialogues on the problem of IMAR showed a partial 
process of sanctioning these open attacks on Ulanfu, of placing his proper name 
within a specific discourse, to perform a negative, oppositional function. The 
I enemy sleeping at our side' who had mostly been referred to obliquely till then was 
now explicitly labelled. 
An issue associated with participation is the ways of signifying the attitude of the 
central leaders to the audience they were addressing (this was especially clear in 
larger meetings like Docs 7 and 9). The participants at these meetings symbolically 
represented all the people of IMAR. It was on this basis that they were present. So 
while an authoritarian attitude was shown in specific encounters between leaders 
from the Centre and local ones in these documents, the audience as a whole 
represented a powerful constituency, and one which had to be appeased and 
satisfied. These texts give indications of extra-textual audience reaction - laughter, 
shouting, chanting of slogans. This culminated in the penultimate dialogue where the 
text indicated that the audience 'rise to their feet and shout: Long life to Chairman 
Mao! Long life! A long, long life ! '135 This ritualistic chanting of a generic slogan 
from the Centre was repeated by both the single voice of Zhou, and of the 
I rebellious factions' at the end of the final meeting, showing an elision between the 
Centre and the region. The voices of each were as one, saying the same thing. A 
similar attempt to enlist the support of the audience occurred when Kang Sheng used 
a photo of a nude woman he claimed was once a lover of Wang Yilun (referred to in 
134 See, for instance, the pamphlet published on 29th June attacking Wang Duo 
discussed below in 2.2.3. 
135 Doc 11,86. 
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the previous section). This elicited laughter. 136 It was also indicated in the climax of 
approving applause as Chen Boda made his final contribution in Doc 10 by praising 
Zhou Enlai 137 and called for 'protecting the relationship between the people and the 
PLA like a precious pearl. ' 138 At these moments, the paradigm was promoted of the 
Centre leaders and local people speaking with one voice, according to common 
beliefs, with a common language. This language was the location of negotiations for 
its terms between the Centre and the locality, and the carrier and expression of 
hegemony. 
2.1.12 We, 1, You 
The use of 'we, ' T and 'you' within the text relates to participation, to who was 
included and excluded by these terms. It also relates to the issue of how a collective 
voice, by claiming to speak on behalf of 'everyone, ' was created, along with the 
question of who was granted the right to use this voice. Zhou set out these polarities 
between 'we' and 'you' in his first lengthy monologue in Doc 2. He talked of 'our 
great leader Chairman Mao, '139 implying a collective project, verging on ownership, 
either by or of Mao. But in the details of his dialogue, the world split between the 
addresser, who is either 'P or 'we' and the addressed, 'you. ' There was a process 
from 'P to 'we, ' with the grander claims that 'we' can make, and the greater prestige 
accorded to this in this discourse: 
'Zhou: ... Your minds are a little overheated. Have yqu not thought, without Chairman Mao's leadership, or the protection of the PLA, how can ygu 
implement greater democracy? I know you haven't thought of this question, 
y2u are rubbing blackness on the face of the PLA. (The Premier angrily 
stands up) ... Among yqu there are quite a few leftists, I acknowledge that 
y2u are leftists, but in this matter y2u are mistaken, with people dying can 
Xqu act like this? We do not know how many PLA soldiers heroically 
sacrificed themselves, so can we act like this? ... Comrades, y2jul have struck 
mistakenly, yqu have struck ýhairman Mao's PLA. Even if the Red Guards 
are wrong, we still can't say that (about) our Red Guards, not even publish it 
in papers. We can't curse them, nor speak about them, but need to protect the 
136 Ibid 104. 
137 Ibid 113. 
138 Ibid 115. 
139 Ibid 2 1. 
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honour of the proletariat. .., 
140(My 
underlining). 
The key moment in this passage is the rhetorical transition from Zhou's talking from 
his own perspective, to his adoption of 'we, ' without specifically identifying who 
this 'we' was, whether the Centre, the Party, the people or the local interlocuters. But 
Zhou strengthened his condemnation with the use of 'we, ' changing to a more 
demanding voice. This passage contained two voices - 'F and 'we. ' Those addressed 
remained 'you' (nimen), plural, and presumably, from context, the specific groups 
that Zhou had been speaking to in this dialogue, the revolutionary factions that made 
up part of the IMAR delegation. 
Zhou's use of 'we'in his condemnation revealed much about the sort of authority the 
text aimed to create, and the means it used to do this. 'We' here shows the promotion 
of a collective voice. Although used by a speaker from the Centre, it aimed to be 
inclusive, and to represent the local players, bringing them into; its discourse, but 
also setting the terms within which they were sanctioned to speak. Within the text, 
such attempts at inclusivity were concealed. 'We' was presented in a context where 
it was a given that Zhou spoke for 'all the people' as one with them. It was through 
this underlying collectivity that the voice had impact and moral sanction. In using 
the term, Zhou promoted the attitude that what was said was from a common 
position, articulating a belief and attitude shared by everyone. 
2.1.13 What was the Problem in IMAR? The Issue of National Minorities 
These dialogues articulated the terms for what 'the problem' of IMAR actually was, 
how it could itself be labelled and discussed. Why did the conflict there merit this 
special attention by the Centre? Superficially, these dialogues were precipitated by 
the symbolically portentous event of the killing of the student Han Tong by a soldier. 
This represented a direct challenge to the unity of classes because it involved a 
member of one good class (Han Tong, one of the 'proletarian masses') being 
murdered by a soldier, a member of another good class, supposedly there to protect 
the first. So this pivotal event can be viewed purely in terms of class. 
140 Ibid 19-20. 
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But there was another dimension to this conflict and a further way to view the 
narrative and discourse being created of the revolutionary struggle in IMAR in 1967. 
One clue to this was the specific reference in the introductory material to Docs I and 
6 to Zhou's asking the 'name and national minority status' of participants at the 
meetings. 141 The unique feature of the situation in IMAR, mentioned in Chapter 
One, was the presence of a numerically small but politically significant population 
of Mongolians. The dialogues refer to this issue briefly and obliquely. They 
formulated the problem of IMAR in terms that did not refer to the presence of 
national minorities locally, but to centrally defined political considerations - 
allegiance, for instance, to outside forces (USSR and the Mongolian People's 
Republic), with no suggestion that this could be based on membership of a national 
minority group viewing their identity and political priorities within an ethnic rather 
than class framework. 
Only in Doc 8 did one of the local leaders explicitly refer to this unique 
characteristic of IMAR: 
'Zhou Wenxi: ... There 
is the 'Ba Bai'Commune, the Military District sent a 
so-called Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team there, under the pretext of 
linking up, but actually they were sent to stir up mass struggle, and fabricate 
national minority splittism. They did it very seriously. They said the Third 
Headquarters was counter-revolutionary, and we should not be hoodwinked, 
it must immediately retreat. They said there are no good Mongolians. 
Originally the unity between Han and Mongolian in this village was good, 
but after their propagating, ethnic conflict became very serious. Kids would 
come out and curse Mongolians, saying every day that there were no good 
Mongolians. ' 142 
This passage combines the 'class' terms - 'mass struggle' and 'counter-revolutionary' 
- with those connected to ethnicity - 'splittism, ' 'unity between national minorities. ' 
The discourse contained in these documents prior to this passage had placed the 
IMAR issue within the context of class struggle, of struggle against the Centre. 
Apart from Zhou's request to know the ethnicity of participants, both local and 
Centre participants were silent on the question of how Han and Mongolian had 
interacted within the complicated situation in IMAR since 1966 and how this made 
141 lbid 5 and 57. 142 Ibid 79. 
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the CR there different. 
The marginalisation of this issue is shown by the fact that the only overt statement of 
an ethnic dimension to the IMAR 'Problem' was made in these dialogues through a 
local voice - and that Premier Zhou did not pursue the issue and interrogate Zhou 
Wenxi flirther about the allegations he made. In the summarisation of the issue of 
IMAR in Doc 10 ethnicity did not figure. The 'problems' of IMAR were signified in 
these dialogues through the acts of specific figures (Ulanfu, Wang Duo, Wang 
Yilun). This let the 'problematisation' of IMAR remain largely within a class 
framework, avoiding overt articulation of a 'class' versus 'nationality' clash. This 
was evidence of a highly managed and deliberate discourse, as was its result - the 
promotion of the idea that the removal of Ulanfu and the imposition of a new set of 
leaders in IMAR had resolved this issue. Implict in this, at this stage of the 
discourse's development, was the hegemony of a class-based ideology. But as the 
turbulent course of the CR in IMAR was to prove, the issues surrounding the 
presence of minority groups in IMAR with a different ethnic background to the 
majority Han, and the basis in this of different ideological and cultural objectives, 
were not to be resolved simply by exclusion. 
More localised voices still had to come to grips with formulating this problem. The 
IM Daily, for instance, in articles in January and February 1968 began to talk in 
some detail of national minority prejudice in Ulanfu's theories, of his placing an 
ideology of 'grassland landlordism' against the official ideology of class struggle. 
Ulanfu was accused of 'destroying the unity between Mongolians and Han.. ' 143 An 
enemy counter-discourse was enunciated, inspired by what was labelled as minority 
priorities. This is the central issue in Chapter Three. 
The profound connection between identity and membership of a national minority 
group, how this related to the question of the 'people' and audience, and how they 
were constituted in these texts was touched on in 2.1.6 above. The 'people' was 
presented as a source of authorisation, the major constituency to which speakers 
appealed. But it was also a rhetorical 'empty' term, one which was manipulated and 
143 IMDally, articles 13'h Feb 1968. 
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recreated from speaker to speaker. In the language of the Centre, the 'people' were 
united. Those outside it were deemed enemies of the people. Membership of a 
national minority group was not relevant. Han or Mongolian were presented as 
complete equals. Any difference between them was suppressed. This idea was 
difficult to promote in an area like IMAR where history, culture, and language to the 
Mongolians suggested differences to the Han. The imposition of the term 'people' 
predicated on equality and unity, while promoted as serving collective justice and 
fairness, in fact also aimed to neutralise and weaken the power of local identity. 
Because of this, 'the people' was a critical term in this discourse, a site of conflict 
and contestation. Prescriptions and orders were issued on behalf of the 'people. ' This 
was one of the main paths to the legitimisation of the demands of authority. 'We' 
speak on behalf of the people, and were the people. But however uncontentiously the 
term was placed in the discourse of Centre leaders in these dialogues, in fact it 
occupied a fault line along which the demands of the Centre discourse and the 
locality to which this spoke came into conflict. In the Centre's discourse 'people' 
were unified and equal. This signified a key area where the Centre attempted to 
dictate the framework within which identity was articulated. 
2.1.14 Zhou Enlails Final Speech: The Organising Voice of Authority 
These documents represented a process from interrogation to judgement -a process 
towards authoritative utterance. The culmination of this was the final collection of 
central leaders' statements in Doe 10. Zhou Enlai made the greatest contribution to 
this. 
It is not clear in earlier documents whether Zhou's statements, and his direction of 
enquiry, were controlled by specific notes or objectives that he had. Advisors were 
shown as being present from his Office, but they were not shown as making any 
interventions or contributions. The level of control, therefore, was reactive, 
responding to the answers given by those interrogated, dealing with the questions 
that arose from what they said. It was this process of enquiry that necessitated the 
summons to other participants from IMAR at the end of Doc 1, and the trip to IMAR 
to verify the situation there in Doc 5 by a delegation from the Centre. 
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Doc 10 was different from the other documents in both length and format. It 
contained significant, extended monologuous presentations by Zhou Enlai, Kang 
Sheng, Xiao Hua and Chen Boda. These displayed varying levels of organisation 
and control. Zhou's was the lengthiest, and the one which showed the most 
organisation. He adopted a system of numbering throughout his talks in Doc 10. The 
first problem was announced on page 93, at the start of the dialogue. After 
interventions from Kang Sheng, he pursued the second problem on page 105, the 
third on page 106, the fourth and fifth on page 107, the sixth on page 108, the 
seventh on page I 10, and the eighth on page 112. He offered a marked summary on 
page 114. This extended system of ordering implied a process of prior organisation 
before the meeting, and in an arena beyond the bounds of the previous dialogues 
recorded. The Centre leaders had consulted amongst themselves and, on the basis of 
the interrogations and evidence already gathered, formulated a consistentyiew with 
a unified voice, which Zhou was now presenting. These positions were arrived at 
before the meeting, as Zhou spoke throughout on 'behalf of the Centre, 144 and did 
not unilaterally arrive at the positions taken here. Nor was he making these 
judgements and prescriptions on the hoof. He may have been reading from a 
prepared text, as some of the language was formulaic and uncolloquial (the praise, 
for instance, of the PLA on page 116). There was a gap between Docs 9 and 10, 
which was the decision process. This was made either in a restricted meeting with 
only leaders from the Centre present, or through written communication purely 
among the Centre authorities. 
Zhou talked about eight issues, summarised thus: 
1. Condemnation of previous leaders: Summation of the events in early 1967 in 
IMAR culminating in death of Han Tong. Condemnation of Ulanfu and his 
followers; labelling of them as 'conservatives' and 'capitalist roaders, ' thus 
placing this in the context of the condemnation of Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiaoping at the Centre. This utilised the Centre categories in the local context 
and created a connection between the two narratives (of central and local 
144 See his use, for instance, of 'we' on page 99 when expressing the dissatisfaction 
of the Centre in the death of Han Tong and the attempts to blame it on other 
students. 
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placing this in the context of the condemnation of Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiaoping at the Centre. This utilised the Centre categories in the local context 
and created a connection between the two narratives (of central and local 
'revisionism'). Defence of Wu Tao at the Military District Party Committee. 
Apportioning of responsibility in this highly personalised context on Wang Yilun 
and Wang Duo. (Here Kang Sheng offered the destructive counter-narrative of 
Wang -Yilun and Wang Duo's history analysed in 2.1.10 above. ) 
2. Appointment of Liu Xianquan as commander of IMAR MilitM District: 
Opposition from Zhao Yongfu, leader of the '8-1-8' faction. Connection with 
Russian and Mongolian revisionism. 
3. Creation of the IMAR CR Standing Committee Preparatory Small Group: 
Prescriptions on who can join, organisationally and in terms of specific people. 
4. Rectification for revolutionga cadres and mass organisations and judgement o 
responsibility for Han Tong's death. 
5. Sanction to openly condemn Ulanfu in IMAR. 
6. Order to help revolutionary organisations recover and develo]2: Orders to 
vigorously use and study (huoxue-huqyong) Mao Zedong Thought' and the 
great linking up' (da lian he). 
7. Rehabilitate those revolutionary cadres and groups that had been labelled 
I counter- revolutionaly': Send Deputy Commander Teng Haiqing from Beijing to 
IMAR to do preparatory work before Liu Xianquan. 145 
8. Deeply propagate the principles of the Centre's '13'h Al2ril Decision' on the 
'Problem of Oinghai, 'along with other key Centre documents. 146 
The first 'issue, ' on which Zhou spent the most time, was concerned with offering an 
interpretation of the past, and an authoritative narrative, supplied from the Centre, 
within which to apportion blame. This was located in particular figures, not groups. 
The other seven issues were prescriptions about the future and what should be done. 
145 Liu Xianquan evidently never went to IMAR to take up this position despite what 
it says in the 'I P April Decision. ' In his speech on the 27 th April Zhou Enlai said 
that although Liu had been appointed, he had been unable go to IMAR because of 
the problems in Qinghai he had been sent to deal with (Doc IIb 1967,14). 
146 Qinghai also experienced particular difficulties at this stage in the CR 
necessitating the Centre's intervention - see note above (interview with Wu Di, April 
2003). 
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Some of them (specifically Issue 6) were conveyed in generic language and tied to 
the idiom of national campaigns ('Vigorously Use and Study Mao Zedong 
Thought'). Others (Issue 2 and 7) ordered specific personnel changes in IMAR. 
The actual implementation of some of the actions commanded in the 'issues' above 
can be specified. The setting up of IMAR CR Standing Committee Preparatory 
Small Groups stipulated in Issue 3 was fulfilled on 18th June. The sending of T6ng 
Haiqing to IMAR spoken of in Issue 7 occurred three days after the meeting, on the 
16th April. But the open attack on Ulanfu sanctioned in Issue 5, because it required 
preparation, both organisationally, and in terms of public opinion, was left till 29th 
August. 
2.1.15 From the Individual Voice to the Formal Document: The 1 13 th April 
Decision' 
The judgements above were only effected within the formal '130, April Decision, ' 
which carried them to the larger public for implementation. This was issued as 
document number 126 in 1967, to provinces and military organisations in the PRC. 
Like Zhou's final speech, the '13th April Decision' set out eight issues. These 
followed the same order that Zhou gave in his presentation in Doc 10, the first one 
dealing with issues of blame and culpability, the second with the appointment of 
new local leaders, etc. 
The '13th April Decision' lifted specific key prescriptive sentences from Zhou's 
speech, almost word for word. In Issue 5, for instance, the decision read: 
'The problem of Ulanfu, the power seizer in the Party taking the capitalist 
road, may now be openly exposed in IMAR. Wang Yilun must be isolated 
from the region, and Wang Duo should stop work and examine his attitude, 
and be given over to the masses for struggle and criticism. ' 147 
In Zhou's formulation, this had been: 
'Number five, the problem of Ulanfu, the power scizer in the Party 
taking the capitalist road, may now be openly exposed in IMAR, deeply 
147 Ibid 2. 
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and from every angle. Last year at the North China Bureau meeting he was 
exposed, pulled off his high horse, and dismissed as First Secretary, 
Committee Commander and Political Commissar of the Military Region, 
leaving him with only the nominal title of Chairman. From the point of view 
of strategy, the most important consideration was the problem of Mongolian 
and Soviet revisionism, so this was not put out publicly in the papers. 
Struggle is something that must be slowly deepened. Now there is public 
criticism of the power seizers in the Party taking the capitalist road, now 
Tiananmen also has "big character posters. " Last year I urged [not to publicly 
criticise], this year I don't. 
'Ulanfu's problem should be openly exposed in IMAR, but not put in 
papers... (Chi: We want to pluck Ulanfu out to struggle -against). At the 
moment don't pluck people out to take them back. Let's talk about this later. 
There are already many targets for your struggle. 
'Wang Yilun must be isolated from the region, actually this evening he has 
already been taken into custody. (Warm applause). 
'Wang Duo should stop work and examine his attitude, and be given 
over to the masses for struggle and criticism. (Warm applause). You are 
responsible for taking them back, guaranteeing you do things according to 
the rules' 148 (my emphasis). 
The sentences in bold occurred in exactly the same form in the 130' April Decision. ' 
This ornited the background information that Zhou gave (about, for instance, the 
reasons why Ulanfu could not be publicly exposed before). As this was a finished 
written document, the interventions of the other speaker (Chi) and the extra-textual 
indications of the approval of the audience were absent, leaving only the key 
commands. One of these (Wang Yilun's incarceration) had already been 
implemented. The '13th April Decision' was an indication, in this instance, of the 
Centre's commitment to a leadership change in IMAR. It was a document to 
publicise this. 
The '13th April Decision' was a written document, as opposed to the dialogues 
which, while written, represented, however imperfectly, spoken communication. Its 
register was impersonal. It contained no sense of voice, of a 'we' issuing and 
authorising it. Its judgements were conveyed in formal, prescriptive language to 
impose rules and orders. Zhou had still needed to argue, present a case, supply 
background on which to base decisions in his discussion of the recommendations. 
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He had needed to exlain why Ulanfu was not openly attacked earlier, justifying it by 
remarking that struggle was something to be slowly deepened. He spoke as one of 
the most senior office holders in the Party and government. But he also spoke as one 
of the longest-standing and most admired leaders of the CCP since its foundation in 
1921. His basis for authority was both institutional but also personal. This did not 
mean that he had no need to present forms of arguments distilled in the accepted 
central idiom of the CR at this stage in 1967. His discourse displayed appropriate 
deference to the current campaigns to 'Vigorously Use and Study Mao Zedong 
Thought' (Issue 6), and used the condemning categories of 'capitalist roader' and 
I power seizer, ' working within an accepted current narrative of the 'unprecedented 
purpose of the CR' (returning power to the revolutionary masses). It was the 
combination of these rather than any single element that created a power-discourse, 
and legitimised Zhou's right to say what he was saying and have it implemented. 
The transformation of Zhou's language to the '13'h April Decision' was the 
culmination of a process. Context or argument was replaced by the simple function 
of issuing prescriptions, which were to be acted upon. The 'I P April Decision'was 
the material distillation of the power visible in Zhou's talk, a document produced 
after what was seen as a legitimate and legitimating process of investigation and 
dialogue (albeit in the unique and restrained terms outlined above), issued in a form 
which was socially accepted as authoritative and thereby influential. The 'Decision' 
pulled together the separate voices of the Centre and local leaders, issued in a 
monovocal text, its language standardized, its material issuing through the 
established. channels and in recognised forms of other central edicts. The bold 
passages in the excerpt above had the force of universal rules and were placed in that 
form - using prescriptive language like 'should' (yingdang), 'must' (yao) and 'not 
allowed' (buxu). This indicated the level of permissions and sanctions the '13 th April 
Decision' gave, and its objective of focussing on influencing action and events. 
Finally, the 'Decision' distilled the public language, carrying away the restricted 
element of the dialogues and paring it down to the essential audience-messages. In 
this language Ulanfu, Wang Yilun and Wang Duo were labelled as 'capitalist 
roaders, ' and fitted into the narrative described above of good against bad, within a 
148 lbid 107-8. 
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covert local history linked to a national one of revisionism and treachery. These 
formulations of labels culminated in 'conservative factions set up by Wang Yilun 
and other representatives of Ulanfu, the main power seizer in the IMAR region 
taking the capitalist road, ', a label derived from the central slogans calling Liu 
Shaoqi the 'main person in the Party taking the capitalist road. ' This illustrated the 
connection between the struggle at the Centre, with the language that this was 
carried through, and the local one. In details of its language, the '13 th April 
Decision' showed a process whereby the hegemonic narrative and language from the 
Centre was imposed on situation locally by a process of adaptation. 
2.1.16 Conclusion: Process and Power 
One potentially misleading issue for students of Foucault is the stress he lays on the 
term 'power' and the assumption that this refers to political power, and to force, 
coercion and hierarchy. Kendall and Wickham argue that a better definition of power 
in Foucault's work would be to view the word more from its separate meaning as 
I energy source. ' 149 They quote Deleuze: 
'Power is a relation between sources, or rather every relation between forces 
is a power relation... Force is never singular but essentially exists in relation 
to other forces, such that any force is already in a relation, that is to say 
power ... Power, then, is not essentially repressive: 
it is not possessed, but is 
practised. Power is not the prerogative of "masters" but passes through every 
force. We should think of power not as an attribute (and ask "What is it? ") 
but as an exercise (and ask "How does it work? ")"50 
These documents show the process of 'power, ' through the various 'loci' listed 
above -a process whereby, after interrogation and enquiry, constituting a form of 
negotiation, a formal position was achieved, aimed at resolving the conflict between 
the various power centres involved. This position, articulated and formulated in an 
institutionally and socially accepted way, was then materially issued within the 
target environment. 
Ostensibly, the dialogues support a 'top-down' model of power, with centres of 
149 Kendall and Wickham 1999,48. 
150 Ibid, 50. 
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authority issuing diktats and orders. They show the central voices imposing a 
political solution on a specific locality through the promotion of a discourse -a 
combination of ideology, narrative and the language this was conveyed through with 
its institutional support. However, as the local material and the history of the CR in 
IMAR thereafter showed, that imposition was' unsuccessful. While the '13th April 
Decision' specifically militated against violence, from 1967 onwards, unrest 
increased in IMAR (peaking in 1968). The terms and framework granted to the 
IMAR were centred on a specific concept of 'unity', with no space for the 
articulation of local 'national minority' identity. This strategy to control and manage 
the situation by the Centre in IMAR was to prove unsuccessful, but only after a 
destructive and concerted campaign in which many thousands lost their lives. 
Section Two: Impact of the '13 th April Decision' in IMAR: The 
Mini-Campaign against the Wangs 
2.2.1 June 1967: The Felling of Wang Duo and Wang Yilun 
The '13th April Decision' sanctioned open attack on Ulanfu, but this was not 
immediately implemented. The IM Daily did not issue the first attack using Ulanfu's 
name until 29th August. Like Liu Shaoqi in the national campaign, Ulanfu was 
referred to indirectly till then as 'the biggest power holder in the IMAR Party taking 
the capitalist road' (zizhiqu dangnei zui da de zou zibenzhuyi daolu dangquanpai). 
Like Liu Shaoqi nationally, Ulanfu had occupied a prestigious and powerful position 
for almost 20 years. His removal needed sensitive handling. 151 Thus the time 
between the issuing of the 'I 3th April Decision' and the public attacks was used for 
preparing the main constituency in IMAR. 
Part of this preparation involved a preliminary attack on the smaller fry, Wang Yilun 
and Wang Duo. Both Wangs had occupied senior positions in the IMAR Party 
structure prior to 1966. Born in 1904 in Chifeng in Inner Mongolia, Wang Yilun had 
studied in the USSR in the 1930s before working at Yan'an. After 1949, he had 
15 1 The mechanics of this 'erosion and destruction of authority' are looked at in the 
next chapter. 
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occupied positions of responsibility in the Party financial department, rising to the 
key posts of deputy and then Party secretary of the IMAR Party Standing 
Committee. This was the position he occupied at the start of the CR. 152 Wang Duo 
was bom in 1912, in Liaoning Province. He too had worked in Yan'an in the late 
1930's, before moving to Inner Mongolia in 1945, and occupying a number of 
positions in the Party there. He had also, like the other Wang, worked as the deputy 
secretary of the local Party, and deputy director of the IMAR CRC Both were 
ethnically Han, and both had served under Ulanfu. 153 
And they had other things in common. Both enjoyed brief moments of ascendancy 
after Ulanfu's fall in 1966. Both, as a result of the discussions in Beijing, were 
labelled the 'representatives' (daili ren) of 'the biggest power-seizer' (Ulanfu) who 
remained unnamed for the time being. And both were attacked at the same time - 
mid-1967. This brief campaign against the Wangs is analysed through two main 
document types: the first, articles in the IM Daily, and the second an example of an 
attack pamphlet issued against Wang Duo in June 1967. Similar genres of material 
are looked at in the larger campaign of attack from August 1967 onwards after 
Ulanfu's public naming. This campaign showed that the '13 th April Decision' 
created both the overall administrative framework (through the imposition of new 
personnel and through legitimising the setting up of new organisations) and the 
vocabulary through which to implement new forms of attack, against new targets. It 
also achieved this through the sponsoring of a new narrative, one in which the 
functions and role of the Wangs was reinterpreted, and they moved from being 
people in authority to figures of disgrace. 
2.2.2 Mechanisms of Implementation 
The '13th April Decision' was facilitated by the setting up of the IMAR CR 
Preparatory Committee, on 18th June, which issued a document on Vt July: 'How to 
Implement the Central Party 13th April Decision. ' Large public meetings became a 
152 Chi 2000,507. 
153 lbid, 516. Although Wang was effectively removed from power, he continued to 
be director of the Price Commission under the IMAR CRC until September 1968. 
Like Wang Duo, he was to return to power after the CR (Nei Menggu zizhiqu zhi 
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key means of disseminating the decision, after the founding of the Preparatory 
Committee. The IM Daily reported one held on the evening of 27 th June at the 
Hohhot sports stadium, attended by '100,000 people. ' 154 The meeting was labelled 
as a 'cable broadcast meeting' (youxian guangbo dahui) sponsored by the Third 
Hohhot Group. 155 The participants were the Third Group, Hohhot Railway Bureau, 
Hohhot suburb peasants, IMAR PSB, IM Teachers College, and 'representatives of 
proletarian groups from Hohhot organisations and work units. ' These represented the 
key constituency in -Hohhot for the 'I P April Decision. ' 156 
The IMAR article presented this meeting on a metaphorical and an ideological level. 
Like the articles describing Mao's reviewing of the Red Guards in Tiananmen 
Square in 1966-67 at the beginning of the CR, great attention was paid to the 
physical context of the meeting, and its implicit signification. The article described 
the 'battle-like atmosphere' (zhandou qifen). Participants from the various 
organisations were described as 'raising the red flag, and holding the "Quotations 
from Chairman Mao Zedong" in their hands, ' making the stadium into a 'red sea. ' 
The article described the people chanting ('Long live Chairman Mao! ') before the 
'targets' of the struggle were brought in. At this point the slogans changed from 
positive to aggressive: 'We will strike whoever seeks to bring back capitalist 
revisionism. ' The slogans then became localised, with one indirectly referring to 
Ulanfu when it demanded 'resolutely strike the current overlord and his 
representatives Wang Yilun and Wang Duo. ' 
The ideological context of the article was explicitly from the '13 Ih April Decision, ' a 
document mentioned in the first paragraph as something that was to be 'resolutely 
implemented' (flanjue guanche zhixing). 'Seizure of power' operated as a key term 
in this discourse, as it had in the discussions in the Centre. The process of 
personalisation of power contained in the dialogues is shown in the focus on the 
Wangs, and the unnamed 'main person' representing the ideological crimes. The 
'I P April Decision, ' figured as a judgement, something with quasi-legal status and 
2001,413). 
154 29th June 1967, front page. 155 'Cable broadcast' here probably referred to the use of loud speakers at the 
meeting to relay it to the audience, and to work units in the city. 
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authority. At points in this article the Wangs were recorded as having committed 
I counter-revolutionary crimes' (fangeming zuixing). Values and judgements were 
conferred on their actions because of the context arising from the '13th April 
Decision. ' 
The report of this meeting with its 100,000 participants in the IM Daily was 
motivated by the need to promote a new narrative and ideological paradigm. It 
propagated the significance of the '13th April Decision, ' contributing to the creation 
of a new narrative. The record of the meeting in the newspaper was largely bare of 
particularities. It contained no individual voices, nor specifics of the actual 
arrangements of the meeting (timings, order of events, etc). It described something 
highly generic. The only specific addition was the mention of local place names: 
'During the current period of the capitalist counter-revolutionary restoration 
of power, Wang Yilun, Wang Duo and their type have used the red flag to 
strike the red flag, hanging the "three alliances" signboard, to oppose the 
revolutionary alliances. [They] have used fascistic violent methods, madly 
seeking to seize power from the proletariat. In February and March, these 
ranks of counter-revolutionary revisionists gathered their puppets, not only 
seizing power in organisations, factories, schools and other work units in the 
Autonomous Region and Hohhot, but also in most areas throughout the 
region. In the places and work units they seized power, they implemented 
capitalist dictatorship. ' 157 
The crimes imputed to the Wangs 'and their type' in this paragraph were largely 
signified metaphorically ('used the red flag to strike the red flag'). Reference to the 
place and time when the crimes were performed was also in highly general terms. A 
time-frame was given, but no named organisations or work units. No individual 
voices were quoted in the text. The record of a specific event was subsumed within 
a larger story, the narrative imperatives of which overrode the need to convey any 
impression of the meeting as a specific event on its own. The meeting was 
significant because of its use in carrying an ideological point. 
These reports excluded the issue of national minorities, representing the ideology 
promoted through and because of the '13'h April Decision, ' revolving around class 
156 Wang Duo described this meeting in his memoirs (Wang 1992,523). 
157 IM Daily 29h June 1967,1. 
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struggle and a need to 'rectify the Party, ' ridding it of class enemies. Splittism, and 
the host of other terms which were to appear increasingly from August 1967 
onwards were absent. 
The impact of the 1P April Decision' and its attempt to set out the parameters 
within which discourse could operate after its publication is seen more distinctly in 
an article published on the 26h June, with the cumbersome title: 'Thoroughly Weed 
Out the Counter-Revolutionary Restorationist Crimes Committed by those 
Representing the Main Person in the Faction of Power Holders in the District Party 
Who Take the Capitalist Road, Wang Yilun and Wang Duo. ' Here the '13 th April 
Decision' was presented as offering a key moment to expose the 'IMAR 
underground black headquarters' and their 'opposition' (duikang) to the Centre. 
Before the '130' April Decision' was issued, the 'black underground' had 'confused 
good with bad, issued every kind of falsehood, cheated the majority of the workers, 
prevented the peasants working, stopped production, and made people take to the 
streets. ' The 'I P April Decision' was described in this narrative as 'a verdict from a 
court of law' (panjueshu), passing the death sentence on the 'schemes of the 
representatives of the main person taking the capitalist road power-seizure faction in 
our Party, Wang Yilun and Wang Duo. ' The article, after deploying legalistic 
language, suggested that the '13th April Decision' was the legitimate endpoint in a 
process of judgement and sentencing, then reverted to the language of 'street' 
vernacular condemnation, calling the Wangs 'bastards' (huaidan) whose 'dreams 
have been smashed. ' This mixture of registers indicated the intention both to 
legitimise the decision to the audience in IMAR, and to impose a more emotional 
atmosphere of 'heated condemnation. ' The Wangs 'openly opposed the "13 th April 
Decision, " and undertook measures to oppose the Centre. ' Their crimes were 
described as being against the the Centre and the authority exercised by the Centre 
on behalf of 'the people. ' 
The issue of power was also more explicitly articulated in this article: 
'These fellows [the Wangs and who they represent] have already stolen quite 
a lot of power from our district and organisations in it. In these places and 
organisations, they have hung up the signs of the proletariat, but in reality 
implemented the dictatorship of capitalism. The fundamental purpose of our 
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CR is to seize back this power, completely take it back, and place it again in 
the hands of the proletarian revolutionary groups. ' 158 
Power figures as a substance in this discourse, passing from hand to hand. There was 
the same reliance on metaphor as in the previous IMAR article analysed above 
('hung up the signs'), along with the sense of this being *our CR' and the article 
being read to, and therefore possessed, by an audience who 'belong. ' This audience 
shared similar definitions and understandings of the key terms in the passage. It used 
the term'seizing power' rooted in the context of the CR in 1967, arising from a 
situation in which factions and established organisations were competing against 
each other for legitimacy and influence. 
The audience needed to interpret messages delivered indirectly through specific 
language forms in this discourse. This was most evident in the careful formulations 
to label enemies: 'those representing the main person in the faction of power-holders 
in the district Party taking the capitalist road, Wang Yilun and Wang Duo. ' There 
was no doubt about who this was directed at, but the text was faithful to the courtesy 
of not directly naming Ulanfa, despite the sanction from the Centre to do so. This 
demonstrated sensitivity to the need to prepare the audience, both by a process of 
creating a new narrative of treachery and 'hiddeness, ' and by implying the 'crimes' 
which the newly discovered enemies have committed to a new paradigm -a new 
framework, in which what was once viewed as legitimate and authoritative was now 
discredited. Changing the symbolic value of such figures was achieved through use 
of a new narrative, articulated by language structures signifying legitimacy and 
approval. 
2.2.3 Localising the Attack: Pamphlet against Wang Duo 
If on one level the IM Daily represented the 'official' discourse of IMAR at this 
time, there was also a mass of 'unofficial' material - pamphlets, articles, booklets, 
issued by groups of varying sizes in varying qualities. One of these, issued on 29'h 
June 1967, was entitled 'Indignantly Denounce the Towering Crimes of Wang Duo 
in the Great Proletarian CR' (Fennu shengtao Wang Duo zai wuchanjiej! wenhua da 
158 IM Daily 26h June 1967,2 
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geming zhong taotian zuixing). The sponsoring group was the Hohhot Revolutionary 
Alliance Headquarters (lianluo zongbu). This was an 18 page pamphlet in two parts; 
the first 13 pages is a narrative of Wang's crimes in the general context of the CR in 
IMAR; the second part was a five page chronology of Wang's activities in the CR 
since 1966. This demonstrated the imposition of the narrative structures set in place 
by the 'I 3th April Decision' being applied to the personal histories of participants in 
IMAR. 
There were two differences between this document, and the material appearing at the 
same time in the IM Daily. Firstly, Ulanfu was directly named. This happened at the 
beginning of the pamphlet, in the second paragraph. Secondly, there was explicit 
mention of the question of national minority issues and their importanc6 in IMAR. A 
further difference was the rhetorical style of the document. Its use, for instance, of 
addresses to the audience, of rhetorical questions, exclamations, and metaphor. All 
of this gave the piece a colloquial tone. There were no indications, however, of its 
being the verbatim report of a speech, nor of any individual author. It belongs more 
to the genre of polemic pamphlets issued by factions and groups to promote their 
viewpoint. It is not possible to say if it was performed at a meeting of any sort 
convened by this faction for members, though the reading of such documents in this 
sort of environment was common in the CR, and the colloquial and rhetorical style 
of the piece would have lent itself to this. 
This informal register creates a sense of unity, conveying the idea that the 
document's voice was at one with the audience, in effect being their voice. 
Throughout the piece, the audience was referred to as 'revolutionary rebellious 
allies, comrades. "59 The final sentence was a slogan calling Mao 'the reddest 
reddest sun in our hearts' (my underlining). The familiarity extended to the use of 
direct addresses to the targets of the attack: 'I tell you, Wang Duo, crying for Ulanfu 
is the beginning of your tragedy. ' 160 These addresses became stronger as the piece 
progressed: 'You are Ulanfu's right hand man, his mouthpiece, Ulanfu's blue-eyed 
boy, someone in the Party who had been pushing revisionism for Ulanfu for a long 
159 Doc 13,1 and 13. 160 lbid 2. 
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time. ' 161 Part of the technique for reducing Wang's 'reputation' or status was the use 
of his own words against him, with an interpretation (called *exposure' in this 
discourse) of their real 'hidden meaning' offered after they had been quoted. This 
creation of opposition between quoted words and destructive, disrespectful comment 
brought the language of someone previously occupying a position with status and 
power down to 'street level, ' accessible to public attack, in the same way that targets 
of the CR were humiliated, and their bodies exposed in public to violence. 
The document contextualised the current attack on Wang within an atmosphere in 
which power was seen as highly personalised, with the credibility and capital of 
some figures brought against others in an environment of competing values. Unlike 
the dialogues with the Centre, where the appeals to power and sponsoring authority 
were more indirect and understated, here there was explicit invocation of the CR 
being a movement 'personally started by Chairman Mao. ' 162 A similar expression 
was used about Mao's 'personally issuing the "16 Articles" on the 8th August, ' 163 a 
I glorious document that illuminated the road of the CR. ' Mao had the highest value 
and authority in this market. Wang, in this document, was shown having none, 
I madly attacking and slandering the "16 Articles. "' Specific labels signified his 
crimes. His new status was now one as an enemy: %Wang is IMAR's biggest political 
profiteer (toujishang), the biggest political pickpocket. ' He was described in the new 
narrative offered by the pamphlet as 'continuously cheating the Centre. ' 164 The 
personal narrative of running against Mao and the Centre was symbolised by Wang's 
issuing his own 'black report, ' containing language from a counter-discourse which 
he himself wished to impose in order to attain hegemony in the IMAR struggle: 
'This black report is equally open opposition to the revolutionary path of Chairman 
Mao, confusing black with white, diverting people's attention, twisting the general 
direction... ' 165 Such personal language betraying individual political ambition was 
brought against the 'correct language' of the centrally produced Red Flag magazine, 
which in this part of the pamphlet was directly quoted to counter Wang's %black 
161 Ibid 3. 
162 lbid 1. 
163 Ibid 8. 
164 Ibid 12. 
165 lbid 4. 
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report. ' 166 Explicit examples of this 'anti-language' were given in the slogans 
imputed to supporters of Wang on page 6: 'Leader of the leftists; ' 'Make revolution 
with Wang. ' 
This was complemented by rhetorical devices to bolster the sense of informality and 
thereby convey disrespect for Wang. The use of interjections like 'no, absolutely 
no, ' in the course of an argument, 167 repetition of phrases to structure sentences 
('You're Ulanfu's right hand man, you're his blue-eyed boy, you're the person 
taking the revisionist road for the longest time in Ulanfu's party' 168); exclamations 
('Enough! ' 169) commenting or indicating speaker attitude; use of colloquial sentence 
endings (e. g., ya 17); control of the discourse by the use of rhetorical questions ('Has 
Wang Duo really changed? No! 171); invitations to the audience to 'please listen' 
(qing ting172) . All this was supplemented 
by vulgar language ('a bastard from the 
Second School Work Group. ' 173) 
This location of various forms of power in figures and signification of their separate 
and competing values in discourse was accompanied by a localisation of the themes 
of the national CR, adapting these to appeal to the local audience addressed in this 
document. Part of this was the creation of a local narrative of subterfuge and 
treachery. All this worked within the parameters sanctioned by the '130' April 
Decision. ' In August 1967 'bearing enmity to the CR and hatred to the revolutionary 
masses, ' Wang Duo went to the Ximeng League. 174 Here he was accused of 
'deliberately propagating confusing accounts of the counter-revolutionary faction's 
doing revolutionary actions, and in this way... seeking to turn the revolutionary 
masses into counter-revolutionary ones. ' 175 Accounts of his crimes were localised 
166 Ibid 5. 
167 Ibid 2. 
168 Ibid 3. 
169 lbid 9. 
170 Ibid 9. 
171 lbid 11. 
172 Ibid 11. 
173 Ibid 8. 
174 In Mongolian, Shilingol. 
175 lbid 6. 
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through the mention of specific individuals who he had allowed to be persecuted ,1 
76 
(although in this text some anonymity was conferred by use of only the family name 
rather than the full one). The key event of this narrative was the death of the student 
Han Tong, the occasion which provoked the dialogues leading to the '13 th April 
Decision. ' In this document Han figured as a 'martyr' whose murder had caused 'ten 
million (yi qian wan) Han Tongs to stand up. ' There is a verbal echo back to Mao's 
words at the seminal moment in the founding of the PRC in 1949 (7he Chinese 
people have stood up') offering a conection to this 'good history. ' But the key thing 
was the attribution within this discourse and the narrative it conveyed of symbolic 
capital to Han Tong and his death, viewing this as symbolising victory of the weak 
over the oppressors. The new narrative was itself a means to liberation. The knowing 
of it and its terms meant knowing the means for one's own liberation. 
This localised narrative contained Wang's own reaction to the central meetings after 
the death of Han, where he and Wang Yilun were accused of 'continuing to be the 
play things' of 'the dynasty of Ulanfu' (Wanfu wangchao), 177 meeting secretly, and 
issuing black reports in Ulanfu's name. There was a return to the same question 
which had dominated the dialogues from February to April 1967: do these people 
have 'the Centre in their eyes? Or Chairman Mao? ' 'All they had in their eyes was 
the dynasty of Ulanfu, ' the document declared. 178 The dialogues had entered the 
narrative, forming and managing it. They figured as 'a great victory for the CR. A 
hymn to the victory of Mao Zedong Thought reaching to the skies. ' 179 Value had 
been apportioned to them. They and the 'I 3th April Decision' were part of a narrative 
leading towards final victory (see 2.2.5). 
2.2.4 Localisation and the Issue of National Minorities 
The process of localisation was most clear in the much stronger language dealing 
with the issues of national minorities in these attacks. Whereas the central dialogues 
had mentioned these obliquely, this document was more explicit. In the preamble to 
176 Ibid 7. 
177 lbid 12. 
178 Ibid 12. 
179 lbid 13. 
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the piece, in the second paragraph on page 1, the author referred to Wang 'selling 
out big time to the traitor of the Chinese people, traitor to the Mongolian people 
Ulanfu, whose counter-revolutionary line is "don't divide, don't struggle, don't 
distinguish classes - what's good for the grassland workers is good for the grassland 
herdlords. "' The treachery presented fitted -with the account of Liu Shaoqi's 
'withering away of class struggle' ideology in the struggle at the Centre. The two 
conflicting discourses of national minority issues and class were indicated, with a 
connection made very early between the hegemonistic language of class, and its 
precedence over all other ideological categories. In words imputed to Ulanfu on 
page 2, the document showed that he had aimed to allow more Mongolians to take 
up positions of power in IMAR, just because of their being Mongolian. This 
connected to the grander though still indirectly expressed political mission to 
promote SplittiSM., 180 In this document, the concept of splittism was presented as 
I national minority splittism' (minzu fenliezhuyi), with the implication that Ulanfu 
had been aiming for greater power for Mongolians in IMAR. The much more 
damning accusation that he was aiming for something beyond this, for a complete 
break with the PRC, and unification with the Mongolian People's Republic, was left 
unexplicated at this stage. The notion of the IMPP intially formulated in confidential 
reports to local Party leaders in November 1967 was to become the vehicle used to 
convey news of this spectacular treacheryý 
At this point, the formulation of Ulanfu's treachery was only halfway to its full 
expression in later attacks on him. He was labelled 'a great traitor to the Chinese 
people and a great traitor to the Mongolian people. ' Frank Dik6tter has talked about 
the creation of the invention of the Han as a race at the end of the Qing dynasty, and 
of racial or ethnic concepts in classical Chinese. 181 This document used two 
formulations - Zhonghua minzu and Zhongguo renmin, against one formulation 
specifically relating to the Mongolians - Mengzu renmin. The concept of Zhongguo 
renmin could be seen as 'people of China, ' without explicit mention of the political 
entity extant since 1949, the PRC (there had been other Thinas' before 1949). This 
term merely related to residence or occupancy of a geographically determined space, 
regardless of which ethnic groups they might claim to belong to. Zhonghua minzu 
180 Ibid 2. 
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was much more loaded, referring to the sense of a 'Chinese people, ' a concept 
including minority groups within the confines of the PRC, and imputing them with 
an allegiance to the 'Chinese state' in the specific PRC manifestation. The term has 
meaning within the PRC discourse of national minorities and majorities, expressing 
and imposing a unified status and allegiance on all the groups included in it. As in 
the use of the central 'we' and 'people, ' there was a process of exclusion, of 
enforced inclusivity in this. People were spoken of as 'Chinese' first, with their 
ethnic categorisation subsumed within this overriding hegemonistic term. How they 
negotiated their identity within this term was highly contentious, especially as they 
needed to find space for themselves here in competition with an overwhelming 
majority who belonged to a national majority - the Han. 
2.2.5 Victory 
The central dialogues resulting in the issuing of the '13 th April Decision' showed 
power and the expressions of power as a process, through which interests were 
articulated and negotiated between groups and individuals. The reception and 
propagation of the '13th April Decision' in IMAR showed a similar process, along 
with the brief campaign against the Wangs. A new narrative of threat and of an 
ongoing struggle ran through these discourses, of dark and hidden enemies 'sleeping 
at our sides' who were gradually being dug up, and the need to establish support in 
this battle. There were grey, confused areas in this new, evolving discourse. The full 
labelling of those who were eventually named as the chief enemies was too sensitive 
to achieve without a process of audience preparation. Another factor was that 
subjects like splittism were contentious, and needed careful management. The '13 Ih 
April Decision' and the documents that followed it only a gradually articulated these 
issues. 
Alongside the negative language of conflict and struggle there was the positive 
language of victory, of a battle being waged in which victory was assured. The 
editorial in the IM Daily celebrating the first anniversary of the publication of the 
'130' April Decision' in April 1968 expressed this. The official register of this 
18 1 Dik6tter (ed) 1997,12ff. 
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document, its presentation as reflecting official policy, makes it valuable for 
assessing and quantifying the impact of the 'I P April Decision' on the discourse of 
the CR in IMAR. 
The opening words of the editorial were in the generic CR exaltation mode: 
'The first anniversary of the "Decision of the Centre on How to Handle the 
Problem of INIAT' personally issued by our great leader Chairman Mao has 
now arrived. The 13 million peoples of all nationalities in IMAR, welcome 
in their own battle "red letter day" in the tempestuous class struggle. Today, 
on the publication of the great leader Mao Zedong's personal "13 th April 
Decision" the proletarian revolutionary factions and the great revolutionary 
masses in our district who limitlessly love Chairman Mao's revolutionary 
path, are presently eliminating [Ulanfu] the representative of China's 
Khruschev in IMAR Ulanfu, along with other Party scum, waging a heroic 
battle for the complete victory of the CR. ' 
This passage ended with a direct address to the 'proletarian revolutionary factions 
and great revolutionary masses' to 'unite, and launch a complete new attack on the 
treacherous alliance of Ulanfu and his anti-Party scum. ' 
Such language was supplemented by images of 'the red sun shining on the grassland 
of IMAR, ' and of Mao's directives 'illuminating the victorious future path of the 
CR. ' The grand narrative was of a 'two year long' battle which had been waged, 
'attaining great victories. ' Within this context, the '13 th April Decision' had started a 
subsidiary process of local battle and conflict, which itself had resulted in 'us 
achieving victory together, a great victory for the glorious limitless Mao Zedong 
Thought, and a great victory for Chairman Mao's revolutionary path. ' 
In this battle, the enemies were named as 'the small group of rightists in the Party 
taking China's Khruschev's line, representatives of the Nationalists and capitalists, 
and counter-revolutionaries. ' But they were also referred to nine times in the page- 
long article as 'the anti-Party scum' (candang-yunie). Their actions were referred to 
in metaphorical terms: 'stirring up ill winds, setting ghost fires, creating falsehood 
and lies, pointing the spear towards those in positions of responsibility in the IMAR 
Party Committee. ' These enemy actions were complimented by those of struggle - 
I restoration of power' (fubi), 'seizing power' (duoquan), 'turning over power' 
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(fang'an), all delineating the space, where this struggle was to take place. The 
Centre's narrative of a struggle between two lines was adapted to a local context: 
'The current movement of great strategic meaning to dig up the black line of Ulanfu 
and cleanse the revolutionary masses of Ulanfu's poison is really the continuation 
and development of the struggle between the two classes, the two paths, the two 
lines in our district. ' The Centre's story was therefore transferred to the local 
context, with all the necessary actors and actions added. 
As in the document attacking Wang Duo, the editorial addressed the audience as 
'battle friends, revolutionary comrades. ' This created commonality, based on a 
unified ideology and an acceptance of shared enemies. The common ideology was 
bluntly summarised as 'life is contradictory, life is a struggle' at the end of the 
article. The '13th April Decision' figured as the expression of Mao's thought about 
the local situation, imputing enormous symbolic value to it. It was itself now part of 
a new localised master discourse, one which people used a common voice to speak 
in, sponsoring unified strategies and actions. 182 
But in many ways, celebrating victory in such a context was contradictory, because 
if all life is struggle and conflict, then victory itself, and the position it created, was 
soon threatened again. The situation immediately reverted to a continuation of 
struggle, the appearance of new enemies, and the need to battle against them once 
more. If the '13'h April Decision' was a glorious day for the struggle in IMAR, and a 
step closer to naming and then attacking the hidden enemies, it was also the 
beginning of a new period of struggle - the time when its message was superseded 
and new instructions and calls needed to be given. This was the contradiction at the 
heart of this revolutionary discourse. The new struggle was the full attack upon 
Ulanfu, analysed in the following chapter. 
182 The 'I 3th April Decision' indeed recurred as a canonized source of textual 
authority up till 1969. On the 8th January 1969 attack on another leader, Gao Jinming 
(analysed in Chapter Five) it was referred to as the 'death sentence on Wang Yilun 
and Wang Duo. ' The 'Eight Conditions' were a 'beacon, an historical document 
illuminating the radiance of Mao Zedong Thought... publicly opening the new start 
of the CR in IMAR'(Doc 39,11). 
III 
Conclusion 
The dialogues between the Centre and regional leaders showed a journey towards 
the production of full authoritative, prescriptive language contained in the '13 th April 
Decision, ' exemplifying a new discourse aimed at 'managing' the region by 
asserting the hegemony of the Centre there. This was partly achieved by using the 
symbolic capital of the central leaders - their prestige and authority, and their ability 
to promote new narratives within which local events were interpreted, creating the 
framework for future courses of action. The leaders at the Centre had to claim 
certain vocabularies in order to promote their aims locally. They needed to push a 
sense of unity and overriding purpose. The ethnic constitution of the IMAR did not 
make this easy. The strategy used by the Centre in these dialogues was to attempt to 
suppress the existence of these local concerns, excluding them from the discourse. 
The issuing of the 'I 3th April Decision' and the campaign against the Wangs set out 
the parameters of the CR locally. But the version of a unified identity and a language 
through and by which to convey this was to become the site for great negotiation and 
conflict. Far from being a final statement on 'handling' the IMAR, the '13 th April 
Decision' was only the first event in a deepening of the crisis in IMAR. 
112 
Chapter Three 
The Campaign Against Ulanfn - 1967-1968 
The treatment of b7anfu, Party secretary of the IAMR CCP and Chairman of the 
region since itsfoundation in 1947, was central to the CR in IAMR. In the campaign 
against him the impact of the discourse arisingfrom the 13th April Decision' is 
shown for the first time. In the new narrative Ulanfu symbolised much of the 
specifics of the IAMR situation. For over 20 years he had represented and spoken 
for the region. He had a unique authority there. In the new order of the CR, this was 
a threat, particularly because dealing with Iflanfu involved confronting the issue of 
the meaning of nationality in an area with minorities. The main accusation against 
Ulanfu was to be that he spokefor the interests of one group - the Mongolians. This 
was taken as destroying the unitypromoted by the Centre. The strategy to reduce his 
political : face' and capital involved an attack on two main areas. The first was the 
promotion of the ideological hegemony of class. The second was the creation of a 
new narrative in IAMR, based not on a minority with a specific history, through 
which they were identified, but a common history between all national groups, in 
which patterns of exploitation and narratives of oppression were shared The attack 
on Wanfu's personal authority and prestige as a means to assert the primacy of 
central class ideology and narrative in IAMR was the first step towards the more 
widespread attack on the organization, the IMPP. 
Section One: General Features of the Campaign 
3.1.1 Ulanfu as Symbol: His Importance in IMAR 
On his death in 1988 Ulanfu was described in his official obituary as a 'reliable 
communist soldier, distinguished Party and state leader, outstanding proletarian 
revolutionary, pre-eminent nationality work leader. ' 183 But only 20 years before this 
he was viewed differently. He was 'a counter-revolutionary revisionist, ' 'minority 
splittist, ' 'Mongolian trash, ' 'an outright aristocratic herdlord' married to a 'dog 
183 Bulag 2002,208. 
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wife. ' The invective reached its nadir in 1968 when he was referred to in rebellious 
group pamphlets as a 'bastard' and 'common enemy. ' His immediate family was 
also subject to derogatory attacks. How can one understand this journey from 
holding the most influential positions in the region, able to speak directly to the 
Centre 'on behalf of all the people of IMAR, empowered to use the most 'power- 
laden' language, to becoming the passive target of attacks? This journey from one 
end of the power spectrum to the other illuminates the dynamics of power in the CR 
in IMAR. This is done through the very specific discourse that was deployed to 
construct his fall and signify his changing power-status. 
Ulanfa is central to an understanding of the CR in IMAR. He had played a major 
role in the region's politics and history from the 1930s onwards. He had headed the 
Party in the region, had been Chairman of the local civilian government, and taken 
the lead role in the military district. 184 This concentration of formal responsibilities 
in one person has never reoccurred in IMAR. Ulanfa had arrived at this through a 
history of interaction and service to the CCP. In Yan'an in the 1940s he reputedly 
helped the CCP formulate their policies towards minorities. At that time he built a 
strong relationship with the leaders-to-be, Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi. 185 This paid 
off in the 1950s and 1960s, when his direct link to them, and his posts as alternate 
member of the Politburo and second secretary of the North China Bureau of the 
CCP, meant that he was able to lobby for interests he believed important for the 
IMAR. But Ulanfa also had political capital of his own. He had joined the Party in 
1925, and had impeccable credentials through his participation in the early 
revolutionary movements. He was originally a protegd of Li Dazhao, who was also 
influential in the early career of Mao Zedong. In addition to this, Ulanfu could claim 
to represent a further constituency, the Mongolians, who were important allies for 
the Communists in the Northern Chinese campaigns. Through this combination of 
positions and relationships, Ulanfu accrued influence and authority. He was central 
to the narrative of revolutionary history in the IMAR, and to its new identity, and 
had immense symbolic importance. 
But there was ambiguity and hybridity at the heart of Ulanfu's symbolic power. 
184 lbid 213. 
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Bulag argues in his chapter on Ulanfa in The Mongols at China's Edge that his 
political career fits into two narratives. One was the centrally sponsored version, in 
which he was seen as a model representative of the 'national minorities, ' faithful to 
the project of the centralised (and overwhelmingly Han) Chinese state from its 
inception, a guard against splittism, and a preserver of 'national unity' (a narrative 
temporarily suspended in the CR but which returned in the late 1970s). The second 
was the localised version in which he promoted Mongolian interests in the region as 
far as possible in the face of demographic inequality (at that time, Mongolians made 
up only 10% of the IMAR population) and political reality (which meant 
acknowledging the general indifference of the only players that might have helped 
IMAR become independent in the 1930s and 1940s, the Mongolian People's 
Republic and the USSR). 186 
Tluoughout his career Ulanfu had to face two constituencies - the Centre, and the 
locality - and perform in their separate discourses. He appeased the Centre, with 
their assertion of the primacy of national unity (i. e. unity to the Chinese state created 
in 1949), to which any strong expressions of Mongolian cultural and political 
identity was viewed as a strategy for autonomy. But his power in IMAR was based 
on his constituency there, in particular the Mongolians, on whose support he relied 
to have credibility. As Bulag stated, Ulanfu lived 'between two worlds. ' 187 A 
Mongolian who could not speak Mongolian, he was one of the few minority cadres 
who attained high positions within the CCP. He distilled many of the key features of 
the problematic relationship between the Centre and IMAR - the desire for national 
unity on the one hand, and for greater regional autonomy on the other. The treatment 
of him in the CR showed this relationship at breaking point. The prime territory was 
the conflict over which should take priority, class relations (social ones) or those 
based on national minority status (and therefore on ethnicity). 188 
185 lbid 220. 
186 This is not to assert that Ulanfu was viewed by all Mongolians as acting for their 
benefit. See Bulag 2002, Chapter Five, for a description of the tensions and different 
versions of Mongolian identity that existed, along with the non-Mongol Dauer 
minority who also lived in IMAR, and articulated their own competing sense of 
identity - in this case as the minority under another minority (Mongolian). 187 Ibid 207. 
188 Ulanfu's power was sufficiently potent that even after the attacks in the CR he 
was to return to positions of influence in post-Maoist PRC (he was appointed a vice 
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3.1.2 The Attack on Ulanfu: Chronology and Structure of the Campaign 
Ulanfu's position on nationality was signalled as problematic as early as 1965 when 
he was accused of being 'soft' on Mongolian class enemies within the CCP. 189 At 
the Qianmen Hotel meeting of the North China Bureau, of which he was second 
secretary in May 1966 he was attacked for opposing the Centre (ironically by the 
then Chinese President Liu Shaoqi, who was himself about to become the chief 
I villain' of the CR). Ulanfu's failure to understand the key importance of class 
struggle according to Deng Xiaoping, another attendde of the meeting, led to his 
dismissal from his Party posts by the Centre in August 1966. This was followed by 
his removal from his Military District chairmanship in November, leaving him only 
with the nominal title of Chairman of the region. This was taken from him in 
1968.190 
The further meetings from February to April 1967 analysed in Chapter Two resulted 
in the '13'h April Decision' which sanctioned open attack on Ulanfu. Here the local 
campaign against him mirrored that against Liu Shaoqi and other key figures 
centrally. Before Ulanfu could be openly attacked a certain amount of preparation 
and management was needed. He was not named directly in an IM Daily editorial as 
'the key representative in the IMAR taking the capitalist, revisionist road' until 29 th 
August 1967 (though he was directly named as early as June in rebellious group 
publications with more limited audience in IMAR). 191 
In material attacking Ulanfu toward the end of the period (winter 1967 to spring 
1968) there was a more explicit mention of the IMPP. Just as there had been a period 
when Ulanfu was under attack, but not yet named within the discourse directly, so 
one can plot a similar journey from the indirect to the direct explication of an 
I enemy' counter-organisation, the IMPP. It is impossible to impute this to some 
premier in the 1980s before his death in 1989). The attempt in the CR to deny him 
power, therefore, proved to have temporary impact, as was the unsuccessful parallel 
attempt to deal with the class/nationality clash. 189 Woody 1993, ii. 
190 Ibid. 
191 This article twice referred to the fact that it was permissable to 'openly name' 
Ulanfa. 
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grand design at the opening of the CR in IMAR. On the other hand the extension of 
the attack, from individuals to supposed groups and organisations, indicated the 
increasingly ambitious scope of the movement as it proceeded. Although the 
campaign against Ulanfu continued after 1968 (well into the 1970s, in fact), it was 
most concentrated in late 1967 and early 1968, when other factors (IMPP being the 
most important of them) had yet to feature. After the spring of 1968 the IMPP, as a 
named entity, became the key element to the campaign in IMAR. Ulanfu from this 
stage merely came to represent or symbolise this. 
A key feature of the campaign against Ulanfu was that his removal in 1966 was not 
just symbolic but physical. From this date, till his formal rehabilitation and return to 
public positions in 1978, he was not allowed back to IMAR. Most of the time he was 
either under house arrest in Beijing, or, towards the end of the CR, in Hunan. 192 
Unlike Liu Shaoqi centrally, or Wang Duo and Wang Yilun locally, Ulanfu was not 
made available for public attack, nor subject to denunciation or violence in person. 
This meant that he was an 'invisible' presence in the attack documents aimed at him. 
None were 'performed' before him or upon him, as some of the attacks on the 
Wangs were. His absence restricted the opportunity to extend the violence of the 
language into violent actions on him as a person, but increased the symbolic aspect 
of the attack. More than other targets (e. g., the Wangs, in the dialogues looked at in 
Chapter Two, whose voices at least appeared, even if symbolically marginalized by 
being put in parentheses) Ulanfu's voice in the CR was mediated through edited 
quotations from his own works and speeches, or simply through the attribution of 
words to him. His direct contemporaneous voice within this discourse did not figure. 
He always spoke from the past, controlled and managed in the narrative in which he 
had been confined. 
3.1.3 The Labels for Ulanfu 
Ulanfu's 'name, ' his reputation, needed careful handling. Its devaluation and 
destruction took preparation. A strategy was needed to disempower him in the new 
discourse. The various labels used for Ulanfu in the material analysed here indicate 
192 Bulag 2002,226-7. 
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the pre-occupations of the campaign against him, and its general policy direction. 
1) July 67 The oldest and biggest splittist in IMAR. 
2) July 67 A princely aristocrat (wanggong guizu) worming his way into 
the Party. 
3) Sept 67 Counter-revolutionary revisionist, splittist element Ulanfu. 
4) Sept 67 The chief representative of China's Khrushchev in IMAR. 
5) Sept 67 A power holder in the Party (dangquanpai) taking the 
capitalist road. 
6) Sept 67 The typical dutiful son (xiao zi xisun) of landlords, herdlords, 
and capitalists. 
7) Oct 67 A jackal from the same lair (yiqiu zhehe) as Liu Shaoqi. 
8) Oct 67 The modem Genghis Khan. 
9) Oct 67 A representative of the nobility inside the CCP. 
10 ) Oct 67 The swom enemy of the working people of all nationalities. 
11) Oct 67 A time-bomb (dingshi zhadan) buried in the northern border 
region. 
12) Oct 67 The representative within the Party of Inner Mongolian feudal 
herdlords, landlords, bureaucrats and upper class clergy. 
13) Jan 68 The arch criminal destroying the national minority policies in 
the district, cities and the autonomous region. The black hand 
of IMAR. 
14) Jan 68 The watchdog for feudal herdlords. 
15 )Feb 68 The biggest rightist in the IMAR CCP. 
16) Feb 68 Scum of the Mongolian nationality (menggu minzu de bailei). 
17) Feb 68 The sworn enemy (bugong dailian de sidi) of all nationalities 
18) April 68 Careerist, schemer, double-dealer (Iiang mianpai). 
19) May 68 Chief representative of the nationalist counter-revolutionaries 
in IMAR. 
20) May 68 The backstage boss of cow ghosts and snake spirits (niugui- 
sheshen). 
21) May 68 The black manipulator of landlords, rich [peasants and 
herdsmen], counter-revolutionaries, [as well as] bad and 
rightist elements. 
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By 1969, Ulanfu was simply 'the leader of a treacherous anti-Party clique. ' 
These labels illustrated the two narratives in which Ulanfa existed: those which are 
generic and lifted from the discourse of the Centre and those that relate specifically 
to the situation in IMAR, and made little sense applied outside it. 18, for instance, 
was used about Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in the central campaign, as was 21 
which used generic labels (the 'five bad classes') and a generic noun ('black 
backstage boss'). Reference in 12 and 14 to the category of 'herdlords' (muzhu) was 
specific to IMAR. Similarly, reference to Ulanfu as the 'Ghenghis Khan' of the 
modem times was also a label originating locally. Between these two categories fell 
a number of labels lifted from the central discourse and adapted to local use (3 and 
4, for instance) which placed Ulanfu in a hierarchy of villainy directly related to the 
'bad elements' he represented at the Centre. 
These labels showed the importance of class classification in the condemnation of 
Ulanfii. Eight of the labels (3,4,6,9,12,14,19 and 21) condemned Ulanfu because 
of his representing the rights of specific bad classes. But others focused on the 
claims about Ulanfu's 'nationalism. ' He was simply a 'national splittist element' 
(minzufenUezhuyifenzi). The reference to Genghis Khan belonged to this group. 
Ulanfu was labelled as the enemy of 'all national groups. ' These labels showed a 
process of increasingly free and unbridled attacks on him, from the formulaic labels 
in I and 2, to the outright and contemptuous denunciations of 16 and 18. They plot 
the process whereby someone's social face and influence was dismantled and 
represent the gradual devaluation of the 'currency' of Ulanfu's authority. They stand 
as the material indications in this discourse of his loss of formal power in the region. 
3.1.4 Ideology and Nationality: the Centre's Position 
At the heart of the campaign against Ulanfu was the attack on the discourse and 
ideology of nationality (minzu) and national minorities (shaoshu minzu) which had 
been promoted in the PRC since 1949. And central to this was the management of 
the relationship between the majority Han and the sorts of identities allowed the 
PRC's various designated minorities. This was politically and culturally sensitive. 
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There was a history of how the terms of this discourse had been set and the 
vocabularies created. In the Republican Period (1911-1949), the canonical statement 
on the relationship between China's national groups was contained in Sun Yatsen's 
assertion of the equality of all groups 'in the context of integration and eventual 
assimilation. ' The American 'melting pot' was a powerful inspiration for this model. 
According to Sun, there were five major ethnic groups: Han, Manchu, Mongols, Hui 
and Tibetans. 193 But as Bulag pointed out, the position of ethnic groups in China 
(beyond the Han) was different from America because for many of these (many 
more than the five ordained by Sun) there was a memory, sometimes very recent, of 
having been parts of independent or semi-independent territory. 194 For these 
minorities, the desire to Preserve identity went hand-in-hand with control and special 
rights over specific territories. Central promotion of unification could therefore be 
read as trying to pursue a process of colonisation. 195 The Mongolians of IMAR fell 
into this category. 
Mao had made explicit statements about the issue of national minority self- 
determination early in his career. In a declaration to the Inner Mongolian people in 
December 1935 he had stated that 'only by fighting with us can the Inner Mongolian 
nation preserve the glory of the epoch of Genghis Khan, avoid the extinction of their 
nation, embark on the path of national revival and obtain independence and freedom 
like that enjoyed by the nations of Turkey, Poland, the Ukraine and the Caucasus. ' 196 
But such an explicit endorsement of support for the region's independence was not 
elevated to official ideology in the canonical works of Mao Zedong published after 
1949. From the 1950s the key label was 'national minority' (shaoshu minzu), 
placing groups within the greater entity of the new PRC. This was used ostensibly to 
guarantee some level of independence for these groups, and to satisfy their 
contending claims, whilst preserving national unity. 
Mao's works (the ones that appeared in the official five volume Selected Works 
edited and sanctioned by the Centre, which should be regarded as one of the main 
193 Atwood 2002,103 and Atwood 1993,7. 
194 Bulag 2002,18-19. 
195 lbid 105. 
196 Schram (trans) 1999,71. 
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distillations of ideological orthodoxy) contained few explicit treatments of 
nationality issues. 197 The treatise 'On Coalition Government' (originally published 
in 1945) contained a very short section on 'The Problem of Minority Nationalities' 
in which all national groups within the PRC were assured equality and unity (but not 
autonomy). 198 This message occurred throughout Mao's official works. 199 By the 
time of Mao's influential 1956 Statement, 'On the Ten Major Relationships' the 
majority Han were instilled with the task of 'actively help[ing] the minority 
nationalities to develop their economy and culture. ' But the 'unity of nationalities' 
was still important. 200 A year later in 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions 
among the People' Mao merely stated that 'it is imperative to foster good relations 
between the Han people and the minority nationalities. 201 Mao admitted here that 
'local nationality chauvinism' was as much an issue as Han chauvinism. This was 
enshrined in the 'Constitution of the Communist Party of China' adopted in 
September 1956, in which it stated that 'our country is a multi-national state... The 
Communist Party of China must make special efforts to raise the status of national 
minorities... The Party opposes all tendencies to great-nation chauvinism and local 
nationalism, both of which hamper the unity of nationalities. ' 202 
This entered the local discourse in IMAR. In the quotes attributed to him in a 1967 
pamphlet (issued by the Hohhot Revolutionary Alliance Headquarters) Mao. Zedong 
spoke about the 'Han having positively to help national minorities implement 
policies to develop economic and cultural construction, ' of 'liberating the national 
minorities' and of 'us uniting with all national minorities, regardless of whether they 
are big or small... we wish to unite with them. 203 This sense of patronage over the 
minorities was distilled in the metaphor of the PRC being a 'great family' which 
must be protected against splittism. The master ideology in the CR from the Centre, 
which promoted the importance of unity, and the reduction of nationality and 
197 See Martin 1982 for the evolution of the Mao canon, especially 4-11 on the 
sanitising of Mao's original works and their development to 'state ideology. ' 198 Mao Tse-tung, vol 3,305. 199 Ibid, vol 5,35: 'It is of vital importance to unite with the minority nationals. ' 
200 Ibid, 296. 
201 Ibid, 406. 
202 'Documents of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Sept 1956- 
A ril 1969, vol 1, Union Research Institute Hong Kong 1971,3. 20P Doc 13,2-3. 
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minority questions to ones of social, class relations, effectively closed off the option 
204 
of granting the larger freedoms for regions that Mao had talked of in 1935. 
3.1.5 Class 
Orthodox communist ideology had introduced the predominance of class over 
ethnicity, whether framed in terms of nationality or otherwise. In the key statements 
on the issue of nationalities the commitment to 'equality' and liberation transcended 
all other issues. 'The capitalists, ' Lenin was quoted as saying, 'always put 
nationality demands first... But the proletariat believes that nationality demands 
should serve the interests of class struggle. 205 The aim of Marxism was to guarantee 
that 'all national minorities are equal (pingdeng), and have self-determination 
(zyuequan), the workers of all groups joining up. ' The expression of differences 
based on ethnicity or nationality was, in the end, an attempt to assert unique rights, 
to claim a privileged position. It was a means whereby the old class antagonisms 
could be reintroduced into the relations between national minority groups, to assist 
the dominance of one group over another. Class was the predominant relationship 
and ethnic/nationality relationships had to be translated into class-type ones to make 
sense in this system. 
Mao Zedong had not taken the leading role in introducing the Marxist-Leninist 
discourse of class and class struggle to China, as Luk made clear in his history of the 
formation of Chinese Communist thinking in the 1920s. 206 It was a project in which 
many Chinese had participated. Even something as fundamental as the concept of a 
proletariat or peasantry took a long time to define properly: 'The founders of the 
CCP... were often indiscriminate in treating the workers and peasants as one broad 
category of social elements. 207 But the key, point, and the one that Mao was to 
exploit to such political effect, was the primacy of class relations above all others, 
204 'Theoretically, the Party's position has always been that so-called "nationality 
chracteristics" are in reality only the characteristics of the bourgeoisie of that nation: 
there is a natural harmony of interests between workers and peasants the world over. 
Thus, all national struggle is in reality class struggle' (Dreyer 1968,4). 205 Doc 68,2-3. 
206 Luk 1990. 
207 Luk 1990,165. 
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and their connection to means of production or land use. He was also adept at 
adapting this to the situation in China. 
Mao's position on class had been set out early in his intellectual career. The opening 
words of the first essay in the official version of his Selected Works had answered 
the famous question: 'Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? v208 with a list of 
good and bad social classes: 
" Landlord and comprador class 
" Middle bourgeoisie 
" Petty bourgeoisie (including owner peasants, master handicraftsmen, 
lower level intellectuals, small traders) 
" Semi-proletariat (semi-owner peasants, poor peasants, small 
handicraftsmen, shop assistants, peddlers) 
" Proletariat 
While these categories had been refined over the 30 years from 1926 to the 1950s, 
the fundamental principles of classification and the need for social categories had 
notchanged. 
In an area with significant numbers of national minorities like IMAR, the assertion 
of standard central class labels was problematic. At the root of this lay the different 
histories and cultures between Han and Mongolian. In the IMAR many Mongolians 
were not, historically, economically dependent on settled agrarian cultivation as the 
Han settlers were. They were mainly pastoralists and their relationship to the land 
and land ownership was therefore different. 209 This left the Centre with a choice: 
either special terms needed to be created in public discourse to convey (and accept) 
this difference, or the central categories were rigidly imposed. There was a long 
history of the process of management of these two competing pressures. The CR 
208 'Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society, ' March 1926 in Mao 1963-1977, vol 
1,13ff. 
209 See 'Grassland Identities' in Bulag (forthcoming): 'Pastoralism as economic and 
social practice adapted to the sociology of the grasslands and dating back to 
antiquity, has become the ultimate cultural symbol defining the core of Mongol 
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saw the peak of the latter option, but it had been a contentious issue since 1949. 
Bulag's retelling of the complicated history of land reform in IMAR after 1949 
illustrated this well. In the initial movement, redistribution of land was based on 
classifying people in IMAR according to class labels from the discourse of the 
Centre. But the blanket imposition of these labels was unsuccessful. A CCP 
document in 1949 admitted that local unrest was common because of this process: 
'In the pure and semi-agricultural pastoral areas, the pastoral economy has suffered 
severe damages. IMAR had few tenant Mongolian farmers. Pastoral farming was ill 
suited to land reform. ' 210 So initial policies of equal treatment based on the 
centralised class ideology had to be adapted to the local situation. The discourse was 
adapted and localised. 
In the CR such accommodation disappeared. The attack on Ulanfu saw people 
divided into two broad categories: national ones, and those applicable to specific 
local conditions. These are set out in the table below: 
Table 4: Attack on Ulanfu Material: Differences in Class Nomenclature between the Centre 
and IMAR 
National Class Labels (Used Locally) Purely Lýcal Clasiti 
'Landlord' (&--hu) A ferdlords'Outzhu) 
'Rich peasants' (lunong) 'Rich herdsmen" (fimm) 
'Capitalists' (zihenjia) 'Hei-der-worknien' (mugong) 
Tolorusers' (-7himin) A lerders' (mumin) 
Trolet ariat' (wu(. -hanjieji) 'Nornadic herders' (voumu) 
'Bourgeoisie' (zhongchanjiqji) 'Lamas' (lamu) 
'Princely aristocrats' (shangt. -mg 
wanggong gui.: u) 211 
'Poor herdsmen" (pinku mumin), also 
conveyed by the Mongolian term 
viulumalaqin * 
Toorish herdsmen' (zhong(leng mumin) 
also conveyed by tile Mongolian term 
va(lulikenialaqin * 
identity. ' 
2 ýO Bulag 2003,119-120. 
21 Mongolian leaders installed by Qing authorities and claiming descendency frorn 
Genghis Khan. 
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* Both transliterations from Mongolian words into Chinese characters. 
The attempts to articulate and accommodate 'special' circumstances and deal with 
them within the central discourse can be located in this vocabulary. The success or 
failure of this vocabulary to convey to the audience in IMAR the real social and 
cultural situation there best demonstrated the success of the hegemony of the Centre 
and the project which had been ongoing since the late 1940s when the land reform 
programme was instigated of imposing a sense of identity rooted in class, not 
ethnicity. 
This process had the potential to cause great conflict. The use of central terms based 
on 'class' labels, while superficially attempting to accommodate the specifics of 
IMAR, was underpinned by the Centre's claim that class analysis was based on 
universal criterion. The acceptance of the universality of class terms and the 
ideology supporting them was not negotiable. It was to be imposed. In the CR, 
where the discourse and ideology of class reached its most extreme form, the IMAR 
was not seen as a 'special' area. Such special areas did not exist. In this context, 
wanting local adaptations to the master terms only betrayed a darker purpose - the 
desire for local autonomy and independence. 
This was the basis for the main accusation against Ulanfu. In presenting nationality 
considerations as equal to or more important than class ones Ulanfu had betrayed the 
Centre's ideology. The Centre presented class ideology as being 'in the best 
interests' of the audience in IMAR, whether the audience was Mongolian or Han 
Chinese. But the IMAR CR campaign saw overwhelming violence against a far 
larger proportion of Mongolians than Han. The language of class and its hegemony 
was used to attack the national minority, Mongolians, and frame them as enemies. 
This assertion of the primacy of class over nationality labels also appealed to the 
Han majority of the IMAR audience. As in Gramsci's concept of hegemony, power 
relations are based on forms of consent, and dynamics between ruled and ruler. The 
condemnation of Ulanfa's 'minoritising 212 policies in the CR played to Han 
212 'Minoritising' was an expression to convey Ulanfu's promotion of policies that 
supported the national minorities, asserting these above those that promoted class 
interests or considerations. 
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grievances over how they had been treated in the early land reform campaigns, and 
threatened over their status in the IMAR as it was. Despite what it said about the 
primacy of 'national unity, ' the CR campaign exacerbated this conflict. 
3.1.6 Ulanfu's Counter-Ideology 
Ulanfa was presented not just as having destructive, negative influence but as 
representing and promoting his own 'counter-ideology' articulating and materially 
embodying the primacy of 'nationality' over 'class' in a common language. In 
Triticise Ulanfu, Encourage Battle, ' published in August 1967, the attack essay 
referred to the following 'Ulanfu' counter-policies: 
'Don't struggle, don't disfinguish, don't divide according to class' (bu 
dou, bufen, bu huajyie): the assertion of the special social composition 
of IMAR, based on ethnic, not class, composition. 
'Stable, broad, long' (wen, kuang, chang): this originated in Ulanfu's 
prescription that the revolution in IMAR should be slower because it 
must be 'stable, with broad policies, and last longer. ' This was seen in 
the text as demanding policies different from those implemented in areas 
where the Han were in the majority. 
The 'theory that revolution harms production' ('geming pohuai 
shengchan' lun): an attempt not to implement full-scale revolution by 
pretending that such a revolution would damage the material well-being 
of the local people. 213 
In this attack, it was claimed that these policies were based on a 'common language' 
(gongtong yuyan) shared by Ulanfu and 'China's Khrushchev' (Liu Shaoqi). The 
guiding ideology of this was labelled as the 'theory that class struggle will die out' 
(fleji douzheng ximielun). 214 Another policy imputed to Ulanfu was to promote 
213 Doc 18,12-13. 
214 Ibid 15. A theory based on the idea that the persistence of class difference under 
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greater minority unity so that they had more say in the areas in which they lived. 
This turned into the demand that they be 'the masters in their own territory' 
(shaoshu minzu dangfia zuozhu). 215 Connected with this was the 'minoritising'216 of 
organisations and cadres in IMAR (zizhifiguan minzuhua, ganbu minzuhua). Most 
comprehensive of all was the reference to the 'three foundations' (san ge fichu), 
encapsulating the key points from a speech Ulanfu made to the IMAR Party 
Committee in late 1965, in which he had demanded progress in 'politics, economics, 
and culture. ' In all of these areas, Ulanfu was accused of committing major 
ideological 'crimes' (not mistakes - his actions were seen as deliberate). For culture, 
Ulanfu was accused of indirectly promoting the study of Mongolian by demanding 
Ia common language' for all cadres to work in. 217 
The more serious accusation was that Ulanfu had produced an ideology with its own 
discourse in opposition to the Centre. In this counter-ideology (materially 
represented by the quotes taken from Ulanfu's work and assembled as evidence of 
his darker purpose) a key vocabulary of 'minoritising' was asserted, in contradiction 
to the one of unity through common class labels from the Centre. An article on 6th 
March 1968 accused Ulanfu of having a 'national minority viewpoint' (minzyguan). 
In this article the basis of 'nationality viewpoint' was Ulanfa's 'three foundations. ' 
This was the area in which Ulanfu was attacked. 
3.1.7 Narrative 
The class ideology of the Centre was promoted through being encapsulated in an 
historical narrative, legitimising the right for certain privileged groups to use key 
terms and monopolise these within the new discourse. In this narrative, exploitation 
had ended in the seminal moment of liberation in 1949.1949 was the watershed 
socialism meant that class struggle must still be waged. Maoists believed that the 
dictatorship of the people meant that while class contradictions continued to exist, 
they could be solved peacefully. They accused 'rightists' of assuming that economic 
and material progress would lead to the dying out of class struggle on its own. 
2 15 Doc 16, Issue 17,7, echoing the CCP's ideal that the proletariat should be 
masters in their own house. 
216 Increasing proportion of members of minorities serving as officials in local 
government. 217 Doc 4, Issue 17,7. 
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between the old and new history. The new history had, as its foundation, the 
acceptance of the centrality of class and common class labels. Liberation was based 
in this history on social, not ethnic identity. The key tenns in the new discourse 
conveying this history and narrative were class not ethnic ones. 218 
Such a narrative had no space for the notion of a group of people not belonging 
clearly to the system of exploitation articulated and labelled in it. The experience of 
exploitation was universal, as was the language through which it was conveyed. The 
idea of IMAR having a 'special history' with its own narrative based on nationality 
rather than class labels was only evidence of destroying national unity and going 
against the people and the Centre. Acceptance of the Centre's class ideology in 
IMAR therefore also meant acceptance of the Cente's historical narrative. It was not 
possible to accept both the primacy of class, and a historical narrative that 
accommodated a special Mongolian history. If class was paramount, IMAR history 
was one of competing classes, with the oppressed marching towards liberation just 
like the national one. 'Exploitation, ' 'fiberation, ' 'progress, ' the keywords in the 
new discourse, were not based on ethnic labels. 
This issue of narrative works in many areas and on many levels. In the analysis that 
follows, it was located in the treatment of Ulanfu, and the significance and 
interpretation of his own history. It was in his history that the conflict between the 
two narratives -a local one and the one from the Centre - was represented. He was 
shown as setting and defining himself within a narrative in which legitimate power 
and authority were attributed to nationality (and therefore ethnic) identity, not class. 
Ulanfu's symbolic value - and the threat he was seen as posing - was sited here. 
218 Apter and Saich 1995 describe the narrative of Chinese revolutionary history as 
being rooted in the Yan'an experience where Mao's life was symbolic of redemption 
through revolution. 
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Section Two: The Attack 
3.2.1 Material Carriers 
The material carriers of the attack on Ulanfu fell into two very broad categories. The 
first was contained in a series of articles and items in the IM Daily. This constituted 
the 'official' attack on Ulanfu. Its language was more restrained (illustrated by the 
late naming of its main target). In this material, the ideological factor was more 
important, presenting criticisms of Ulanfu within the broader terms of his 
representing local opposition to instructions from the Centre on class and class 
struggle. There were some accounts of specific public meetings, in which voices 
were recorded representing the condemnation of Ulanfu by different sections of the 
IMAR public. This material represented the public attack on Ulanfu and his power 
base. 
The second band of material was more varied, sponsored by specific factions. Its 
criticisms were fiercer, and conveyed by more aggressive language. Within this 
category there were a variety of sub-genres. One of the most common was 
collections of Ulanfu's own 'black sayings' (as they were frequently called) with 
editorial comment and notation. Another was prose narratives or chronologies of 
Ulanfu's 'black counter-revolutionary deeds. ' As the first type of material presented 
a counter-language, a 'language of the enemy' from the other side, so the second 
type presented the 'counter-history, ' the history that had occurred to support this 
language, with other named individuals, a detail of the organisations and histories 
that this narrative of treachery had contained. A final kind of material, but less well 
represented in the collection analysed here, was purely ideological attack - 
presentation and analytic discussion of the ideological heresies attributed to Ulanfu. 
The producers of this material indicated who the administrative implementers in the 
I new history' were. The IM Daily carried the voice of the new establishment, close 
to the Party and revolutionary committee, with their capital to call on and 
supplement. The other material arose from the varying groups competing with each 
other, speaking to different memberships, attempting to either enhance their own 
status or denigrate others, with affiliations varying from universities to work units. 
129 
Some groups were set up to specifically attack Ulanfu, demonstrating participation 
in the CR. 
3.2.2 Ideological Attack in the Official Material 
This section analyses two articles from the IM Daily which contain attacks on 
Ulanfu on the ideological level from early 1968. The first, published on 15th January 
1968, was entitled Tlanfu's Arch Crimes Destroying the National Minority Policies 
in the Leagues, Cities and the Autonomous Region. ' The second, from 6th March 
1968, was entitled Triticise Ulanfu's Nationality Viewpoint (minzuguan). ' 
I 
The 15'h January article was authored by Leng Xiongxiang. No affiliation was given. 
It is divided into four sections, each carrying a label for Ulanfu: (1) 'activist peddler 
of 'peaceful democracy in the new era'; (2) 'faithful guard-dog of the feudal 
herdlords'; (3) 'swom enemy of the dictatorship of the proletariat; ' (4) 'chief leader 
of the national minority splittists in the IMAR Party. ' The introit to the piece was set 
within the master narrative, viewing the founding of the PRC as the moment when 
all classes and national minorities were liberated from exploitation. It also asserted 
the primacy of Mao and the Centre in this liberation: 
'On I" October 1949, and the founding of the PRC, the end came to the 
bitter time of the "100 years of humiliation, and the disunity of 500 million 
people" of all the national groups of our people, and implemented the 
unprecedented unification (tongyi) of the country and unity Quanjie) of all 
the national minorities within China... The national minority areas, cities, 
and autonomous regions are one manifestation of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, a part of the composition of the dictatorship of the proletariat in 
our country... This is a glorious example of our great leader Chairman Mao 
using Marxist-Leninist nationality theories to solve the problem of 
nationality in China... A great victory for Mao Zedong thought. ' 
This was the strong assertion not only of the categories from the Centre 
('proletariat'), of the power holders (Chairman Mao and the Party) and of the 
carriers of their ideological expression (Mao Zedong Thought, Marxism-Leninism), 
but also of the absolute primacy of the objective of the Centre of 'unity, ' and 
ownership of this concept and term in 'our country, ' the country of 'all national 
minorities. 
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The writer took the key-phrase that 'the principal issue for revolution is one of 
power' from the Centre's discourse. In IMAR this was distilled into a struggle 
between the dictatorship of the 'princely aristocrats' (wanggong guizu), the 'big 
herdlords, big landlords, and the big capitalists, ' and the construction of 'the 
political power of all national groups. ' As 'the region's Khrushchev, ' Ulanfu had 
I openly opposed Chairman Mao in his project of building a new democratic country 
led by the proletariat. ' Ulanfu's true purpose in opposing the Centre's ideology of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat was to realise his 'dream of a greater Mongolian 
empire' (da Menggu diguo), and to protect the bad local classes while they 
continued their exploitation. It was critical for the coherence of this ideology that 
one accepted a specific version of the past, in which the classes outlined above had 
indeed followed the patterns of oppression described. 'Exploitation' (boxue) and 
A oppression' (yapo) were the key actions in this historical narrative, addressed or 
applied to the 'good' classes, those liberated after 1949. The article claimed that 
Ulanfu had denied his audience empowerment by refusing them recourse to class 
language, to the means to identify their social position, and therefore to justify their 
demands and work towards liberation based on this. 'Herdlords, ' Ulanfu is claimed 
to have said, 'do not have class in their heads. ' This proved Ulanfu's 'denial' of 
class. What Ulanfu had allegedly done, since 1949, was to reproduce the old pattems 
of exploitation, through protections of the chief actors, the 'feudal herdlords, the 
upper classes of the nationality groups and the upper levels of the religious leaders' 
against 'the poor herders. ' This was perfectly compatible with the analysis of pre- 
1949 exploitation. 
One of the key means to impose unity was through organisational and linguistic 
standardisation. Ulanfu was accused in this article of opposing this by promoting 
I minoritisation' (minzuhua) of the organisations; of autonomous rule. He was also 
accused of mounting Campaigns that promoted nationality interests: 'making 
national minorities the lords, ' leading to 'the dictatorship of nationalism, ' and 'the 
nationalism of the leadership organs in the IMAR CCP. ' To achieve this, Ulanfu had 
appropriated key terms from the legitimate discourse of the Centre, like 
'dictatorship' and 'Joining up, ' but changed them by placing them in an illegitimate 
I nationality' context: 'The state is always a class state, and political power is always 
f4class political power. "' Nationality was not the key. Class relations were. Attempts 
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to nationalise concepts and institutions from the Centre were merely a means to 
create disunity by undermining the hegemony of class. 
Ulanfu's specific political ambition had been to subvert the unity of a country built 
on class relations with 'splittist' notions, dividing the classes from one national 
minority to another, and destroying their common ground for revolution and 
liberation. He himself had worked for a 'Greater Mongolian Empire' under the 
dictatorship of capitalists. The ideological basis of this 'new empire' would build on 
what was labelled in the article (and which figured heavily in the labelling of 
Ulanfu's thought throughout the campaign against him) as the 'three theories' (san 
ge Nun), a counter-ideology to the 'correct thinking' from the Centre in this 
universe of starkly opposed forces and ideas. The 'three theories' were political, 
economic and cultural: 
Political: To have both Mongolian and Han in the organisational 
headquarters (in effect, to have a higher proportion of Mongolians in 
authority locally than the Centre deemed necessary). 
Economic: 'Mongolians can graze sheep, and so can the Han' 
(supporting Mongolian -pastoral patterns of land use against centrally 
promoted agrarian ones). 
Cultural: 'Study two languages. With a common language, there is a 
common heart' (reference to the use of different scripts in Mongolian 
People's Republic and IMAR - see following section). 
Ulanfa's theories were sited in the three critical areas where the Centre authorities 
needed to exercise control. Admitting a 'national' dimension in any of these 
conceded legitimacy to national minority demands and to identity being rooted in 
something other than class. The Centre promoted, instead, a 'common political 
basis, ' a 'common economic basis, ' and finally a 'common cultural basis, ' through 
the ideologies respectively of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism, 
and Mao Zedong Thought. These, they asserted, were the firmest foundations of 
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unity. 
The assertion of commonality was a theme of the second IM Daily article from 6 th 
March 1968. Unlike the earlier article, 'Criticise Ulanfu's Nationalism' was the 
product of two groups, rather than individually named authors - the Central Party 
North Bureau Organisation (Red Alliance) and the IMAR Hohhot City Red Guard 
Third Division. This disseminated the idea that Mao's 'national minority struggle is 
an issue of class struggle, ' the most 'scientific, most penetrating, most beautiful 
summary' of Marxist-Leninist teaching on the issue of nationality. Marx, the article 
declared, had said that 'national minority groups have different class organisations. ' 
In any group of national minorities, there existed classes and class struggle. 
Conflicts within such groups were due to 'class struggle. ' The article mentioned the 
same narrative of exploitation and oppression as the first: 'In old China, oppressing 
the labouring people in the national minority groups were the imperialists, the 
counter-revolutionaries of the Nationalist Party, and the counter-revolutionary 
classes in all minority groups. ' The labouring peoples in these groups, both Han and 
national minority, shared common enemies. They fought a 'common struggle' 
(gongtong douzheng). And with the victory of the CCP in 1949, they shared a 
common liberation: 'From the first day of the founding of the PRC, all nationalities 
joined up to become a friendly, co-operative family. ' This metaphor of the 'big 
family' of China (dafiating) was meant to exercise a powerful emotional hold over 
those to whom it was directed, constructing a sense of kinship and allegiance in a 
constituency that was in fact very diverse. 
A new term in this article, however, was that of 'class struggle, ' a key import from 
central Maoism, and one of the most powerful prescriptions of the political 
programme of the CR. Class struggle, the necessary antidote to exploitation and 
oppression from the historical narrative outlined above, was the means to liberation, 
to the realisation of justice in the new society. Mao's concept of 'national minority 
struggle in the end being class struggle' was juxtaposed in the article to a direct 
quote from Ulanfu, who was said to have declared that 'nationality contradictions 
are the main thing, class contradictions are secondary. ' 
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3.2.3 The Problems of a Common Language 
The issue of Ulanfu's attitude to a 'common' language' (gongtong yuyan) also 
appeared in this article: 'When he says that if there is a common language then there 
is a common attitude, this is clearly the old tune of class compromise theory (1yie 
tiaohelun de laodiao). Although the oppressors and those oppressed in a minority 
group have the same language, their attitude is utterly opposed. ' The promotion of a 
I common language' was more directly related to the specific use of Mongolian or 
Chinese in other quotes. In a speech in 1965, Ulanfu was quoted as saying: 
'In IMAR we have two types of language and writing... In IMAR now there 
are many Mongolians who can't speak Han Chinese, and even in pastoral 
areas there are Han who can't speak Mongolian. From now on cadres should 
be able to speak both languages. You speak Mongolian, and I also speak 
Mongolian. If you speak Han Chinese, I speak Han Chinese. Mongolians can 
speak Mongolian, and Han Chinese cadres also can speak Mongolian... If 
we have a common language, we have a political foundation, and economic 
foundation. A common language reflects a common heart. 219 
In the IM Daily on 3 rd February 1968 in an article attacking Ulanfu, this statement 
was taken as 'a denial of class struggle': 
'In a class society, our common attitude must have a class aspect. Because 
the position of the proletariat and the capitalists is not the same, they all have 
their own "attitude. " Chiang Kai-shek, and Derzhinsky, even though they 
had a different language, had the same "counter-revolutionary" attitude. The 
great mass of revolutionary peoples, even though their language and writing 
are not the same, have a common class attitude. We all love Chairman Mao, 
and resolutely wish to push forward along the path of socialism. ' 
Superficially this declared that the fundamentals of ideology transcend language. 
But there was also a sense in which this was a suppression of greater use of 
Mongolian, and a reaction against the symbolic unity coming from the common 
spoken language between the Mongolian People's Republic, and Mongolians in 
IMAR . 
220 Thus the condemnation of Ulanfu when he was accused of trying to use 
the same written alphabet as the Mongolian People's Republic (cyrillic), and not the 
old script traditionally used in IMAR, and the banishment from early 1968 onwards 
2 19 Doc 3, Issue 16,16. 
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of the few words in Mongolian that had appeared on the front page of the IM Daily. 
The common language, in the end, was that of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought, and class analysis and struggle. This cut across specific languages, 
signifying adherence in the discourse to the view that there was a fundamental 
ideological body of truth beyond language, but that only the language of the Centre 
could adequately convey this truth. 
3.2.4 Material from Other Organisations: Using the Words of Ulanfu to 
Condemn Himself 
A major part of the 'smashing' of Ulanfu's authority was the use of collections of 
his own words against him. This type of attack was effective as it meant the enemy 
themselves was directly exposed through their own words, giving greater credibility. 
This appeared in material produced by smaller groups. 
The collections of quotes took a number of forms. In the autumn of 1967, a special 
series of four 'CR Materials' (Wenge cailiao) was issued by the Hohhot 
Revolutionary Rebellion Liaison Head Office 'Criticize and Struggle Against 
Ulanfu' Liaison Station. 221 A total of 91 pages covered every part of Ulanfu's career. 
In another document (analysed in more detail below) the 'Mobilize the Battle to 
Criticise Ulanfu' (Pi Wu gu zhan), issued by the Third Group, IM Teachers College 
'East is Red' Battle Division in August 1967, quotes from Mao on national 
minorities were followed by a theoretical essay condemning Ulanfu, before moving 
into the quotes themselves, though this time in the form of three columns - Ulanfu's 
I counter-revolutionary language, ' paralleled with Liu Shaoqi and Deng'Xiaoping's 
language, and finally a column with the 'directives' of the Central Committee of the 
CCP's Mao Zedong, and Lin Biao. 222 There was a 'parallel text' system, with 
I correct ideology' (designated with the honorific title of 'instructions' (zhishi)) set 
against both the 'counter-ideology' at the Centre of the two named thought- 
criminals, Liu and Deng, and then their local representative, Ulanfu with his own 
local counter-ideology. While Liu, Deng and Ulanfu were set down as personally 
220 See Bulag 2002 for more on this issue of the use of Mongolian versus Chinese. 
22 1 Doc 21. 
222 Doc 18. 
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sponsoring their own thought, Mao and Lin's 'instructions' were presented as 
having the sanction of 'the CCP. ' 
A further collection of quotes from August 1967, 'Confessions of a Counter- 
Revolutionary' (Fangeming de zibaishu) issued by the Hohhot Revolutionary 
Rebellion Alliance Headquarters appeared in several separate parts, each covering 
specific periods in Ulanfu's career. 223 As such it operated as an eclectic collection of 
some of Ulanfu's works, and was used to supply evidence of his treachery towards 
the Centre. A final variant of the 'collection of quotes' genre was the use of a 'secret 
speech' by Ulanfu in 1965. This was critically deconstructed through using isolated 
quotes rather than the publication of the whole speech, and appeared in 'Excerpts 
from Ulanfu's Black Sayings' (Lflanfu heihua zhailu) from the Hohhot 
Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters 'Struggle and Criticize Ulanfu' 
Alliance. 224 
223 Doc 17. 
224 Were these CR collections credible records of what Ulanfu actually said? As in 
the assessment of the records of discussions in Chapter Two, similar principles of 
assessing internal and extrenal consistency apply. There are opportunities to 
compare quotes from the same source used in different collections. The collection of 
the I" July and the 'CR Material' 16,16 quoted the same occasion, with only minor 
editorial differences. The same quote occurred in Aug 1967 though in truncated form 
(Doc 17,22). An edition of Ulanfu's Selected Works published in IMAR in 1999 did 
include some of the speeches quoted in the CR materials. In several instances the 
differences between these was significant. In the Aug 1967 collection it quoted 
Ulanfu as stating in June 1946 at a cadre meeting '-we should pay attention to this 
problem, we need to take notice of the demands for the Mongolian people's 
independence(zhongshi Me renmin duli de yaoqiu) and acknowledge their self- 
consciousness (zyue) and need to prepare to acknowledge their independent spirit' 
(Doc 17,11). But in the record of this in Ulanfu's Selected Works it became: 'We 
should take note of this [the problem of national minorities]. We should take notice 
of the demands of Mongolian minority people (zhongshi Men Qz renmindeyaoqiu) 
and acknowledge their self-government (zizhi)' (my underlinings). The final 
sentence was omitted (Ulanfu 1999, vol 1,18). In the same edition, the editors also 
imputed to Ulanfu a quote that, in Ulanfu's Selected Works was clearly attributed to 
Stalin (Doc 17,12 and Ulanfu 1999,276). None of these meant that the CR versions 
were misquotes from the original versions. The 1999 Selected Works had gone 
through the same process of ideological sanitisation and editorial correction as 
Mao's Selected Works, and it might be that they themselves were 'inaccurate' 
versions. All one can conclude without seeing the precise original of each speech 
was that there were variant versions reflecting the different political environments 
they had been produced in. The main difference however is that the CR collections 
could contextualise and editorially 'bind' their quotes in a way that managed the 
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These collections of quotes contained language which, at one point, was 
authoritative and said by someone occupying formal positions of power, but now 
relegated to legitimate objects of denigration and attack. There was heavy editorial 
control, with the assertion of editorial management of the pre'sented language. The 
final document mentioned above, 'Excerpts from Ulanfu's Black Sayings, ' 
contained Ulanfu's language lifted from a single speech event. The document began 
with a foreword setting the context of the 'secret report. ' This stressed its 
restrictedness, and made clear that it contained language opposed to the Centre. It 
also clearly stated that the objective of the publication was to 'thoroughly expose, 
and deeply, widely, and fiercely criticise' the speech. The editors finally set out the 
principles on which the quotes were arranged and selected from the speech, reducing 
it from more than 90,000 characters down to 'a fraction. ' It was not possible to 
produce the whole speech, they stated, not just because of its length, but also 
because 'in many places it is illogical (yuwu-1unci), chaotic Oazi-linluan), and 
simply without order (mozhi-suoyun). ' 
The quotes from the speech itself were split into five sections: 
9 'Madly oppose great Mao Zedong Thought, try to establish "Ulanfu 
Thought. "' 
'Flaunt the characteristics of IMAR, twist the nature of the democratic 
revolution, advocate the road of peaceful transition. ' 
'Deny class struggle, give in to theories of "exploitation is justified" and 
class surrender. ' 
'Cook up theories of splittism, scheme to build a feudal, bourgeois 
independent kingdom. ' 
* 'Curse Beijing, Tiananmen, oppose the Centre, completely advocate 
building a feudal, capitalist independent kingdom. ' 
Under each of these main headings, there were a number of sub-sets. In the first, for 
instance, there were three: 
reader's or user's reception of them. 
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9 'Cursing Mao Zedong Thought [by calling it] a doctrine, scheming to use 
Ulanfu Thought as a substitute for Mao Zedong Thought. ' 
9 'Distort the basic principles of Chain-nan Mao about the problem of 
national minorities, deny the basic class nature of the problem of national 
minorities. ' 
9 'With "opposing copies" as an excuse, twist Chairman Mao's "three 
revolution" movement, deny the universal guiding meaning of all 
directives and policies issued by Chairman Mao. ' 
There was a limited menu of actions ascribed to Ulanfu in the headings and in those 
throughout the other four sections. Primarily, Ulanfu's words were presented within 
the context of 'opposition' (fandui), 'denial' (fouren), 'elimination' (mosha), along 
with ascribed verbal acts like 'distort' (cuangai), 'excuse' 6iekou), and 'curse' 
(chouma). These were crimes against the true narrative of history (to 'distort' and 
misrepresent' it), against the Centre ('oppose, ' and 'curse' it), and the ideology of 
Mao Zedong Thought ('twist' and 'deny') which were the manifestations of the 
Centre's hegemony. In essence, these covered the key areas where Vlanfu was taken 
as opposing and resisting this hegemony. 
The quotes covered the themes identified in the 'official' material contained in the 
IMDaily articles in 3.2.2 above. First of all, Ulanfu was presented as arguing for a 
I specific IMAR reality' different to the reality dictated from the Centre. 'We need to 
first understand what the real nature of IMAR is, ' Ulanfu was quoted as saying, 
'then secondly, how we link up the reality of IMAR with Mao Zedong Thought. ' 
This, it implied, was taking things the wrong way. The reality of IMAR came 
through the reality designated to it from the Centre. In the editorial comments on the 
first section, it was even claimed that Ulanfu labelled Mao Zedong Thought as a 
'doctrine' (flaotiao). This again was the locality 'counter-labelling' entities from the 
Centre. Mao Zedong Thought was not a doctrine (with its implications of 
dogmatism and formal canonization), but the simple presentation of truth. Use of 
other terms about it was taken as a threat, an attempt to inscribe and control it within 
a different discourse. 
138 
The second area where Ulanfu's words were used against him was the accusation 
that he attacked the ideological unity of the Centre. Ulanfu was cited as using the 
keywords, 'unity, ' 'nucleus, ' and the correct slogan 'Mao Zedong Thought is the 
unity of minority groups. ' But in saying that 'the problem of national minorities is 
the problem of [defining] people, ' Ulanfii was guilty of placing the issue of 
nationality as central to the categorisation of the 'people. ' In the 'correct' Maoist 
classification system, based on Marxist-Leninist thought, people's main social 
identity was based on class, not nationality. Here Ulanfu 'denies the true class nature 
of the national minority problem. 225 
An example of the placing of Ulanfu's words against the Centre's 'class' ideology 
was in the context of economism. His talk of a 'landlord class' was labelled as 'in 
truth out-and-out feudalism. 226 This reached a symbolic level, in the final selection 
of quotes, where Ulanfu was seen as 'cursing Tianamnen and Beijing, ' the symbols 
in the PRC of centrality, unity, and the hegemony of the new political system. The 
editors talked of these places as being the 'heart of our ancestral land, the centre of 
the world's revolution, ' with Ulanfu 'cursing the symbol (xiangzheng) of the great 
motherland, Tiananmen. ' In Ulanfii's counter-discourse, he had appropriated the 
symbolic capital of Mao, and of the central material signifiers for the power, 
Tiananmen Square, Beijing. In striving to make Baotou the centre for the iron and 
steel production in China in the 1950s, Ulanfu had betrayed his desire to set up a 
power centre alternative to Beijing, an 'independent kingdom' with its own 
nationality ideology, and its own geographical symbolism, competing with that of 
the Centre. 227 In this new context, Ulanfu's seemingly innocent quote 'to build 
Baotou, and to continuously build up the autonomous region' was re-interpreted as 
the sinister blueprint for the construction of an independent country. Taking the 
economy, and not class struggle, as the key term, Ulanfu was quoted as saying that 
'from the point of view of economics, things can only really start from IMAR. ' In 
this new state, Ulanfu would supplant Mao Zedong in the symbolic pantheon. In the 
new geography, in which IMAR was at the centre, Chairman Ulanfu was the new 
leader, returning to the ambitions much CR material in IMAR claimed the 
225 Doc 63,4. 
226 Ibid 9. 
227 lbid 17. 
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Mongolians always had: to recapture the glorious power exercised by them in the 
Genghis Khan period seven centuries before, to resurrect this period of hegemony 
over the Han (this is looked at in more detail in 3.2.9 below). 
The use of a single speech dramatically illustrates not only the attempt to contrast 
the currency of one kind of language against the other and thereby discredit it, but 
also the tight material controls exercised by the editors on a text. The original was 
heavily contextualised. It was split up and placed in headed, separately bounded 
sections. Its form was redesigned. The ambition of the editors was clearly to use the 
words of the condemned Ulanfti against himself, and for him to participate in his 
own prosecution, something that his physical absence from IMAR meant he was 
unable to do in person. Ulanfu's language distilled the 'counter-language, ' and the 
need for it to be policed and controlled by the restraints of editorial markers. 
The collection of Ulanfu's quotes contained in the TR Materials' (Wenge ziliao) 
printed in September and October 1967 was from more diverse sources. The quotes 
range from 1945 to 1966, just before Ulanfu's effective silencing by being removed 
by the Centre from formal positions of power. The quotes ranged from Ulanfu's 
speech at a preparatory meeting for the celebrations of IMAR's twentieth 
anniversary, 228 to talks to local leaders, to instructions. The full range of material 
was as follows: 
'Speeches' 6ianghua) 
'Instructions' (zhishi) 
'Inteýections' (chahua) 
'Reports' (baogao) 
'Talks' (tanhua) 
'Summaries' (zongfie) 
'Statements' (fayan)229 
'Opening words' (kaimuci) 
228 A moment of great symbolic importance in the region, to which several years 
preparation was devoted. See Bulag 2002,226 for contemporary accusations of 
Ulanfu's darker purposes in marking this event as a celebration to prepare for local 
independence. 
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'Declaration' (xuanyan) 
'Secret talks' (mitan) 
'Remarks on a piece of writing' (piyu) 
'A letter' (yifeng xin) 
'Regulations' (guiding) 
Of these, the most numerous were 'speeches' (jianghua) followed by 'reports' 
(baogao). In TR Materials 20, ' the vast majority of the quotes were taken from 
speeches. There were, in addition to the genres above, some materials from Ulanfu's 
essays and books. However, these were exceptions. The bulk of the material was 
from specific 'speech occasions' - speeches, talks, or reports at Party and local 
meetings. None were given in their entirety, nor was there any indication of where 
the materials were sourced, though some indicated that they were summaries, which 
implied a longer written source, recorded elsewhere. 
The collection was arranged according to particular categories connected with verbs 
or actions Ulanfu was accused of performing: 
'Openly opposing' (gongkaifandui) Chairman Mao's heroic theories of 
national minority struggle. 
Within this section, the verbs 'speaking nonsense' (hushuo), 'denying' 
(fouren), and 'advocating' (guchui) were used as headers to sub-sections. 
* 'Opposing' giving prominence to Mao Zedong thought, 'attacking' 
(gongji) the mass movement to live and study Chairman Mao's great 
works. 
In this section, 'excuse' (liekou) was used. 
'Be hostile to' (choushi) and 'strike' (dadao) the masses of the people. 
'Beautify' (meihua) and 'rely on' (yikao) the aristocrats. 
9 'Oppose' (duikang) the three revolutions. 
229 Including 'summary statements' (fayin caogao). 
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'Openly resist' (dizhi) the leadership of the Centre, 'destroy' (pohal) the 
unity of the motherland. 
In this section, 'threaten' (yangyan) was used. 
Similar patterns of using specific negative and positive verbs of actions are found in 
the other collections in this series. These included 'resist' (kanglu), 'soak' (paozhi), 
'deny' (mosha) and 'push forward' (tiaofa). 
These 'framing' verbs indicated how Ulanfu's words were manipulated into 
positions of active opposition through context. While the real subject of the 
sentences imputed to Ulanfa was often abstract, ideological issues, the verbs framing 
them in the CR collections created an atmosphere of physicality and struggle. 
Ulanfia's language was presented as speech-acts of dissent in their own right, able to 
damage and threaten like physical violence. The editorial language had to control 
these 'dangerous' quotes. Ulanfu's words were policed, under suspicion. This was 
the means by which they were disempowered in the new discourse, and their value 
decreased. 
This larger collection offered a picture of Ulanfu's sustained treachery, reaching 
back to the 1940s when he was the most prominent supporter of the CCP in 'pre- 
Liberation' Inner Mongolia. In the previous official founding narrative of the PRC, 
Ulanfu was the national minority leader closest to the Centre, fighting alongside 
them against the common enemy of the Nationalists. He had been instrumental in 
IMAR's establishment as an autonomous region within the PRC, stopping it 
becoming an independent state. He was a comrade of the CCP. 
In the new CR narrative Ulanfu had not become a splittist. He had always been one. 
There were no chronological principles to the arrangement of Ulanfu's words. 
Quotes from the 1940s stand next to those from 1965. The impression is of a steady 
and unchanging 'opposition' which was ahistorical and had not developed during the 
huge political upheavals of the time. Nor were the very different contexts within 
which Ulanfu spoke at different periods explained. In TR Materials' No 16, under 
the heading 'Advocating "Pushing Forward the Upper Class"..., ' Ulanfu's words 
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were placed together from a speech before the IMAR had even been established in 
February 1947, a declaration at a speech to the Party in 1953, a national (quanguo) 
meeting in 1955, a central (zhongyang) meeting in 1956, and the preparatory 
meeting for the IMAR 20th anniversary celebrations in 1965 . 
230 Regardless of 
context, Ulanfu had always been a criminal. 
One of the longest quotes presented in the collection was from a speech in June 
1946, to cadres in the inner Mongolia Autonomous Movement (zizhi yundong), an 
organisation predating the formal creation of the IMAR. At this meeting, Ulanfu had 
talked about the characteristics of the Mongolians. 'Mongolians, ' he was claimed to 
have said, 'are a soft minority group. ' They had their own history of exploitation. 
They were reliant on the politics, economics, and culture of other national 
minorities: 
'Because the Mongolians are simple, they are not clear about [what] the 
[Communist] Eighth Route Army [is], nor about how we differ from the 
Nationalists... They also have a characteristic. In the beginning, they never 
trust, but as soon as they start to trust you, then they do so completely... 
Mongolians worship their idols to excess. Whatever is in their heads they 
believe to be correct. ' 
Ulanfu's analysis was presented as ahistorical, broad generalisations on the 
immutable characteristics of the Mongolian people. No attempt was made in the 
collection of CR material to present any development in his position. This material 
only became meaningful within the specific master narrative from the discourse of 
the Centre outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Before 1949, there were patterns 
of exploitation based on class membership common to all, including national 
minority groups. In 1949, these injustices started to be rectified. The ideology of the 
CCP was shown to be true and victorious. Ulanfu, who had presented himself as a 
friend and supporter of the CCP ideology, was actually working within the new 
system for the interests of the old exploiters, the upper classes. They may well have 
been Mongolian upper classes. But their ethnicity was irrelevant. What mattered and 
had meaning in this discourse was their class. 
230 Doc 16, Issue 16,14. 
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Such a narrative was motivated by a utilitarian view of history. Telling and retelling 
history served to show how class conflict and struggle could be used for liberation. 
The key issue for participants in the CR was to hold the grand template of this 
history against the individual histories of people, to define their place in this master 
narrative as either exploiter or exploited. Ulanfu's case was one of the trickiest. 
While using the 'form' of the ideology of CCP communism, he had actually been 
promoting his own interests based on an alien ideology. The quotes were offered as 
proof of this. They were not questioned, and the only context within which they 
were set was the 'history as liberation from class exploitation' one described above, 
in which they were immediately condemned and criminalised. Their articulation of 
ideological key points through narrative led to the second major area of contestation 
- the recreation of a history to follow the terms of the ideological attack, asserting 
class over national minority/ethnicity issues. 
3.2.5 The Narrative Attack: Ulanfu's History and Actions 
The terms of debate were set in the ideological attack analysed above. Class was 
asserted. Nationality/ethnicity issues were secondary. The Centre's narrative based 
on class liberation was promoted. A narrative asserting 'specifics' of IMAR history 
and Mongolian identity was rejected. The issue was not just therefore Ulanfu's 
I counter-ideology, ' but the meaning given to his own history, the symbolic 
importance contained and conveyed by it, and the master narrative within which it 
was set. 
The 'CR Materials' No 16 began with a description of the meaning of Ulanfu's 
personal history interpreted in the tenns and discourse of the new narrative: 
'For more than 20 years from the IMAR Movement to the socialist 
revolution, this "contemporary godfather" [Ulanfu] has all along pushed 
forward splittism, madly opposing the red, red sun in the hearts of all 
nationalities, Chairman Mao, wantonly opposing Mao Zedong Thought 
limitlessly believed in and revered by people of all nationality groups. He 
separately raised the banner, falsifying the heroic thesis of Chairman Mao 
about the national minority struggle, trying in vain with the "problem of 
minorities" to deny class, class contradictions, and class struggle. Distorting 
the truth by despicable means, by "pushing forward class problems" and 
promoting "capitalist class politics" in opposition to pushing forward Mao 
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Zedong Thought. With monstrous audacity, using "minority characteristics" 
and "local characteristics, " "looking at things from a practical viewpoint, " 
etc, and "IMAR characteristics" theory, he denies the leading policies of 
Mao Zedong Thought are those of the whole Party and country. Attacking 
the mass movement of living and studying Chairman Mao's works, shouting 
himself hoarse, talking up the feudal upper classes, twisting the unity of 
Chairman Mao's Thought, advocating class co-operation, vainly trying to re- 
organise the ranks of the exploiting classes, hatefully, he denigrates working 
people, opposing the revolutionary masses. -)231 
This contained a rich vocabulary of actions, some conveyed through standardized 
idioms - four-character expressions (chengyu), such as 'monstrous audacity' 
(goudan-baotian), 'shout oneself hoarse' (shengsi-lyie), 'distorting the truth' 
(toufian-huanri). The central hegemonic ideology was distilled in the formulation 
'Mao Zedong Thought, ' or personalised by being attached to Mao's symbolic figure. 
Even in describing the actions of Ulanfa, the language was highly symbolic. It was 
not fixed in reference to specific events but operated on a very general level. The 
reference, for instance, to 'banners' denoted abstract thoughts but conveyed this 
metaphorically. Ulanfa's crimes were ideological ones, but they were conveyed in 
ways that made them seem like actions. His own 'ideology' was separated from the 
main text by quotation marks. It was distilled into sound-bites or slogans - support 
for 'minority characteristics' (minzu tedian), and 'regional characteristics' (diqu 
tedian). 
3.2.6 The Narrative Attack: Specifics 
'New Account of Nasty Goings-On in Ulanfu's Mansion' (Wanfu dizhu zhuangyuan 
choush! xinblan) produced by the Third Group of Red Guards, in Hohhot, on the I" 
November 1967 offered a sustained narrative attack. 232 A document of 32 pages, 
with a foreword sponsored by the IM University 'Jinggangshan' Corps 
'Zhongnanhai' Section, it was divided into three sections. The first, 'The Place 
Where Counter-Revolutionary Restorationist Experiments are Done, ' concerned a 
report Ulanfu made on the inspection of a mansion, a 'landlord yard. ' The second, 
simply entitled 'Landlord, Hegemonist, Hooligan' was an attack on the 
23 1 Doc 16, Issue 16,1. 
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I contemporary Cixi, ' Ulanfu's wife. 233 The final, and by far the longest section (it 
runs from page 14) was called 'New Account of Nasty Goings-On' and was divided 
into eight separate sections. This pamphlet contained material that worked on two 
levels. First, it promoted an attempt to denigrate Ulanfu by attacking his kin in 
IMAR. Secondly, it supported a specific narrative in which the past and the present 
were recast within the terms of a struggle between Ulanfu and the Centre. For both 
of these purposes, specific rhetorical and symbolic devices were used. 
The introduction set out the general context for the attack. The founding of the 
IMAR CRC was directly mentioned, a 'great victory for the all-conquering Mao 
Zedong Thought, and a great victory for Chairman Mao's revolutionary fine. ' It was 
also a 'great victory for the "13'h April Decision. "' This set out the hierarchy: the 
metaphors for the ideology of the Centre, Mao Zedong Thought, and Chairman's 
Mao's Revolutionary Line, asserted at the head, with the manifestation of what was 
now taken as their local expression, the '130' April Decision, ' afterwards. There was 
also the assertion that this work was the 'expression of denunciation for the counter- 
revolutionary revisionist Ulanfu, and of limitless love for the great revolutionary 
masses of the people. ' The work was declared to be a 'gift given to our red political 
power, the IMAR CRC, ' and to the '13 million people of all nationalities in our 
region' (my italics). The location of power within institutions and of its symbolic 
signification was immediately clear. 
The introduction referred to an underlying programme of violence and purposeful 
destruction. The writers talked of 'the revolutionary masses of all our area picking 
him [Ulanfu] up, smashing him to the ground, and kicking him down. Let us rain 
down 100,000 kicks on the body of the counter-revolutionary revisionist element 
Ulanfu, and then a 100 million blows, so that he will never rise up again. ' Ulanfu's 
body was a metaphor for the whole 'enemy' corps. Actions against it were actions 
against all enemies. This figure paralleled what Foucault talked of in using the 
treatment of the body of the condemned during a punitive process as a means of 
232 Doc 24. 
233 Cixi was Dowager Empress of China at the end of the Qing Dynasty, and a figure 
associated with the weakening of China and its exploitation by foreigners at this 
time. 
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symbolising society purging itself Within this language which promoted 
committing violence upon a symbolic body there was a tightly built symbolic world. 
Although in written words, the attacks that followed could be seen as part of these 
'kicks' rained upon a body - speech acts of aggression in a war against someone 
condemned. In utter contrast to this rhetorical aggression, the foreword ended with a 
note of courtesy to the readers: 'We hope that our battle comrades, the great masses 
of the proletarian revolutionary elements, together with the revolutionary comrades, 
will offer their precious comments [on this work]. ' 
3.2.7 Xiao Yingzi Village: Symbolic Importance as the Locus of the Conflict 
between Central Hegemony and Local Dissent 
This was an attack grounded on a narrative taken from the Centre but placed in a 
specific local domain, an area within which Ulanfu's family and close allies worked, 
a place in which Ulanfu's power was exercised and which physically symbolised 
that power. The pamphlet began, for instance, with a paragraph on Xiao Yingzi, a 
village-sized'division in the Tuqi Banner in Wumeng League between Hohhot and 
Baotou, with 39 'households, ' 22 of whom were poor, seven from the middle 
peasantry, and ten who were landlords, with a population of 143 people. This was 
the 'home' of Ulanfu's 'Dowager Empress Cixi, ' his wife Yun Liwen, a place where 
'for five years, Ulanfu undertook counter-revolutionary experiments. ' This was the 
location for Ulanfu's treachery, illustrating his schemes against the Centre, and his 
attempts to steal the symbolic capital of the Centre's icons. A mini-chronology of 
the history of Xiao Yingzi was set out, related to speeches Ulanfu had made 
demonstrating his purpose there: 'Xiao Yingzi is a Mongolian village, a laboratory 
pushing forward the linking of agriculture, herding, and forestry for several years to 
the south of the Daqing mountains. ' 234 The text contrasted this with Dazhai, the 
commune in neighbouring Shanxi Province promoted by the Centre as a model in 
the CR. Xiao Yingzi was Ulanfu's 'capitalist independent kingdorn. ' The setting of 
Dazhai, the focus of a national campaign sanctioned by Chairman Mao, against 
Ulanfu's own, Xiao, Yingzi, was symbolically important. Ulanfu's place, like his 
family, belonged to the *counter-world, ' the 'counter-naffative. ' This embodied the 
234 Doc 24,4. 
147 
general antagonism set out between Ulanfu's imputed splittist ambitions and the 
'correct path' of the Centre. 
This theme of the symbolic importance of Xiao Yingzi returned at the end of the 
pamphlet. It was in this place that 'one can see the real character of Ulanfu' (Wanfu 
flujing shi shenme huose). 235 It was here that Ulanfu and his 'lackeys stirred up fires, 
and let ghosts out. ' This description of the crimes underscored the metaphoric nature 
of the attack. Ulanfu's words were used against him. The attack stated that his claim 
that 'there was little exploitation in Xiao Yingzi before Liberation' was labelled 
I arrogant and bragging. ' The real issue of Xiao Yingzi was set out at the beginning. 
In this place, the intention was to 'raise up' nationality criterion in denial of class- 
based criterion, not to implement the dictatorship of the proletariat against the 
Mongolian landlords. 236 The text stated that Xiao Yingzi was the same as other 
places in the PRC, after quoting Mao on the primacy of class struggle in history. 237 
Despite the victory of the Communist revolution, Ulanfu's family in Xiao Yingzi 
had set up a %castle' opposed to the revolutionary dictatorship. Ulanfu had declared 
that the area was a Mongolian one. 'If we acknowledge history, we must 
acknowledge that the land is Mongolian land, ' he is claimed to have said. In a 
struggle against a local called Yun Erdan, who had tried to implement the Centre's 
class reforms, Ulanfu and his family had tried to seize power. Xiao Yingzi had 
become the site where the assertion of power and ideology based on nationality had 
come face to face with the class ideology sponsored by the Centre, thus distilling the 
main ideological conflict of the CR in IMAR. 238 
235 Ibid 27. 
236 Ibid 3. 
237 Ibid 2. 
238 There are parallels in the use of Xiao Yingzi village in the campaign against 
Ulanfu and his wife, and the attack on Liu Shaoqi's wife Wang Guangmei and her 
championing of her experiences in Taoyuan Village during the CR. See 'Pseudo- 
Four Clean-ups and Real Restoration -a Report of the Investigation Made into Four Clean-ups Movement in the Taoyuan Production Brigade Conducted by the Top 
Person in Power Taking the Capitalist Road, ' (People ý Daily 9 th September 1967) 
and Dittmer 1998,81 for Mao's take on this. 
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3.2.8 Guilt by Association: The Attack on Ulanfu's Family 
This narrative was centred on exploitation as the primary characteristic of 
powerlessness. Ulanfu's 'corrupt' were seen as the main practitioners of 
exploitation: 
'Yun Liwen's family were originally in the Wumeng League and Lingge'er 
Banner, Siqinwanqi Village. From small, Dageqin [previously referred to as 
Yun's father] lived the life of a playboy, an aristocrat. Living off the rent... 
he didn't work but achieved the life of a parasite. Occasionally getting up, 
eating, drinking, playing, chatting, tagging along behind his dog-father on a 
horse hitting pigs... Or on a cart, going all over the place, up and down 
, 239 mountains, playing in the water... 
This image drew from that of the decadent exploitative 'aristocratic classes, ' 
personalising the grand themes of the master narrative in a local context, bringing 
them close to the. target audience, who could then be made to feel the hurt and 
damage these exploiters had brought. 
The second part of the narrative attack was on Ulanfu's relatives. Food was the 
symbol to convey this sense of privilege and corruption. This was carried by the 
mini-narrative of someone who worked for Yun's family, Gu Chengxi. In 1928, the 
pamphlet stated, at the most disastrous time, when inflation was soaring and there 
was a famine, 'in this kind of time, the more difficult it is, the more rich people have 
the chance to get richer. ' At this time, 'ugly Yun' (Yun chouchou) defaulted on Gu 
Chengxi's wages. The most powerful means to convey Gu's abject servitude was to 
describe Gu's wife Jhaving to] cook for the Yun family for over ten years. ' The text 
listed the many parties and occasions when the Yun family banqueted, 'eating big 
fish and fatty meat, eating and drinking the fat of the land and sea. ' Gu's wife had 
to 'fry the vegetables and warm the alcohol, serving the food and holding the plates, 
mashing the tea and lighting cigarettes, without rest. 240 Grand metaphors were used 
to describe the disaster enveloping people in 1928. It was a 'year of many 
calamities' (duozai-duonan), with high winds, drought, and starvation, with people 
working 'until they fainted with hunger, ' and many dying, 'fathers and mothers 
239 Ibid 9. 
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selling their daughters and sons, and husbands their wives. ' At this time, in order 
just to eat, people went over to the Nationalists to fight for them. But the Yun family 
'ate white noodles every day, ' and lived a 'life of dissipation' (huaflan-jiudi) 
regardless. 
After this stark depiction of the contrast between the exploiters and exploited classes 
in the 'old society, ' the text attained a collective voice. There was a reminder that 
the narrative recalled the suffering and exploitation of 'our people. ' History always 
has a message: 'We must always remember Chairman Mao's instructions, never to 
forget class struggle, never to forget the dictatorship of the proletariat. Smash 
Ulanfu, Yun Liwen and Yuri Kanxiao and their type to the ground, kick them a 
100,000 times, never let them get up again. 241 The ideological prescriptions of the 
Centre appeared in the collective voice, before setting down the actions which were 
to be endorsed and promoted locally. The section ended with five slogans: the first 
against Liu Shaoqi, the second against Ulanfu, and the final three, positive 
declarations for the victory of the CR, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the 
leadership of Chairman Mao. 
The counter-narrative drew on history in other ways. Exploitation was still an 
important connecting theme. In referring to Ulanfu's wife as an 'empress dowager' 
(Oxi taihou) the text deployed well-established stereotypes of imperial exploitation 
and feudalism, and drew on a collective memory of the injustices of the past, before 
the ending of the imperial dynasties in 1911. This was strongest in the final section, 
which referred to 'King U[Ianfu's] visit to the ancestral grave (shangfen), ' in which 
a journey in 1959 by Ulanfu and his family to Xiao Yingzi was described as an 
imperial procession, startling the local workers with the arrival of five jeeps, the 
front one of which was occupied by the 'modem day monarch, Ulanfu, ' the second 
by the modem 'Cixi Empress Dowager, ' his wife Yuri, and the final one by the 
'Prime Minister' (chengxiang, a special term used in China pre-191 1). 242 A further 
example was the use of 'imperial edict' (shengzhi) issued by one of Ulanfu's 
'lackeys. 243 
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This appeal to historical memory. was also contained in the writing style, with its use 
of many literary and written forms, paradoxically paralleled by low-level abuse 
terms (see below in this section). In the final section the following classical terms 
were used: 
Dao, 'to say' 
Feiyou, 'not' 
Qiyou, 'isn't, ' 'wouldn't' 
WU, , 11 
Yue, 'say' 
Ye, used at the end of sentences as a marker in classical Chinese 
Gu, 'I, ' used only by feudal princes in classical texts. Imputed to Ulanfu in 
this text. 
It was unusual, outside of literary texts, to find these characters, though they were 
still widely understood by the educated who have studied classical Chinese. 
Deploying such 'elitist' and esoteric language within a document which was 
ostensibly part of a popular attack on behalf of the 'great masses of the people' 
seems contradictory, and gives a clue to the very diverse background of those 
producing material in the CR. This document was sponsored by the local university. 
Its authors were classified as 'intellectuals. ' The literary nature of the material was 
compounded by the dense use of formulaic language (chengyq). In the description of 
Ulanfu's 'Jeep' procession reference was made to the green plum trees and the 
'fierce empty sunlit air. 244 It was also evident in the courtesy shown to the 'reader' 
245 (not listener), in the sentence: 'honoured reader, please note' (duwel, qing zhuyi). 
While this was produced by a highly literate author (or authors), it was also aimed at 
an audience that was assumed to have good literary and historical knowledge. This 
indicated the heterodox nature of the audience of this mass, popular movement, the 
CR, and the need for more than one register with which to speak to them. 
The attack on Ulanfu's family had another strain. While some elements of the 
pamphlet's written style were literary and elegant, there was also a strong strand of 
244 lbid 14. 
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invective used for the accusations of the family's corruption and greed. Yun was 
referred to as Ulanfu's 'ugly wife' (chou laopo), a label that was both familiar 
(laopo is a more colloquial form for wife, a little like 'old woman') and derogatory 
246 (chou). She was also referred to as Ulanfu's 'dog wife' (gou poniang), who had a 
'dog father' (goufu). Yun's paternal grandfather was referred to as a 'drunkard, 
smoker, gambler' (jiugui, yangui, dugui). 247 He was also a 'womaniser' (segui). 
Stronger terms occurred with the use of 'sons of bitches' (gou zaizi) about the Yun 
family. The culmination of this abuse was contained in the sentence which, under 
the sanction of the great proletarian revolution, condemned 'patriarch U(Ianfu) (Wu 
wangfu) and his type to be plucked up and dumped in the rubbish bin of history' 
(fishi lajixiang), becoming as filthy and contemptible as a 'pile of dog's shit' (buchi 
yu renlei de goupidui). 
The efforts to discredit Ulanfu through attacking his family shows the role played by 
class and family connections in the social and political context of the CR. Bulag 
makes clear that one of Ulanfu's vulnerabilities was that he had promoted close 
family members in IMAR, and could be accused of creating a personal power basis 
there. 248 While this may have been entirely rational political behaviour in the PRC 
(both then, and to a lesser extent now) it conflicted with the stress from the Centre, 
which reached a peak during the CR, of the precedence of class relations over all 
other kinds of social connections. 'In the class society, there is only class love and 
class kinship. 249 It was inevitable that Ulanfu could be damaged through his family. 
Nationality did not need to be mentioned. They just needed to be related to him. 
3.2.9 Getting Personal: The Direct Attack on Ulanfu 
Ulanfu was not merely attacked through a place he was symbolically associated with 
and the behaviour of his close relatives. His own history and person were also 
directly criticised. His appearance was carefully described in the final section, 
during the 'procession' to the ancestral grave: 'Tall and fat, like a big pot, a high 
245 lbid 16. 
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brow, flat nose bridge, long chin, thick lips, like a big monkey. 250 Such an attack, 
ostensibly on Ulanfu's appearance, worked more by taking him as a symbol than an 
historical person. What he symbolised was made clear in the third section, where 
Ulanfa was attributed with words articulating a counter-ideology: 'You are all 
Mongolian, you should paint gold on the faces of Mongolians, not make 
Mongolians' faces black. ' Ulanfa was accused of using the promotion by the Centre 
of self-reliance (zili gengsheng) for his own 'restorationist' counter-revolutionary 
purpose. This culminated in the verbal sacrilege of taking the supreme slogan of 
Maoist fervour of the time, and transferring it directly to Ulanfa: 'Long life to 
Chairman UlanfiW (Wanfu zhuxi wansui). 
The only direct speech attributed to Ulanfii was a statement made to one of his 
supporters, He Yao. 25 1 The style attributed to him was highly literary, full of arcane 
terms, far removed from contemporary colloquial Chinese: 
'I must have He Yao as my extra pair of wings. You say a good man needs 
three helpers (suyu shuo haohan sanbang), like a tiger sprouting wings [to 
fly]. I will do great work. Just at the time I need someone, He Yao will 
become a high official of great use. You must know in your heart that in this 
way I will create an independent fiefdom. ' 
This language compounded the sense of Ulanfii as a symbolic rather than a literal 
figure, an Ulanfu who existed only within the text. Little was conveyed of his 
biography, of his actual policies or political positions. Ulanfu was made into a 
remote, almost mythical figure, so that even the voice he was given in the text 
looked unnatural. 
In other documents Ulanfu's chief crime of appropriating the symbolic power of 
others was accentuated. The most damaging of these was the accusation that Ulanfu 
had intended to become the 'modem Genghis Khan. ' Genghis Khan's centrality to 
Mongolian identity and history is well recognised. He was the great historical leader 
who showed that if Mongolians were united they would shake the world. His story 
encapsulated the memory of when the Mongolians ruled over a weak Chinese state 
249 Doc 24,11. 
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and had true self-determination and power. This golden age has dominated 
Mongolian collective memory ever since. Genghis Khan remains a contentious 
figure to this day, creating unease in Han Chinese, and feelings of lost greatness to 
many Mongolians. 252 
In 'Confessions of a Counter-Revolutionary' (Fangeming de zibaishu) published by 
the Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters, in August 1967, a 
section contained quotes detailing Ulanfu's counter-thoughts on splittism and the 
creation of a new 'Ulanfu Dynasty' (Wanfu wangchao). The editorial imputed to 
Ulanfu a desire to become a 'leader' (lingxiu) and 'saviour' (fluxing) of the 
Mongolians, both phrases taken from the contemporary discourse about Chairman 
Mao. It was claimed that Ulanfu would do this on the grounds of being a saviour and 
leader of the minority group to which he belonged. He was not a real saviour for all 
people, because that needed to be based on class. Part of Ulanfu's method was to 
I glorify Genghis Khan, ' appropriating his symbolic capital amongst Mongolians for 
himself, *chasing dreams of grandeur. ' Ulanfa was quoted as saying during a speech 
to open the People's Congress in 1947 that Mongolians were the %sons and 
daughters' of Genghis Khan and needed to unite around him. Their history was one 
of %oppression, exploitation, humiliation... The sons and daughters of Genghis Khan 
must, for the glory of their ancestors and prosperity of the 10,000 generations of 
mothers, father, brothers, sisters, husbands and wives, unite to save themselves. 253 
The oppression used in the central narrative was localized, and became oppression 
of the Mongolians, of a national minority by the majority group. Genghis Khan 
became the key symbol of the resistance to this outside oppression. 
Ulanfu was accused in another document from the period of supporting those who 
wished to 'preserve the glory (guangrong) of the period of Genghis Khan. 9254 In an 
ideological attack from 20th August 1967, the writer(s) started with words attributed 
251 lbid 20. 
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to Ulanfu in 1957, during an 'national minority work conference': 
'[Ulanfii says] "Some Mongolians say I have done a good job on the 
relationship between us and the Han. I say this all comes from Genghis Khan 
and the development of history after that. If he hadn't handled relations with 
the Han well, how could the Yuan dynastic rule last 90 years? " 
'This really lays it all out in the open. He [Ulanfu] wants to "do a good job 
on the relationship with the Han" [and] carry on Genghis Khan's 
"development of history, " according to the method of Genghis Khan's rule 
"lasting 90 years. " To tell the truth, Genghis Khan is the representative of the 
feudal exploitative classes. Lifting up Genghis Khan's dead spirit, and 
making it a model for Mongolian and Han unity, carrying on "development 
of history" from Genghis Khan, just means carrying on the history of 
exploitative classes, the continuation of national minority oppression and 
national minority exploitation. 255 
In this local discourse attributed to Ulanfu, Genghis Khan was presented as a symbol 
of unity within the Mongolian community, and between Mongolians and Han (but in 
terms of creating a hierarchy - ruler (Mongolian) and ruled (Han)). In the discourse 
of the Centre, he was placed within the class categories of 'exploiter, oppressor, ' a 
maker of disunity and discord. As a symbol Genghis Khan occupied the fault line 
between the two discourses. In one he was seen as positive, in the other as entirely 
negative. Ulanfu's attempts, evidenced in these texts through his words, to 
appropriate Genghis Khan's symbolic power was offered as proof that he subscribed 
to feudal, counter-revolutionary values. 
In the foreword to the attack containing the words on Genghis Khan above, the 
authors also held out the real symbol of unity: 'Let us, holding high both hands, 
welcome the limitless glory of Mao Zedong Tbought, lighting up the red new 
IMAR, the new China. 1256 In the framework of the new narrative, Ulanfii figured as 
a secret supporter of 'China's Khrushchev' to whom he was linked as a 
representative and lackey. The only 'leader' (lingxiu) in IMAR, was Chairman Mao 
'whom we [the people of IMAR] follow eternally, leading us to a future of victory. ' 
As Xiao Yingzi was presented as a place of symbolic competition and opposition to 
the centrally supported model Dazhai, so too was the local narrative of Ulanfu's 
255 Ibid. 
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experiments there set against the founding myth of the PRC and the symbol 
conveying the most value, Chairman Mao: 
'On October Vt 1949, at Tiananmen, Chairman Mao solemnly declared the 
founding of the PRC. In these few years to 1965 it was like spring rain after a 
long droughtý or like a hurricane stopping to let a tree grow at last. Under 
Chairman Mao's heroic leadership, it really is like an eagle spreading its 
wings to soar, or a horse galloping full speed ahead, every day moving 
towards communism. The people have never been this blessed, the 
"fatherland" (zuguo) never so strong and rich. 9 257 
Chairman Mao personally figured in this central narrative, placed in a context where 
he symbolized oppression, liberation from strength through unity, ranged against 
Ulanfu and his local discourse promoting splittism and disunity. 
3.2.10 Voices of Others: Reports of Meetings during the Campaign 
The texts analysed in the sections above contained a restricted number of voices. 
They were either those of the Centre and its canon of ideological saints - Mao, 
Lenin, Stalin, Marx, Engels. Or they were of the condemned victims - Ulanfu and 
his supporters. Or they belonged to the editors of the collections. The narrative 
attack document was also, in its imposition of a specific literary and symbolic menu, 
monovocal. These texts were to instruct and guide the audience, to impose ideas on 
them, and lead them towards a correct position. As such, they were prescriptive in 
intent. What voice was allowed in the anti-Ulanfii Campaign, for those at whom this 
material was aimed, the 'great mass of the people' referred to so often in these texts, 
the 'workers and proletariat, ' the 'exploited and oppressed classes, ' the audience for 
whom the CR was part of a continuing programme of liberation, and in whose name 
the movement was carried out? 
Rebellious group pamphlets claimed to contain the real voice of the audience. 
However, while rebellious groups presented themselves as being supported by broad 
constituencies, they were manifestly documents sponsored by factions, groups with 
a necessarily limited popular reach, competing with other similar groups of varying 
size and power. Only the IM Daily set out, in some reports, a range of voices of 
257 lbid 18. 
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participants from the approved CR classes, commenting and participating in the 
campaign against Ulanfu. These voices, in their condemnation, were used to serve as 
a reflection of the public denigration of Ulanfii's power, proof that his power base 
had turned against him and that he had lost his local mandate. 
On 16d' September 1967, a full page report in the IM Daily recorded a range of 
voices against Ulanfu. Of the five voices, four were classified as 'poor herdsmen' 
(pinku mumin). The exception was a 'herd worker' (mugong). The editorial 
introduction stated that the reports came from a 'cadre meeting' organised by the 
'Xilinguole League-Aabaga Banner proletarian revolutionary ranks '258 attended by 
the poor and semi-poor herdspeople. The purpose of the meeting was to implement 
the new directive of Chairman Mao to 'fiercely strike down the representative in 
IMAR of China's Khrushchev, Ulanfu. ' The speakers were from communes 
(gongshe) or division in the league. All the pieces were by Mongolians. 
As in the material analysed above, the relationship between central and local 
concerns operated in terms of ideological competition which was partially conveyed 
through the promotion of different kinds of narratives. All five contributions began 
with a quotation from Chairman Mao marking adherence to a central, unified 
ideology. The contribution by a man called Daoerqi was the most dramatic, 
containing a personal account of exploitation in the 'old society. ' At that time, he 
said, his father worked for a 'herdlord' for a wage of ten yuan a month, enough only 
to buy a pair of shoes. His mother worked helping the herdlord's wife cooking. He 
himself worked with his mother, rewarded either with a sheep's tail for food or brick 
tea (the cheapest kind): 'In the cannibalistic society of the past (chiren de jiu 
shehui), our family scraped a living, unable even to support ourselves, with nothing 
to eat, nothing to wear, living a tragic life worse than a beast of burden (guozhe 
niuma buru de beican shenghuo). ' The speaker asked rhetorically: 'What is the 
difference between this life and the exploitation of poor peasants by rural landlords 
in the feudal societyT This stressed the common currency of class exploitation. The 
narrative of exploitation and oppression in the old society, which was given 
generally in 3.1.7 was here placed in the history of an individual, given a specific 
259 In Mongolian, Xilingol Aabag. 
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voice and context. For this person, liberation came when 'the sun which never sets 
rises higher above the grasslands. ' Such liberation was conveyed through the person 
of Mao, through symbolism of his presence in IMAP, on the grasslands, and his 
direct intervention in the individual lives of the 'oppressed' classes there: 'Chairman 
Mao has liberated us herders who have suffered oppression, giving us a prosperous 
and happy life. ' The enemy, in the person of 'IMAR's Khrushchev' Ulanfu, was 
attempting to destroy this happiness. In the new narrative, the bad of Ulanfu was 
balanced against the good of Mao. 
This individual's narrative authenticated and gave credibility to the new history 
within which the CR worked. There was an unconditional acceptance of the Centre's 
ideology of oppression and liberation being based on class terms to frame identity, 
not ethnic ones. While this appeared to be a personal narrative, its terms were purely 
collective. The tale of oppression was one for which there were infinite variants but 
one basis. Each person's individual story had to be cast according to the context and 
framework supplied by the Centre. The imposition of the Centre's designs in such 
personal voices was shown by the fact that in this exercise of retelling history, the 
author generated from his or her personal story a moral, a message: 
'We must never forget Chairman Mao's teaching, loving the things Ulanfu 
hates, hating the things Ulanfu loves, resolutely smashing the herdlord 
economy (muzhu fingii), resolutely raising up the banner of Mao Zedong 
Thought, persevering in violently striking down China's Khrushchev and his 
representative in IMAR, Ulanfu, pushing them into the water, this scum, 
ensuring that our glorious proletariat will never ever change colour. ' 
Qingbatu's piece talked of the 'evil objective' (zui'e mudi) of Ulanfu's 
I restorationist capitalism, ' which opposed Mao's teaching on social class and class 
struggle. Ulanfu was accused of using 'economism' 6inglizhuyi) to 'blind us, so we 
could not clearly see the socialist road, pulling us astray from the economy of 
people's communes. ' The assertion of the primacy of class struggle was also made 
by Xiang Qizheng, who stated his criticisms of the Ulanfa and his faction within the 
central terms of 'bolstering their own selfish interests' (sizi), and weakening the 
I public' ones (gongzi) . 
259 The categories to which people belonged (poor peasant, 
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middle peasant) while adapted locally (herders, herdlords) were based on class, not 
nationality/ethnicity. The prime objective was the assertion of the dominance of 
'dictatorship of the proletariat. ' It was only in accepting this ideological framework 
that the specific voic es had credibility and generated knowledge of such exploitation 
and the kinds of action needed to be freed from it. Such commitment was marked by 
adherence to a common ideology, a common narrative, and a common language. 
Section Three: From Person to Institution. The Formulation of the 
IMPP 
3.3.1 The Attack against Ulanfu as a Process 
In the analysis of the dialogues between the Centre and the region in Chapter Two, 
they were described as a process moving through assessment of the local situation to 
a judgment by the Centre and the issuing of implementable prescriptions. A similar 
process occurred in the attack against Ulanfu. There was an initial process used to 
discredit and undermine his local status (this is best illustrated by the fact he could 
not be openly named in the early stages of the attack, to his full outing from mid- 
1967 and the expansion of 'targets'). The real strategy of the attack was the 
identification of a discrete 'faction' with a programme, a history, and institutional 
identity, within and through which it was claimed Ulanfu (and his supporters) 
attempted to realise their splittist ambitions. In naming Ulanfu, in describing his 
crimes, and his counter-ideology, and in labelling him, the organisations within 
which he was accused of attempting to work also come more clearly into focus. The 
key moment was the shift from attacking Ulanfa and his clique as a limited group of 
people, to talking about an underground party, with an institutional history, 
manifestos, documents, organisational structure. At this point the IMAR situation 
became much more dangerous. What had finally been identified was a vehicle for 
collective splittist intentions. This struck at the heart of the CCP's power locally and 
was a direct threat to their hegemony. 
This entity, the IMPP, did not figure in the CR in IMAR until the end of 1967, at 
Maoist discourse see Gao 1994,14. 
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about the time when the newly set up IMAR CRC under Teng Haiqing was 
implementing the centrally endorsed 'Party rectification' campaign . 
260 What was 
referred to until then as Ulanfu's 'creation of an independent kingdom' was now 
labelled as a whole party, connected to the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary 
Party which had been active in the 1920s. According to Tumen and Zhu, the true 
emergence of the IMPP as a local issue came when Ulanbaagen, a low level local 
official, was tasked by Teng Haiqing with producing evidence discrediting Ulanfu. 
At the heart of this lay the claim that there was a complete splittist counter- 
revolutionary party, the IMpp. 261 According to Woody, well into 1968 Teng was 
reluctant to accept that such a 'complete' organisation existed. But from April 1968, 
the claim was accepted, publicised, and from that point became the focus of the 
campaign in IMAR. 262 This introduced a new and explosive element into the local 
narrative; the existence of a 'counter-Party' institution as a vehicle through which 
splittism was promoted, embodying a separatist political programme. Treachery to 
the central unified Chinese state was no longer hidden. It was now explicitly labelled 
and could be described in the attack discourse. 
3.3.2 'Thoroughly Smash the Counter-Revolutionary Fortress of Nationalism - 
the IMPP' 
While the first public mentions of the IMPP did not occur till mid-1968, material 
like this document, published in December 1967 by the IMAR Hafeia United 
Committee and IMAR Language Committee, Philosophy and Social Science 
Research Institute 'East is Red' Alliance in Hohhot went into considerable detail 
about the IMpp. 263 The 51-page pamphlet was marked as restricted and not for 
public use. As such, it was one of the earliest appearances in the CR of a description 
of the IMPP phenomenon. 
The collection began with a 'highest directive' stressing the utter primacy of CCP 
unity. Only this guaranteed the unity of the PRC. After this, the foreword to the 
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pamphlet described the early history of the IMPP, and its roots in Inner Mongolian 
nationalism in the 1920s, with a list of early leaders, mostly drawn from the 
Mongolian upper classes. The foreword stressed the complex membership and 
strategy of the party from its foundation. During the period of Japanese occupation, 
the party had been dominated by 'traitors' (maiguo toudi), either high officials or 
officers. A Mongolian called Hefeia was identified as one of the key early leaders, 
and described as a 'Mongolian spy, Japanese spy, Nationalist lackey. ' The greatest 
crime of this party was to 'stubbornly oppose the leadership of the CCT: 
'They flagrantly advocated that Inner Mongolia had no working class 
(gongrenjyie) according to the criterion of socialist economic development, 
therefore there was no necessity to organise a communist party. The only 
thing was Hefeia's IMPP. What was called the "Inner Mongolia People's 
Revolutionary Party" was the same in the main as the Mongolian 
Revolutionary Party, aimed at pushing forward the merger of Inner and 
Outer Mongolia. They tried to make out that IMPP and the CCP were 
"friends, " brother-parties, who could communicate with each other, but there 
was [no question] of leadership. ' 264 
In not accepting the leadership of the CCP, in rejecting its ideological hegemony, the 
IMPP had shown that its real purpose was to set up a 'separate country. ' In 1946, 
Hefeia and his co-leaders 'had no option but to publicly dissolve the IMPP. ' But at 
the same time, they set up a new 'IMPT party, with a membership of young 
Mongolian intellectuals. This had a constitution, seal, and a committee. In fact, 'it 
was the same colour and type as the old IMPP. ' It was this organisation which 
Ulanfu had followed. The so-called 'revolutionary path' which Ulanfu had taken 
was 'in fact one in which Ulanfu had violated Chairman Mao's [own] revolutionary 
path': 
'Upwards of 20 years of Ulanfu's counter-revolutionary revisionist splittist 
crimes amply shows that all that Ulanfu has done while pretending to be a 
CCP member has actually been to faithfully continue the work of the 
impp. 9265 
This was a clear declaration that while Ulanfu might have appeared to have been 
working within the structures of legitimate power and accepted the CCP ideology, in 
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fact he belonged to a separate power-structure, and followed a separate strategy. 
Identification of the IMPP was the first step in exposing and then digging out those 
'hidden enemies, ' with their counter-institutions and objectives, and their own 
I manifesto' containing an anti-Han chauvinist ideology (fanhan-panhan). 
Following this introduction was a collection of supporting documents containing the 
counter-language of the IMPP. As in the attack against Ulanfu, words were quoted 
directly from the enemy. But in this case complete documents with full sourcing and 
documentary type attribution were offered. These ranged from the draft of the IMPP 
Constitution (dangzhang), to the instructions issued to the East Inner Mongolia 
IMPP, to a banner from 1945, and the summary constitution (zong zhang) of the 
Mongolian Communist Youth League. Over 40 documents were presented, some 
giving regulations and rules, others setting out structures and personnel, all 
contributing to the sense of a well-organised and comprehensive counter-entity 
operating by issuing 'decisions, ' prescriptions and rules similar to the CCP itself, 
with a similar hierarchy and power structure. 
The most vivid illustration of this presentation of the IMPP as a organisation was the 
setting out of an organogram, detailing the structure of the organisation: the Party 
Congress at the top, the Central Standing Committee Full Session below this, and 
then the Central Committee split between administrative and political functions, 
reaching down into the cities, leagues and banners, to cadres, and finally individual 
members. A structure like this paralleled almost exactly that of the CCP itself. It 
was, therefore, even more to be feared because it 'ghosted' the functions, and 
institutional set-up, of the CCP. It had a shadowing, underground structure, so that 
the members of one could occupy places in the other. The difference was not in its 
structure but in its ideology, in its pursuit of objectives opposed to those of the CCP: 
'The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [IMPP] represents the 
common interests of the Mongolians and Mongolian people. It aims to 
implement the current stage of the system and struggle for Chinese new 
democracy... Its ultimate objective is to bring about in Mongolia a socialist 
communist system. This party leads a unified group of people from the 
Mongolian world, and is allied with the CCP, the Outer Mongolia 
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, 266 Revolutionary Party, and International Communism... 
The IMPP was not subordinate to the CCP, but presented as equal to it. The CCP 
was unable to accept this challenge to its hegemony, simply because its power was 
predicated on possession of a universal truth, one of the central tenets of which was 
its right to a monopoly of power in the PRC. 
The documents in this pamphlet indicated the formulation of a new narrative, and 
detailed a counter-history. The narrative here was not based on individual accounts 
of exploitation and oppression. Instead, ostensibly it dwelt on the more factual 
presentation of personnel, structures, documents, events, from a 'parallel history, ' a 
history that had disappeared underground in 1947. Now the time had come to dig 
this out and expose it. In practice this meant from 1968 to 1969 Mongolians (both 
those who were members of the Party and those who were not) became targets of a 
savage campaign. 
Conclusion: A New Narrative 
The impact of the Centre's discourse of the management if IMAR's problems 
distilled in the '13th April Decision' can be seen in the localized discourse in which 
Ulanfu was portrayed as a representative of a 'counter-ideology' within a counter- 
narrative, using a counter-language. The key issue during this period was the 
conflict between the centrally supported ideology of class, and a local one imputed 
to Ulanfu based on nationality issues. The destruction of Ulanfu's prestige and 
influence to the local audience was a logical objective for the new power structures 
implementing this discourse in IMAR. 
An attack centred on Ulanfii only took things so far. The real crisis point came with 
the articulation of a counter-organisation, signifying aspirations for a fully 
independent Inner Mongolia. This entered the territory deemed forbidden by the 
discourse from the Centre, with its promotion of unity. 
The campaign against Ulanfu was a means to implement the hegemony of the 
ideology of class over nationality, something implict in the discourse arising from 
266 lbid 11. 
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the 'IP April Decision. ' It also delivered control over the keywords of political 
action - 'liberation' and 'Justice' - and the key moments in the narrative of IMAR 
history and the contribution this made to the region's political identity: 'Because of 
the tumultuous CR led by our great leader Chairman Mao, Ulanfu's throne has been 
smashed (wangye baozuo), and the scum protected and collected by him swept 
away, ' a contemporary attack concluded. 'Ulanfu is in the water, Hefaia has fallen 
from his stage... We will completely smash the IMPP .... This is the great will of the 
people (renxin), a great, urgent matter for the people. ' 267 
The imposition and promotion of this new order fell to the leader appointed by the 
Centre in the '13'h April Decision, ' Teng Haiqing. The next chapter looks at his use 
of this language, and the narrative created through and by it. 
267 Ibid 4. 
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Chapter Four 
Teng Haiqing: The Voice of Power? - 
1967-1968 
From his appointment as a result of the '13'h April Decision' in 1967, till his 
removal after the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, Teng Haiqing was ostensibly 
the most significant power-holder in IAMR. Teng's appointment was approved by 
the Centre. His voice carried the discourse of the central CR ideology with its 
legitimised and legitimising vocabulary into IAMR. He was in close contact with 
leaders in Beying, and his terms ofreference were initially set by them. He occupied 
the leadership positions in the newly created administrative organisations ofthe CR. 
Teng was the nexus ofpower in IAMR, and yet in the new context his position and 
voice illustrated two features of power holders. The first was the impossibility of 
imposing central hegemony on a local situation without adaptation or engagement. 
Teng's language dealt with the contentious issue of nationality versus class which 
hadfigured so much in the campaign against Wanfu largely by mentioning it in 
ways heavily circumscribed by the parametres of the Centre's discourse. He initially 
attempted to use this discourse purely, refusing to engage with the audience in 
IAMR in terms that related to them, imposing the Centre's categories and language 
as a mechanism of control. But towards the end of his time in IAMR the narrative of 
the IMPP which began to appear in his'language showed the impact the local 
situation had had on him. The secondjeature of Teng's period in IAMR showed the 
extreme insecurity of the power holders in the new system, and the shallow purchase 
of the new administrative structures. This was underpinned by Teng's own lack of 
symbolic power. Analysis of Teng's time in IAMR shows a discourse asserting 
power, andfailing. 
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I 
Section One: Context 
4.1.1 Teng Haiqing: When he Held Power in IMAR and his Role 
Mid-1968 to April 1969 was the period of greatest upheaval and violence in the CR 
in IMAR. This coincided with the high tide of Lin Biao's influence within the PLA, 
and the national establishment of the revolutionary committees, the main 
administrative achievement of the CR. And it also coincided with the central 
symbolic event, the expulsion of Liu Shaoqi from the CCP in October 1968, 
signalling a break with the previous course of the Chinese revolution. The 
skirmishes between the PRC and the USSR on the northern border in March 1969, 
and the Ninth Party Congress which ran from April to May of that year marked the 
end of the period. The Centre attempted to stabilise the situation after this. 
One of the key movements of 1967-1969 was the purge associated with the 'Party 
rectification' campaign within the CCP. The impact of this in IMAR was profound, 
aggravating extant tensions, and ultimately bringing them to crisis level. In his 
chapter on the CR in IMAR in Massacres of the CR the Chinese scholar Wu Di 
argued that the 'Party rectification' campaign became in IMAR the primary vehicle 
through which to purge what was identified in November 1967 as IMPP. From April 
1968, the campaign to 'dig and cleanse the IMPT became a central pre- 
occupation. 268 The anti-IMPP campaign itself ran through three main phases with 
varying degrees of intensity and violence: the 'opening' phase, from November 
1967 to April 1968; the 'developing' phase from May to November 1968, and the 
most violent 'high-tide' phase, from November 1968 to May 1969.269 
The critical figure in the CR in IMAR during this period, Teng Haiqing, had no links 
with IMAR before 1967. This is important in understanding his involvement there 
from 1967 to 1969, and his lack of capital and credibility in dealing with the 
situation which he had been put and spoke in. He was born in Anhui province and 
268 Woody 1993,7. Wu Di and Woody are the same person. Song 2002 and Woody 
1993 contain portions of what is in fact a much longer unpublished history of the CR 
(interview with Wu Di, 17th March 2003). 269 Song 2002,88. 
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joined the Red Army in 1930, working under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping as 
commander of the political division in the Third Field Army during the Civil War in 
the 1940s. He studied at Nanjing Military College for five years from 1949, and was 
made a Lieutenant General in 1955, before moving to Shijiazhuang in Hebei 
ýrovince to be the principal of the advanced infantry academy. In 1961 he was made 
Deputy Commander of the Beijing Military District before being despatched by the 
Centre to IMAR as a result of the 1P April Decision' in 1967.270 
Teng differed from his predecessor Ulanfa not just because he was an outsider to 
IMAR, but also because he was ethnically Han. Theoretically, these two factors 
worked in his favour. He was not implicated in the complicated network of 
relationships that existed for Ulanfu, and for which Ulanfu had been criticised. 271 
But it also meant that there were considerable problems in installing himself in 
Hohhot, once he had received instructions from the Centre. 272 Here he differed 
dramatically from Ulanfu, whose power was based on his own prestige and 
background in IMAR and on a narrative that showed personal involvement there. 
Ulanfu was also perceived as having devised his own ideology (albeit one labelled a 
counter-ideology), based on defending and explaining the conditions unique to 
IMAR. This credibility was strong enough amongst local people to require the 
lengthy campaign described in the last chapter to dismantle it. Finally, Teng was a 
military figure. His appointment seemed to assert the importance of the army 
factions over the new rebellious groups. This reduced the constituency in IMAR 
with whom he had capital and who were therefore likely to immediately accept him. 
Teng mainly exercised his power through the new administrative positions created to 
implement the CR: as head of the CR Military District (the position to which he was 
appointed by the Centre on 16'h April 1967), the IMAR Preparatory Commission 
(set up on 18th June 1967); the IMAR Cultural Revolutionary Committee (IMAR 
CRC), set up in November 1967, and the Central IMAR CRC Nucleus Group, set up 
270 Tumen and Zhu 1995,40. 271 See Chapter 3,3.2.6 at the end for more on this. 
272 Zhou Enlai in his speech on the 27h April 1967 referred to the refusal of the 
Military District to accept Teng when he went there, and the fact that he was 
working from the Railway Bureau as 'this is not under the army' (Doc IIb, 15). 
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on 1P February 1968. Teng's power was institutionalised within these four entities. 
The last three were short-lived, being disbanded in 1969. 
Teng was an imposed leader. He was sent to be an administrator, conveying and 
implementing instructions, 'handling' a situation in the ways laid out in the '13 th 
April Decision. ' His immediate capital was located in assuming the position of a 
spokesperson on behalf of the Centre, using their discourse of management of the 
local situation. 273 He did not have, and was not meant to have, power in his own 
right, as Ulanfu had. In his brief period in IMAR Teng was the servant of the Centre". 
attempting to deal with a situation he knew little about and had no background in, 
using categories that were imposed from outside. It was not surprising that his 
reaction to the complications of IMAR was crude and unsuccessful. His lack of a 
natural power base in IMAR was best illustrated by his removal. It took a concerted 
campaign to unseat Ulanfu, lasting over two years. But Teng's fall, after the Ninth 
Party Congress in April 1969, was swift, taking only two months. 274 
273 This is reinforced by Teng being referred to during the early part of his time in 
IMAR as 'Vice Commander of Beijing PLA Units (South China Morning Post 7 th 
November 1967, and broadcast monitored on 19th December 1967), rather than 
Chairman of the IMAR CRC, his pre-eminent local position. 
274 His career after this was intriguing. He was sent for re-education to Hebei in 
1970. He was recorded by Xinhua and other sources as having attended the 
memorial service for Chen Yi in January 1972, and being at the Korean National 
Day celebrations the same year. According to the same sources he attended military 
celebrations and hosted foreign military delegations (from Yugoslavia and Romania) 
throughout 1973 and 1974. He was posted as Deputy Commander of the Jinan 
Military District from 1975 to 1980. The last formal event of which he was recorded 
as being present was at the Leading Organs National Day on 8 th August 1979 
(Tumen and Zhu 1995,295 and FCO archives). In an interview in 2003, Wu Di 
stated that in 1980 Teng had been discreetly retired off, and had gone to live in 
Shandong. Teng's previous revolutionary record, in particular his contribution to the 
wars in the 1930s and 1940s meant that he received top-level protection, and was 
never formally charged with the excesses of the CR in IMAR. He seemed genuinely 
not to have known of the extent of the violence in IMAR until his own fall in 1969, 
when he was brought face to face with some of those who had suffered during his 
I reign. ' These confrontations in struggle sessions against him (described in the 
following chapter) seemed to have scarred him. He was reportedly on medication in 
the 1980s for sleeplessness. He died in October 1997 in Beijing. Most mystifying of 
all, his name figured among those acknowledged as helping in the writing of the 
1995 Chinese history of the CR in IMAR (Tumen and Zhu 1995,338). 
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Teng's career in IMAR also illustrated one of the paradoxes of the CR. While the 
movement saw specific figures and factions accrue immense short-term power, there 
was a profound insecurity at the root of their authority. Andrew Walder described 
this in the broader context (though he cited the situation in IMAR at the time) when 
talking of the 'Party rectification' campaigns: 
'Those who held authority in most of China early in 1968 occupied positions 
that were ad hoc, in hastily formed revolutionary committees, or 
"dictatorship headquarters"... People react differently when their livelihoods 
and even lives are at risk than when they are secure. People act differently 
when the personal consequences of their own actions can be very large. And 
the actions of thousands of individuals, all of whom alter their behaviour in 
similar ways, can cumulate into profound societal outcomes when the 
institutions that protect and constrain no longer work. These are the simple 
yet profound changes that Mao and his cronies wrought in Chinese society in 
late 1966 when they made clear that virtually any authority figure in the 
country could be suspected of being a traitor, and when they unleashed 
students and workers upon officials, and removed from them the protection 
of army and police. 275 
This relates to Tcng's situation. He had to perform in a new administrative context, 
yet according to a template of 'authority behaviour' expected from those exercising 
any form of power in the PRC, which in many ways had not changed. This was 
manifested in the way in which he spoke, and the assumption, by himself and others, 
of his right to say certain things. The new administrative context was highly 
provisional and unstable. It was one in which it was legitimate to question power- 
holders. In such a situation, Teng needed to play two roles - one as the new power 
holder, in a new political culture of rebellion and radicalness, and the other still 
acting according to the system in which power derived from personal patronage, and 
was highly centralised and clearly marked in certain conventional ways. 276 
In his speeches, Teng occasionally referred to the violent background of the times he 
was speaking in, and let this world enter and impact upon his own language. He 
talked, on 9h June 1968, of the 'formidable aihai) armed struggle' in an 
275 Walder 1996,49-50. 
276 This 'power insecurity' was present in the Centre. See Qiu's description of the 
bewildering arbitrariness of the power culture around Lin Biao before his fall in 
1971. Qiu's account is particularly interesting as her father was one of those accused 
of being collaborators with Lin (Qiu, 1999). 
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organisation in Wumeng League 277 and condemned those who exploited the anti- 
rightist campaigns to 'strike, smash, hit, bum, grasp and create an atmosphere of 
terror, pressuring the real "dig, cleanse" activists. ' 278 In the record of his talks with 
the group from Pingzhuan on 200'November 1967, one of the delegation members 
referred to those killed in the armed struggle in August in the district. But Teng did 
not explicitly invoke or condone violence. Unlike the 'lower-level' attacks analysed 
in the last chapter, Teng used a more dispassionate, remote style. His language itself 
was rarely violent. His use of expletives or 'taboo language' was, as is shown below, 
infrequent. His primary register was official, ordered and prescriptive, and the 
violent and convulsed world in which he spoke was kept far outside the discourse he 
spoke within, which proclaimed in its own structured hegemony based on carefully 
controlled definitions of order and unity. 
4.1.2 Teng's Ideology 
Teng was appointed to his position in IMAR without having an adminstrative power 
base there, or any of his own capital to build on. His condition as an outsider was 
compounded by his being a spokesperson for an ideology that asserted the 
hegemony of unity based in class. He represented and promoted this unity in the 
language he used, demonstrateing allegiance through the use of a vocabulary with a 
clearly marked basis in central terminology, and working tightly within a framework 
inspired by it. This was signified by his speaking within the master narrative 
supplied from the Centre. He advertised this in his speeches by reference to the 
national campaigns, adapting them locally. 
277 Doc 2, Issue 219,1. 
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Table 5: Teng Haiqing Material: Central Campaigns and Local Variants 
Campaign Name First Appearance in the Teng's First Mention 
Centre 
I'hc 'Urcat Alhaiice' Lauiichcd in a Ccntrc Melitloncd h) I k: 110 III 
(dalianhe) document in September February 1968. 
279 1966 . 
The 'Three Unities' (san Representing the unity 
jiehe) between the revolutionary 
masses, the PLA, and 
revolutionary cadres. 
Sanctioned by Mao in 
People's Daily article in 
November 1967.280 
'Party rectification' First used in the 1940s. 28 I Referred to by Teng from 
(zhengdang) 20"' April 1969. 
'Arranging study classes' Used in the early 1960s, Referred to by Teng in 
for Mao Zedong Thought but in the CR had the May 1968. 
(ban xuexiban) specific meaning of the 
main vehicle for class 
struggle and criticism. 282 
'Faction Nature' (paixing) First used nationally in Used throughout 1968 by 
293 September 1967 . 
Teng. 
'Great Criticism' (da 284 First used in 1968 . 
Appears from Teng's 
pipan) speech on 7"' July 1969. 
'Unification' (yiyuanhua) Used by Mao in a speech Used by Teng from 
in March 1968.285 November 1968. 
279 lbid, 13. 
279 Xiong 1993,155. 
280 lbid 201. 
281 lbid 42. 
282 lbid 124. 
283 lbid 200. 
284 lbid 212. 
285 lbid 222. 
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The campaigns marked out in Teng's speeches how he stayed close to the 
ideological themes pursed in the CR centrally. The 'Party rectification' campaign 
however occupied the fault-line where the central and local campaign differed, and 
caused a fracture between Teng's fidelity towards the Centre and the imperative to 
impose its demands, and the practical impossiblity of doing this in a region like 
IMAR. Teng propagated this campaign in its central terms, but it had a structure and 
course locally that differed from its form elsewhere, because in IMAR, 'Party 
rectification' became the main means to target the IMPP, the brunt of which was 
borne by cadres and people of Mongolian ethnicity. 
In the 'Party rectification' campaign in IMAR, the key area of contention and 
pressure were the importance of contradictions, 'and polarities and their 
interpretation and application to their description and analysis of the local situation 
in Teng's discourse. On the 3"d June 1968, in his speech to a Mao Zedong Thought 
Study Class, Teng had stated categorically that 'class struggle is not abstract. 286 In 
line with this stated dislike of 'abstraction, ' contradictions were seen in purely 
concrete, embodied forms. 'The main contradiction, ' Teng said on 25 th November 
1968, 'at the moment is still that between the revolutionary proletarian ranks and the 
small clique of power-seizers in the party taking the capitalist road. 1287 Teng 
repeated this on 10th December 1968, adding that in IMAR this was manifested in 
the contradiction between the great masses of the region's proletariat and 
representatives of Liu Shaoqi and his people in the IMAR, 'the small capitalist 
faction taking Ulanfu as its leader. 288 More fundamental forms of contradiction 
were cited in the clash between the 'personal' (si) and 'public' (gong) '289 and in the 
polarity between leaders and masses, what Teng cited as the 'mainstream' (zhuliu) 
and the 'side-current' (zhiliu). 
The terms of this ideology were taken directly from the sanctioned and canonised 
theory of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradiction in Mao Zedong's 
theoretical and political. thinking. Mao's 'On Contradiction, ' written in 1937, and 
286 Doc 2, Issue 178,1. 
287 Doc 36,3. 
288 Doc 37,7. 
289 Doc 14,3. 
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widely regarded as his most accomplished theoretical work, set out this ideology. 
Contradictions were described as all-pervasive: 'The law of contradiction in things, 
that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of nature and society, and 
therefore also the basic law of thought. 290 Mao's treatment of contradictions 
illustrated well his ability to import abstractions from the master communist 
ideology and to adapt and relate them to creating a new perception of reality in 
China. Contradictions pervaded the whole of Chinese society for Mao. They were 
meticulously described in his 'Ten Great Relationships. ' The social acceptance of 
Mao's teachings on contradictions is exemplified in an editorial in the People's 
Daily on 5h April 1956 which baldly declared that 'society at all times develops 
through continuous contradictions. 29 1 Linked to the ideology of contradiction was 
that of permanent revolution, struggle against nature, and the transformation of 
people through the working out of contradictions in society. 
Teng talked of contradictions and polarities locally within this central ideological 
framework. Contradictions and conflict was embodied in his description of enemies 
and the good, and even between the description of 'open' and 'dark' enemy actions 
contained in his speech on IOh December 1968. This symbolised in its language the 
duality that it was attempting to describe: 
'Now enemies are using two types of methods. One is open fight, but this 
open kind of fighting is very easy for us to see through. One is hiding 
themselves in a dark comer, scheming, firing arrows, using the rightist 
tendencies and capitalist factionalism of some comrades, spreading vicious 
rumours, creating splittism, showing off. This is the greatest danger at the 
moment. 292 
He also encapsulated contradictions in the metaphors of the two paths or lines from 
the ideological discourse of the Centre as expressed in Mao's Works: 'In the CR in 
IMAR, there is a battle between two classes, two paths, two struggle lines. 293 our 
common path' Teng declged on 20th November 1967, 'is the path of socialism and 
290 Ibid 201. 
291 lbid 93. 
292 Doc 3 7,7. 
293 Doc 14. 
173 
communism. ' Repeating a theme already mentioned, the 'non-abstract' nature of 
class struggle, ' Teng continued on 22 nd February 1968: 
'Class struggle ... has specific people, specific enemies, two classes, two 
paths, two directions. This is not an abstract issue. The proletariat and 
capitalists are two classes. This is a concrete thing. There are two classes, 
and that means [there are] two paths [they take]. Capitalists take the capitalist 
path and the proletariat take the socialist path. If there are two paths then 
there must be a struggle between two directions. The struggle for two 
directions is really about what path you eventually take: that in the direction 
of proletarian revolution, or that in the direction of revisionist splittism. Real 
people take their steps along these paths. ' 294 
The metaphor of the 'path' was applied locally when Teng talked, in 14 th April 
1968, of 'the CR from beginning to end being a struggle between two classes, two 
paths, two directions. Resolving this issue [of the two paths or lines], you then have 
the power of initiative. If you don't resolve it, you don't have the power of initiative. 
The Third Headquarters (san si) have still not resolved whether they go in Chairman 
Mao's revolutionary direction, or whether they are standing at a crossroads. 295 Teng 
called this 'a problem of standpoint' (lichang), of where someone's thought locates 
them. The ideology from the Centre supplied the context within which people and 
organisations were located to be meaningful and understood. 
The right direction, Teng declared on 14th June 1968, was the direction of Chairman 
Mao, which is 'our destiny and our spirit, the basic guarantee of our victory. 
Chairman Mao's revolutionary direction is that of the proletariat, the basic direction 
of our Party, and of the masses. If you don't understand Chairman Mao's 
revolutionary direction, then you don't understand why we continue revolution 
under socialism, and whose revolution we wage. 296 
Part of the ideological importance of the working through of contradictions in 
society, encapsulated in the metaphor of 'two paths and directions' used by Teng 
from the beginning to the end of his period in IMAR, was that it conveyed, in simple 
language, the complicated messages about class classification, and struggle 
294 Doc 2, Issue 82,4. 
295 Doc 2, Issue 13 1,1. 
296 Doc 65,4. 
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promoted by the Centre. Without directly mentioning the very difficult situation in 
IMAR (described in Chapter Three) it conveyed metaphorically the sense of social 
contradictions and the urgency needed to rectify them. The contentious area of 
nationality was managed by being left outside its terms. 
Indeed, Teng's speeches were largely silent on the 'class versus nationality' problem 
that had dominated material attacking Ulanfu. Nowhere in his speeches, beyond 
isolated mentions of 'splittism, ' did Teng set out, in any detail, a defence of the 
hegemony of the central language of class, as opposed to the claimed counter- 
ideology of nationality. Beyond the most orthodox presentation of the central dogma 
on class, Teng did not refer to the specific 'Mongolian' class categories mentioned 
in Table 2.1, Chapter Three, 3.1.5. Only in one document (8th January 1969) did he 
refer to Ulanfu in something a little more than generic, sloganised form. In Teng's 
discourse, the anti-IMPP campaign was purely -a 'Party rectification' exercise. 
Teng's relative silence on the issue of nationality and class was all the more, 
extraordinary in view of the fact that these documents covered a period in 1968 in 
which murder, torture, violence, and social dislocation, caused by these conflicts and 
overwhelmingly vented on people of Mongolian ethnicity were daily occurrences. 297 
This exemplified the strategy of exclusion, pushing the issue of ethnicity outside the 
discourse by undermining or simply ignoring its terms. 
4.1.3 On Whose Authority Did Teng Speak? 
Teng signified his self-consciousness to his power position in the frequent use of 
orders, judgements, or commands in his speeches. This demonstrated his belief in 
297 According to Woody, Teng was unconvinced of the existence of the IMPP prior to 
April 1968: 'Teng Haiqing, as the person bearing overall responsibility in Inner 
Mongolia, and Gao Jinming as the one in charge of civilian affairs, disagreed about 
whether or not there really existed a New Inner Mongolian People's Party... Teng 
had misgivings. The reason for this was quite simple. As a recent arrival, he knew 
literally nothing about the situation in Inner Mongolia' (Woody 1993,6). Certainly, 
the most explicit mentions of the IMPP by Teng occurred well into 1968 - in, for 
instance, the speech on 25'h November 1968. Mentions of nationality early in 1968 
were very general. On 22 nd February 1968, Teng referred to the struggle against 
Ulanfu simply as 'a struggle against the counter-revolutionary revisionist nationalist 
splittists alliance of Ulanfu. ' Beyond this label, Teng said nothing more about 
nationality or an ethnic dimension to the struggle against him. 
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his occupying a place within a system in which his authority and its exercise was 
legitimate. He stated categorically at the beginning of several speeches that 'the 
situation of the CR throughout the country is very good, not just quite good (dahao, 
bu shi xiaohao). The situation in IMAR is the same as in thý rest of China, very 
good, not quite good. t298 His audience accepted this confidence in his right to speak 
about the whole situation in IMAR and pass judgement on it. His words were 
reported in newspapers, and quoted by other leaders (see 4.3.5). The main indication 
of Teng's authority locally was that he was seen as having the power to speak and be 
listened to by the wider public. 
Unlike some leaders at the Centre, Teng only once appealed to the formal positions 
he held as the basis upon which he had the right to speak in this material . 
299 For 
other speeches or speech events he did not state that he spoke as Chair of the IMAR 
CRC, or the Military District. In the majority of the talks he was indicated as 
'Comrade' Teng (as is the case with references to him in IM Daily). In nine of the 
documents he was called 'commander' (silingyuan). In the remaining three 
documents he was simply 'Teng Haiqing' with no title. There were occasions when 
Teng made clear that he was giving his 'own opinion' (for instance, at the beginning 
of his speech on 20'h February 1968) - but such personal opinions were merely to 
deliver orthodoxies and appeared more as a rhetorical strategy to adopt a colloquial 
register towards some kinds of audience. 
Such reticence about citing formal administrative positions as a basis for the right to 
issue authoritative utterances betrayed the confusing enviroranent within which 
298 He repeated this judgement at the beginning of 25h March 1968, and during the 
speech on 14'h June 1968. This was also a common phrase used in central leaders' 
speeches. See, for instance, Zhou Enlai's opening words on 27 th November 1966 at 
the Revolutionary Rebellion Meeting in Beijing (recorded in , Wuchanjieji wenhua 
da geming ziliao huibian, lingdao tongzhifianghua, (Great Proletarian CR 
Materials, Leaders' Speeches) part 4, published by the IM University in December 
1966,227. Another example occurs on page 256. Whether according to a formula or 
not, the important point is that Teng evidently felt he had the right or sanction to use 
this sort of language. 299 This was the speech on 21" February 1968, of which there are two versions. In 
the fuller verbatim version, Teng stated at the beginning that 'I represent the CRC of 
the IMAR, and send the warmest greetings to the student study council. 'This was 
omitted from the summary version. 
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Teng spoke, with a new raft of organisations created as a result of the CR being set 
up, some competing with other 'non-official' entities within this new market. Teng's 
appeal to authority was therefore to a more fundamental basis. The first was derived 
from the Centre, and specifically sited in Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought, 
along with its signifiers. The second was 'the masses. ' 
Teng's appeals to central authority, demonstrating direct sanction from them, were 
clear from the earliest of his speeches analysed here, that of the 5 Ih July 1967 (two 
months after arriving in IMAR). Referring to the '13'h April Decision' in that 
speech, and instructions 'personally approved (zi pizhun) by Chairman Mao, ' Teng 
stated that 'because the Centre has adopted heroic, resolute measures, thoroughly 
smashing the black underground headquarters... and shattering the capitalist 
counter-revolutionary power-restorer counter-current... IMAR CR has entered a 
new period, following the healthy path opened personally by Chairman Mao 
developing towards the future. 300 Teng was buying into the symbolic capital of 
Mao, locating Mao in the discourse as a source of power and legitimacy. Teng was 
speaking on behalf of Mao when he demanded a personal response from his 
audience: 
'This meeting is to lift high the red banner of Mao Zedong Thought, to carry 
out politics, to use Mao Zedong Thought as commander. We must cede 
absolute authority to Mao Zedong Thought in our heads. We must believe 
Mao Zedong Thought can solve all problems together. We don't want to try 
to use some twisted evil path to solve problems. 301 
In this speech, approval by the Centre was even invoked to endorse the good status 
of the local Third Headquarters: 'Third Headquarters is a model in IMAR of a 
revolutionary rebellion group, this is approved by the Centre. ' 
Later in the text, Teng posed the rhetorical question: 'Should we hit them [enemies] 
or teach and help themT He resolved this by appealing to 'what Chairman Mao has 
taught us. ' He referred to 'the cadres who have made counter-revolutionary direction 
mistakes. If, after these few people have made mistakes, the Centre points this out, 
300 Doc 14,1. 
301 Ibid 1. 
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[and they are] very quick to correct themselves, [and] stand on the revolutionary 
direction of Mao Zedong thought, [this] is good. 9302 The speech ended with a paean 
to the glory of the Centre, personified in Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. Teng 
stated that one should 'establish the complete -authority of Mao Zedong Thought, ' 
changing 'our world view. ' One should 'study Chairman Mao's highest, newest 
directives, to direct our revolutionary practice. ' We must 'propagate Mao Zedong 
Thought, ' and finally 'develop a universal Mao Zedong education, for the 
rectification movement. 303 
Teng's words were saturated with overt signifiers of Mao's and the Centre's 
authority. The local situation figured only insofar is it was seen through the 
categories from the Centre: 'In the CR in IMAR, we are going through the battle 
period of struggle between the two classes, two paths, two directions. 304 The chief 
responsibility for participants in the CR, therefore, was 'to criticise the power- 
seizers in the Party taking the capitalist path, criticise the small group of power- 
seizers taking the capitalist path in IMAR, and those taking the capitalist power- 
seizing path of the Ulanfu faction and his representatives. ' 305 These were not 
expositions of Mao's theories, and arguments for their relevance or validity in 
IMAR. They were assertions to be taken as fact and applied without adaptation in 
IMAR. 
The formulation of instructions or statements from the Centre in Teng's speeches 
did not vary greatly. At its most paradigmatic it appeared in the speech on 9 th 
November 1967, which, like Teng's other more formal speeches (2l't February, 14 th 
June, l2th July, and IOh December 1968) began with 'reverent greeting', the purest 
expression of Mao-adoration, lifted from the language of the Centre, the: 'Let us 
reverently send greetings together: greet the reddest reddest sun in our hearts, the 
contemporary Lenin, the greatest, most glorious leader of the proletariat of the 
whole world, Chairman Mao, a long and prosperous life. 9306 This 'greeting' 
302 Ibid 6. 
303 Ibid 8. 
304 Ibid 3. 
305 Ibid 3. 
306 Ibid, 2. There are variants on this pattern. For instance, this was the only occasion 
in this collection when Mao was spoken of as the 'contemporary Lenin' (a phrase 
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rhetorically declared fidelity to the common symbol of Mao by the use of generic 
language. It was indicative of adherence to a collective rather than an individual 
language. Mao existed in this discourse not as an historical figure but a common 
symbol: 'The great masses understand "only with Chairman Mao, and Mao Zedong 
Thought, can we save China, save the world. "' Teng called this a 'great truth' 
(weida zhenli). 'From a 100 million people's hearts will come the common cry, 
"Long life to Chairman Mao, 10,000 years, 100 million years! "' Teng at this point 
integrated into his voice in the text common slogans from the campaigns from the 
Centre: 'They will not fear heaven, or earth.. they will smash the old thought, old 
culture, old customs, old habits from several thousand years of the exploiting 
class. 307 The assertion of the authority of the Centre was manifested through 
support for, and reliance on, central ideology, conveyed by common forms of 
language, common patterns signifying allegiance and acceptance. The Centre was 
present not only in thought, but in the actual words to convey that. The use of a 
common language signified Teng's participation in a common discourse of 
recognised power and authority. 
Teng made his position as the transmitter of directives from the Centre to IMAR 
explicit. He talked on 25th March 1968 of the meeting between the Centre (Premier 
Zhou"Enlai, Comrade Jiang Qing) with representatives from Tianjin, and their 
prescription to 'oppose the rightists. ' 'I hope, ' Teng stated after this, 'that all 
banners and towns and responsible people in work units can scrupulously 
investigate, and overcome the rightist tendency. 308 Teng's function as a 
disseminator or transmitter of messages from the Centre was strongest in the speech 
to artistic circles on 27"' March 1968, in which he based his position on Jiang Qing's 
speech from November 1967. Here, the - means of transmission were not direct 
quotes from Jiang's speech, but rather a reference to the 'encouragement' that her 
talk had given. 309 Appeals to the Centre become more explicit when Teng talked of 
'whether or not we follow Chairman Mao, and the Centre... The Centre almost 
that originated from Lin Biao). Others mentioned the 'four limitlesses' (12 th July 
1968). 
307 The latter phrase referred to in Centre discourse as 'smashing the four olds. ' 308 Doc 2, Issue 111,4. 
309 Doc 2, Issue 112,1. 
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certainly will support the struggle to "dig up the black line, and cleanse [the 
enemy's] poison. ", 310 
Ability to demonstrate the support of the Centre was important. The identification of 
the IMPP from November 1967 onwards meant that the focus for the CR in IMAR 
became different, and took an increasingly unique route. While the Centre supported 
class struggle nationally, it was not so clear whether it sanctioned the version of 
class struggle that was occurring in IMAR with its high levels of violence and 
disturbances. As the campaign got out of control, so the failure of the discourse set 
out in the '13th April Decision' to actually manage the situation on the ground in 
IMAR grew more evident. Teng was placed in a position where he was exercising 
authority on the terms laid out by the Centre in the document, but in a situation 
where one of the key features in his environment, ethnicity, could not be clearly 
articulated - only excluded. This was to prove an unsuccessful strategy of control. 
This was also a problem in the second basis for authority to which Teng referred to 
extensively in these speeches, the 'great revolutionary masses! Teng talked on 
many occasions of the imperative to 'trust the masses! 'Truth is in our hands, ' he 
declared on I" June 1968, 'we must use Mao Zedong Thought, and trust the great 
revolutionary masses! At another point, Teng addressed this directly to his specific 
audience (and to the constituency they represented): 'Now, revolutionary masses, 
the leaders have put you in the most important place. Politically they really trust 
YOU., 31 1 This was presented within the context of serving the people, arriving at a 
broad understanding of common interests, against the factions, and leadership 
groups, that were active until then. Teng's main criticism of a group from IM 
University, from a transcription of a meeting with them on 28 th June 1968, was 
, 312 simply 'you do not trust the masses. In his important speech to the plenary 
session of the IMAR CRC, he stated in more formal and prescriptive tones that 'we 
must implement Chairman Mao's line, we must resolutely trust and rely on the 
masses, mobilise the masses, and wage people's battle. 313 On many different kinds 
3 10 Doc 2, Issue 131,2. 
31 1 Doc 2, Issue 219,4-5. 312 Doc 2, Issue 209,3. 
313 Doc 32,13. Similar formulations are used on 22nd February 1968,12'h March 
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of occasions, therefore, Teng reverted to the issue of 'trusting the masses, ' implying 
that he was speaking on their behalf. On the 9th November 1967, he said: 'We must 
never part with the masses, we must always be responsible for the people, study 
from the people, we must honestly act as the "beasts of burden" of the people. 
Departing from the masses is irresponsible; one starts putting on the airs and graces 
of a high official. ' 
The pressure on the keywords 'people' (renmin) and 'masses' (qunzhong) was 
discussed in Chapter Two, 2.1.13, along with issues the contestation and negotiation 
over who was, and was not, included in these terms. 'Masses' in the discourse Teng 
used was a clear signifier of his allegiance to the Centre and its discourse. These 
were the 'proletarian' masses, the good masses, as opposed to the legion of enemies 
that also occurred in Teng's discourse - the rightists, power-seizers, capitalist 
roaders, and splittists. In trying to refer to the 'masses' or 'people' in a localised 
sense, Teng's discourse showed a clear disjuncture. The 'people' he actually spoke 
to, on whose behalf he claimed to be speaking, were from a specific place. As his 
time in IMAR proceeded, there were indications of an increasing awareness of a 
I section' of these local people who were traitors, enemies, untrustworthy - the 
IMPP. The Centre's terms for the 'non-people, ' class enemies, was unable to 
accommodate or correctly label these specific local enemies. This flew in the face of 
the declaration of the hegemony of the Centre's 'class' ideology, and the strategy to 
exclude the issue of ethnicity. So Teng's discourse became the site for the conflict 
between the assertions of the problem of IMAR in the Centre's terms, and an 
articulation of it in purely localised, ethnic terms. 
Section Two: Teng's Words 
4.2.1 The Teng Material 
The material carrying this discourse and through which this negotiation for authority 
in IMAR occurred is listed in Appendix Two. This contains a very small portion of 
the material put out in Teng's name during the CR in IMAR. While it cannot be 
1968, and at the end of the speech on 25'h March 1968. 
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taken as in any way comprehensive, it contains examples from materials delivered at 
a broad selection of the various events and occasions at which Teng spoke. It 
covers the full period during which he was active in IMAR. It should also be 
stressed that this material was acquired randomly. It was collected from several 
sources with no other criterion than that the material came from the period 1967 to 
1970 in IMAR. 
Of these 34 documents in which Teng's words are recorded, there are: 
0 18 speeches (either labelled 'important, ' or 'draft') 
0 Three formal reports delivered at public occasions 
0 Three 'discussions' 
0 One 'informal discussion! 
0 One 'interjection! 
0 Two 'opinions' 
* Three 'instructions' 
0 One 'record of comments' 
0 Two 'letters' 
Only two of the documents recording Teng's words were written in origin. There are 
no examples of pamphlets authored by Teng, or articles in the IM Daily over the 
period he was active in the region, although there was an article bearing Teng's 
name which was published in January 1968 in the People's Daily. His public 
activity was almost wholly through speaking. His words were transcribed in various 
ways and presented in written form. 
21 documents (marked by an asterisk in Appendix Two) were disseminated through 
the daily newsletter, 'Red Flag Internal Reference Material' (Hongq! neican), issued 
by the IMAR Party Committee Red Flag Alliance Headquarters. All of these carried 
under their mast the label of 'internal' publications, which were not to be 
disseminated 'to outsiders. ' Their intended readership was therefore limited to those 
in this organisation. Editions of the 'Red Flag Internal Reference Material' also 
carried speeches and instructions from Centre leaders and the Party. On the 12th 
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April 1968 Teng's speech was placed after Zhou Enlai's instructions to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in Beijing issued on 10"' October 1968, and a reprint of an article 
from the Liberation Daily published in Beijing originally on the 27 th February 1968. 
There was also a short 'Instruction from the Centre' on the 'Issue of Arranging Study 
Classes in Yunan. ' Placing Teng's speeches amongst such prestigious material issued 
by the Centre enhanced their status. Those marked in Appendix Two with a cross 
appeared in a similar news-sheet, the 'CR Dictatorship, ' issued by the Eighth 
Division of the Construction Project Department. This was also marked as 'internal' 
material. Those with double crosses in Appendix Two occurred in the 'Struggle 
Notice' news-sheet (Zhengduo tongxun). Of the remaining documents, the issuing 
authorities were as follows: 
1.5h July 1967 - Hohhot Revolutionary Alliance Headquarters 
2.12th July 1968 - IMAR Military District "Support the Left" Office 
3.10th December 1968 - Hohhot Workers Union 
For the documents of the 5h July and 9th November 1967, and 21" February and 14 th 
June 1968 no issuing authority was indicated. These were some of the administrative 
organisations, new and old, to which and through which Teng spoke - the carriers 
and conveyers of his voice, and the social entities within which his power was 
enacted. Setting out these groups maps out the organisational geography within 
which Teng, with signifiers of support from the Centre in his discourse, negotiated 
influence and authority. 
4.2.2 How Teng's Words Were Taken Down 
The most common form of transcription in this material was 'corrected record. ' All 
of these documents carried a disclaimer that the original producer of the words had 
not checked these versions. 
One (27h March 1968) was a transcription from a recording. 
The speeches of the 9th November 1967, and 21st February, 14'h June, 12 Ih 
July, 25h November and 10h December 1968 were presented as complete 
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records of either what Teng said, or what he had intended to say. The last of 
these began with an address to the audience ('Comrades! '). The one on the 
12'h June 1968 ended with three generic slogans ('Long live the victory of 
Mao Zedong's CR line, long live the limitless glory of Mao Zedong Thought, 
long live the great leader, great commander Chairman Mao! ') 
The speeches from 12th March, I't June and 28th June 1968 were presented as 
dialogues, with the voices of others present in the text. 
That of 17th July 68 was presented as the voice of Teng and other leaders 
within a text, similar to a newspaper report conveyed through the third 
person. 
There were some indications within these texts of the kinds of editorial control and 
manipulation exercised over Teng's reported words before being issued in the forms 
in which they finally appeared. For the discussion on 14th April 1968, the compilers 
of the speech (activists at IM University and IM Workers College) indicated at the 
end of their 'synthesised version' that 'there is a small section which was not 
recorded, and has not been set down here. This corrected record has many parts that 
are not the original words, but convey the core meaning. 314 
There were also variations in the insertions in the texts. The transcription in dialogue 
form of Teng's 'Speech' on I" June 1968 indicated in brackets at one point that 
attend6es of the meeting laughed. In another (25th March 1968) the speech ended 
with the simple addition in parentheses of 'slogans' (kouhao). 315 In the speech on 
27th March 1968, two days later, 'shouting slogans' was indicated twice in the 
closing two paragraphs of Teng's speech with applause indicated earlier. 316 
The transcribed speech of 14th June 1968 showed in two places the words 'unclear' 
(bu qing) in parentheses, implying that these versions were either taken from hand- 
written records, taken down during the speech itself, or (less likely) from a 
recording. 317 Finally, two of the speeches are available in separate versions. The 
314 Doc 2, Issue 131,3. 
3 15 Doc 2, Issue 111,4. 
316 Doc 2, Issue 112,4 and 2. 
317 Doc 65,6 and 11. 
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speech to the 'Study Mao Thought Propaganda Division Class of Hohhot Workers' 
on 10h October 1968 was issued separately by both the Hohhot Workers 
Conference, in a single pamphlet on 13th December 1968, and as part of the 
'Struggle Notice' on 19th December 1968. There are no variations between these two 
versions. 
4.2.3 Kinds of Meeting and the Audience Attending 
Teng had a wide constituency. He spoke not just to organisations and groups in 
Hohhot, but also to representatives from Hailar (northern IMAR), Zhemeng League 
(southern IMAR), Pingzhuan (a small town near Hohhot), Yimeng League 
(bordering Shanxi in southern IMAR), Wumeng League (around Hohhot in central 
IMAR), Guyang Town (near Baotou), and Baotou. His words, therefore, were aimed 
at groups that came from all parts of IMAR. He addressed these people in person at 
the following sorts of occasions: 
" 'Meetings' (huiyi) 
" 'Mass meetings' (dahui) 
" 'Meetings/granted interviews' (liejian) 
" 'Study meetings' (xuexihui) 
" 'Party committee meetings' (dangweihui) 
" 'Discussion meetings' (zuotanhui) 
" 'Enlarged Plenary Committee Meetings' (quanwel kuoda huiyi) 
" 'Study classes' (xuexiban) 
A listing compiled from a summary of world broadcasts made during the CR 
showed that Teng spoke to a large number of groups from early on in his time in 
IMAR. On 18"' September 1967 he attended a mass rally of 60,000 workers to 
celebrate the founding of the Preparatory Committee for the Workers Congress in 
Hohhot, at which he 'delivered an important speech. 93 18 He was recorded as having 
attended various events to establish organisations (the founding of the Factory 
318 Sourced at Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East (SWB FE) 2575/B/8 22.9.67, 
FCO archives. 
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Revolutionary Committee on Sept 20'h, and the Hohhot Municipal Revolutionary 
Committee on P October). He spoke for the first time as Chairman of the IMAR 
CRC at a 'mammoth rally' on I't November 1967. The summary also recorded him 
speaking at study classes, sessions of the IMAR CRC, rallies, Mao Zedong Thought 
Classes, wired broadcast rallies, to propaganda teams, student groups and military. It 
was in this organisational context that Teng's language was meaningful and meant 
to have impact. This was the world that he spoke to. 
In terms of political importance the highest-exposure events analysed here were the 
speeches Teng gave at the Plenary Committee meetings. There were a total of four 
of these: the first from 3 rd to 5h November 1967, the second from 6 th to 8 th January 
1968, the third on 5th July 1968, and the final one from 3 rd to 19 th November. 319 
These made up the administrative backbone of the CR campaign in IMAR from late 
1967 to 1969, and were the main vehicle for the regional CRC, of which Teng was 
Chairman. The other meetings listed above were more generic to the CR as a whole 
(see Chapter One, 1.12 for more detail on the kinds of meetings in the CR). What 
differentiated them was the kind of people indicated as attending. These were 
grouped as: 
" 'People in charge' (fuzeren) 
" 'Working personnel' (gongzuo renyuan) 
" 'Representatives' (daibiaq) 
" 'Members' (chengyuan) 
" 'Leaders' (lingdao) /'leading comrades' (lingdao tongzhi) 
The organisations are listed in the third column of the table in Appendix Two, and 
consisted of the following: 
" 'Revolutionary rebel factions' (geming zaofanpai) 
" 'Revolutionary committees' (zizhiqu geming weiyuanhui) 
" 'Study conference' 
" 'Railway bureau' 
3 19 These are listed in the chronology contained in Tumen and Zhu 1995,319-335. 
The final meeting lasted well over a week, at a point when the newly appointed 
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" 'Preparatory groups of the revolutionary committees' (geming 
weiyuanhui choubei xiaozu) 
" 'Leadership small groups' (lingdao xiaozu) 
" 'Advanced work units' (xianjin danwei) 
Some of these were created during the CR (e. g. the first and second) and were 
generic in the sense that they existed throughout the country. Others existed prior to 
the CR, and outlasted it (bureaux Uu] and work units [danwei]) 
For those speech occasions that do indicate specific participation there were the 
following details: 
" The meeting on 20'h November 1967 with delegates from Pingzhuan, took 
place in Teng's office, and lasted an hour and 35 minutes. Four people were 
named as attending. 
" The meeting on 24h November 1967 took place in the Xincheng Hotel, 
Hohhot, and ran from 3: 40 PM to 4: 40 PM in the afternoon. Five people 
were named as attending. 
" The speech on 29h February 1968 took place in an office in a guest house in 
Baotou, and ran from 9: 40 AM to 1: 30 PM. Five people are named as 
attending. 
" The Instructions on 9th June 1968 involved representatives from Guyang's 
'490 Division, ' the 'Battle Division, ' and 'Guyang Middle School Mass 
Group with responsible people from other work units. ' 
" The discussion on the 17th July 1968 involved 'work units and 
representatives from Kanghou, Ningcheng, Baotou, Erzhi, and Hohhot 
Aviation Factory and Fifth Middle School... along with another 17 work 
units. ' 
The differences in Teng's register and tone in front of these various groups was 
evidence for the ways he adapted his language to the occasions at which he spoke. It 
also signified awareness of a 'market' of organisations and the differences in their 
leadership in IMAR was already beginning to fracture and experience difficulties. 
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value encoded in the kind of language used with them. The report that Teng 
delivered to the plenary CRC meetings on 12'h July 1968 was extremely formal, and 
used patterns and structures modelled on central leader speeches of the period. 
Teng's meeting on I't June 1968 with the 'three comrades from IM Teachers 
College' contained many colloquialisms, and used a much less formal register. The 
use, for instance, of the sentence ending 'what' (sha - northern Chinese dialect for 
shenme), and Teng's exclamation at one point that 'there's nothing great about this' 
(mei shenme liaobuqide). This was made even more colloquial in the speech on 7 th 
July 1968 when Teng simply used the same phrase but with sha instead of 
shenme. 320 This descended at some (rare) points into the use of invective. In his 
speech on 14th April 1968 Teng said to the Hohhot Third Headquarters: 'saying that 
Baotou is a capitalist restorationist [place is] bullshit (fangpi) . 
02 1 Responding to a 
report by one of the participants on the talk cited above from Pt June 1968, Teng 
merely stated: 'Blockheads! (caobao) They are blockheads! ' And on 31" May 196 8, 
Teng talked of a member of the Workers Union, Bai Mingzhi, who was a 'bastard' 
(huaidan). The range of voices that Teng used, therefore, ran between these 
parameters; the very formal, for the most formal meetings, to a less structured 
colloquial style for small-scale meetings. At the formal meetings, it was clear that 
Teng's style was dictated both by the genre of leadership-speeches of the time, and 
by the responsibility to convey and represent messages from the Centre to the local 
audience, themselves critical players in the CR in IMAR. 322 
Finally there is the issue of the amount of time Teng spoke. Based on rough 
calculations for the speeches that appear to be verbatim records of what he said (five 
minutes to read aloud for closely printed material, three minutes for double-spaced 
material, making allowances for audience interruptions, etc), Teng's set speeches 
were lengthy events. For a formal event Teng spoke at on 14'h June 1968, the speech 
ran to 16 closely printed pages, which would come to a total of 80 minutes speaking 
time. The verbatim record of the speech on 12'h July 1968 came to 28 double-spaced 
pages - approximately 84 minutes. The shorter speech on 25h November 1968 came 
to ten pages - 50 minutes. That of 10th December 1968 13 pages - 65 minutes. 
320 Doc 2, Issue 215,2. 
321 Doc 2, Issue 131,3. 
322 The styles and registers Teng used, and their function, is looked at in 4.2.5. 
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These were the speeches most clearly marked as verbatim records. Other speech 
occasions were either clearly summarised (and marked as such), or, for the one 
document in which specific start and finish times were indicated (29h February 
1968) evidently heavily edited. Indeed this specific document mentioned that part of 
the meeting was taken up with Teng listening to other reports, which were not 
recorded. 
In terms of preparation, records like that of 7h July 1968 were of Teng's impromptu 
and unscripted remarks. But the lengthier speeches on the set-occasions mentioned 
above were prepared, in some form - perhaps even in the form in which they were 
presented in the documents. It is unlikely that Teng wrote these speeches himself, 
but rather had them prepared by his officials. Schoenhals described the process 
through which Lin Biao's speechwriters went, and what contribution he finally made 
to the words he delivered at formal events publicly. 323 Mao Zedong had a similar 
group of assistants and writers working for him (led by Chen Boda). Certainly Teng 
had some resources in terms of officials and administrators to support him. Woody 
mentioned that Teng's speech on 27th March 1968 was drafted by his secretary, 
Chen Xiaozhuang, who had 'in turn gotten most of his material from Ulangbagan, ' 
the Mongolian official who had been tasked with collecting material on the IMpp. 324 
The extent to which Teng's speeches were the product of the official, bureaucratic 
machinery or his own creation, however, is impossible to tell from the documents 
alone. 
4.2.4 The Dissemination of Teng's Words 
While the circulation of the versions of his speeches analysed here was wide, it 
could not have exceeded that of the IM Daily which remained the main official 
propaganda mouthpiece throughout the CR period in IMAR. Access to this means of 
propagation was one of Teng's most powerful advantages as a leader, and 
administratively and materially one of the key means to disseminate his words. 
323 Schoenhals 1992,70-71. 
324 Woody 1993,1. Probably this is the 'Secretary Chen' that figured in the note of 
the meeting on 3 I't December 1968. 
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A report to members of cultural and artistic circles Teng gave on 27h March 1968, 
and the article in the IM Daily arising from it almost a month later (24, h April) 
illustrates the sort of transformation from Teng's private voice used with a small 
group, to a wider, public one. Whereas the record of the speech itself in the 'Red 
Flag Internal Reference Materials' contained no comments or editorial, merely a 
record of Teng's words (in 'corrected record' form), the article in the newspaper 
lacked direct quotes. Instead, Teng's words were paraphrased, delivered in the third 
person, and placed within a very specific contextual framework, within which value 
judgements were rendered on the importance and use of the original speech event: 
'Comrade Teng Haiqing's speech at the IMAR Cultural Circles Meeting on 
27'h March has aroused a great response. Following this the situation of 
struggle in the great cultural yard (wenhua dayuan) has undergone rapid 
change... Those die-hard followers of Ulanfu who a few days ago were 
hiding in secret offices, planning their attack, along with the representatives 
of the cultural yard stuck in the comers - chameleons, black counsellors, and 
bad people like that - are frightened and being picked up one-by-one. ' 
While the speech, and the article 'inspired' by it in the IM Daily share the same 
purpose of spreading Teng's message, they use different methods. Teng declared the 
objective in his speech at the beginning: 'to push forward the mobilisation of the 
masses in the artistic and cultural worlds, completely to open [up] class struggle. ' 
The sanctions that Teng cited was the speech by Jiang Qing in November 1967, 
which inspired decisions at the IMAR CRC Second Plenary Meeting, and 
instructions from Premier Zhou and the Centre in February on cultural and artistic 
matters. Teng's speech was highly localised and personalised. He condemned the 
Zhemeng League CRC, accusing them of 'aiming their spear towards the Central 
CRC, ' and defended 'Zhao Baowen, ' a good comrade who had made some mistakes, 
but who had been picked out for struggle and criticism by the Zhemeng League 
CRC. 'I believe that the majority of rebellious factions are good, ' Teng declared. 325 
Later in his speech, he said, 'I'm not going to go through this blow by blow, but just 
let you all think about it. That is enough... I trust that no matter which work unit is 
involved, the majority of the masses, and the revolutionary masses wish to push the 
CR forward thoroughly. 326 
325 Doe 2, Issue 112,2. 
326 Ibid 3. 
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The IM Daily article was written in the third person. It had no individual voice. 
Comparisons of the article and the speech's conclusions illustrate the journey from a 
personal voice to an impersonal public one within this discourse. Teng closed by 
stating: 
'Comrades, the class struggle in IMAR is very complicated, very violent, the 
struggle in the cultural and artistic circles more complicated, more violent. 
... In the educational department, the health department, and all other work 
units, in this CF, although they have had many successes, [they] still have 
many problems, and they should investigate themselves like the cultural and 
artistic circles.... Enemies now use the rightist tendency of our leaders, and 
the rightist thinking of our rebellious groups, and intend to creep in that way. 
We need to unify the masses, rely on the masses, respect the spirit of the 
revolutionary masses. In revolution we must mobilize the masses. If you 
don't, you fear the masses, and are not real revolutionaries... ' 327 
In the IM Daily, the final message was a collectivised one: 
'Let us lift high the red banner of Mao Zedong Thought, under the correct 
leadership of the IMAR CRC... preserve the highest levels of revolutionary 
investigation, see through the schemes of counter-revolutionaries, overcome 
the rightist tendency in thought of some in our ranks... ' 
This illustrated the different functions of these documents. The first was a direct 
announcement by Teng, based on his own authority, and the use of a personal voice 
to convey specific prescriptions and instructions. The second was a generalisation of 
the first voice, the propagation of a message through the original words of Teng and 
their expansion into general instructions. There was a single message underlying 
both these, but conveyed in two different registers and working in different ways in 
the various constituencies in IMAR. 
4.2.5 The Register of Utterance 
Teng's exercising of authority was most signified by his frequent use of a 
prescriptive register. In almost every speech or meeting in this collection, his 
primary language activity was to instruct, pass orders, regulate, and to tell his 
audience what to do. In the speech on 9h November 1967, he set out 'seven major 
327 Ibid 4. 
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responsibilities' for participants in the CR (though here he was transmitting these 
from a 'notice issued by the IMAR CRC'). The language was to propagate: 
'immediately to lift up, " 'continuously to deepen, ' 'to do well' (gaohao), 'grasp 
revolution, ' 'positively build. ' These activities were addressed to 'all levels of 
members of the CRC, ' 'to the great masses of the revolutionary organisations, ' 'all 
battle lines, all departments, all work units. 'Tbis was to be done 'with all one's heart' 
(quanxin quanyi), 'politically, intellectually,, theoretically. ' Some of these 
prescriptions were explications of campaigns or slogans of the Centre. Both these 
general headings were lifted from the Centre's discourse, and were common at this 
stage in the CR. Teng used imperatives throughout this explication: 'must' (bixu and 
yao), 'definitely' (yiding), 'absolutely not allowed' Yuebu chongxu). 
A high proportion of Teng's prescriptions appeared even in minutes of dialogues. 
The same list given for the first document above also appeared on 31" December 
1968. Despite being a year apart (albeit an exceptionally tumultuous year) Teng's 
commands remained the same: grasp revolution, arouse the masses, and 
continuously push ahead with the 'Vigorously Use and Study Mao Zedong Thought' 
classes. 328 Such commands did not figure as part of an argumeýt. They signified in 
language a speaker who was demonstrating their right to authority simply by the use 
of such language alone. 
Teng used other registers to signify his authority: 
Judgemental register: Judgements on how various regions and areas had 
succeeded in implementing the anti-Wang Zaitian campaign on 22 nd 
February 1968, and most commonly in the assertion of the 'general situation 
being good, ' both in the IMAR, and in the country. 329 The latter was a phrase 
taken from the discourse of the Centre. 330 
328 Doc 37,2. 
329 See, among others, 25h March 1968,1. 330 'The current CR is in a great good situation' (Yipian da hao xingshi), (People 
Daily New Year editorial, I" Jan 196 8, in Guosh! tongfian, vol 3,1966- 76, Beij ing 
1995,673). 
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Positive register: Language contained in the paeans of praise for Mao in the 
introduction to the speech on 21" February 1968, and the dense use of 
superlatives ('most, ' 'greatest'). On 31" May 1968 Teng talked of 'a great 
victory for the revolutionary path of Chairman Mao ., 
33 1 This victory was not 
related to any specific event, but set within a metaphorical context of 'the 
proletarian revolutionary masses standing on the path of Chairman Mao. ' 
Expository register: Explanation or transmission of the ideology of the 
Centre. In a speech on 29h May 1968, Teng offered thoughts on 'the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. ' 'The best is army leadership, which really has 
no factionalism. Comparatively good people can participate. Leadership 
power will be grasped. Without a period of experimentation before, it is hard 
not to make mistakes. The basic responsibility of "the dictatorship of the 
, 332 masses" is to mobilise them, educate them... Expositions that Teng 
offered were very closely linked to prescriptions for a programme of action, 
either preparing the way for these or explaining them. Teng's prescription on 
20th November 1967, to a delegation that 'you must definitely carry out well 
the "Great Alliance" and the "Three Unities" was followed by explanation: 
"'Great Alliance" is unification in thought, [but] unification still 
needs a leadership class. Start from the IMAR CRCs. If you want to 
set up CRCs, you must have the "three foundations: " This must be 
done according to Chairman Mao's instructions, resolving well the 
problems of cadres. [The main task] is to strike down capitalists, not 
raise capitalists up. Mistakes must be resolved according to the 
principles of "unity - criticism and self-criticism - unity. "' 
333 
The definitions of concepts here were lifted straight from the Centre's 
ideology. This discourse was motivational. Its aim was to bring about 
improved actions and correct behaviour. All explanations therefore were 
linked to demands for implementing a certain prescribed course of action, 
and were rooted in a discourse in which certain actions were already judged 
morally correct, and others condemned. 
Interrogative register: On 30'h May 1968, Teng asked a series of questions to 
delegate members. The issue of the function of questions in Teng's discourse 
33 1 Doc 2, Issue 219,6. 
332 Doc 3, Issue 31,4. 
333 Doc 2, Issue 34,4. 
193 
is looked at in the next section. In these cases, it is clear that Teng was 
seeking specific responses before beginning ftirther delivery of judgement, 
and then prescription. Interrogation was therefore closely linked to a 
programme of instruction. 
Self-critical register: What later became the prime feature of Teng's 
discourse after his removal from power in 1969 was the smallest part prior to 
that. While there were occasions when Teng admitted making mistakes, such 
admissions of error were conveyed as collective ones - 'our failings, ' 'our 
faults. ' 334 There was little sense of Teng's authority having space within it 
for responsibility and personal accountability. Only when Teng was removed 
from power was it possible (indeed, did it become necessary) for his voice to 
accommodate admissions of failings. 
In addition to these various different registers in Teng's discourse, which showed the 
interaction with his audience and his attitude to them, there were also the variations 
in formality. His use of a formal register was seen in his speech on the 10 th 
December 1968. In this, a generic beginning offering praise to Mao was followed by 
a report on 'the general situation, ' and the 'current characteristics of the class 
struggle. ' Teng spoke primarily in a collective voice, using 'we' rather than T: 
'After propaganda groups entered each work unit, [they] did great work, 
achieving great results. They have lifted high the great red banner of Mao 
Zedong Thought, grasped well Mao Zedong Thought classes, opened and 
developed the "three faithfuls" movement, making Mao Zedong Thought 
enter deep into their hearts. They have grasped firmly the struggle between 
the two classes, two paths, two directions, especially grasping the great 
criticism and "Party rectification, " pushing forward struggle, criticise, reform 
in each work unit. ' 335 
The language consisted primarily of slogans from the Centre, or campaign names. 
There was little space for a personal voice. 
334 E. g.: 'I heard I said some nonsense on 1P September, about the basic 
contradictions from Ulanfu having been resolved. I forgot how I said this, but if I 
did, it was a mistake, and should be retracted' (25h October 1968). And the more 
contrite 'Today [1] intend to express a few opinions. These are very incomplete, and 
not totally correct' (27h March 1968 in Doc 2, Issue 112,1). 335 Doc 37,13. 
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But at other times Teng also used an informal register. In his meeting on 22"d 
February 1968, he started offi 
'This doesn't count as a report (busuan shenme bapgao), but Comrade Wang 
Jinbao wanted me to speak at this meeting, I've not prepared. He asked me to 
, 336 speak. I don't expect to go on for very long. 
The transcriptions of Teng's dialogues showed him at his most informal in this 
material. On the 30'h May 1968, he was recorded as using the colloquial 'gao' for 'to 
do, carry out. ' 337 He also used the sentence ending 'ma. '338 His informal register 
was even evident in giving prescriptions: 'Bad people shouldn't have complaints. 
You see who is bad, then you need to resolutely pluck them out. Plucking out bad 
people doesn't need someone to authorise it. It only needs you to pluck out bad 
people, and the CRC will support you. And if the CRC doesn't [offer] support, then 
I'll criticise them. '339 This exercising of authority through a colloquial rather than a 
more formal, personally sponsored style had its uses. It served to build capital with 
the audience, a small group specialising in 'plucking out' enemies. Teng was 
demonstrating closeness to the people he was talking to, addressing them in 
language that implied no distance. Mao's speeches contain similar demonstrations of 
closeness. Before being polished and refined they were frequently in a highly 
colloquial register, promoting his image as the 'people's leader' able to use the 
language of common men, not a representative of elitist power interests. 340 
This 'informalisatiod of Teng's register extended to using expletives, another 
similarity with leaders from the Centre like Mao, who famously littered his speeches 
with swear words and slang. 341 There was considerable tolerance on the part of the 
336 Doc 2, Issue 82,2. 
337 Dittmer and Chen imputed increased usage of this in the CR to the influence of 
Mao, who had a preference for these simplied verbs (Dittmer and Chen 1981,23). 33' This 'ma'refers to the sentence ending corresponding approximately to 'OK, ' 
and not the question marker particle, which is also pronounced 'ma. ' 339 Doc 2, Issue 181,2. 
340 An example of this is the first, unedited (and chaotic) version of Mao's 'On the 
Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' in MacFarquhar, Cheek and 
Wu 1989,131 onwards. 341 Schram described Mao as 'Rabelaisian in speech' (Schram 1974,8). Schram 
'quoted the following from a speech Mao gave to the Tenth Plenum in 1962 in which 
he claimed Peng Dehuai had said: 'You fucked my mother for twenty days, can't I 
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audience for public use of 'bad' language. On 14'h April 1968 Teng, as an aside, 
declared that one opinion is 'bullshit' (fangpl). 342 In the fuller version of Teng's 
speech on 21't February 1968, he quoted a Party secretary in a factory who said: 
'You are still fucking (ta made) implementing the counter-revolutionary line. ' 
Finally, there is the issue of the other voices contained in Teng's discourse, which 
were included in these records. Formal speeches like that on 10 th December 1968 
were monovocal texts which represented the words Teng said on their own, with no 
other interventions or additions. But other voices appeared in separate texts. The 
unadorned and transmitted voice, for instance, of the quotes from Mao Zedong and 
Lin Biao, marked clearly, or embedded within Teng's words. The parenthesised 
words of the unnamed audience, whose response to parts of what Teng said was 
deemed worthy of being recorded, acting as a reminder that these texts existed and 
had meaning in a social context and were publicly enacted. There were voices that 
Teng assumed within his talks, the opposition he created in his discourse, marked by 
phrases like 'people who say, ' and allowed to enter into the text either as proxy 
enemies, or opponents, or simply to represent those who thought erroneously. 343 
4.2.6 Rhetorical Features 
If Teng had anything approaching a personal voice, it was shown most clearly in the 
specific rhetorical patterns he used. Teng partly used dense repetition of key phrases. 
There is also the rhetorical use of questions, and of polarised structures ('either... 
or') in his speeches and talks. The speech of the 20'h February 1968 contained the 
following introduction: 
'Chairman Mao is the greatest (zui weida) Marxist-Leninist of the modem 
times, the greatest teacher of the whole country and the world's revolutionary 
peoples, the most outstanding leader, the most heroic commander, the most 
correct helmsman. He is the modem Lenin, the greatest authority of the 
modem world for revolutionary people.... Mao Zedong Thought is the peak 
of contemporary Marxism-Leninism, the highest, most living Marxism- 
Leninism, the exemplary most advanced thought of mankind. 1344 
fuck your mother for twenty days. ' Mao's response? 'All this ficking messed up the 
conference and the work was affected' (ibid 194). 342 For more examples, see 4.2.3 above. 
343 See following section. 344 Doc 31,1-2. 
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There then followed six shorter sentences, all beginning with the mantra: 'It is the 
great leader Chairman Mao.... ' Patterned repetition like this was a constant feature 
of Teng's spoken style. On 9h November 1967, though at the end of the speech, 
Teng repeated 'quick' (kuai) at the beginning of sentences five times. 345 On 25th 
March 1968, in explaining the importance of struggle, Tcng stated 'this affects the 
implementation of Chairman Mao's battle strategy in our district, it affects the 
problem of the movement of 13 million revolutionary people in IMAR, it affects 
whether or not the newly made red power can be consolidated, and in a word, it 
affects the issue of whether or not the CR can be carried forward in our area. 
346 The. 
hierarchy within repetition here was to start from the top (Mao) and move down. On 
14'h June 1968, he launched four longer sentences in the middle of a speech, with the 
formulation 'undertaking big critiCiSM., 347 On 12d' July 1968, he used the following 
words: 
'The great dissemination, great broadcasting, great implementing of the 
glorious limitless radiance of Mao Zedong Thought is just now washing 
away all the filthy water, sweeping all the dark comers. The revolutionary 
people of all nationalities, limitlessl love, limitlessl believe, limitlessl 
have faith in, limitlessl worship Chairman Mao, Mao Zedong Thought, 
Chairman Mao's revolutionary direction's feelings towards the proletariat, 
increadU, ly consolidating, increasingl deepening, increasingl developing, 
making deep changes in the mental outlook of the people. In other words, use 
Mao Zedong Thought to command together, to push forward togethe , to 
lead together, to change togethe .' 
348 (All my underlinings. ) 
As Teng prescribed 'unity, ' especially the importance of unity of thought, he 
exemplified this in a unified, tightly patterned public language. These examples 
were indications of preparion and management. This was language used in a 
monovocal setting, rather than a situation of dialogue where there was always the 
possibility of interruption and premature closure of the repetition, (for examples of 
which see the angry and unplanned audience interjections during Teng's self- 
criticisms in Chapter Five). This uniformity of voice signified adherence to the 
Centre's ideology, which was the source of its sanction. 
345 Doc 64,8. 
346 Doc 2, Issue 111,2. 
347 Doc 65,8. 
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Teng frequently used rhetorical questions. This mirrored the ideological polarity, 
offering, on most occasions, 'either/or' modalities, without open-ended questions 
which might lead to a number of (unwanted) answers: 'So in the end was Ulanfa a 
Communist seizing power from the Nationalists, or a Nationalist supporter seizing 
power from the Communists? 349 'Have you implemented this or not? Have you 
seen it or not? Who have you hit? 050 At other times, what seemed framed as a 
question was actually a statement of rhetorical condemnation: 'So I'd like to ask, 
this is what kind of stance, what kind of feeling, what line? 935 1 At other times, 
questions were also rhetorical exclamations: 'Any sort of mass movement can't be 
totally without trouble, utterly free of chaos. This sort of thinking is too nSfve. How 
could this be possibleT 
Questions did not function in Tcng's discourse to open up issues or embark on 
enquiry. For Tcng, questions were answered before they were asked. They were 
used in order to make rhetorical points. The polarity created in the speech on 5 th July 
1967 was easily resolved by the delivery of 'correct' solutions from Mao Zedong 
Thought: 
'What do we say to cadres who have been lost in battle? Losing requires the 
shedding of blood as a price. What can we do? Do we strike them or educate 
and help them? Chairman Mao has taught us, real long term military 
victories are few. Even losing, we can still summarise experience and go on 
to win. 352 
In the instructions Teng gave on 10 April 1968, he stated: 'What kind of problem is 
this? Is it moaning about the great mass of the people? Or is it the leaders? It's not 
about the masses, it's the leaders. ' 353 
There were other uses to which Teng put questions. On the same occasion on the 
14"'April 1968, he used a series of questions to create cumulative effect: 
348 Doc 32,3. 
349 Doc 2, Issue 232,2. 
350 Ibid. 
35 1 Doc 37,10. 
352 Doc 14,5. 
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'We must seize power till we are completely victorious. IMAR has so many 
traitors, spies, cow ghosts and snake spirits, bastards... our rebellion factions 
have a small number of bad people... For whom does Bai Mingjie's 
rebellious faction rebel? For whom does Zhang Zhipeng's rebellious faction 
rebel? They are carrying out counter-revolutionary activities. How can we 
put up with them not distinguishing between us and the enemy? How can 
that be OK? We revolutionaries need to take the path of socialism. Are they 
taking the path of socialism? They are carrying out capitalist power- 
restoration. How can we get together with enemies [like this]? '354 
Such questions were parts of an attack. They were used to set up assertions that were 
finally shown as absurd. They functioned in a strategy to expose the illogicality and 
wrongness of the alternative discourse - creating an opposition within the language 
which was then dismissed as untenable and wrong. 
Teng sometimes created 'other voices' in his speeches, articulating these untenable 
positions, which he attributed to unnamed people and groups. These were then 
attacked. In the report on the 250' March 1968, Teng said 'there are people who fear 
(you ren pa) saying they support agitating and causing chaos. 355 Teng's motive in 
this section was to show how 'causing chaos' (1dobao-fantian) was useful and 
therefore permissible in the current context and gave these words a new meaning - 
an example of controlling terms of the discourse. A little later in the same speech he 
talked of 'a few comrades' who made mistakes in their work, recognised this, and 
changed. He held this against 'a few old counter-revolutionaries, ' attempting to aim 
their 'spear at the PLA, and the headquarters of the proletariat, ' proving themselves 
to be 'old capitalists' in the process. Such positions acted as the voice of the 
I counter-discourse. ' 
With these rhetorical features, Teng's overall objective was to create unity and 
exercise control. They signified his allegiance to the master discourse within which 
he operated. The final objective was a 'pure discourse, ' a language of 'unified 
thought and theory' that demonstrated, by its tightly co-ordinated surface features, 
unity with the Centre and the language emanating from there. But they were also 
signifiers of the sort of control Teng wished to exercise over what he said, and his 
353 Doc 2, Issue 13 1,1. 
354 Ibid 2. 
355 Doc 2, Issue 111,2. 
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audience's reaction. They indicated the tight parameters within which he allowed 
intcraction with this audiencc. 
4.2.7 Teng's Symbolic World 
Accompanying and reinforcing these stylistic commonalities, there were also 
striking similarities among the symbols and metaphors that Teng used. These acted 
as a key link and signifier of unity with the ideology of the Centre, from which many 
of them were taken. Beyond the metaphor of the 'path' mentioned in 4.1.2 above, 
there were also the core metaphors that related to actions, to descriptions of enemies, 
and to Mao Zedong Thought and Chairman Mao. While these were a further 
demonstration of Teng's acquiescence in his discourse to the hegemony of the 
Centre and his participation in that, they also reveal the area where Teng had to 
localise his language. 
The Centre-inspired campaign that Teng and other local leaders prosecuted in IMAR 
from mid-1968 onwards was labelled the 'dig and cleanse' (sulwa) campaign. Teng 
referred to the 'meeting held in Baotou on the Mao Zedong Thought study classes' 
in his speech on 14'h June 1968 as being 'an heroic mass meeting, communicating 
experiences of class struggle, a mobilizing meeting to push forward the "dig and 
cleanse" struggle. 056 The whole speech itself was entitled 'Set up Mao Zedong 
Study Classes, Grasp Revolution, Great Criticism, and Lift the "Dig and Cleanse" 
Struggle in our Region to a New Level, ' making clear the key function played by the 
idea of digging and cleansing at this stage. On 12'h July 1968, Teng talked of the 
current campaign 'washing away filthy water, sweeping all the dark comers. 357 He 
combined both 'digging' and 'cleansing' when he said later in the same speech: 'A 
great pile of diehards of Ulanfu's anti-party, unchanging capitalist roaders, traitors, 
spies and cow ghosts and snake spirits and splittist elements have been flushed away 
by the "dig and cleanse" struggle. 358 This sentence was preceded by the idea of 
enemies being 'poisonous' (liudu), of them needing to be 'cleaned up" (suqlng). A 
356 Doc 65,1. 
357 Doc 32,1. 
358 Ibid 4. 
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similar idea occurred on 14'h April 1968: '... the struggle to dig the poison of the 
black direction. 359 
Combined with the central metaphors of actions against the enemy - 'digging, 
cleansing' - went metaphorical descriptions of what the enemy did. Teng frequently 
talked of enemies 'having an arrow pointed at the Party. ' In a combination of Tcng's 
creating an 'assumed voice' and this metaphor, he said on 14 th July 1968: 'A little 
time before, weren't there people saying "Hohhot has already completed capitalist 
opinion and organisation, " "the digging and cleansing struggle" was "going along 
the Liu-Deng path, " inciting divisions among the ranks of the revolutionary 
rebellion factions, disseminating falsehood, aiming the arrow at the newly created 
red power?... ' On 31" May 1968: 'Within the rebellion groups there are some bad 
people, a minority, aiming their arrow at the CRC, aiming it at the PLA, aiming it at 
the proletarian revolutionary ranks. 360 This was a metaphor that could be used both 
about the bad or the good. On 14th April 1968, Teng said that 'we must always aim 
the arrow at Ulanfu. '361 And it was also used by other voices within the texts. A 
member of the 'Seizing Traitors Station' on 30th May 1968 said that 'as soon as we 
seize the bad people in the rebellion factions, then there are people who say that we 
must aim the arrow at the rebellion factions themselves. 362 
Set against these negative metaphors were the positive ones, references to Mao as a 
weapon, and to Mao Zedong Thought as a light: 'Our weapon is Mao Zedong 
Thought, leading the revolution, leading production; 363 'The main means for the 
struggle in the PLA was to use Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon (yi Mao Zedong 
sixiang wei wuqi);, 364 'Mao Zedong Thought lights up the grassland of IMAR; 365 
'Comrades, today the overall situation in IMAR is very good. Mao Zedong Thought 
lights up the grasslands. IMAR is flying forward towards the future! 9366 This last 
example demonstrated in one small paragraph the operations of the hegemony of 
359 Doc 2, Issue 13 1,1. 
360 Doc 2, Issue 219,6. 
361 Doc 2, Issue 13 1,1. 
362 Doc 2, Issue 181,2. 
363 Doc 2, Issue 219,3. 
364 Doc 65,7 and Doc 32,12. 365 Doc 2, Issue 219,2. 
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symbols from the Centre and how they were transformed and adapted to local 
conditions. 'The current overall situation being very good' was a formulation used 
by Centre leaders in speeches in the CR. It was common to have Mao Zedong 
Thought referred to as a light 'lighting up China. ' In this case, its beams fell on the 
grasslands of IMAR. Teng used other metaphors. The idea of 'setting fire' to the 
situation in IMAR, 367 of the enemies being dressed in 'outer clothes, ' concealing 
their real identity, 368 and of them 'leading people by the nose, 369 and attacking us 
'in our castle. ' 370. 
The atmosphere of this period in the CR created a heightened sensitivity to and fear 
of hidden enemies. The campaign to attack- these concealed and malevolent forces 
was formulated within and through the metaphor of 'digging, cleansing, seizing, 
plucking out. ' Such language could be interpreted as an endorsement for physical 
violence, and on some occasions this was what happened. But the language was also 
its own form of violence. Just by speaking it users were acting violently. Their very 
acts of uttering this language made them participants in the campaign. 
Teng himself was also moving towards the articulation of something, within the 
narrow and constrained boundaries in which he spoke in this language, which was 
unique to IMAR. The utterance of 'dig and cleanse' in the context of IMAR, with its 
imprecation to hunt down enemies, created an atmosphere in which the IMPP and 
the crimes of splittism and treachery that it embodied were more fully articulated. 
This is the position that Teng reached in mid- 1968: the naming of a discreet group of 
people in local society, with an ideology, organisational structure, aims - and a 
nationalist agenda. This process is best understood by looking at specific speeches 
Teng gave over this period. 
366 Doc 65,1. 
367 Doc 3, Issue 31,2. 
368 Doc 2, Issue 131,2. 
369 Doc 2, Issue 219,3. 
370 Doc 2, Issue 178,2. A metaphor stemming from Mao's 'Bombard the 
Headquarters' 'big character poster' issued in 1966. 
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Section Three: Specific Speeches 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The three documents containing Teng's words analysed here were his speeches on 
140' June 1968,12th July 1968, and 8th January 1969. The first is significant because 
it launched the 'dig and cleanse' campaign, the second because it was delivered at 
the critical Third Plenary Meeting of the IMAR CRC (which saw a stepping up of 
the campaign to root out IMPP members in IMAR) and the third because it is the 
most focussed and sustained attack on Ulanfu and the IMPP issued by Teng in this 
material. 
4.3.2 'Set up Mao Zedong Thought Study Classes, Grasp Revolution, Great 
Criticism, Push the "Dig, Cleanse" Struggle in our Distict to a New Level': The 
Speech on 14 th June 
According to Wu Di's analysis of the three phases of the 'Party rectification! 
campaign in IMAR, this speech occurred early in the second 'developing' phase, ' 
371 which ran from May to November 1968 . 
It was delivered to a meeting (huiyi) of 
the IMAR 'Setting up Mao Zedong Thought Classes, and Great Revolutionary 
Criticism Campaign! The key terms in the speech were 'dig and cleanse! They 
were initially presented as 'the great "dig the black line, cleanse the running poison" 
people's war, currently developing. 372 In IMAR, this became 'digging up the dead 
party elements of Ulanfu, the splittists, and the diehard capitalist roaders, traitors, 
spies... deepen the great criticism, join up the digging of the black line and the 
cleansing of running poison, organisation of revolution and revolutionary thought, 
giving a new form to the "dig and cleanse" struggle in IMAR. ' 'Comrades, ' Teng 
declared later, 'our IMAR CR is entering an extremely important key moment. We 
are faced by a task both glorious and arduous. We must push the "dig and cleanse" 
campaign to a new level, opening a mass movement to cleanse the ranks 
(zhengdang). This great "dig and cleanse" struggle is a very strong political and 
371 Song 2002,88. 
372 Doc 65,2. 
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, 373 strategic struggle. The 'dig and cleanse' campaign was already referred to as 
I great' (weida), just as the CR was referred to as 'unprecedented. 9374 
'Dig and cleanse' was subsumed within the larger ideology of the 'struggle between 
the two lines, ' and the sponsorship of this by Mao Zedong and Lin Biao. Here the 
appeal to the Centre was clearest. In IMAP, Teng stated, 'the main thing is to 
oppose rightism. 375 Opposing rightism was a key part of the struggle between two 
lines, 'our destiny and soul, the basic guarantee of our victory' 376 from Chairman 
Mao. The %dig and cleanse' campaign was part of the process of opposing rightists 
and implementing the correct line, based on the instructions of Chairman Mao. 
After the introductory opening two paragraphs of the speech the first three pages 
were devoted to clearly marked instructions from Mao and Lin on the current basic 
strategies of the CR. These operated on a very general level: 
'Chairman Mao has taught us, the proletarian CR is actually under the 
condition of socialism, a great political revolution of the proletariat against 
capitalist and exploiting classes, the continuation of the struggle of the CCP 
and leaders of the great revolutionary masses of the people with the 
Nationalists, the continuation of the struggle between the proletariat and the 
capitalists. ' 377 
It was within this master narrative that the 'dig and cleanse' campaign in IMAR was 
prosecuted, with the categories within which to understand actions dictated by the 
Centre: 'According to the continuation of revolution under the conditions of 
socialism according to Chairman Mao's theory, line, strategy and policy [we should 
see] wheiher or not the fundamental contradictions between the proletariat and the 
9378 capitalists in our region has been thoroughly resolved... (my italics). According 
to these 'measurements' the 'development of the struggle in the region was uneven. 
Some places, some work units have yet to thoroughly start class struggle. ' The 
373 Ibid 10. 
374 Ibid 6. 
375 Ibid 5. 
376 Ibid 4. 
377 Ibid 2. 
378 Ibid 3. 
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prescription carrying on from the full implementation of the Centre's commands was 
to 'dig and cleanse, "dig thoroughly, 'so that this 'struggle will gain great results! 379 
Struggle, particularly the struggle between the lines, was set out in detail during the 
first part of Teng's speech to 'progressively improve the class and line struggle 
' 380 consciousness of the leaders and great revolutionary masses of the people. Under 
the hegeomonic concepts of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 'pushing forward 
of the struggle between the two lines' was asserted as being something 'permeating 
every area, every aspect, no one can avoid it. ' This concept of struggle between the 
two lines was 'our revolutionary staff, ' 'our destiny and soul, the fundamental 
guarantee of our victory, ' but it was primarily ascribed to Chairman Mao. 'Chairman 
Mao's revolutionary line is the proletarian class line, the fundamental path of our 
Party, and of the masses. ' The struggle between the two lines was also labelled as 
'the fundamental consciousness of a revolutionary, ' a question Teng finally 
formulated as one of 'where you stand. 1 381 
The location of this speech was Baotou. Teng praised Baotou for carrying forward 
the revolutionary struggle at the beginning of his speech, with his words of praise 
clearly linked to the Centre: 'A great change has happened in the current situation of 
the revolution in Baotou... All of Baotou, has flown forward along the revolutionary 
, 382 course of Chairman Mao. This is a great victory for Mao Zedong Thought. Later 
he cited specific organisations in Baotou, relating the 'dig and cleanse' campaign 
directly to them. He referred to the Baotou Iron and Steel Works, 'opening and 
developing an earth-shattering revolutionary battle' taking inspiration from Vice 
Chairman Lin Biao's words: 'Baotou Iron and Steel Works implementing the "dig 
and cleanse" campaign, has given us a great and important experience. 383 This 
organisation, with its Imethod, plans, focus, objectives, ' was held up as a model for 
those that had failed, or fallen behind, in implementing Mao's general instructions. 
379 Ibid 3. 
380 Ibid 4. 
38 1 Further sanction from Centre leaders was taken from Jiang Qing: 'From the 12 th 
November last year when Comrade Jiang Qing talked to artistic circles in Beijing, 
this started the "dig the black line, cleanse the running poison" people's battle' (ibid 
9 
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Only two places in the text overtly mentioned issues of nationality. The first was 
simply the inclusion of the 'national splittists' in the list of enemies presented to be 
dug out and cleansed at the beginning of the speech. The second elaborated on the 
distinction between 'agricultural' (nongqu) and 'herding' (muqu) environments: 
'The main thing is for agricultural areas to study Kanghou, Ningcheng, and 
the 40' May Division, and other advanced work units' experience. Herding 
areas must mainly study the experience of Wushenzhao Commune and 
Narenbaolige Commune... Agricultural and herding areas can't adopt factory 
methods. They have their own characteristics, but the content is still to grasp 
class struggle in study classes, and thoroughly implement the criticism of 
, 384 Ulanfu... in the herding areas. 
Speaking in a context dominated by the implementation of the campaign of 'Party 
rectification' and in an area in which the Mongolian minority was severely affected, 
Teng hardly mentioned national minority issues. The Centre categories of class 
struggle he used and the two lines which supplied the overall ideological context of 
his speech were not related to the issue of nationality, but presented in their own 
terms. Whereas the material in the previous chapter focussed on accusations of 
Ulanfti and his supporters promoting a nationality discourse over a class-based one, 
for Teng nationality barely registered. In the closing parts of Teng's speech, he 
referred to the organisational prescriptions of the CR that had to be implemented 
locally. These were relayed firstly as fUlfilment of the Centre's instructions, and 
secondly purely within the terms that the Centre designated - setting up study 
classes, grasping revolution, organising 'great criticism, ' and implementing the 'dig 
and cleanse' campaign. 
The hegemony of the Centre was demonstrated finally in the victory mode which 
Teng adopted: 
'Comrades, IMAR is now in the midst of the high tide of revolution. The 
situation is good. We must closely follow the great leader Chairman Mao, 
closely follow Chairman Mao's great battle strategy, always grasp the great 
direction of struggle... push forwards for victory, develop the great ood 
situation, to achieve the complete victory of the Great Proletarian CR. i 3S 
383 Ibid 9. 
384 Ibid 9-10. 
385 Ibid 16. 
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The victory referred to was also victory for the central language, for the standard 
discourse from the Centre of the CR, with use of generic slogans and categories. It 
demonstrated that Teng was to be a transmitter, a propagator between the Centre and 
the region. He was a spokesman for the new history, the new world being declared 
from the Centre, carrying its liberating message into the locality. But the definite 
parameters imposed from the Centre on the issue of nationality were a problem to 
formulate in IMAR, where its very identity and history were saturated with these 
issues, and could not be managed in this discourse by total exclusion. 
4.3.3 'Raise High the Great Red Banner of Mao Zedong Thought, Fully 
Implement Chairman Mao's Latest Directives, Firmly Grasp Class Struggle, 
Push for the Full Victory of the Proletarian CRI: Teng's Report to the Third 
Plenary Meeting of the CRC, 12'h July 1968 
The enlarged Tbird Plenum of the IMAR CRC met in July 1968. According to 
Woody, it was this meeting, presided over by Teng and Wu Tao, that formally 
passed a resolution calling for the elimination of the IMPP. This was intended to 
prepare the way for the full-out purges of Party officials that continued into 1969.386 
The plenums of the CRC were key meetings in the CR, the main administrative 
mechanism for the implementation of the movement. Decisions they issued had 
significant authority. Speaking as the Chairman of the Plenary Meeting, Teng made 
a report that was therefore a key means to disseminate a pronouncement from the 
Centre to local officials and activists. This gives an opportunity to see Teng 
speaking within the new organisations, and exercising power through them. 
The 12th July report was not as preoccupied with ideological issues as the speech 
analysed above, but was structured towards prescriptions and instructions. It 
consisted of five sections. The first was a positive assessment of the results of the 
CR in IMAR so far. The second was a description of current enemies and their 
activities. The third described recent problems in the region. The fourth and fifth 
were instructions for the coming year. Like the 10 June speech, the key campaign 
referred to was the 'dig and cleanse' one: 'The broad direction of the "dig and 
386 Woody 1993,15. 
207 
cleanse" struggle is completely correct, the results the best. ' 387 As on 14'h June, 
Teng described the 'dig and cleanse' struggle as 'a mass movement with a strong 
policy nature. 388 It was tied closely to the other master campaigns of 'cleansing the 
ranks' (zhengdang) and 'faction-nature'(paixing). 389 
Legitimacy was supplied by regular appeals to the Centre, to Chairman Mao and 
Vice Chairman Lin: 'The PLA, created by Chairman Mao, directed by Vice 
Chairman Lin, raising the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought, has built a great 
victory in the Great Proletarian CR. 390 At the root of this were the requirements for 
unity, for which adherence to Chairman Mao and the instructions and ideology from 
the Centre was critical. The key slogan was 'unification' (yiyuanhua): 'We must 
implement unified leadership... We understand that politically unification comes 
from Mao Zedong Thought. Organisationally, [we act] according to Chairman Mao's 
instructions... Experiences teaches us that without resolutely doing things according 
, 391 to Chairman Mao's instructions... we will not be victorious in class struggle. 
Mao's thought was a lighe 92 , and a weapon. 
393 He was present at the beginning of 
the speech, in the generic 'four limitlesses' intoned by Teng, and at the end, in the 
'long life to Chairman Mao. ' 
The structure of the speech and its rhetorical devices indicated a consciously major 
public announcement. At the beginning, the language was absolute: 'In the last half 
year, the development of the situation in IMAR and the country as a whole is the 
same, completely proving the Great Leader Chairman Mao's heroic theorieS. '394 As 
in the title, there was dense usage of 'complete' (quanmlan), 'limitless' (wuxian), 
'thoroughly' (chedi) and 'most' (zui). Decisions reached at the previous enlarged 
395 plenum six months earlier were 'correct' (zhengque de). The fruits of victory 
already gained by the 'dig and cleanse' campaign were 'huge' (juda): 'In the last half 
387 Doc 32,6-7. 
388 lbid 17. 
389 Ibid 25. 
390 Ibid 5. 
391 lbid 21-22. 
392 Ibid 3. 
393 Ibid 12. 
394 Ibid 2. 
395 Ibid 6. 
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year, the results of our work have been huge, the main, great direction is correct, the 
main current is good. @396 This hyperbole appeared in the assessment of the current 
status of the region and the function of the present in the narrative of history then 
unfolding: 'The alliance between our army and the people has never been as good as 
it is now. 397 Amongst the prescriptive modes that Teng used, therefore, there was 
also this promotional mode, pushing forward a positive image of the 'great current 
situation' in the region, stressing benefits and positive images for his audience, 
asking them to participate in the positive campaign to 'dig and cleanse' enemies. But 
in fact this language was occurring during a period of social turbulence, when acts of 
mass violence were happening, something hardly discernable from the positive tone 
ofthelanguage. 
Teng based his judgements and prescriptions on an appeal to the 'proofs of 
experience' over the last six months, and not the Centre's sanction alone. 'The "dig 
and cleanse" struggle experience proves that we must respect Chairman Mao's "help, 
criticise, unite" poliCy., 398 And again: 'The last half year's experience has proved that 
if you want to do this "dig and cleanse" struggle well, then you must arouse the 
masses ., 
399 And: 'The experience of the last half year of class struggle has made us 
400 realise... The basic conclusion of this half year of 'experience' alluded to in these 
various references was summed up in one sentence: 'Limitlessly to believe 
Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. 401 Just as the administrative campaign promoted 
by Teng was the setting up of 'Study Mao Zedong Thought Classes, ' so his speech 
was saturated by a pedagogical sense of the 'teaching' function of revolutionary 
experience. Teng's talk of the final guarantee of the revolutionary path being 'the 
objective laws and scientific conclusions of class struggle' was consistent with this 
use of 'superlatives' and appeals to 'what experience proves. ' 402 Struggle was based 
on scientific truth, precluding the need for any further demonstrations. The 
formulation he used halfway through the speech encapsulated this: 'Facts prove. ' 
396 Ibid 8. 
397 Ibid 5. 
398 Ibid 15. 
399 Ibid 14. 
400 lbid 11,14,16 and 18. 401 Ibid 11. 
402 Ibid 17. 
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Indeed, within the framework of proof that Teng used (instructions from Mao as 
basis of proof, backed up by experience) he created a perfectly consistent TR 
Logic': 
'(a) The practice of the "dig and cleanse" campaign makes us realise deeply, 
(b) that pnly when you strike down enemies, (c) can you then represent the 
basic interests of the great masses of the people, (d) and this is then greatest 
protection for the people' 403 (my markers). 
Within this discourse, such arguments were logical. If you have (b) based on 
experience (a), you can then draw the first conclusion (c), from which you infer (d). 
Of course, the critical issue was whether you were justified in asserting (a) in the 
first place. But in this discourse, such an issue was foreclosed - (a) was axiomatic. It 
created its own kind of knowledge, meaningful within the discourse. 
Teng's final basis of appeal was the people, the 'great masseS,, 404 who must be 
'trusted' and 'relied on, ' but also 'mobilised, ' and 'aroused. 005 The 'positive' nature 
of the masses stood against the enemies, who in this speech were referred to as: 
I counter-revolutionary revisionist roaders, ' %feudalists, Japanese imperialists, Soviet 
and Russian revisionists, Nationalist counter-revolutionaries. 9406 Enemies who %steal 
revolutionary slogans,, 'use and stir up capitalist factionalism, ' %hide themselves in 
dark comers, stirring up ill winds, setting ghost fires, creating rumours, firing hidden 
arrows ... #407 Enemy actions were conveyed through metaphors, compatible with the 
overall symbolism of the discourse of the Centre of the CR. Within the ranks of the 
enemies, there were the hard and soft enemies, the hard-line minority splittists, and 
those who were simply not clear about the issue of nationality politics, traitors and 
spies, those who merely had some political problems in their past, 'cow ghosts and 
snake spirits, ' and those who had bad family backgrounds. 408 
Closely related to the issue of enemies, and how they were distinguished, was that of 
the crime of splittism. Teng articulated the special dimension of the 'dig and cleanse' 
403 Ibid 14. 
404 Ibid 13. 
405 Ibid 14. 
406 lbid 5. 
407 Ibid 7. 
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campaign in IMAR in this report more fully than in that of the 14'h June. He referred 
more explicitly to Ulanfu's counter-ideology labels - the 'theory of being special, ' 
and 'stable, long, wide, ' (see Chapter Three, 3.1.6 above)409 and their impact in the 
area. But the particular issues for the CR in IMAR were articulated in terms of the 
area's geopolitical, rather than ethnic specificities: 'We must see that our region is a 
border one, and that class struggle is more complex... For a long time, Ulanfu's 
counter-revolutionary party alliance politically and organisationally has pushed 
forward counter-revolutionary revisionism, and splittism, creating a seriously bad 
reSUlt. '410 Apart from its label and the mention of Ulanfu's 'counter-ideology, ' there 
was no more detail on the danger of splittism. 
But Teng did mention the IMPP once. The entry of this label into the public 
discourse of the key representative of the Centre in IMAR at this time was an 
important moment. The IMPP was to become the focus of the campaign from July 
1968 onwards. It signified something far more threatening than Ulanfu's own 
ideological unsoundness and heresy, which had been the focus of the early stages of 
the campaign. The IMPP was a counter-organisation, with rules, institutions, 
ideology, a purchase on a constituency, and most feared of all, a political 
programme - pan-Mongolian unity. Like a doctor finally diagnosing a sickness and 
being able, through the act of classification, to prescribe its treatment, so the real 
enemy hidden at our side' could only be dealt with when named openly. With the 
explicit entry of the IMPP into Teng's discourse, this moment had come. It marked 
the point when the true enemy had come into sight in IMAR. Now the battle could 
commence for the %new history, ' the new narrative, and the relegation of the old 
narrative and world to the 'dustbins of history. ' 
408 Ibid 18. 
409 Ibid 24. 
410 Ibid 8. 
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43.4 'Instructions Issued by Comrade Teng on January 8'h at 4: 00 in the 
Afternoon after Hearing the Work Report of the Wumeng [League] CRC 
Leaders' 
Teng's assertion of Mao's hegemony in this text was categorical: 
'The leaders' and masses' movement should happen in the spirit of Chairman 
Mao's latest instructions, fully mobilising the masses, implementing 
Chairman Mao's newest directives. If Chairman Mao says we should firmly 
grasp "Party rectification, " then that is what we are going to do, acting 
according to Chairman Mao's instructions, doing things according to his 
thought. We must see that if we do things the way Chairman Mao wants, 
everything will be good. All 
Mao was the centre of this discourse, all things regulated 'according to what he 
instructs. ' Such a categorical base also sponsored uncompromising prescriptions. 
Teng talked in the first part of his speech of his audience 'having' (yingdang) to see, 
having to seek truth from facts, having to speak from this direction, having to speak 
clearly, having to do things according to the way Chairman Mao instructed. This is 
accompanied by 'not' (bu yao) blaming those responsible, of being 'certain' 
(kending) of being part of the 'main stream' (zhuliu). 412 
Teng's instructions to the Wumeng League leaders also contained the strongest 
statements in the collection of material analysed in this chapter. It attacked Ulanfu 
on the grounds of supporting the IMPP. IMPP was set in the overall context of the 
'Party rectification' campaign of which it was 'a part, not the whole. " 13 But while 
I organisationally' IMPP was a small part of the activities of traitors, involving only 
a minority of people, a high priority was given to opposing it, redirecting the 
boundaries of the movement in IMAR. In this new narrative, 'Ulanfu had been a 
counter-Party traitor, opposed to Chairman Mao, opposed to socialism for 20 years. ' 
Ulanfu was the %big boss' (zong toumu) of IMPP. His history has been a double one, 
using the Party against the Party, protecting counter-revolutionary elements. In 
smashing IMPP, we are smashing the basic foundation of Ulanfu's counter- 
411 Doc 40,12. 
412 Ibid 13. 
413 Ibid. 
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revolutionary activity. ' The IMPP was described as purely a 'counter-Party, 
counter-revolutionary' organisation, with no mention of the claim that nationality 
was the basis for membership of it. 
Teng confirmed that this struggle had class, not nationality, as the key element: 
'It is worth noting that quite a few of the IMPP plucked up in Jining [City] 
were Han... Of course, there is the problem of Han entering the IMPP. How 
can we understand this? It's not hard to understand. It's happened in other 
regions. We can't understand this from the point of view of nationality, but 
from the world view of class. It's a counter-revolutionary problem, not some 
nationality problem. ' 
The tone was defensive. A person's national minority status in this struggle was 
considered irrelevant. 414 Teng's main declaration (which he said 'we are preparing 
to issue to the Centre soon') was that 'Ulanfu had organisation and plans' for the 
IMpp. 415 Ulanfii's main crime was that he had set up and supported 'counter- 
organisations. ' Ulanfu's own words in his speeches were offered as the proof for 
this. 416 
There was also the onlyexample in these texts of Teng being directly challenged at a 
meeting. Talking of the situation in Wumeng, he declared Vumeng has done so 
many [people], x 10,000 or more [no specific figure given in the text - merely a 
cross], but as part of 13 million this is not that much. ' At this point, in parentheses, 
someone merely named as Zhou intedected: 'That statistic isn't confin-ned. ' Teng's 
response to this was a brusque: 'The problem isn't about a few tens of thousands, 
it's about how to pluck people out and criticise them, so that there are fewer and 
fewer enemies. " 17 Teng could not have complained about the unsettling situation 
that he found himself in, however, as he embraced the prescription from the Centre 
414 At this point, the text indicated in parentheses, that 'the record sent by Wumeng 
of this part and our record differ, and has been corrected over the phone by Comrade 
Chen Xiaozheng'(Teng's Private Secretary - see 4.2.4), an indication perhaps of how contentious the content was perceived to be, and the need for careful clearance 
of it. 4 15 Doc 40 14-15. 
416 Ibid 15. 
417 Ibid 12. 
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to welcome 'chaos. 418 There was also ambiguity in Teng's repeated attacks on 
'leaders, ' the 'responsibility of the leaders, ' and the hegemony of the masses. At the 
point when Teng was making the largest and most categorical statements, and 
talking about the 'local enemy' in the most explicit fashion, he was also 
experiencing what many other leaders of that period, according to Walder's analysis 
(see 4.1.1 above) were going through - the utter transience and insecurity of 
occupying powerful positions in the CR. Within four months, Teng Haiqing's reign 
in IMAR was over, and he would himself be the victim of vitriolic, angry attacks. 
4.3.5 Other Leaders' Voices 
%ile Teng held the main positions of administrative and organisational power in 
IMAR from 1967 to 1969, he was not the only leader, but one of a group of about 
half a dozen who had influence and authority in the region. His words must finally 
be put in context alongside these other leaders' voices, to locate a common discourse 
for figures in authority in IMAR during this period. 
The main leaders Teng worked with were Gao Jinming, who was the head of civilian 
affairs in IMAR, and had worked as Ulanfu's deputy until 1966, before becoming a 
founding member of the IMAR CRC and Wu Tao, who was Teng's deputy in the 
IMAR Military District, a position he had in fact held prior to 1966. Gao was a 
Manchu by ethnicity; Wu was Mongolian. 
Wu Tao's speech on the 5' November 1967 at the First Plenary Meeting of the CRC 
has clearly marked deference to Teng Haiqing in its opening: 'About the problems 
and responsibilities of the current situation, Comrade Teng has made a systematic 
announcement, with which I totally agree. A 19 As with Teng's main public speeches, 
Wu's opening tone was positive: 'The current situation in IMAR is excellent, it has 
never been as good as this. ' The newly-established CRC was taken as a symbol of 
this. 
418 Ibid 13. 
4 19 Doc 26. This speech had the title 'Concerning the Problem of Strengthening the 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat. ' In the version in my possession, there was no 
sponsoring organisation linked to the copy, nor any indication of how it was 
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Wu also agreed with Teng in stressing the utter primacy of Mao. The current 
I excellent situation' in IMAR was 'a victory of Mao Zedong Thought, a great 
victory for the revolutionary path of Chairman Mao. ' Like Teng, Wu utilised 
sanctioned repetitions when talking of Mao Zedong Thought: 'We must never ever 
forget (nian nian bu wang) class struggle, never forget the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, never forget practicing politics, never forget to lift high the great red 
banner of Mao Zedong Thought. ' Wu's statement in this speech of the source of the 
CRC's power in Mao was categorical. The CRC was a 'structure with temporary 
powers, a political authority/organ. ' (yi ge finsh! quanli figou, sh! zhengquan 
figuan), a part of the structures for the dictatorship of the proletariat set up 'under 
Chairman Mao's leadership': 
'VvIere does the source of our power come from? From the heroic leadership 
of Chairman Mao, directed along the path of the proletarian revolution by 
Chairman Mao, from the bitter struggles of the proletarian factions. Our 
power is from Chairman Mao, from the proletarian revolutionary factions 
and working people. We have power on behalf of the proletariat and the 
workers... We must make the best of this power, grasp it well, use it well. 9420 
To use power well was, 'according to Mao Zedong Thought, ' to practice 
dictatorship of the proletariat. The people were also cited as the other source of 
power, the 'real heroes, the iron walls, who we must trust and rely on. The people 
know the most, their eyes are the clearest, their power the greatest. ' 421 
In asserting the hegemony of Mao, in his statement of the ideological primacy of 
class, and the doctrine of the two paths and of the need to 'trust the people, ' Wu's 
words were 'united' with Teng's. However, Wu differed from all but the last of the 
Teng documents looked at in this chapter in the strength and detail of his attack on 
Ulanfa. Wu Tao had held positions of responsibility in IMAR since 1959. He was 
also ethnically Mongolian. His familiarity with the local situation therefore meant he 
had more personal credibility than Teng when speaking about it. 'The foundations of 
recorded. 420 Ibid 9. 
421 lbid 11. 
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society in IMAR are very complicated, ' he stated. 422 They were not complicated for 
ethnic reasons, however, according to Wu, but because of IMAR's strategic position, 
and the actions of 'Soviet revisionists' who have sent spies in to destabilise the area, 
and American-supported Nationalist operatives, and the 'landlords and rich counter- 
Party, bad and rightist' elements who 'want to gang up with foreign enemies. ' 
Reflecting his responsibility for military issues in IMAR, Wu offered details of the 
evidence for 'enemy activity' in IMAR. 70 cases of 'receiving enemy broadcasts' 
from the 'American Chiang [Kai-shek] clique. ' 290 so far in 1967 of 'counter- 
revolutionary slogans, handbills, ' 59 of these alone in Hohhot, 337 cases of 'spy 
propaganda materials. 423 Wu Tao called Ulanfu 'the contemporary patriarch' 
(dangdai wangye) sitting on his 'throne' (baozuo) with 'his lackeys' representing 
'the feudal aristocracts, herds-lords, landlords, capitalists. Although Ulanfu and his 
lackeys have already been knocked to the ground, politically, intellectually, 
theoretically they still haven't been knocked out. 20 years of their evil influence and 
running poison and the roots of this are very deep. They haven't been cleansed 
yet. 1,424 
Gao Bruning's speech to the 'Second Plenary Meeting of the Hohhot Red 
Representatives Meeting' on 180' February 1968 was marked as 'an important 
report, which should be carefully studied by all groups. ' It was published in the 'Red 
Flag Internal Study Materials, ' as were many of Teng's speeches . 
425 Gao, like Wu, 
referred to 'Commander Teng' and what he had instructed. But he cited the sanction 
from the Centre as his main basis of support at the beginning of his speech: 'The 
Centre definitely supports our work in the last period, our direction is definitely 
correct. ' 426 Declaring closeness to the Centre also, however, carried its risks of 
exposure. He stated on the same page that 'the Ninth Party Congress will be held 
this year. ' In fact, it was four months into the next year, 1969, before the long 
delayed Congress was finally convened. 
422 Ibid 5. 
423 Ibid 6. 
424 Ibid 3. 
425 Doc 2, Issue 106. 
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This speech was more explicit on the issue of nationality, and on the claim that 
Ulanfu had 'made a minority autonomous region. ' Gao, also appealed to the sanction 
of the Centre on this issue: 'We need to do things according to Chairman Mao's 
instructions; a minority autonomous region is a new development in the Marxist- 
Leninist treatment of the issue of national minorities by Chairman Mao. ' This was 
something other countries had not done. The inevitable progression of the future 
narrative of history, according to Marxist-Leninist ideology, was to see country 
boundaries disappear, and to see 'nationality become less and less, not more and 
more [important]: ' Nationality divisions in society needed to be 'dissolved. A27 The 
'disintegration of nationality issues' was a 'natural development. ' In referring to 
, V; ho is Ulanf ? '428 Ulanfu, Gao personalised this issue: u But the admission into his 
discourse of a question also allowed entry for doubts: 'We haven't resolved this 
issue [of who Ulanfu is]. ' It was only 'very likely' that he was in fact a Soviet 
Mongolian revisionist spy, a traitor to the CCP. Gao spelt out the complicated 
narrative of Ulanfu's background, of his connections of treacherous organisations 
and to a network of exposed criminals and spies. He also gave a detailed chronology 
of the IMPP, founded in 1925, with its original leaders, and its connections to the 
Nationalists. Asserting the hegemony of class over nationality Gao declared that 
'what [parts of the IMPP wanted] was not to classify people according to class, but 
according to nationality. They didn't want a revolution for the Mongolians, they 
wanted revisionism, they didn't want a revolution for the Han, they wanted 
revisionism for them. It seemed like they were for class distinctions, but in fact they 
were for nationality ones. 429 Revolution was the common liberation of all national 
groups. It was achieved through awareness of class and class struggle. The real 
crime of the IMPP in Gao's formulation was to pretend to their constituency that 
they were representing the interests of a national minority group, the Mongolians, 
when in fact they were all along supporting the bad exploiting classes. 
Gao Jiruning's voice in the IMAR CR was noteworthy because despite having 
served as his right hand man for some years he was Ulanfu's first enthusiastic 
denouncer at the Qianmen Hotel meeting in 1966 in Beijing. But, as is shown in the 
427 Ibid 5. 
428 Ibid 2. 
429 lbid 2. 
217 
next chapter, he in turn was accused by the outsider Teng of being 'too soft' in 
carrying out the 'Party rectification' campaign in IMAR, labelled a rightist and 
removed from power in October 1968. He was reinstated after the 'Ninth Congress' 
in April 1969, only to be felled again in 1970. His career illustrated the insecurity of 
leaders in the CR and the dangers of someone who, while declaring that the 'true 
objective of the "dig and cleanse" campaign is to rid the Party of bad elements 430 
was, in fact, entirely dependent on this Party for their power, and was as much as the 
mercy of its decisions as those labelled enemies. 
Conclusion 
Ideologically and stylistically, Teng's was a borrowed voice, parasitical in content 
and form on the discourse of the Centre. Despite the fact that Teng spoke in such a 
tumultuous and unique period, what he said and how he said it was marked by a 
rigid adherence to the ideological parameters and classifications from the Centre. 
Teng came to IMAR with little sense of the audience and constituency he had there. 
Unlike Gao and Wu who at least showed awareness of the complicated nature of the 
struggle going on in IMAR, Teng's main function was the categorical imposition of 
the Centre's edicts and instructions on IMAR. 
Working within these parameters, Teng's attempts to articulate the specifics of 
IMAR were to take him towards an acceptance of the existence of a counter-party, 
the IMPP. The increasing prominence of this in his discourse was framed purely in 
terms of its violations of the Centre's class ideology. Nationality, with the issues of 
ethnicity subsumed within this, hardly existed for Teng. His voice was to speak 
within, and of, the new history, the new master narrative being promoted in IMAR, 
of unity based on class identity, and liberation from class-oppression through 
struggle. 
Teng's position as an outsider, with only the support of the Centre to rely on, meant 
that he was organisationally profoundly insecure exercising power in IMAR and 
influencing events there. His appeals were constantly to the Centre. He himself had 
43'9 Ibid 1. 
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no local credibility, and implemented the 'dig and cleanse' campaign in such a way 
that its excesses caused the Centre finally to remove and criticise him. More 
generally Teng's language showed the insecurities of all power holders at this stage 
in the CR - the impossible pressures put on them to faithfully implement 
instructions from the Centre leadership that was itself fractured and chaotic, with 
only very specific symbolic high-grounds like Mao and his statements taken as 
utterly unquestionable, and to locate and appeal to an audience and constituency 
locally. In the case of IMAR, the audience was in fact riven by factions, different 
interest groups, the most deeply divided being those along the lines of nationality 
classification, something that could not be sympathetically addressed in the 
discourse of the Centre at that time. It was unsurprising that barely 24 months into 
his time in IMAR, Teng was unceremoniously removed, and exposed to attack. 
M aterial from this time is the subject of the final chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
The Politics of Saying Sorry: The Fall of Teng 
Haiqing - 1969 
The material looked at in this chapter comesfrom the final stage of the 'digging and 
cleansing' IMPP period in IAMR during the CR. At its heart ws the power change 
after the Ninth Party Congress in Beying, when a new narrative was established and 
promoted by the Centre, necessitating the withdrawal of supportfor Teng Haiqing 
and his removal from formal power. This was signified through the self-criticisms 
which Teng performed in the summer of 1969, dominated by the language of 
submissiveness, apology and admission of culpability, and aimed at negotiating both 
for the Centre and Teng. In this new power paradigm the audience figure differently 
than in earlier material -a new register was used towards them. More of their 
voices appeared in the material. The treatment of the issue of ethnicity and national 
minorities remained highly controlled and sensitive, hut the particular treatment Of 
Mongolians was allowedfor thefirst time a new voice. This material demonstrates 
the complex dynamics of power in the CR, its language signifying the Centre's 
attempts to respond and engage to the situation in IAMR. Analysis of Teng's voice 
finally offers the opportunity to understand what it meant to he 'in' and 'Out' of 
power in the CR, how this was signified in discourse, and what the mechanics of 
power being taken away were. 
5.1 General Context of the Fall of Teng 
The material in this chapter was dominated by one event - the Ninth Party Congress, 
convened in Beijing in April 1969, the first for over II years. This Congress 
formally marked the end of the most violent periods of the CR nationally. It saw the 
adoption of a new Party constitution in which Lin Biao was described as Mao's 
successor. Only 19% of the Eighth Party Congress membership was re-elected, 
marking a sea change in the PRC's leadership. 431 
431 Schoenhals 1996a, 371. 
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The impact of the Party Congress in IMAR was dramatic. This derived from the 
issuing of a single utterance from Mao Zedong that 'excesses had been committed in 
432 the course of the movement to rectify the Party' in IMAR. This was encapsulated 
in the '22 nd May Directive' from the Centre that figured so prominently in local 
literature. This judgement by the Centre on the CR in IMAR suffering from 
I excesses' (kuodahua) was repeatedly used in the main accusations against Teng, 
sanctioning the attacks on him. 
This was the briefest period in the IMAR CR movement. But like the 1967 
dialogues and the '13th April Decision, ' it marked a decisive intervention by the 
Centre in events in IMAR, and the concerted attempt to impose a new narrative and 
ideology, through which it distanced itself from the violence that had occurred from 
1967 to 1968, and which had been based on the existence of the counter-party, the 
IMPP. Teng was critical in this process, acting as the fall-guy taking responsibility 
for the previous excesses, becoming the mouthpiece of the new register of contrition 
and apology, within a discourse in which the strategies of management of the issues 
in IMAR was approached in a different way, with the use of different narratives and 
keywords. His apology was to prove a highly political act, dominated by the 
continuing need both to assert the Centre's hegemony, but to do this by adapting it 
and renegotiating its terms. Teng's removal from power was most clearly signified 
by his physically leaving the region in December 1969, for re-education in 
Tangshan, Hebei province. The PLA 65th Corps was sent from the Beijing Military 
Region to control what was left of IMAR. A new leadership was put in place, and 
the period of Teng's authority was over. 
5.2 The Attacks on Gao Jinming - Early 1969 
In terms of strategy, the campaign against Teng was similar to the earlier one against 
Ulanfu. Like the earlier attack, which was preceded in mid-1967 by a mini- 
campaign against the two Wangs (see Chapter Two), a shorter attack on Gao 
Jinming preceded that on Teng. Gao, ethnically a Manchu, had been active in IMAR 
since moving there from Shaanxi province in 1946. He had worked himself up to 
432 Woody 1993, v. 
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being Ulanfu's deputy by the time of the Beijing Qianmen Hotel meeting in May 
1966. According to Woody, Gao had attacked Ulanfu with particular ferocity at this 
meeting, and had served as one of the founder members of the IMAR CRC under 
Teng. 433 
In October 1968 Gao was dismissed from his posts. The case against him, according 
to the attack published in the 'Great Criticism Battle Paper, ' on 20 th March 1969 was 
that he had 'denied class struggle, propagated the idea that all state owned 
enterprises had no class struggle, sung the praises (meihua) of capitalists, boasted 
about the capitalist productive abilities... opposed putting politics first., 434 In 
addition, he was guilty of 'restorationism' (fuci), and of splittism. His friends were 
the 'soviet revisionists. ' Gao was 'an enthusiastic follower of Liu Shaoqi and 
Ulanfu. ' 
The campaign against Gao signified the creation of a new narrative, both for Gao's 
history and for the CR in IMAR up till his fall from grace. An attack published on 
8 th January 1969 ('Thoroughly Destroy Gao Jinming's Smooth Words on 
"Representing the Correct Line"q in the 'Great Criticism Battle Paper' took the 
February Counter-Current as the critical moment of the whole CR till then, 
redirecting its meaning and significance. But all of Gao's previous history in the 
region was also re-examined and re-narrativised. 'What exactly has Gao's Jinming's 
past been like? What's he been doing these last 17 years? Has he been following the 
proletarian revolutionary path of Mao Zedong all along? '435 The immediate focus 
for the attack on Gao was his closeness to Ulanfu from the time of his arrival in 
IMAR. He was guilty by association. The campaigns from the Centre against Liu 
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping had offered inspiration for the local attack on Ulanfu, 
and been the model for this. Gao in turn was accused of promulgating the same 
I splittist and revisionist policies' in Baotou, where he had been active, as Ulanfu 
sponsored in the region as a whole. 
433 Woody 1993, iii. 
434 Doc 39,20'h March 1969,3. 435 Ibid 8. 
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This signified one of the characteristics of the CR - the conflict over narratives, and 
meanings imputed to recent Chinese history. Gao's fall illustrated many features of 
this battle. Events he was involved in or actions he committed that were positively 
appraised in the 'old history' became 'black counter-currents' or 'crimes' in the new 
narrative. At the Qianmen Hotel meeting, a key moment in the creation of the new 
IMAR history, Gao performed faithful service by attacking Ulanfu. But in the 
narrative promoted in this early 1968 material, Gao's participation in this event was 
re-created: 'At this meeting which played a decisive part in the struggle against 
Ulanfu, Gao Jinining did not take part with his full heart. ' Because of their 17 year 
association, Gao had proved incapable of attacking Ulanfu, but had sought to protect 
him through 'ensuring that his "associates and followers" were left in place. 436 
In following this private programme, Gao was also guilty like Ulanfu of working 
against the Centre and its hegemony. He had 'sung a tune contrary (dachang 
, 437 fandiao) to our great leader Chairman Mao's teachings. This failure to serve the 
Centre was supported by evidence. In early 1967, attending a meeting in Beijing, he 
failed to relay accurately how violent the situation in IMAR was. 438 Gao Jinming 
'doesn't trust the Centre above, or the revolutionary masses below, ' the attack 
declared. 439 
An important ingredient of the attack on Gao was the mixture of using denunciations 
based on 'mistakes' (cuowu) and 'criminal behaviour, ' or 'guilt' (zubcing). The 
attack on Gao from 20'h March 1969 referred to above talked of the 'crimes' he had 
committed which needed to be thoroughly reckoned with . 
440 At the end of this 
attack, the authors talked of 'the need to thoroughly clear out and criticise Gao 
Jinming's towering crimes in pushing forward along the counter-revolutionary 
revisionist and splittist path. 9441 Mao Zedong's word offered the standards of 
judgement in this process of proving Gao's 'guilt. ' Halfway through the attack, they 
were reproduced, with the statement that they 'proved' (zhengming) the 'crimes' 
436 In fact, the exact opposite had happened. See above. 437 Doc 39,3. 
438 Ibid 9. 
439 Ibid 15. 
440 Doc 3 9,20'h March 1969,6. 441 Ibid 16. 
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(zui'e) which Gao had committed. This prefigured the talk of 'mistakes' and 
I crimes' in the material against Teng, and the kind of processes offered in the 
various documents to prove 'culpability' fulfilled an equally important role. The 
attack on Gao therefore set out the parameters of a new narrative within which new 
forms of power were needed, with an appropriate discourse to convey these. This 
prepared the way for the full attack on Teng, and the removal of his authority. 
5.3 Teng's 'Confessions': From Demand to Apology 
Teng Haiqing no longer speaking in a context in which he was empowered was 
signified by his discourse being dominated by a register not of prescription and the 
right to use imperatives and commands (seen in the last chapter), but by one of 
apology and admissions of culpability. This materially illustrated the extreme 
insecurity of those occupying positions of power in the PRC during the CR. In 1968, 
Teng delivered orders to organisations and units of every size and variety in IMAR, 
and spoke directly on behalf of the Centre as its mouthpiece and main 
representative. But by 14th June 1969 he was reduced to saying this: 
'Comrades... My mistakes are very serious... I have committed crimes 
against the people, and hanned them, and towards Chairman Mao. To him I 
plead guilty (qingzui). Those comrades labelled as IMPP include many old 
people who have lost their sons and daughtdrs, many young people who have 
lost their wives and husbands, many children who have lost their fathers and 
mothers. I am the guiltiest in making these great mistakes... I have let down 
(duibuiqi) these comrades, let down Chairman Mao, let down the 13 million 
people of IMAR, let down the revolutionary people of all nationality 
backgrounds. ' 442 
The removal of support at the Centre meant that the value of Teng's words in the 
new market had decreased. This was compounded by the organisational changes that 
had occurred - the setting up of a new institution (see following section), signifying 
new power priorities and objectives, accommodating admissions of mistakes made 
in the previous order. The illocutionary force of Teng's words was affected by this - 
he spoke to different groups, with different objectives and sanction. The context in 
which he had exercised power had changed, and his new voice was partly brought 
442 Doc 55,1-2. 
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on by a need to renegotiate in this new situation. The sort of power he exercised now 
was therefore affected by the national and local context. 
This was primarily created by the Ninth Party Congress with its embodying the 
criticisms of excesses by those implementing the CR in certain regions, which 
formed a new narrative, a new authoritative framework through which to assess and 
describe recent events. A letter sent by Teng, Wu Tao and Li Shuda from Beijing on 
the 4th April to Quan Xingyuan and 'othercomrades on the Standing Committee, ' 
issued at the beginning of the Congress (which had started formally on I" April) 
was primarily in prescriptive mode, because at the time Teng still notionally had 
formal authority. The authors referred to the Ninth Congress as one 'with historic 
significance and great contemporary importance. 443 In his response to the letter 
written by Teng and others, Quan Xingyuan reiterated that the Congress was 'great, 
glorious and correct' (this despite the fact that it had yet to start). 444 According to 
these letters, a new meaning was imposed from the Centre on the issue of 'unity' 
and of the enemy. Instead of being all around, the enemy were in fact a 'tiny 
minority. ' The key issue now was to 'implement policies' (luoshi zhengce), a phrase 
which would be heavily used in the ensuing months. These policies included 
processes of criticism for individuals and organisations (a process Quan began by 
criticising the units and areas that had refused to disseminate Teng and Wu's 
messages from the Centre during the preparations for the Congress). 445 
Declarations of the 'spirit' of the Ninth Congress (jiuda defingsheng), and of the 
I people of all nationalities in IMAR raising the great red flag of Mao Zedong 
Thought and letting it fly in the great billowing wind of the spirit of the Ninth 
Congress were contained in a statement issued on 12'h May 1969 by the Political 
Work Section of the IMAR CRC. This was the first document in the material 
analysed in this chapter in which Teng was openly criticised. The key issue was how 
to implement this 'spirit, ' specifically stated to be 'thoroughly criticising Teng 
Haiqing's leftism. ' 'This was a good new stage in the current proletarian CR being 
443 Doc 44,1. 
444 Ibid 3. 
445 Ibid 4. 
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waged, ' the authors stated, and a 'concrete manifestation of the spirit of the Ninth 
Congress in IMAR. A46 
At this stage in the campaign, it was still unclear which policies were to be 
implemented. As the following sections show, ostensibly these new policies turned 
out to be more moderate, aimed at carrying more of their constituency with them. 
They were therefore set up as a direct rebuke to the excesses of Teng and those 
associated (or deemed to have been associated) most closely with him. 
The material attacking Teng also involved the emergence of a number of voices 
which had hitherto been suppressed, and their inclusion within the discourse he 
used. While the primary material was Teng's own self-confessions and criticisms, 
his direct voice ceased to dominate. Even texts 'authored' by him, such as his 
examinations, included critical and lengthy interjections from the audience dictating 
their direction and tone. 
5.4 Anti-Teng Material: New Organisations 
The new context in which Teng found himself speaking from April 1969 is signfied 
by the raft of adapted organisations he spoke to, or which issued his self-confessions 
or criticisms by others of him: 
* IMAR CRC Political Work Group 
9 Hohhot CRC Standing Committee Branch for Criticising Teng Haiqing's 
[Practice of Being] "Leftist in Appearance, but Rightist in Reality. " 
e IMAR Fifth Section of the Mao Zedong Thought Great School Station of the 
Alliance to Criticise Teng. 
* Alliance to Criticise Teng at the Hohhot PSB Organisation Revolutionary 
Great Criticism Station. 
* The 80' Construction Company "Jinggangshan" Alliance. 
* IMAR CRC Standing Committee Organisation Joint Committee for 
Criticising Teng. 
446 JYi shengming (Urgent Declaration), Hohhhot, 12'h May 1969. 
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* IM University "Jinggangshan" Criticise Teng Liaison Headquarters. 
Hohhot Railway Bureau Liaison Headquarters. 
Hohhot Workers Union. 
As the material carriers of Teng's new voice, and constituting the institutions and 
administrative structure within which his words were enacted, these organisations 
reveal much about how the environment had evolved to accommodate the new 
narrative and culture of power. Many of these grew from previous entities. A 
'declaration' (shengming) issued by the Hohhot CRC Revolutionary Masses' on 14 Ih 
May 1969 announced the creation of the second organisation above, tracing its 
sanction to the 'spirit of the Ninth Congress, ' and acting in accordance with the '16 
Articles' issued by the Centre on 'how mass organisations should arrange 
themselves. 447 The objective of the new group would be to 'criticise Comrade Teng 
Haiqing's counter-revolutionary path, protect Chairman Mao' s proletarian path, 
saving Comrade Teng and the other comrades who have made serious mistakes 
(cuowu), making them return to the correct path of Chairman Mao. ' The 
organisations saw their main function as part of a positive campaign of correction, 
rather than the prosecution of accusations against criminals and enemies. 
The 'anti-Teng' material falls into the following genres: 
" Teng's own words (letter, self-criticisms) 
" Formal announcements 
" Copies of speeches by local leaders newly in place after the Ninth Congress 
" Narrative attacks 
" Letters from other smaller groups directed at the central leaders 
" 'Core Statements' (zhongdianfayan) 
Many of the prose attacks, and reprinting of Teng's self-criticisms, were contained 
in the '801 News Report' newsletter, produced by the Construction Corps, and in 
447 Yanzhong shengming (Serious Declaration), Hohhot, 14'h May 1969. 
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'Study Materials' produced by the CRC Committee of the construction 
department. 448 
A wide range of voices with varying registers were used against Teng. Minutes of a 
meeting focussed on how to implement the 'spirit' of the Ninth Party Congress in 
IMAR held from the 28th April to 5th May 1969 (and issued on the final day) gave 
some indication of this. Of the 30 people present, the majority were representatives 
either of various parts of the Workers Union (gongdaihui), or leaders or members of 
sections of the 'Third Hohhot Red Union, ' with the remainder coming from the 
IMAR Workers Propaganda Leading Department Group. The document was 
presented as a synthesis of the opinions of all these groups. 449 
Deeper into the anti-Teng campaign were the voices of new leaders. These appeared 
in the document issued on 27h May 1969 by the IMAR CRC 'deputy leader' Lei 
Daoyu, and his colleagues Wang Zhiyou, and Xi Guangda. The first and second of 
these professed 'humility' before their audience (a register looked at later in 
discussing Teng's tone), and issued their statements grounded much more in terms 
of their own perspectives and experience, rather than speaking on behalf of the 
Centre or any other more general authority. 
There were also documents directly issued from local organisations, like the letter 
from the IM University 'Jinggangshan' Criticise Teng Alliance Station on the 5h 
July, to Zhou Enlai (named simply as 'Premier' (zongli) in the letter), Chen Boda, 
Kang Sheng (called Kang Lao, use of a familiar appelation), and Jiang Qing. The 
democratic notion of a direct approach from a small, provincial faction to the leaders 
at the Centre is striking, and indicated something of the complicated geography of 
power in the CR. This was compounded by the fact that the authors of the letter 
asserted ownership over their opinions, rather than merely presenting them 
subserviently. 450 
448 These news-sheets also published materials issued by local groups, such as the 
Zhaomeng Balin Banner Alliance (I 70'July 1969) and the Xilingoule Banner CRC 
United Investigation Group (I S'h June 1969). 
449 Doc 46. 
450 They stated, for instance, in the opening paragraph: 'We are preparing to reflect to 
the leaders at the Centre our opinions over correcting mistakes with a rightist, 
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Between these two local extremes were the interjections contained by members of 
the groups Teng appeared before for his examination. Greater audience participation 
was permitted in these meetings compared to the public meetings from earlier parts 
of the CR in IMAR campaign analysed in previous chapters. In these transcripts, 
there were voices interrupting, correcting and challenging Teng from members of 
the Railway Bureau, and 'organisations under the Study Mao Zedong Thought Great 
School. ' The role of the audience in Teng's confessions is looked at in more detail 
below, but it is an example of material displaying a more multivocal, varied 
composition, and of a challenge to monovocal authority utterances. 
The inclusion of so many voices, from local groups, individuals, organisations, 
pointed to a crisis of authority at the time, and were symptomatic of the 
renegotiations among power groups. The Ninth Congress, with the importation of its 
symbolic importance into IMAR, had sanction&d the promotion of a new evaluation 
of the 'Party rectification' campaign, and the unique course it had taken in IMAR. 
This new narrative had challenged the monopoly narrative promoted by previously 
dominant voices, which had been categorical in tone, and clearly signified their 
absolute correctness. The entry of other voices, contradicting this certainty and 
monovocality, was a major change. The conveying of Teng's voice embodied this, 
issued now not through texts largely containing his unchallenged voice, but ones in 
which dissenting and contradicting 'other voices' were also present, competing with 
his. 
5.5 Anti-Teng Material: Strategies 
There were common features between the campaign against Teng, and the previous 
one against Ulanfu, beyond the fact that the initial stages were ostensibly aimed at 
other targets. A key means to discredit Teng was to attack him using his own words. 
A similar method was used with Ulanfu. A collection of Teng's 'countcr-sayings' 
(as they were now labelled) was pitted against the correct language of the 
opportunistic tendency in national minority policy made by Comrade Teng, taking 
notice of minority soldiers in the PLA, and strengthening the unity of national 
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'instructions' (zhishi) of the Centre, Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin in a 25 
page 'Selection' from May 1969. A5 1 As with Ulanfu, Teng's words were takes as 
indications of specific counter-categories of thought: pushing for 'independence, ' 
setting up a separate power-basis for himself in IMAR, opposing the Centre. 
Paradoxically these were the accusations that Teng had levelled at Ulanfu. The most 
striking of these was that Teng was a new kind of splittist. The term was shom of all 
its pro-national minority connotations in this context. As a Han Chinese, who did 
not originate from IMAR, and who had been in power while a devastating campaign 
had been waged against local Mongolians, it was impossible to say that Teng had 
worked on a positive agenda to empower minorities. He was simply accused of 
being ambitious and pursuing personal glory. 
The other accusation against Tcng was his support for violence. There were many 
examples of his speaking in prescriptive mode against violence in copies of his 
speeches issued when he was still supported by the Centre. 452 By the time he was out 
of favour in 1969, however, he was labelled as a keen promoter of unrest. In the 
May 1969 collection of quotes from Teng, in the third section entitled 'Teng's 
Serious Acts of Pressing, Confessing and Excesses, ' Teng gave the following 
instructions to a Wpmeng League CRC group on 8h January 1969: 
'Undertaking a bit of armed struggle [and] going on from this is good. Quick 
results are what is wanted. Battling enemies, [with] a high positive attitude to 
struggle, hating the enemies for these things, all help maintain the positive 
spirit of the masses. A53 
minorities. ' 451 Doc 45. 
452 E. g., Teng's speech on 5h July 1967 where he criticised violence at local struggle 
sessions: 'I say that revolutionary rebellion factions shouldn't act this way, it's not a 
high way to act, it's low' (Doc 14,6). On 24h November, he stated when told of 
armed struggle in Wumeng League that 'we should not use sticks and guns to hit 
people, but adopt unifying education ... not pressure them" (Doc 2,29th November 1967,3). Even in the depths of the 'Party rectification' campaign, on 10 Ih December 
1968, Teng condemned those who 'struck, tore, ripped, hunted houses, grasped 
people, and created an atmosphere of terror... destroying the healthy development of 
the campaign'(Doc 2,19th December 1968,9). 453 Doc 45,5. 
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Context was the means by which Teng's words were manipulated and then 
condemned. In the original copy of Teng's instructions from this meeting issued on 
the 12'h January 1969 in 'Struggle Notice' these words had occurred in a more 
complicated context. The main subject he pursued there was the importance of 
implementing Chairman Mao's policies, and the fact that many organisations, 
because of lack of understanding and incomplete appreciation of the depth of Mao's 
thinking, had not achieved this. He also made clear the main issue was not the battle 
between who seemed left and right but how to carry out instructions properly. The 
earlier version read: 
'Those doing leftist work while actually being rightists are the minority. The 
majority don't allow policies to be grasped, [thinking that] undertaking a bit 
of armed struggle, [and going on] from this is good. "Quick results are what 
is wanted. Battling enemies, [with] a high positive attitude to struggle, hating 
the enemies, these things all help preserve the positive spirit of the masses. " 
Leaders also bear responsibility [for this]. They haven't set out the policies 
clearly. 9454 
In Teng's original words, he criticised an attitude he was ascribing to other people, 
signifying this by the use of quotation marks. But six months later, with the final 
part of the piece left out, this was presented as the direct expression of his own 
sanctioning of violence. Words he used to characterise others were now manipulated 
to seem like his own, signifying the decrease of their political capital in the new 
market created after the '13th April Decision' for Ulanfu, and the Ninth Party 
Congress for Teng. 
A second common element of the campaigns against Ulanfu and Teng was the 
disrespectful register with which both were referred to. Just as Ulanfu had become 
'Old Ulanfu, ' 'Prince Ulanfu, ' along with a host of other derogatory labels (see 
Chapter Three, 3.1.3), so Teng was referred to as 'Old Teng' or simply 'Teng 
Haiqing' without the respectful 'Comrade, ' indicating a closeness and familiarity 
between the issuer of the documents and Teng himself 455 Wu Tao referred to Teng 
as 'Little Teng Haiqing' in his speech of 13th June, 456 an even more belittling label 
454 Doc 40,12'h January 1969,13. 
455 Doc 48,4. 
456 Doc 56,170'July 1969,4. 
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probably sanctioned by the fact that Wu Tao was still a local leader at the time. The 
implication of this addressing of Teng in the same way as others was clearly marked 
as something he was expected to feel (and did feel) uncomfortable about when one 
of his interrogators simply demanded of him: 'What's so dangerous about some 
young students and you discussing a few issues? A57 The 'reduction' of the space 
between the 'leader' Teng, and his audience implied in these familiar forms of 
address was a key means of conveying his lack of authority in the new context in 
which he spoke. 
While Teng was spared the intense invective which had been levelled at Ulanfu, one 
way in which the two campaigns did differ was the active part Teng was made to 
play in discrediting himself, and the fact that he participated in this in person. In his 
self-criticism of 14th June, Teng directly quoted words he had previously used, and 
then denounced them: 'I have said: "The branch name of the CCP is what is sinks or 
swims by, and in fact this is an IMPP branch. " This is totally incorrect slander 
against Chairman Mao's Thought. '458 Teng was within his own denunciation, 
making it first rather than third person. Behind this lay the simple withdrawal of 
sanction from Teng, his voice no longer occurring in an adminstrative and 
ideological context where he could rely on support. 
5.6 Teng's Mistakes and Crimes: The Basis for Denunciation 
In the new narrative created after the Ninth Party Congress Teng's role changed 
from a power holder, to one of someone accused of not understanding the situation 
in IMAR and being an outsider: 
'Teng Haiqing, he doesn't understand the real situation in IMAR, he doesn't 
start out from how things really are in IMAR, he doesn't investigate, doesn't 
research, objectify, but is happy to exaggerate the enemy feelings (diqing) 
and view IMAR as a black nest, countering the high hopes of Chairman Mao 
towards the 13 million people of IMAR. 9459 
457 Doc 53,2 nd jUly 1969,2. 458 Doc 52,2. 
459 Doc 51,25h June 1969,8. 
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In the new narrative, Teng was an outsider, someone who had intervened, who had 
no capital locally. At the same time as he was denounced in this narrative for 
making mistakes, there was also a process of mitigation being prepared for him. He 
had come to a situation blind, and acted from ignorance, not with malice 
aforethought. 
The keyword in the discourse used in this process against Teng (and one he used 
himself in his self-criticisms) was 'mistake' (cuowu). There was also a category of 
I crimes' (zui), though this was used less frequently. An attack on Teng published in 
the '801 News Report' on 25h June 1969 had divided Teng's mistakes into political, 
military, organisational and intellectual ones. Within and across these categories, the 
main mistakes Teng was accused of committing were: I 
9 Encouraging and sanctioning violence. 
Opposing the centre, and placing himself in competition to Mao in IMAR. 
Being contradictory in his statements. 
Being unfaithful to the Centre. 
Supporting the exploitative classes. 
The one area where Teng was accused of committing crimes rather than making 
mistakes was to have 'not had the Centre in his eyes. ' 'He cheated the Centre, ' the 
attack continued, 'and suppressed the people, trying to set up "Teng's independent 
kingdom. " This is historical proof. Comrade Teng Haiqing was guilty. We must 
criticise Comrade Teng Haiqing's mistakes, [but] we must thoroughly rectify 
Comrade Teng Haiqing's "leftist" opportunism crimes (zuixing). 060 As argued in 
the last chapter, Teng had started off following the Centre's ideology closely, using 
its discourse. But the articulation of a unique aspect to the struggle in IMAR, the 
IMPP, had brought conflict and problems. In the material condemning him this was 
cited as the failure to understand the Centre's prescriptions about how to handle the 
problem in IMAR. But in the stronger of the material analysed here, this failure was 
seen as a deliberate distortion of the Centre's instructions. 
460 Doc 5 1,1 O'h July 1969,1. 
233 
The small ideological part of the attack on Teng focussed on the idea that he had 
I opposed' or 'threatened' the Centre through a 'theory of many centres' (duo 
zhongxinlun). This appeared in the %801 News Report' 17'h July 1969, with a series 
of quotes from him. Teng had competed with the Centre, and tried to set up a 
parallel power structure in IMAR. A similar grouping of material issued in May 
1969 claimed that Teng had wished to create his own 'kingdom' (gao Ali 
wangguo). Quotes were used stating that Teng wished to see the IMAR CRC 
become independent, and in which he criticised the Centre's management of 
industry as opposed to the local one. 461 But these attacks lacked the edge of those 
against Ulanfu and the IMPP, where issues of a national minority trying to assert its 
wishes for independence came closest to the area where the Centre was most 
sensitive. The accusations of Teng working for an 'independent kingdom' were 
standard means to slander someone who was being cast as incompetent or 
inefficient. None of Teng's ideological or political objectives were set out, as they 
had been against Ulanfu. It was a label, the most powerful label among several, used 
to criticise him and indicate dissatisfaction in his failure to handle the situation in 
IMAR as the Centre had prescribed, in the discourse they had devised. 
5.7 Nationality: The Breaking Point 
The most dramatic sign in Teng's new discourse of a paradigm-break with the 
previous one was the admission that the brunt of the purge of the IMPP had been 
borne by Mongolians. But this was still framed in such a way that control over the 
key terms for the discourse and the ideology it carried was asserted. Teng was 
accused of stating in a speech that 'the targets for the development of the IMPP were 
cadres of Mongolian nationality, and students, in both large and small schools. The 
other was working people. 462 A more general criticism of the nature of the 
campaign Teng had helped wage in IMAR was contained in the '801 News Report' 
on 25th June: 'Regarding the problem of national minorities, Teng Haiqing took the 
chance given him by the "dig the IMPP" to purge the national minority cadres, 
thinking that they were unreliable. He labelled a large number of them IMPP, 
forbade the use of their languages, and didn't respect their characteristics, seriously 
461 Doc 45,18-19. 
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against the Party's policies on national minorities, destroying the unity between 
nationality groups. 9463 
Teng admitted in his self-criticism on 23"d June that 'in some work units 80% of 
those who were national minorities were labelled as Mpp. 9464 But neither Teng, nor 
his accusers in these documents, spoke of the IMPP purge being mostly aimed at, 
and suffered by, Mongolians. Both are located in the broadest context of treatment 
of 'minorities. ' 
The most explicit link between the IMPP purge and the open persecution of 
Mongolians in this material was contained in a stencilled 'Open Letter' to the central 
leaders issued on 5' July 1969: 
'Comrade Teng Haiqing supports capitalist proletarian minoritisation, 
dragging a large number of local and military Mongolian cadres over to 
Ulanfu's black line, pushing them towards Ulanfu. Chairman Mao says "We 
must believe that more than 90% of cadres are good or relatively good. " 
Under the mistaken leadership of Comrade Teng Haiqing's thought, from the 
IMAR Party down to work unit level, more than 90% of Mongolian cadres 
have been labelled as IMPP. A leader of the Yimeng Kangxi Banner, Li 
Wenju, even said: "Support for IMPP is based on nationality. There are no 
good Mongolians. Ulanfu is their godfather. Now he's being fucked, and so 
should they. "' 
This admission by some of the voices in the anti-Teng campaign that national 
minorities in general, and the Mongolians in particular, had suffered in the purge of 
the IMPP was supported by the appearance of a statistical, factual register in the 
discourse. Careful tabulation of numbers and percentages of those in specific work 
units and areas who were victims in the campaign were set down: 
'95 cadre workers in the commune and organisations under it, 48 labelled as 
IMPP, making 52%. Of the 50 Mongolians 32 were labelled as IMPP, 
making 64%. Of 34 Communist Cadres, 16 were Mongolian, and all of these 
were labelled IMpp. 9465 
462 Doc 51,16'h June 1969,4. 463 Doc 51 25h June, 7. 464 Doc 51: 26h July 1967,3. 465 Doc 51,17'h July 1969,1. 
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A similar rendition of statistics was presented on 29th July, this time for work units 
and communes in Zhemeng League. This statistical data gave the overwhelming 
impression that, whatever the type or size of the organisation, Mongolians had been 
the main victims. This was presented as a brute fact. No questions were raised as to 
why a far higher proportion of Mongolians figure in the statistics than other groups. 
The extremely sensitive question of whether the Centre had pursued policies in 
IMAR that led to the victimisation, persecution and slaughter of a national minority 
on the basis of their ethnicity was omitted from this discourse. All that was allowed 
was the admission that Teng had 'misadministered' the area and made mistakes. 
This was a great symbolic moment, marking the discourse off as very different from 
what had preceded it. The terms had changed - the sort of hegemony arising from 
the '13th April Decision' with its terms of management and control had changed, in 
response to the situation in IMAR spiralling out of control and violence reaching 
unacceptable levels. But the central issue of the assertion of the hegemony of class 
over national minority terms was not conceded or softenened. The new discourse 
still sought to exercise control, and was an indication of the realisation that the best 
route to this was to concede the suffering of Mongolians, but not to interrogate this 
further and change the prime ideological terms. 
5.8 Keywords: 'Rectify' and 'Sorry' 
The keywords in the previous stages of the CR in IMAR had delineated the main 
territory for contention between competing forces and signified the process of 
control and its mechanisms. In 1967, 'people' and 'power' were at the forefront, 
within a discourse aimed at aggressive management of IMAR and tight definition of 
the constituencies there. 'Class' and 'nationality' dominated the central period, 
highlighting the ideological conflict between two opposing factions, the Centre and 
a perceived local 'counter-party. But in the terminal phase of the CR, the key terms 
became ones indicating the strategic points to regain control in a situation that had 
got out of hand. Here 'pacifying, ' 'admission of mistakes, ' 'apology, ' and 
. rectification' were central, achieved and implemented by organisational processes 
of mass-critisicms and self-criticism, and conveyed in a register of submissiveness 
and admission of culpability. 
236 
The criticism from the Centre of the conduct of the CR in IMAR provoked the open 
publication of data on the suffering from the purge of the IMPP. This was seen as a 
situation meriting rectification. From May 1969 onwards, therefore, the term 
I rectify' (pingfan) became central in the anti-Teng material. Wu Tao (at the time the 
deputy leader of the IMAR CRC and the Military District), on meeting a delegation 
from Zhemeng League on 30'h June 1969 had said: 
'We need to thoroughly give rectification to those who have suffered, 
according to the instructions from the Centre, notices, and the " 165 Notice. " 
Politically, intellectually, organisationally, we need to thoroughly rectify. We 
need to restore the good name of politics and rectify organisationally. 
Intellectually we need to undergo criticism of mistakes, and really give 
rectification to those struck down as "counter-revolutionaries" and IMPP, 
and followers of other types of bad organisation. Especially intellectually, we 
need rectification, real and complete rectification. Intellectual rectification is 
very important. We undergo criticism; bad thoughts are cleaned out... 
[Ending up by] having real class feeling, this is the result of a thorough 
cleansing. A66 
This dense use of one term, 'rectification, ' (seven times in the passage above) made 
clear the importance of this in the new stage of the campaign. Rectification, as a 
term and process, was promoted by Wu Tao and other leaders at the time of the '24 
Character Directive' contained in the 'Central Notice' issued on the 22"d May that 
had originally criticised Teng. In this the key prescriptions was to 'strengthen unity, 
correct mistakes, summarise experience, implement policies, stabilise organisations, 
unite against a common enemy' (flaqiang tuanjie, xiuzheng cuowu, zongilefingyan, 
luoshi zhengce, wendingjushi, gongtong duidi - in total 24 characters). Parts of this 
directive appeared in other material. In his self-criticism of 14th June, Teng stated 
that 'if you don't criticise me, then that's not "implementing policy" Quoshl 
zhengce). ý467 It also appeared on the 'Resolution' issued by the Ilohhot Workers 
Union on 6th July, labelled as the 'concrete policy of the Centre resolving the 
issue/problem of IMAR. ' To compound the hegemony of this statement, the 
'Resolution' continued: 'All steps to go behind Chairman Mao's strategy, and to 
leave the great direction of the current movement and the "24 Character" policy arc 
mistaken, and are against unity. ' The negative language of mistakes, admissions of 
466 Doc 56,17 th July 1969,1. 467 Doc 52,1. 
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culpability and crimes was balanced by the promotion of a new policy and direction, 
embodied in the '24 Character Directive' offering a new solution to the 
'issue/problem' of IMAR. 
The other keyword in this discourse was 'sorry. ' By necessity, Teng was the key 
performer of that term. Clustered around its performance were the issues of for 
whom Teng was saying sorry (himself, or the Centre he had represented till then), 
why he was saying sorry (to fully repudiate a form of power that had failed, or to 
serve as a fall-guy for the Centre, which could continue to exercise power in the area 
once he had taken the flack for them), and to whom he was saying sorry (the 
I people' of IMAR - the national minorities, the broad masses of the people, the 
leaders, the 'wounded'), and finally how he said sorry (the form of words he used, 
the way they were issued). Teng's very utterance of the term 'sorry' distilled critical 
issues of the relationship between the exercise of power in the CR and language. It 
showed how someone who once issued orders, prescriptions and demands was 
placed in a position where they had to request forgiveness (leaving aside the kind of 
forgiveness this actually was) from their audience or constituency. Teng's apology 
served many functions, and proved to be a rich speech act. 
5.9 Teng's Self-Criticisms: The Context 
Two full length versions of self-criticisms Teng Haiqing perfon-ned on the 18'h 
June 468 and the 23 rd June 1969469 are looked at in this section, along with a stencilled 
two page fragment of a further self-criticism from the 14 th June 470, and the criticism 
of Teng's examination of 20 June published on 17'h jUly. 471 These are only a small 
sample of what was evidently a busy schedule of self-examinations. The first open 
criticisms of Teng occurred on 9h May. However, it was likely that he started to 
actively participate in self-criticisms after the issuing of the '22 nd May Circular. ' In 
468 Issued in Doc 51,24h June 1969. 469 Issued in Doc 51,26h July 1967. 470 Doc 52. 
47 1 Doc 56. 
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the opening words on the 18th June, Teng stated that 'in the recent period, I have 
done probably 30 criticisms before the masses. 1472 
The written records make clear these events were not brief The first was 13 closely 
printed pages, the second 12. Assuming five minutes to perform each page, this 
would mean a minimum of an hour each. The 18th June performance, however, was 
clearly marked as a 'uncorrected record, ' and therefore was likely to be only a 
summary rather than a verbatim record. In addition, both events clearly involved 
heavy audience participation and interjection. Shouts, slogans and questions were 
marked, suggesting that the actual events from which these documents emanated 
were rowdy affairs, militating against the smooth delivery of a single text. Indeed, 
according to Wu Di, Teng's more tumultuous confrontations with his audience 
sometimes descended into physical violence against him (see below). 
There was the important issue of general context. In all four documents Teng was 
clearly stated as performing an 'examination' (flancha). This draws on a history of 
CCP discipline, and was a genre that had a 40 year pedigree in the CCp. 473 It was, in 
fact, one among several methods used by the CCP (including struggle sessions, mass 
criticism rallies, the writing of self-confessions). While some of these were adopted 
for use in the CR, they were not invented then but existed before. This had been well 
documented elsewhere. 474 Yang Jiang, for instance, in her novel about the 1954 
'four clear-ups' campaign (the first large-scale campaign waged against intellectuals 
after 1949) vividly described public meetings at which such examinations were 
472 The first 'confession'Teng seemed to have produced was a written 'examination' 
with Wu Tao and Li Shude while at the Ninth Party Congress on 19 th April 1969, 
confessing to four types of mistakes (see Tumen and Zhu 1995,236). 473 See Luk 1990,217 for first use of self-criticisms in China in 1927. 474 The roots of struggle sessions in the rectification campaign in Yan'an carried out 
in 1942/3 was well documented in Apter and Saich 1994, especially 59-68 which 
deal with the anti-Wang Shiwei and Wang Ming campaign. These were prototypes 
of the later, larger scale CR sessions. Struggle sessions against the landlords were a 
common occurence in the land reform campaign launched immediately after the 
Communists came to power in 1949. Thurston 1987 described these in Chapter Four 
of her study of the ordeal of intellectuals in the CR, paying particular attention to the 
mass-session against Wang Guangmei, the wife of Liu Shaoqi (121-124). Excerpts 
from Wang Guangmei's interrogation record are contained in Schoenhals 1996a, 
101-116. 
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undertaken. 475 The most striking feature of the CR version of such 'examinations, ' 
however, was the frequency in which they descended into violence and the lack of 
safeguards from this. According to Wu Di, Teng was physically attacked at some of 
these meetings, by those he had caused so much suffering to. In one case, a mother 
simply handed her recently born child to him, and demanded that he rear it as the 
father had been killed in the IMPP purge. 476 
As in the geneology that gave rise to the specific cultures or power in the PRC, the 
history of confessions in CCP sheds light on these generic constraints in which Teng 
operated, and the ways in which certain styles of speaking were sanctioned and 
others excluded. Pamela Lubell's study of the CR argues that both the CCP and 
Nationalist used the legal tradition of 'confessions' to demonstrate 'generous 
leniency to the offender who confessed. ' This politicisation of the legal practice of 
confession also drew on 'the Confucian approach to self-rectification. ' Confession, 
Lubell states, while becoming 'increasing public and coercive in its twentieth 
century political culture... still... facilitated the demonstration of benevolence on 
the part of the ruling authority, placing the latter in an enhan , 
ced moral light. 477 Seen 
in this framework, Teng was renegotiating with the Centre, in a manner and 
language which it legitimised and recognised. He spoke with his own voice, but in 
an imposed convention which both dictated what he had to say and signified 
obedience to an outside authority. 
Teng spoke, according to these documents, before two organisations. On the 18 Ih 
June he went before the Hohhot Railway Bureau "Locomotive" Section (Hutieju 
"huochetou"). "' On the 23d June he addressed the 'Great Mao Zedong Thought 
School for the executive organs of IMAR' (Neimeng zhixin figuan Afao Zedong 
sixiang da xuexiao). The stencilled fragment was also from the Railway Bureau, 
though from an occasion four days before the full 23 rd June version. The Railway 
Bureau was of particular significance to Teng, for it was from them that he had 
475 Yang 1988. The second and third parts of this novel described several such 
struggle sessions, and the production of documents of self-criticism and confession 
b the participants. 476 Interview 17'h April 2003. 477 Lubell 2002,13-14. 
478 Here locomotive was used in a metaphorical sense, as the 'engine' of revolution. 
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operated when he had first arrived in Hohhot. The Military District Headquarters, 
his natural base, actually refused to accept him. 479 This special debt made his tone 
towards them familiar and close: 'Today, I have come to the Hohhot Railway 
Bureau to receive the criticism by the great mass of the proletarian revolutionary 
classes and the great revolutionary masses of my criticisms. This is a great lesson for 
me. 480 Both the printed complete self-criticisms were produced in the '801 News 
Report, ' though one was issued by the Construction Department Eighth Bureau First 
Company Workers Union, and the other by the Construction Department Eighth 
Bureau First Company 'Jinggangshan' Alliance. Both of these versions were 
marked as restricted. 
5.10 Starting to Say Sorry 
The speech act which reveals the most about Teng's new power status was that of 
apologising. Apologising signified a new attitude to his audience, and reflected the 
fact that he was placed now in a context in which the value of his previous formal 
positions and the institutional support he appeared to have was replaced by one 
where had to speak on his own, without claiming to represent the Centre, or anyone 
else. 
Teng began his criticism on the 18'h June thus: 
'Comrades! Today, with the most anguished feelings, I come to examine all 
of the mistakes I have made to the people of all national groups in IMAR. 
My mistakes are very serious, I am resolved to change my serious errors. 
Recently, the revolutionary masses have undertaken criticism towards me, in 
every banner, city, village and all other places. In the recent period, perhaps 
30 times, the great revolutionary masses have undertaken criticism towards 
me. This is the greatest care and support of the great revolutionary masses 
towards the CRC, and it is also politically the greatest education for me, and 
the greatest good and help. I am grateful from the depths of my heart, 
warmly welcoming the criticism and help of these comrades. I am resolved 
after examination to continue going among the masses, receiving their 
criticism and help, using practical means to rectify my serious mistakes. ' 
479 Woody 1993, iv. 
480 Doc 52,1. 
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This was formulaic ('my serious mistakes, ' 'I am resolved'). Proof can be found for 
how formulaic it was in the similar patterns of the opening of the examination on the 
23 rd June: 
'Comrades! Today, with most anguished feelings, I come to examine the 
serious mistakes I have made to our comrades in the organisations under the 
Mao Zedong Thought Great School. My mistakes are extremely serious. In 
the recent spirit of the great revolutionary masses according to Chairman 
Mao's 22 nd May Directive and the Centre towards IMAR's instructions, 
launching a mass movement to criticise Teng Haiqing's mistakes, the 
situation is very good. Recently, the IMAR Nucleus Small Group's members 
have regularly held meetings with comrades from all banners, towns and 
villages. The revolutionary masses have exposed and criticised me to my 
face. At the same time, I have been to several units, receiving the criticism of 
the masses towards me. The great revolutionary masses follow closely 
Chairman Mao's great strategy, and are resolutely implementing the 
instructions of the Centre. This shows the greatest care and support by the 
great revolutionary masses and the CRC. It is also the greatest political 
education for me, and the greatest good and help. Going through the 
experience of the great revolutionary masses recently has made me 
understand the seriousness of my mistakes. Two days ago in the evening I 
heard some of the cadres of our Great School expressing criticism of my 
mistakes. I am deeply grateful. I welcome the criticism and help of 
comrades. I am resolved to correct my mistakes according to the recent 
instructions from the Centre, going amongst the masses to receive their 
criticism and help, using practical means to rectify my serious mistakes. ' 
The common structures and phrases between these versions indicate a generic 
language of apology, something rehearsed and prepared. In both examinations, Teng 
was undertaking a 'performance, ' performing the speech act of apology. In speech 
acts, the very act of saying something is taken'as fulfilling what is said as long as it 
meets certain performative criterion. In promising something, for instance, the 
saying of a promise is itself the act of promising. A criterion for this, and for the 
speech act of apologising, is that it should be performed truthfully and with 
sincerity, and in an appropriate context (you can't apologise to someone you have 
done nothing wrong to). Promises or apologies which are false or insincere do not 
meet the performance criterion: both are better described as lies. Teng's admission 
of mistakes and the apology he offered in these two examinations do raise issues 
about the sort of speech act he was performing, and whether he had actually fulfilled 
the criterion for it. In this context, the performance of an 'apology' speech act was 
framed by expectations of how the apology should be said, to whom, and through 
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which language. Teng's apology was very structured and formulaic. When he talked 
in the first and second speech of having 'anguished feelings' he expressed this by 
the use of a saying (chengyu) that is to say, through a clich6 - wanfen chengtong. 
And he apologised not to specific individuals, at this stage, but toward generalities - 
'the great mass of people, ' organisations and large entities. 
The act that Teng was performing also signified something about the new situation 
in which he was placed, and its impact on how he could exercise power and 
authority. Like a judge declaring a sentence, but this being meaningful only when 
there are institutions to implement this sentence, Teng's previous discourse had been 
possible in a-C'Ontext in which he occupied formal positions of authority in IMAR, 
where the Centre's support for him was clearly signified, and this served to 
legitimise his authority. This illustrates the importance of social context in both 
creating and supporting the authority claims in discourse. In the new situation, 
Tcng's words had no illocutionary force because this context had been removed. He 
could no longer speak as the head of anything, but only as an individual who had 
made mistakes. 
Teng's 'apology' was an act of negotiation as much as one of contrition. He was 
performing to two audiences - the Centre, to whom he needed to demonstrate 
obedience, and to negotiate forgiveness to maintain his capital with them, and the 
local audience, to whom he had to act as the main fall guy for the recent failed 
campaign, accepting blame on behalf of the Centre without giving the impression he 
was apologising in their place for mistakes their instructions had inspired. Teng's 
apology functioned as part of a negotiation with these two separate parties. In both 
cases, it was to perform damage limitation - to admit mistakes as far as possible, but 
not in such a way that the credibility of the Centre was challenged, and to maintain 
the best chance of Teng emerging from the process still able to work for the Centre. 
His apology was not an abnegation of power -a removal and disassociation from it. 
In fact, Teng's apology was an act to manage the destruction and damage that the 
previous failed paradigms and narratives had led to. 
While using a personal voice, Teng was not speaking as an individual. He did refer 
to his history in IMAR, to when he came, and to the narrative of the new post-Ninth 
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Congress CR. But this history was conveyed through public events. It could not be 
seen as a personal one, sponsored by an individual voice: 'I came to IMAR on the 
18'h April 1967, for two years I have not worked well, especially after November 
1968, ' he stated on the 18'h June. In the new narrative Teng attempted to create he 
admitted misinterpreting the situation in IMAR: 'I started to believe that the most 
serious animosity came partly from the Manchurian period (weiman shidai), partly 
from the Mengjiang481 period... and partly from Ulanfu's small clique opposing the 
Party. 482 1 put all these parts together, and believed that there were many 
enemies. A83 In the final part of both his examinations he took responsibility for 
these mistakes and the impact that they had in IMAR. The interventions Of the 
audience made Teng more precise about his accountability: 'I wish to admit my 
crimes to Chairman Mao, and to the great mass of the people. I have let down 
(duibuqi) the people, and let down Chairman Mao. ' 
The keywords in Teng's speeches for the admission of culpability were 'mistake' 
(cuowu), 'crime' (zui) and the associated 'confess/own up to having committed a 
crime'(renzui or qingzui), 'letting down' (duibuqi) and 'sorry' (baoqian). The final 
term, 'sorry, ' is the one that depends most on an individual performing the speech 
act in a specific context to be meaningful. At one stage on the 23 rd June, Teng 
directly apologised-to Gao Jinming. On the 18th June, towards the end of his 
examination, he offered a series of personal apologies to named comrades in specific 
work units, in a highly formal manner - 'zengli daoqian. ' Such apologies to specific 
individuals culminated in the final apology: 'I have let down the rebellious factions 
of IMAF, I say to the revolutionary groups of the whole region I am most deeply 
sorry. ' 
But what did Teng say he was apologising to these people and groups for? In the 
third person attacks on him referred to above, he was accused of opposing the 
Centre, creating his own power base in IMAR, promulgating violence, implementing 
48 1A reference to the Japanese label imposed on Prince De Wang's Mongolian 
Borderland Administration in the 1930s and 1940s. 482 All oblique references to periods when parts of IMAR aspired to independence 
ýthough in Ulanfu's case, this was an accusation unique to the CR). 83 Doc 51,24h June, 2. 
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policies in the 'Party rectification' campaign that targeted minority cadres. On 23 rd 
June, Teng stated that his crimes were: 
'Destroying the three unities of the revolution, and the great unity of the 
revolution, destroying the relations between nationality groups, and between 
the army and the people, the cadres and the masses, upsetting the great 
measures of Chairman Mao, pushing back the process of struggle, criticism 
and change in IMAR, seriously influencing the productivity of agriculture, 
grasslands, and industry. 484 
He went on to talk of the impact of his administration in the areas of rail transport, 
and the production of food and power. Such failure to succeed in practical areas was 
due, in Teng's own words (and here there was unity between what he said, and the 
accusations contained in other material against him) to his refusal to obey the 
instructions of the Centre: 'The things that I wanted to disseminate [from the Centre] 
I did so, and those that I didn't want to, I didn't. A85 The key act that Teng had 
committed was to 'disobey' (weifan) the Centre and Chairman Mao: 'Previously I 
had run counter to Chairman Mao's teaching, I didn't seek evidence [in accusing 
people of being IMPP] but just wanted verbal admissions (kougong). ' During 
interrogation later Teng repeated that 'I have violated Mao Zedong Thought, I have 
not done things according to Chairman Mao's instructions. 486 In this way, Teng 
had 'cheated' the people. 487 
Teng admitted earlier in this examination that he had not understood or appraised the 
situation in IMAR properly: 'Under the development of my "leftist" tendency 
thinking, I believed that the "Party rectification" campaign in IMAR had not been 
done thoroughly, that it needed to continue, from the beginning of the "Party 
rectification" campaign, I continuously opposed rightism. 9488 At the end of 1968, 
Teng stated that he had been given material showing that the IMPP had 60 sections, 
and 12 party committees. 'I believed this, ' he said, 'but in fact this material was all 
extracted under pressure and torture. ' 489 It was this issue of the physical suffering of 
484 Doc 51,26"July, 11. 
485 lbid 8. 
486 lbid 7. 
487 Ibid 5. 
488 Ibid 2. ' 
489 Ibid 2. 
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the Party members and others in IMAR accused of being IMPP which most aroused 
the audience's anger. Teng's breaching of his responsibility for this, and his 
apology, along with any explanation for its causes, is worth quoting at length: 
'All of the people of IMAR, all of the cadres, love Chairman Mao, are 
faithful to him, faithful to his Thought, and limitlessly love Chairman Mao's 
line. The sky of IMAR is Chairman Mao's sky, the earth is the earth of his 
Thought. Because of the mistake of my serious "leftist" tendencies the 
feelings and trust of the great mass of the people of IMAR towards Chairman 
Mao has been shaken. This evil is very serious. Because of this mistake, 
many of our cadres have suffered. We still don't have a final figure. If we 
say in the whole region that 100,000 people have suffered from being dug up 
as IMPP, that is still 100,000 people. If there are five people in each 
household [these victims come from], it doesn't matter if we say we've dug 
100,000,200,000, several hundred thousand, this isn't a problem of giving or 
taking a few hundred thousand, this is thousands of people politically being 
struck, with their families, their children, their relatives, all of them receiving 
political damage. This destroys the relations between national groups, and 
relationship of those above and below. For this crime you can't use figures 
and numbers, or economics, no numbers can reflect it. The most serious 
thing is that, of our national minority cadres, in some work units 80% of 
these have been labelled IMPP, and in some others 100%. And there are 
others that say that our great leader Chairman Mao is not the leader of the 
Mongolians, [that] the leader of the Mongolians is Ulanfu. This completely 
slanders our national minorities and the great revolutionary mass of the 
Mongolians. 2490 
Teng's new discourse allowed public admission that Mongolians had suffered in the 
CR, but control was still signified over this deeply sensitive part of the discourse by 
the failure to articulate reasons for why they had suffered. The Centre's policy of 
I unity' between all groups was still asserted as paramount, its value unaffected by 
the recent events in IMAR waged to defend the same concept of unity. Teng's 
I apology' was a political act, connected as much to the promotion of central interests 
in the IMAR as had his previous prescriptive language. It was an act to control the 
accepted bounds of discourse, and then negotiate. He admitted to this situation in 
IMAR being caused by %my leftist tendencies. ' But he did not go beyond this. Even 
the audience's goading did not prompt him to ask what 'specific' feature of IMAR 
he had so badly misunderstood. As in previous terms of discourse used in the CR in 
IMAR, his apology was aimed at foreclosing certain lines of enquiry and blocking 
others off. His prime objective, as in many apologies, was to appease the receiver, 
490 lbid 3. 
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the audience, to satisfy at least their most urgent needs for rectification, so that their 
anger did not push the movement in directions that were not desired. His role was 
that of a scapegoat, and his activity still to deliver control - to control the discourse 
of anger and attrition so that it did not stray towards the most sensitive sources of 
grievance and hurt. 
5.11 The Audience 
Prime evidence of the new political context Teng spoke in was the greater awareness 
of an audience, signified by the other voices, attempting to break into his, to hold 
him accountable in his examination, and of his needing to report and answer to these 
external questions. He no longer employed the monologue of authority attempted in 
the previous period where he had institutional and organisational support to speak 
within, but was open to the voic es of others entering his discourse and effecting and 
dictating its terms. 
There was no indication in either record of the number of people Teng was speaking 
too, nor are any of the questioners named. On both occasions they were marked 
merely as 'the masses. ' Also on both occasions, their interjections occurred almost 
halfway into Teng's own words. This indicated that at least at the beginning, the 
format of these meetings meant that Teng was not prompted by directed questions, 
but had the responsibility to present his case. In both versions, there were indications 
of slogans, and other impromptu interruptions. In talking about Gao Jinming, Teng 
stated: 
'I believed that in criticising Ulanfu, Gao was looking to bolster his own 
position, and that he was aiming the arrow at me, at me myself. (Slogans: 
Teng Haiqing making false accusations against the revolutionary cadres has 
completely failed to stick. Old Teng has got to admit his crimes to Chairman 
Mao, we will definitely not let Old Teng slip away. If Old Teng doesn't 
surrender then we'll call for his death). 9491 
49 1 Doc 51,26th July, 5. 
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Such impromptu expressions of anger were unmarked, and stand against the 
evidently more planned questions that the examination started with when Teng's 
main presentation had terminated. 
In terms of what participation was allowed, both examinations were different. The 
audience on the 180' June was more restive. Their first intedection occurred at the 
point (which Teng also mentioned on 23d June) where Teng said he believed there 
were 60 sections of IMPP in IMAR, and 12 party committees (see section above). 
'What evidence did you have for this? ' they asked (their contribution was marked as 
'intedected' (chashuo)). But Teng did not relinquish control: 'Wait till I've finished 
speaking. ' The tone of the first lengthy exchange was equally negative: 
'Question interjected: How many died after being labelled as IMPP in 
IMAR? 
Teng: I don't know. There's no way of estimating this. 
(Audience slogans). 
Question interjected: Was there any evidence for IMPP? 
Teng: The IMPP was a small secret organisation, I made that clear just now. 
Question: You made this clear? So what organisations were under IMPP? 
How many? Where? 
Teng: I don't understand, Comrades, please forgive me. 
(Audience slogans). 
Teng: I want to continue making things clear. 
Question: Tell us clearly, how big was IMPP? 
Teng: The excesses I've committed were because I didn't see this 
organisation's size clearly. If I had then I wouldn't have made this mistake. 
Question: How long were you digging up IMPP in IMAR? 
Teng: From November 1967, about a year. 
Question: How many did you dig up, and how many were interrogated to 
death? 
Teng: I'm not sure. 
Question: Are you making a joke at the expense of the 13 million people of 
IMAR? 
Teng: I'm guilty of this... 
Question: At the same time, why don't you set out to the masses the situation 
of the IMPP? 
Teng: I still haven't grasped how many were dug, how many died... 
Question: You said the high level organisations of IMPP have basically been 
destroyed, you did say this didn't you? 
Teng: I said that, the main thing was 60 sections, 12 party committees being 
destroyed, that's what I said. 
Question: So say once more, was there or wasn't there an IMPP? 
Teng: Today I've no way to answer that question speaking for my own part. 
Question: You've got to explain all this clearly about a secret organisation. 
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Teng: I'm unable to. 
Audience: This isn't a sincere examination you're making. Your attitude to 
the 13 million people of the whole region is dishonest. Teng wants to slip 
away. Let's temporarily halt his examination, and let the persecuted 
speak. , 492 
As in the attack on Ulanfa, the function of questions was to assert rather than 
enquire. Teng still had some ability (and inclination) to obstruct the lines of enquiry 
directed at him simply by asserting either that he did not know, or did not wish to 
answer. Trying to negotiate with the audience, or their speaking representatives, 
with a 'please forgive me' (here using yuanliang rather than daoqian) was evidently 
not successful. Teng's 'performance' on this occasion was judged 'insincere, ' not 
'from the heart' (chengxin chengyi). This indicated awareness, at least among some 
of the audience, that they were not in fact being offered an 'apology' on the terms 
they wanted it, and indeed were unlikely to get one. 
On 23 rd June, Teng declared that he felt 'very close to the comrades criticising him, ' 
and that many were those who had received persecution. 493 On this occasion, while 
the audience interrogation that was recorded was shorter than that on the 18'h June, 
the tone was still prescriptive and firm: 'You must answer, ' the 
interrogator/audience demanded. 494 The audience also repeatedly insisted that Teng 
answer the specific questions put to him, and answer them 'frankly' (zhengmian). 495 
The intedection of the audience at this point showed the competing purposes 
between them and Teng. 
The fact that Teng was now speaking in a new context, in which he needed to react 
more to the audience, and enter into dialogue with them was reflected in the ability 
of the questioners to frame some of the terms of his discourse. This is clear in the 
different structures of each examination. In both, they open with Teng's univocal 
presentation, according to a generic template. But in each case the audience reacted 
slightly differently, meaning that the shape and form of Teng's full examination 
differed. 
I 
492 Doc 51v 26th July, 2. 
493 Ibid 7. 
494 Ibid 7. 
495 Ibid 8. 
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This was most evident in the final apology that Teng offered in each examination. 
On the 18'h June his apology was finally to specific individuals and groups - to 
named entities - to people of the IM Teachers College like Ding Kerning, to all the 
I revolutionary rebellious factions in the region, ' to the 'workers propaganda groups' 
and the 'army propaganda groups' (junxuandui), culminating in an apology to 'the 
IMAR proletarian revolutionary factions, ' and to the 'great masses of the IMAR 
revolutionary factions, and to the rebels of IMAR. A96 The final arbiter in this 
hierarchy of power was the % 13 million people of IMAR, ' to whom he 
I acknowledges mistakes, and admits culpability' (ditou renzUi). 497 The apology on 
23 rd June was more in terms of the acts that Teng accused himself of committing: 
'The evil consequences of the mistakes I have committed... have destroyed 
the three unities of the revolution, and the great unity of the revolutionary 
masses, destroyed the unity between national minorities, and between the 
army and the government, and the cadres and people, disturbing the great 
strategy and measures of Chairman Mao, setting back the criticism, struggle 
and reform process in IMAR, seriously influencing agricultural and 
industrial productivity... ' 498 
In this later examination, there were no lists of people to whom Teng specifically 
addressed apologies. He spoke instead to groups: 'My mistakes have struck (daju) 
the revolutionary cadres, struck the poor and middle peasants, struck the poor and 
middle herdsmen, struck workers, struck Red Guards, pressured these comrades, 
struck them politically and spiritually, damaging them, physically harming 
9499 them... This was an admission of responsibility, but it was not an apology. In the 
fragment from 14'h June, Teng's apology was almost immediate, and to the 'class 
brothers' (fleji xiongdi) who Teng called 'his own: 'I have let down these comrades, 
let down Chairman Mao, let down the 13 million people of IMAR, let down the 
revolutionary people. 500 
Perhaps this was because Teng was before an audience he could feel were more 
hostile to him, and to whom he had to display more humility - to whom, in a sense, 
496 Doc 5 1,240' June, II- 12. 
497 Ibid 12. 
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from the beginning he had to negotiate, by using a more submissive tone and 
manner. But there were still vestiges of Teng's older prescriptive and authoritative 
registers in his examinations. On the 2P June, Teng slipped into command mode: 
'No matter which comrades, they should do things in IMAR according to the great 
leader Chairman Mao's "22nd May Notice, " and the instructions from the Centre 
about how to do work in IMAR. '501 This 'command' culminated in the need to 
I criticise Teng Haiqing's mistakes, ' the 'heart at the heart of the "24 Character 
Directive. "' 
The disruptions and interruptions in these examinations showed the dynamics 
between Teng's voice and the people he spoke to. Teng may have been apologising 
but he was still talking on behalf of, and with the protection, of larger powers - 
those at the Centre, who had sent him to this place about which he knew almost 
nothing, and to whom he had constantly answered. His apology was part of a 
process which had been ongoing since the start of the CR - how to handle the 
problem of IMAR, how to manage and control it according to the template given by 
the Centre. His failure to indicate any recognition of the unique ethnic element in 
IMAR showed his discourse excluding the thing that was most important. 
This element was not only excluded by him but also by the audience. In Teng's 
examination, the audience never pressed him on it. Their questions concerned 
numbers, whether there was or was not an IMPP, but it never got close to the deeper 
question of why this movement against a 'counter-party' should have effected so 
many Mongolians. The main function of his apology therefore was to ensure that the 
specific power structures he had worked on behalf of were not affected or damaged 
by the ill advised policy that had been implemented in IMAR since 1967 and the 
Centre's main interventions. His apology was structured to maintain the very forces 
and ideas for which, ostensibly, he was apologising. His reward was to be taken 
from IMAR at the end of 1969, to undergo a process of re-education in Tangshan, 
Hebei, and be posted to Jinan, northeast China from 1975 to 1980 as Deputy 
Military Commander. By 1980 however his position was untenable (due to the trials 
of others, particularly the Gang of Four implicated in the CR) and he retired. He was 
501 Doc 51,26h July, 5. 
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never fonnally held accountable for what had occurred in IMAR during his tenure 
there, and was spared a trial due to his impeccable credentials before 1967, and 
protection from the Centre. 
5.12 The Use of Teng's Apology 
Teng's apology had symbolic power and value, and could be used in the campaign. 
His participation in his own criticism was also of great symbolic importance. On the 
17th July, one of the key organisations before whom Teng had already performed 
examinations, the Railway Bureau, produced a joint issue of the 'Great Criticism 
Battle Report' and 'Workers Information' entitled '50 Problems - in Response to 
Comrade Teng Haiqing's Examination of the 24th June. ' This was with the Hohhot 
Workers Union. 502 
The opening section of this ten page document made clear that however thoroughly 
Teng - may have been fulfilling his duty to offer examinations, there was 
dissatisfaction with what he had said and the manner he had said it. This specific 
document was the result of an examination carried out at 4: 00 PM on the 24h June (a 
day after the second of the two examinations analysed above). This had been before 
University and school students (they are described as 'school masses' - xuexiao 
qunzhong). It is recognised that Teng had been performing such criticisms fýr over a 
month, as a result of the interventions of the Centre after the Ninth Party Congress. 
But he had needed to do this so often because he 'ignored (wushi) the instructions of 
our Great Leader Chairman Mao about IMAR's problem, he did not see the many 
criticisms the leaders from the Centre had issued of his mistakes, he did not see the 
serious criticisms the revolutionary masses of IMAR had made of his mistakes. ' 503 
In the end, the authors of this document stated, the key problem for Teng was 'his 
attitude (taidu) towards Chairman Mao, towards the Centre, and towards the 
revolutionary masses. ' This was at the heart of the mistakes he had made, and 
continued to make in failing to undertake correct examinations. The authors had 
faith that the process of criticism would be successful. Teng was no longer the issuer 
502 Doc 56. 
503 Ibid 1. 
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of commands, and demands for enactment, but the subject of patient processes of 
correction upon which he was being operated - Foucauldian. regimes of correction: 
'Teng can certainly be educated, certainly his soul can be touched, he is able to do a 
full examination. ' But until this point the audience had been' disappointed. ' 
In this document, criteria were set out for what might constitute a successful 
examination. The Centre had already presented these in asking for an 'honest, 
sincere and reformed attitude' (laoshi... gaihao de taidu). The critical issue was 
again one of 'manner, ' the way in which Teng expressed his mental attitude through 
the performance in public of the examination, and the way in which this was 
interpreted and read. At the heart of this was the notion of 'sincerity, ' of him 
adequately meaning what he said and the audience recognizing it. Teng had, 
according to this document, failed to do this. 
The means by which Teng was assisted towards proper examination, and the 
corrections it would bring about, was through questions. The function of questions 
in this document firstly revealed the lacunae in Teng's previous words through 
interrogation, through locating the spaces and gaps left in what he had already said. 
It is not clear from this document what its practical function was. As it referred to a 
previous examination Teng had undertaken, rather than one being prepared, it was 
not specifically made as material to be used against Teng at a future examination. 
Nor was it clear how Teng was supposed to have replied to these questions. The 
final sentence however, does infer that Teng was meant to respond or react to the 
questions in some way: 'Comrade Teng must soon issue an honest, heartfelt, and 
conscientious answer. 504 As in material analysed in previous chapters, the function 
of the questions was sometimes not to elicit answers, but to expose, denounce, be 
noted. The document can be seen as part of an ongoing process, a movement of 
interrogation, declaring and propagating the new forms of knowledge that had been 
created since the the Ninth Congress. 
This was reflected in the various ways the questions were framed, and in the 
categories into which they were placed. While the opening introductory section of 
504 lbid 10 
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the document set the context, and was in the third person, referring merely to Teng, 
the questions were all issued to 'you' [Teng] and, where issuers were mentioned, 
indicated as coming from 'us' or 'we' (women). Some of the questions were framed 
with courtesy - 'please answer' (qing huida). But others were issued as 'imperatives' 
- you 'must answer' (bixu huida). A ftirther category was the simple 'do you or 
don't you' (shi bu shi) either/or dichotomy. And the least used formulation - to 
'beg' (qiu) Teng to reply, with its shades (possibly sardonic) of submissiveness. 
What expectations did the framers of these questions have about the answers they 
were likely to hear? Questions for instance of simple fact, such as those asking how 
many died or were wounded in the 'Party rectification' campaign could, 
theoretically, have a simple numerical reply (however difficult it was to assess this, 
or unlikely Teng was to admit to a figure). But the question about 'what in fact are 
your feelings to Chairman Mao' touched the rawest of nerves, and were issued as a 
denunciation in the form of a question. Any likely response was necessarily 
complicated, and needed to be carefully framed. 
The categories -into which the questions were placed were also indicative. These 
were: 
1. Attitude towards Chairman Mao, and towards the proletarian headquarters. 
2. Concerning the IMPP problem. 
3. Concerning the problem of Gao Jinming. 
4. Concerning the Fourth Plenary Session of the IMAR CRC. 
5. Concerning other comrades. 
6. Concerning the handling of the revolutionary rebellious factions. 
7. On 'unity' and 'democracy. ' 
The issue of the Centre and obeisance to its symbolic power was placed at the front. 
Teng's key crime was to 'oppose' (duikang) these various representations of the 
hegemony of the Centre: Chairman Mao, the proletarian workers headquarters, the 
revolutionary path of Chairman Mao. '505 For this crime, Teng 'must admit 
culpability. ' A manifestation of this was his distortion of the Centre's language, his 
505 Ibid 1. 
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failure to disseminate instructions Properly, or to do so selectively. 506 As with 
Ulanfu, Teng's words were deployed against him, cited as indicating 'his attitude 
towards the Centre. ' 507 His words were brought against Mao's and the Centre's, 
offered as samples of a now discredited and outlawed counter-discourse. 508 This 
tension was distilled in the formulation: 'We want to ask, does the word of the 
Centre and of Chairman Mao count, or does your word countT The concept of 
I count' (suan) is difficult to translate well outside the context of PRC political 
culture. It is close to the idea of what someone says going, who has authority and 
whose capital is recognised within a system. A question towards Teng in this context 
was motivated by exposing his own ambition: 'Does the Centre and Chairman Mao 
lead you, or you lead the Centre? '509 The value of Teng's authority was no longer 
recognised; his capital was exhausted. 
The issue of the meaning of the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the IMAR CRC only 
served to highlight that part of the objective of these questions was to promote the 
new narrative, one in which Gao Jinming was no longer a villain or a counter- 
revolutionary, but had been 'rectified, ' and in which the Fourth Plenary was the 
ultimate expression of Teng's errors and ambition. The questions were based on an 
understanding of the 'real situation. ' Teng had failed to disseminate the Centre's 
narrative of criticising the February Counter-Current of 1968, and implementing the 
510 newly open criticism of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. In the newly promoted 
history, previously discredited figures like Gao Jinming and those around him were 
now returned to public discourse as acceptable. 
As though to compound the radical reversal in Teng's function in this new narrative, 
the authors of the document referred approvingly to Teng's admission of 'supporting 
some groups and suppressing others' (zhi yi pal, ya yi pai): 511 'This is some 
progress. ' What was expected from Teng was 'honesty, sincerity, ' according to the 
criterion in the new narrative. His 'attitude' or 'bearing' was no longer that of issuer 
506 Ibid 2. 
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or commander, but object of criticism and correction -a new model of wrongness 
and how to rectify it. Both in the act of being able to question, and the kinds of 
questions asked, this document was evidence of the new power dynamics in IMAR. 
Such questions indicated the power to interrogate and question (and therefore doubt 
and denounce) those who were previously unavailable for treatment like this. 
5.13 Teng's Final Words 
In their section dealing with the 'Problem of Other Comrades' the authors of the '50 
Questions' for Teng had asked why Teng had stayed so close to certain other local 
leaders like Wu Tao, and why he had issued documents collectively, in his and their 
name, even while it was clear he was working against them, and allowing them to be 
publicly accused of being criminals and 'issuers of poison. ' 512 
As an individual, Teng may have had some strategy behind the apologies and 
admissions of guilt he was performing, beyond the commands from the Centre and 
local pressure. In this case, possibly it was to stay close to these other leaders in 
order to share blame, and for a measure of protection. Part of the new tone that 
Teng had to adopt can be seen in a letter issued on the 31" October 1969, with Wu 
Tao, to Gao Jinming: 
'Jingming... Please could you tell the proletarian revolutionary faction 
comrades of Hohhot that, under the heroic leadership of the proletarian 
headquarters by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin, the CR in IMAR 
has achieved great success, although in the recent brief period a few 
shortfalls and mistakes have occurred on the practical work front. But the 
main current is good. The responsibility for this is ours, we can't blame all of 
this on the comrades.... The criticism of us by comrades [shows] great love 
and help. We are grateful from our hearts. We have heard that "big character 
posters" are being stuck along the streets in Hohhot. We hope that comrades 
will not do this, because in this way it can be used by class enemies. [Ifl you 
have opinions about us, you can write "big character posters" and send them 
to the IMAR CRC Office. Comrades, please don't worry (fanxin). If we have 
[committed] mistakes, then we will be able to correct them. Let every one 
unite, and fight against the common enemy. ' 513 
512 Ibid 7. 
513 Doc 59. 
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There were signifiers of respect, even for issuing of 'requests' or orders in this letter: 
'Please could you tell ... We hope... Please don't worry. ' The tone Teng and Wu 
used was a submissive one. These were not demands, but requests, to be accepted or 
rejected. They had minimal prescriptive force. This was compounded by the 
absolute acceptance of the 'love and help' of the comrades and their criticisms. The 
only negotiation was to look towards 'common enemies' to whom 'we' should give 
no advantages. Here Teng and Wu's tone searched for a commonality with those 
they were addressing, some grounds on which to base 'unity, ' marked in the last 
sentence. Teng no longer issued 'notices, ' 'instructions, ' but a 'letter, ' to another 
comrade. ' Teng and Wu Tao, in this document, had become 'two comrades, ' 
addressing another 'comrade, ' ostensibly in an atmosphere of parity. 
Teng's capital in IMAR was almost exhausted. Whatever purpose it had served 
sending him to the region had evidently not worked. After the partitioning of IMAR, 
and its reduction in size in July 1969, the PLA 65h Corps from the Beijing Military 
Region was sent to assume control of what was left of the region on 19 th December. 
From this date, Lieutenant General Zheng Weishan, based in Hohhot, was in control 
of the military and civilian government of the region. Teng and the previous leaders 
(including Wu Tao and Gao Bruning) were sent to Hebei. Teng's involvement with 
IMAR was over. 
5.14 The Dominant Register: Submissiveness 
As it proceded the CR created its own narrative. Power interests and objectives in 
the CR changed. There was a dialectic between the policies and discourse of 
management from the Centre, and the implementation of these and how events 
unfolded in IMAR. The key factor was the various strategies used from 1967 to 
'handle' the situation in IMAR according to the Centre's objectives, and within the 
parametres of its ideology. April 1969 was a landmark in signalling a paradigm 
change in which a previous strategy of management was abandoned and new one 
sanctioned and supplemented. 
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In terms of discourse this is signified by the fact that the dominant register of 
documents from May 1967 to April 1969, was one of prescription, command, and 
denunciation. In this language, power was clearly marked. After 1969, there was 
space for apologies, admissions of mistakes and guilt, but only through the mediated 
voice of Teng. There was space for the voices of those who had been silent hitherto 
- marked as enemies and criminals. 
The tone of submissiveness also extended into the voices of those ostensibly being 
aided by the 'Party rectification' campaign. Gao Bruning, at a meeting on the 12 th 
June 1969 before 'seven leagues and two cities, ' speaking still as a formal position- 
holder on the IMAR CRC, concluded his words with the hope that the delegates 'can 
forgive us, and help us. ' 'If you agree with this idea [of organising further meetings 
to discuss the mistakes that had been committed] we will arrange it, setting a 
specific time. ' 514 Wu Tao said to a Zhemeng League delegation on 30'h June, 1969: 
'Firstly, to the wounded, to those in their families, we offer comfort... To those 
wounded, we express our apologies. We accept the criticism and education from our 
comrades. '5 15 Wu Tao demonstrated the closeness of the wounded, of those who 
had been harmed, to the speakers: 'The wounded are our own brothers and sisters. 
They are our mothers and fathers, and our daughters and sons. ' 516 This signified a 
closing of the distance between those speaking in positions of power and those 
people they were addressing by the use of a more 'intimate' register. 
At the heart of this however was the same promotion of a notion of commonality 
and common interests, with a unified language and symbols to convey this, as had 
ostensibly been behind the attack on Ulanfu and the IMPP. An attack on Teng from 
the 29h May combined these well when, after the initial declaration of the goodness 
of the situation of the CR in IMAR, and the victory of the spirit of the Ninth 
Congress, the authors adopted the collective language of deference and submission 
to the Centre: 'Let us together wish our dearest dearest great leader Chairman Mao a 
514 Doc 49,28h June 1969,7. 
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long and healthy life, a long and healthy life... Let us cry together: Long life to 
Chairman Mao! A long, long life to Chairman Mao! 517 
A key objective of the CR from the issuing of the '24 Character Directive' had been 
to 'create unity' Quanjie yizhi). The process of correction was aimed at supporting 
this policy. Unity could be found by appealing to the grand symbols of Mao, and the 
Centre. But it had to be rooted in addressing the common grievances of the 
audience, and in offering them appeasement. One of the central objectives of this 
part of the campaign, therefore, was to reassert, and reconvey, a concept of unity 
through a common language, a unity which the previous stages of the CR in IMAR 
had also been aimed at supporting, but which had evidently failed. The trick for the 
new stage of the CR was to re-assert the importance of the same unity, in unified 
language, even though in fact this differed from what had been promoted previously. 
5.15 Conclusion: Saying Sorry and Staying in Power 
In this final stage of the CR campaign in IMAR, the language used indicated a 
dramatic shift from the exercise of power through categorical statement and 
prescription to the strategic use of submissiveness, admissions of guilt and mistakes. 
In this new context, there was a new market of forces, new values and priorities, 
with the symbolic capital and credibility of certain figures like Teng re-evaluated, 
and their rights to use certain kinds of language removed. This was paralleled by the 
creation of a further, new raft of organisations and institutions, parasitical in their 
turn on those created earlier in the CR, but now working in the new narrative to 
attack Teng. 
This new stage of the CR discourse reveals one thing: that while there could be 
flexibility about certain figures and their values, the primary areas maintained their 
value. In the new discourse, the symbolic capital of Mao, and the Centre, was not up 
for negotiation, and remained the dominant currency. The most sensitive areas (of 
ethnicity and nationality) were left untouched in this discourse. A new narrative 
accommodating Mongolian grievances was structured in such a way that while there 
517 Doc 49,1. 
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were open admissions of Mongolian casualties, this was not imputed to the Centre's 
policies asserting the hegemony of class over national minorities. 
Underlying Teng's apology was the importance of maintaining this credibility of the 
Centre. His performance was more in the nature of a sacrifice, on behalf of the larger 
powers who he served. The voice of one of these, Kang Sheng, when he met with 
the IMAR group during the Ninth Party Congress on 7th April made this clear: 'I 
have not seen you for two years-I am not clear about the situation in IMAR. ' But 
the Centre had one proclamation to make through Kang: 
'The class struggle and "Party rectification" in IMAR has been successful, 
it's the main current, and is good. But we need to understand, Chairman Mao 
has taught us, never to forget class struggle. We need to do class struggle 
properly, we need to grasp policy. Policy is the fate of the Party. If we don't 
grasp policy, we can't do things thoroughly, things become chaotic. The 
majority of Mongolians in IMAR are good. Spies, Mongolian traitors, the 
landlords, rich, counter-revolutionaries and bad are the minority... You need 
to have faith that the majority of Mongolian cadres are good, or relatively 
good. You don't need to say every time a Mongolian cadre makes a mistake 
it means they are IMPP... That's impossible, impossible. '5 18 
In the end, this was a sentence upon Teng, the indication of removal of support. The 
Centre was now the supporter of moderation, fairness to all national minority 
groups. And Tcng, from being the chief prosecutor, had become a new type of 
enemy. 
5 18 Doc 51,29fl' July 1969,5. 
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Conclusion 
Michel Foucault stated that power was something performed rather than achieved: 
'I am not referring to power with a capital P, dominating and imposing its 
rationality upon the totality of the social body. In fact, there are power 
relations, they are multiple. They have different forms. 519 
Foucault's conceptualisation of power captures two things: that power is a force 
rather than an entity, which emanates from disparate centres, and that it is 
negotiated. Analytically, his framing of the keyword power also brings to the fore 
the need to Plot the ways in which power is visible, and how it can be located and 
described. 
Discourse is both the signifier and the carrier of power - discourse understood in 
this thesis not just as the language in documents recording speech and written 
communication of individuals and groups, but the institutional, organisational and 
social context in which language is created, deployed, enacted, and structured. Such 
a framework acknowledges that discourse is activity - that language and the 
utterance of language is action, and one of the main means to promote, negotiate and 
signify relations of power. 
The enviromnent of the CR was a highly politicised one - and one in which the issue 
of power was central. But as Foucault noted, such power, while initially seeming 
highly centralised and stratified, was in fact dispersed. There was a constant process 
of bodies, groups, and individuals competing for power, power delivered through 
control of vocabulary, ideology and narratives. The process of the CR saw various 
authority paradigms - powers rather than Power, as Foucault said - manifested and 
signified in variant ways. Bourdieu's metaphor of the market has been a useful way 
to tease out this phenomenon of competing power forms and languages, and the 
processes of legitimisation they underwent to gain social acceptance. The 
establishment of institutional structures, organisations and their associated 
discourses also impacts on the creation of forms of knowledge, and how these relate 
519 Quotcd in Mills 2003,35. 
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to power. The CR saw the legitimisation of certain ways of knowing, sanctioned 
revolutionary experiences, and narratives, providing the grand frameworks within 
which things were meaningful and 'known. ' 
Analysis of discourse has occurred through looking at the cultural superstructure and 
the material manifestations of this. I have looked at ideology, the processes by which 
an ideology gains dominance. How it is manifested and carried through certain 
legitimised language structures and how they deliver hegemony - the promotion and 
acceptance, in Grarnsci's terms, of consensus and audience buy-in. 
The power situation in IMAR distilled these general themes. It involved the 
negotiations for influence in the region between a political power centre in Beijing, 
itself undergoing transformation and change, and local parties. In terms of the CR in 
IMAR's own narrative, the main issue from 1967 to 1969 was the management of 
the conflict between the Centre's assertion of the hegemony of the ideology of class, 
and the framing of a counter-ideology in the region based on the hegemony of 
nationality/ethnicity. This created the parameters within which the CR in IMAR 
moved. Power based on class was promoted in the Centre's discourse as bringing 
unity and strength. Power based on ethnicity/nationality was excluded on the 
grounds that it was divisive. Accompanying this was the parallel process of asserting 
a narrative which followed the national template, of IMAR's being liberated in 1949 
from a history in which exploitation based on class had existed, in opposition to 
what was framed as a local counter-narrative based on nationality and splittism. 
There was also a process of trying to make ideologies or narratives contrary to these 
dominant ones unsayable, or socially so dangerous or taboo to say that they could 
only be hinted at indirectly. The fact, for instance, that the very issue of the conflict 
between class and nationality/ethnicity was only articulated indirectly in the key 
'13th April Decision, ' then more fully articulated in the attack on Ulanfa, but largely 
dropped from sight in the language used by Teng Haiqing, signified a process of 
management by exclusion. 
Material control of these areas of ideology and narrative delivered several key areas: 
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1) Throughout the CR in IMAR, there was a process of attempts to control 
the discourse through conveying specific meanings to keywords like 
'liberation', 'justice', 'right', 'people. ' Moral vocabularies of 'right' and 
I wrong', and good and bad actions were contested and negotiated. A 
nomenclature of class, localized and grounded in acceptance of the 
Centre's ideology delivered control of the description and labelling of 
participants, and thus framed their identity. The articulation of an enemy, 
and the creation of knowledge of that enemy through the attack on 
Ulanfu and then the IMPP assisted in a programm of exclusion and 
dominance. 
2) There was contestation over the symbolic capital of particular figures, 
and the authority they were seen as conveying - specifically the immense 
capital of Mao and what he symbolized (the legitimate and legitimising 
source of power). Ulanfu, and other local figures, were ranged against 
this and set up in competition to them. Mao's power was signified in the 
discourse by the use of specific centrally sanctioned descriptions, slogans 
and set phrases. 
3) There was clearly signified rights to use c&rtain discourses (and at the 
same time be empowered by these discourses) while in power, and the 
withdrawal of this after falling from power. The career of Teng Haiqing 
illustrates this. When 'in power, ' and authorized, he was able to use 
prescriptive language, signifying his speaking on behalf of the Centre. In 
the period after his fall from power his language was dominated by 
apologies, self-criticisms, and the highly political use of 'sorry' to 
negotiate both with the Centre, and the audience. He had lost his right to 
speak prescriptively. 
4) The role of the symbolic capital of organizations and their material 
ability to produce documents, recruit people, gain status, and have the 
right to issue 'authority' language, and give authority to the people 
speaking to and in them. 
The impact of the ideological and narrative superstructure from the Centre, and its 
being a means of conveying and promoting forms of power through specific 
empowering discourses in IMAR has been tracked during the key phases through 
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looking at the elements set out above in the detail of the documents. Power was a 
process involving the pursuit of variant objectives by different and evolving 
organizations and groups in these documents, the progress of which created its own 
internal narrative. There was initially a dominant discourse of the CR from the 
Centre, based on the political priorities there - national unity around an ideology of 
I correct' Marxism-Leninism against the reactionary 'rightists' who were viewed as 
the enemies betraying the true course of the revolution. But this discourse, with its 
slogans from the Centre, its organizational support, the narrative of history it 
promoted, and the figures it sought authorization and legitimacy from, was adapted 
to IMAR. The first stage of this adaptation in 1967 culminated in the '13 th April 
Decision, ' a case of the Centre's discourse setting out a strategy of hegemony by 
I managing' or 'handling' the problems in IMAR through definition of them, and the 
assertion of a new top leadership structure for the locality. 
The second 'implementation' phase of this 'management' discourse manifested itself 
in the attack on the previous leader of the region, Ulanfu, and the destruction of his 
symbolic capital by locating him within a counter-discourse and counter-narrative - 
based on the hegemony of the ideology of national minority status over class. This 
process was accompanied by the setting up of a raft of new organizations, and a new 
authority' language in the region. This was a destructive phase, in which the 
priority was largely to attack the signifiers of power, both ideological and symbolic, 
of what was described as the 'old' order and power structure. 
The third phase of the development of the discourse can be found in the public, 
language of Teng Haiqing, and the viewing of this as the carrier of the new 
I authority' language. Teng's response to the 'management' of IMAR was simply to 
deal with the most contentious issue - nationality versus class - by the pure 
assertion of the latter and the exclusion of the former, framing issues only within 
ways directly sanctioned by the Centre. But the gradual articulation of a whole 
I counter-organisation' in IMAR, the IMPP, which Teng started to talk of in late 
1967 onwards shows the sort of pressures he was under in using a discourse that 
sought to impose hegemony, rather than negotiate it. Framing the IMPP in terms 
purely from the Centre led to dislocation. The proclaimation of unity, and'the 
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irrelevancy of national minority issues, actually co-existed with a movement in 
which a huge number of Mongolians were persecuted and killed. 
The final phase shows Tcng Haiqing's removal from a position in which he was able 
to issue authoritative utterances. His register moved from prescription to the highly 
political use of apologies to negotiate both on behalf of the Centre in IMAR, and 
with them for his survival and future. 
In each phase of this process, there was a dialectic between the paradigm supplied 
by the Centre, through ideological and narrative superstructure, and the signifiers of 
this, and the impact of and reaction to this locally. This caused a change in each of 
the phases and the materials looked at. Throughout this process, the key issue was 
how palatable the 'compromise' negotiated discourse was to either side. There was a 
two-way process in which participants in the local CR signified closeness and 
sanction from the Centre in various ways, and the Centre sought to impose 
hegemony on a situation which received local support. 
In each of these stages, certain forms of knowledge were sanctioned. Foucault 
argued that power and knowledge were intimately connected - that institutions, 
power centres, organisations pursued claims to power through establishing 
discourses that permitted some forms of knowing while suppressing or excluding 
others. Throughout the CR in IMAR, even in a local context, there was a steady 
readjustment of the terms within which the campaign unfolded. What was 
considered knowledge at one stage was superseded at the next by new claims to 
truth, within new narratives and ideological paradigms. This process of control of 
the terms of knowledge lay at the heart of how power was acquired and directed in 
the CR and it can be plotted through the signifiers found in discourse, with the 
environment in which this were implemented and located. 
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Appendix One: Key Central and Provincial Meetings, Establishment of 
Organisations and Publications Concerning 
Anti-IMPP Campaign during CR in IMAR - 1966-69 
Key 
Ifalicised ývpe - Documents 
OrdinaryType - Meetings 
Under. lined Typ - Establishment of organisations 
Meetings at the Centre Centre Meetings with IMAR IMAR Provincial Level 
Meetings 
1966 (All in Beijing unless otherwise 
stated) 
4'h - 18"' May May - 25"' July (Formal mectings held 21" 
Enlarged meeting of the politburo of the 
- from 7 th June to 2h jql3j 
Central Committee of the CCP - Issued Qiamnen I lotel meeting, BeiJing- attended 
16'h Ma 
,v 
Circular selling zip the CR bv Partv leaders from the Centre and IMAR 
Group personnel 
( IssuinjiZ of Restricted Report 'On I lanfit's 
Problems, 'accusing Ulanjit (ý'. vplilfism) 
I" June 
People's Dail 
, i, published 
'Siveep Out 4"' June 
Cow Ghosts and Snake Spirits' Cadres ofcolleges and schools hold 
meetings in I lolihot to 'arouse masses' for 
CR. 
I 91h -21s' Jul, 41h Atuust 
Meeting of'Regional party Secretaries -i oflMAR I)artý 
ScItim, uL 
and Members ol'CR Group Committee CR Group 
24" Julý, 5"' Atq,, ust 
Enlarged meeting ofthe CR Group Hircc day criticism meeting held 
-it IM Univcrsit) 
I s' - 12'h August 
Eleventh Nenuin ofthe Fighth Central 
Committee CCII 
5 th September 19111 August 22" Vu. Lust- 
_2-V A State Council issued notice on groups August-27"' August. 
coming to Bei. iing - start ol-big alliance' Series ofrallics held llý IMAR 
Ilan) 
27th August 
Creation ofRebelliou-, FacOons, ýIs 
I-c-sult-01,111c Inectings above (i 
'Frsi'and 
_ _ ýý No%cinhcr 
IMAR Varlý Committee holds 
cadre meeting. 
1967 
4" -5 th January 
Setting tip ofShanghai People's 
Commune 
23 d FebruarN 
February Counter-Current. Central 
decision on support ofarmy of CR 
Group. 
March-April 16"' Feb 13"' April 18 11111c 
Central Work Con 11crence Final dejeat Series oftnectings in liciJing bemeen Ncullig 111) of CR SEII]ding 
21'Deng Xiaolnng and Lut Shaoqi central leaders and INIAR parties. Committee N, 111all 
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13 th April 
Central Paqv Decision on How to Handle 
tile Problem of Libli? 
I,, Jul 
Prejwratotýv Commillee issue 
'Ilow to imidement 13'h,, Im-i1 
Decision. 
2 nd j ujý, 
Militarv District discuss IMAR 
Aug 17 th AL19LISI 
Meeting of the Central CR Group Preparatory Committee convenes 
district meeting to discuss '13 (h 
V' A. April Decision. ' 
Meeting of the Central and Regional 
Militarv leaders 
2 91h August 
LA/ DailY Imblished ol)en altach 
on Ulaillit 
Septenihcr/October 
Setting tip ofl. ocal Revolutionarv 
Committees (I lohho 
RevolutionarN Committee set u 
on 18 October) 
Ist Noveinbcr 
Setting tip of[MAR CRC 
3 rd -5 Ih November 
First mccting oflMAR CRC. 
Issued 'Concerning tile 
Resolution oj'the! ýitualion o/ tile 
CR in 1,11. -IR. 
9th - 12 Ih November 
Jiang Qing - Speeches on art and 
culture broadcast nationally. This set off' 
the 'dig and cleanse' campaign. 
1968 
Second Meeting oflMAR CRC. 
Teng I Iaiqi igattacked I Jlanfu. 
23rd Jan 
Small group to deal with IMAR 
Vroblem established tinder Li 
Shude. 
4"' Februarv 13th Feb 
Teng I laiLling and Li Shude report in Founding oflMAR Revolutionarv 
Bei. jing to the CR Small Group. Conimittce Nucleus (; roqp. 
011 February 
Committee meeting of leaders oflMAR 
CRC openly acknmNledgcd the IMIT 
roblem. 
18'' Mav 
Series 4 mectings throughout IMAR LengthN speech hý I cng, to mark 
spreading the 'Dig and cleanse'carnpaign first mink crsarý ofpuhlication of' 
'13"' April Decision, ' 
-5 ='I,, I 
Third Plcnaiý ofIMAR CRC. 
IMIT conics to 1,01-clront. 
30111 Ntqý4'' Sej)t 
Standing Committee of' IMINR 
Rc%olulionarý (Iroupcomenc(l. 
IkCiSiOn 10 OrgMIISC Study 
_ _Mao/c(_I(_)q 
I hoiQuSchool 
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Meeting of 12'h Plenum of8 Ih Congress 
in BeiJing. Teng and WuTao attend. 
(Liu Shaoqi expelled from Party) 
3d- 19"' Nov 
Fourth Plenary Session ol'IMAR 
CRC. 
11"' Nov 
IMAR Ccritral Military District 
convcncd meeting 
1969 
Feb 
Meeting in Bei 
, 
jing between Teng I laicling 
and provinces of IMAR on 'HoNN to I landle 
IMPP., 
1 24" Anril 
_Ninth 
Congress of CCP Beijing 
2 81h Apr 13 th _I 9th May 
First Plenum of 9th CCP Central Central meeting on IMAR attended bý 
Committee IMAR CRC and IMAR Military District 
leaders. lssued. Volice on IV", Akj I, on 
'Reclib-ing Mistakes and AoroughlY 
Implementing IMARs Cio-rew Work' 
22"' Afa 
Cenlre issues 'Notice'on /Atll?. 
5.1uIv 
IMAR split after central decision 
Sources: Lieberthal 1976, Tumen and Zhu 1995, Woody 1993, Neintenggii da shyi 1997. Wang Fcng (cd) 1998, 
and DangdaiNeimenggiiiianshi. ' 
268 
Appendix Two: The Speech-Occasions of Teng Haiqing (See ChapterThrec) 
When Given Genre Where - to which Audience Type of Approx 
(with Doc no in Recording Page 
Bibliography) (if Indicated) Length 
1967 Speech To leaders of' revolutionary Draft xNritten 8 pages 
5 th July (flanghtia) rebellion elements in schools and summary 
(Doc 14) colleges from the Holihot Third (jilu-, iýao) 
Headquarters. 
I" August Discussion To representatives of Hailar Pr&is I page 
(in Doc 2 Issue (tanhua) Revolutionary Rebellion Group. (: haijao) 
99) 
9'h November Speech To a mass meeting (dahui) of Verbatim 8 pages 
(in Doc 64) organisation working personnel in record 
the IMAR committee. 
24 th November* Speech To representatives of' the Corrected 4 pages 
(in Doc 2, Issue Zhemeng Conference. record (jilu 
37) zhengli) 
1968 Speech To representatives of Ilohhot 2 versions: 4 
20"' February* Study Conference and Holihot pr&is and pages/16 
(in Doc 2, Issue Railway Bureau Study full Speech pages 
78 and Doc 3 1) Conference. 
2 nd 2 February Speech To IMAR artistic circles attending Important 5 pages 
(in Doc 2, Issue a Study Mao Zedong Thought speech 
82)* meeting. 
29th February* Speech To members of' the Yinieng Vel-ball-111--- 4page -s 
(in Doc 2, Issue Revolutionary Preparatory 
108) Committee. 
12"' March* Speech To small group of' leaders at file Not indicated 2 pages 
(in Doc 2, Issue IAI Daiýi,, and responsible people 
103) at tile Holihot Third I leadquarters. 
2 1h 5 March* Report 10 IMAR meeting of' Pr&is record 4 pages 
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(in Doc 2, Issue (baogao) representatives of study classes. (filu zhaiyao) 
111) 
27'h March* Report To members of cultural and Corrected 4 pages 
(in Doc 2, Issue artistic circles. according to 
112) recording 
(gen luyin 
zhengli) 
3 I't March* Letter (xin) To IMAR Nucleus Small Group. N/a I page 
(in Doc 2, Issue 
115) 
14'h April Discussion To committee members and From 2 pages 
(in Doc 2, Issue working personnel of the Hohhot combining 
131) Third Headquarters. summaries 
issued by IM 
University 
and Workers 
College 
20u'April* Opinion With Wu Tao, in Beijing, on the Conveyed via I page 
(in Doc 2, Issue (yyian) issue of 'cleansing and Li Liang by 
141) constructing the Party. ' phone 
29'h May+ Speech To Wumeng Revolutionary Prdcis record 2 pages 
(published that Standing Committee. 
day, but no date 
of delivery 
given, in Doc 3, 
Issue 3 1) 
30' May* Discussion To 'plucking out' stations. Prdcis record 3 pages 
(in Doc 2, Issue 
181) 
3" June* Speech To a meeting of whole region to Corrected 3 pages 
270 
(in Doc 2, Issue discuss setting up Mao Zedong record 
178) Thought Study Classes, and 'great 
criticism' experience. 
31 st May* Important On meeting Zhouzi County CRC Summary 4 pages 
(in Doc 2, Issue instructions Plenary Committee. record 
219) (zhongyao 
zhishi) 
9u'June* Important To Guyang Area Proletarian CR. 3 pages 
(published with instructions 
20) 
14'h June Speech To meeting on the current Corrected 16 pages 
(in Doc 65) situation of setting up study Mao record 
Zedong Thought classes in IMAR, 
and the great criticism movement. 
15t" June* Speech To responsible people in Wuda Summary 2 pages 
(in Doc 2, Issue summary Town, at Baotou, with three other 
232) CR leaders. 
28"' June* Important To IM University CR Group. 2 pages 
(in Doc 2, Issue instructions 
209) 
6u' July* Important At plenary session of IMAR I page 
(in Doc 2, Issue speech Nucleus Group Third Meeting. 
214) 
7"' July* Interjections To the representatives of 2 pages 
(in Doc 2, Issue (chahua) Zhemeng Group at the Third 
215) Plenary Meeting of the IMAR. 
12th July Report To the Third Plenary Meeting of Verbatim 28 pages 
(Doc 32) the IMAR CRC. 
170' July* Informal IMAR Standing Committee 2 pages 
(in Doc 2, Issue discussion leaders meeting in small group 
227) (zuotan) with representatives of 17 
advanced work units. 
30th October Opinion To a 'Party rectification' meeting. Transmitted 4 pages 
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(in Doc 34) via Li 
Dechen 
25"' November Speech To 'Construct China! Committee Corrected 10 pages 
(in Doc 36) Fourteenth Plenary Enlarged record 
Conference. 
I oth Speech To the Study Mao Zedong Verbatim - l3pages 
December++ Thought Propaganda Division two versions 
(in Doc 37) Class of Hohhot Workers. 
1969 Record of To IM Daily, and Third Corrected 4 pages 
3 I't January++ comments on Headquarters. record 
IMAR 
problems 
6'h January++ Opinion in a No address. 2 pages 
letter 
8'h January++ Instructions To Wumeng CR Committee in Draft 5 pages 
(in Doc 40) response to a report delivered summary 
verbally. 
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Appendix Three: Illustration of Material from 1967-1969 
Plate One: Example of stencilled pamphlet produced by local rebellious group: 
Lian gfiao laxian, Aa)ý gýZhoq Mingun de dajmexian (1he Great and Decisive Battle Between 
the Two Paths and the Two Fates) IM Teachers University 'East is Red' Battle Group, 
8-1 Division, Hohhot November 1966 (Doc 10). 
Plate Two: Internal reference materials containing the dialogues and foral '13' April 
Decision': Zhongrang Suanyu cbuli Neimengm wentijouguan wenjian he ýZbonzva)%fu. Ze long. -Ihi 
fiaigbua buibian (dijýi) (A Compilation of Relevant Central Documents and Speeches by 
Central Comrades in Charge Concerning the Handling of the IMAR Problem, Vol 
One) Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters, Hohhot 30'h May 1967 
(Doc 11). 
Plate Three: Official documents produced on red-letter headed paper by the IMAR 
CRC Preparatory Small Group, containing the 'Decision on Resolutely Implementing 
the Central Party, State Council, Central Military Commission CRC Small Group 
Decision on 6'hjune [1967]. ' 
Plate Four: Sample of materials produced by liaison group in Hohhot during anti- 
Ulanfu campaign: Wenge #Aao (CR Materials) Nos 17. Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion 
Liaison Head Office Criticize and Struggle Against Ulanfu Liaison Station, Hohhot, 
September 1967 (Doc 21). 
Plate Five: Sample of news-sheet produced by rebellious group affiliated to university 
in Hohhot: Do)ýg faýg bong (East is Red) IM Teachers University Revolutionary 
Committee Revolutionary Education Office, Hohhot, 5th December 1967 (Doc 29). 
Plate Six: Sample of Hongqi neican (Red Flag Internal Reference Material) produced by 
IMAR Party Committee Red Flag Alliance Headquarters on Ch June 1967, containing 
speeches by Teng Haiqing in a meeting with comrades from the IM Teachers College! 
(Doc 2). 
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Plate Seven: Sample of printed copy of speech by Teng Haiqing on 14 th June: Daban 
g dapipan, ba wo qu wa su doxZbeng tuwan ,g x7n 
Mao Zedong swang xuemban, benýZbua gemin 
jlgz, ( Set up Mao Zedong Thought Classes, Grasp the Revolutionary Great Criticism, * 
Push the Dig and Cleanse Struggle of Our Region to a New Level), no date but 
probably 1968. (Doc 69). 
, Uuan Zai 
huabeifiansbe ue#uanhui Plate Eight: Speech by Teng Haiqing: Teng Haiqiq silin 
ji shi 1ju d quanwei (kuoda) huývisbaý g de. Zhon&vaofiangbua (Commander Teng Haiqing's 
Important Speech at the 46' (Enlarged) Plenary Meeting of the North China 
Construction Commission) Construction and Work Department Eighth Section First 
Company Revolutionary Committee Office, Hohhot, 25h November 1968 (Doc 37). 
Plate Nine: News-sheet produced in latter part of campaign against IMPP: Zbengdou 
tong"n (Dictatorship Newsletter) Hohhot Masses Revolutionary Command Centre, 
January 1969 onwards (Doc 40). 
Plate Ten: Material from the attack on Teng Haiqing. Dapipan! Zhanbao (Great Criticism 
Battle Paper) Hohhot Workers Union et al, Hohhot, 1" February 1969 (Doc 39). 
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8. Mao Zedong sixiangguangbmithao caguan (Ihc Glory of Mao Zcdong Thought 
Shines on the Grasslands) IMAR Wulanqi Troupe, September 1966 
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University CR Office Materials Group, Hohhotý 12 th October 1966 
ýgfiao lu. 5dan, kangýbong mingun de dajuexian e Great and Decisive Battle 10. Lian (m 
Between the Two Paths and the Two Fates) IM Teachers University 'East is Red' 
Battle Group, 8-1 Division, Hohhot, November 1966 
1967 
11. Zbon 
, gan guan gg g _yu cbuli 
Neimensgu wenfi youguan wenjian be ýZhongvangfu e ton ýhifian hua 
huibian ( 2ý yýi) (A Compilation of Relevant Central Documents and Speeches by 
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Central Comrades in Charge Concerning the Handling of the IMAR Problem, Vol 
One) Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters, Hohhot, 30th May 
1967. 
11 a Zhon , gang, guanju cbuli 
Neimeý&u wend yom guan wenjian be. ZhonVangfwze foý gZhifian , gbua huibian (di eqýi) (A Compilation of Relevant Central Documents and Speeches by 
Central Comrades in Charge Concerning the Handling of the IMAR Problem, Vol 
Two) Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters, Hohhot, 30th May 
1967. 
12. Fennmsbengtao Wang Dmo ýZaiwmchanjiýi wenbua dagemiýg: Zbongfinfian-. Zuixing 
gndignantly Denounce Wang Duo's Towering Crimes During the Great 
Proletarian CR) Hohhot Revolutionary Alliance Headquarters, Hohhot, 29th June 
1967. 
13. Mao Zhuxi lun minýZm wenti (Chairman Mao's Ibeory on the Problem of Nationality) 
Hohhot Revolutionary Alliance Headquarters, Hohhot, 1" July 1967. 
14. Teiýg dai jilinguanZai Husanji daZbuan g. Zaofanbai. Zongbmfm. Zerrn xue. %i juanxiaogemiý 
gbua, (Commander Teng's Speech to People in Mao Zbu. %i Zbutuo bmýyi defian 
Responsible Positions at a Meeting of the Hohhot Third Headquarters Vocational 
Colleges and Schools Revolutionary Headquarters to Study Chairman Mao's Main 
Works), Hohhot Revolutionary Alliance Headquarters, Hohhot, 5th July 1967. 
15. Fandui Mao Zedoq si%iang, mixing mw&enbqbuji, be0an wucbanjkie Zbuanzbeng Ulanfu 
faqemiq xiuZbeqZb, ýyijulmn gaobian (Oppose Mao Zcdong lbought, Promote 
Splittism of Nationalities, Betray the Dictatorship of the Proletariat - Summary 
Selection of Ulanfu's Countcr-Rcvoludonary Revisionist Language) Hohhot 
Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters, Criticize and Struggle Against 
Ulanfu Counter-Revolutionary Alliance Section, Hohhot, July 1967. 
16. TengHaiqiýgtong. ZhijiýiianHailaergeming: Zaofanpaidaibiaotanbua! Zbaivao (Summary of 
Comrade Teng Haiqing's Talk on Meeting with Representatives of Hailaer 
Revolutionary Rcbcllion Group) Hohhot, 11 d' August 1967. 
17. Fangeming de #baishu (Confessions of a Counter-Revolutionary) Hohhot 
Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters, Hohhot, August 1967. 
18. Pi Wlu ýZbangu (Mobilize the Battle to Criticize Ulanfu) Third group, IM Teachers 
College 'East is Red' Battle Division, ' Hohhot, August 1967. 
19. Neixengu #ýZhiqugemiiýg weývuanhui choubei. ýdao: Zu wenjian gMAR Revolutionary 
Committee Preparatory Group Document), Hohhot, 1" August 1967. 
20. Dmi muýZhufiýji shi xiao: Zai, haishi baobu befatban? (To Eliminate Hcrdlords, or to 
Protect and Develop Them? ) Hohhot Revolutionary Alliance Headquarters, 
Hohhot , 28h September 1967. 
21. Wen 
, ge 
#Iiao (CR Materials) Nos 16,17,18,20. Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion 
Liaison Head Office Criticize and Struggle Against Ulanfu Liaison Station, 
Hohhot, September - October 1967. * 
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22. Zuigao ýZbisbi, ivenbma dageming (Highest Directives from the CR) IM University, 
Hohhot, October 1967. 
23. Wang DAýo defangemingxiu. Zbe)ýrgýZbuyýyanlun (Record of Wang Duo's Counter- 
Revolutionary Revisionism) IMAR Criticize and Struggle Against Ulanfu's And- 
Party Alliance Headquarters, Wang Duo Group, Hohhot, October 1967. 
24. Ulanfu diZbu. 2,, huan Vuan chousbi., dnbian (New Account of Nasty Goings-On in 
Ulanfii's Mansion) Hohhot Third Group of Red Guards, Hohhot, 1" November 
1967. 
25. Teq Haiqiq tongýZbifiýian Zhemeng daibiao defian gbma (Talk by Comrade Teng 
Haiqing on Seeing Representadves of Zhemeng) Zhemcng Army Division, 
Zhemeng, 56December 1967. 
g de wend; Rbi: Zqi: UtbiquSemhý T 26. Guanjujiaqiang wmcbaSiiýi zbu=Zhen - Wlu Tao ton 
iveývuanbui &jidsbang defianghua (Concerning the Problem of Strengthening the 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat; a Talk by Comrade Wu Tao at the First Plenary 
Meeting of the Autonomous Region Revolutionary Committee) N. p. 5th 
November 1967. 
27. Cbe&fensmifandongmin: Zutb. ýyidebaolei-Neimenggmirnmingemingdang(lboroughly 
Smash and Counter-Revolutionary Fortress of Nationalism - INIAR People's 
Revolutionary Party) IMAR Hafeia United Committee and IMAR Language 
Committee, Philosophy and Social Science Research Institute 'East is Red' 
Alliance, Hohhot, December 1967. 
,g "ýyi 
2 8. Neimen ggemin ggugeming weipanhuifu-Ze tongthi tai Zhemen g quncong 7thi dachen 
dahmishaq defianghua (Responsible Comrades in the IMAR Revolutionary 
Committee's talk at the Zhemeng Revolutionary Masses Organization Meeting) 
N. p. 250' December 1967. 
29. DonSfang bong (East is Red) IM Teachers University Revolutionary Committee 
Revolutionary Education Office, Hohhot, 5" December 1967. 
1968 
30. Xiang Neimengu #ýbiqugeming iveimanhui dieni quanwei (kuoda) bujYi de huibao (Report 
to the Second (Enlarged) Plenary Meeting of the IMAR Revolutionary Committee) 
N. p. 13'h January 1968. 
31. Te; ýgHaiqi)ýgiongZbi! ZaijiýianHusbixuedaibiaobuibeHusbi, 6elujuxwedaibiaobuide 
fiaqbua (Talk by Comrade Teng Haiqing on Seeing Representatives from the 
Hohhot Study Committee and Hohhot Railway Bureau study Committee) N. p. 21" 
February (1968? ). 
32. Ge)ý&aodejmqi Mao Zedong jixian ,g weida 
de bongqi, panmian Imosbi Mao ýZbuxixin ýZbisbi, 
benýZbuqjiSd douýZben& duoqm wucbanjiýi wenbua da geming de quanmian sbetý Sli- Teng 
Haiqing lonsýZbitai di san d quanwei (kuoda) buýyishang de baogao (Lift Higher the Great 
Red Flag of Mao Zcdong lbought, lboroughly Implement Chairman Nlao's 
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Newest Directives, Resolutely Grasp Class Struggle, Grasp Power for the Total 
Victory of the Great Proletarian CR - Comrade Teng Haiqing's Report at the Third 
(Enlarged) Plenary Meeting) IMAR Army District Support the Left Office, 
Hohhot, 12'h July 1968. 
, ghua 
huihao (Report of Talks by Comrades in Responsible Positions) 33. FmýZe tongýZbifiaj 
IMAR Committee and Military District The Ten Thousand Year Victory of Nfao 
Zedong Thought' Grand Scale Photo Exhibition Committee Office, Hohhot, 25h 
July 1968. 
r 
gtyo dej#ian - Li Decben toý bi i , gZ sb 
3 4. Teng Haiqhýý Wlutao toqýZbi dmi dangqian #zhiqu Son 
jme sanshi ri xiang thengiiandang buýyi ebuanda (Comrade Teng Haiqing and Wu Tao's 
Opinions About Current Work in the Autonomous Region - Broadcast by 
Comrade Id Dechen at the 'Party rectification' Meeting, 30th October) N. p. 30th 
October (1968? ). 
35. Hong shanfeq lei tong xmn (Red Mountain Wind and Thunder Notice) Chifeng 
District Workers Office, Chifeng, 25th November 1968. 
, Uman ! Zai 
huabei fianshe weipanhui di ji shi km d quanwei (kuoda) 36. Teng Haiqing silin 
, gaofiangbma 
(Commander Teng Haiqing's Important Speech at the hmývisbang de : Zbon 
46'h (Enlarged) Plenary Meeting of the North China Construction Commission) 
Construction and Work Department Eighth Section First Company Revolutionary 
Committee Office, Hohhot, 25th November 1968. 
37. Teng Haiqiq fong. Zbi ýZqi Hushigongirn Mao Zedong xuancbmandmi xuexiban defiaqbua 
(ComradeTeng Haiqing's Speech at the Study Group of the Hohhot Workers' 
Mao Zedong Propaganda Detachment) Hohhot Worker's Union, Hohhot 13 th 
December 1968. 
38. Hubebaotesbigeming weiyunahui &wud quanti ueýyuan (kuoda) hu#i (Fifth (Extended) 
Plenary Meeting of the Hohhot Revolutionary Standing Committee) N. p. 26 Ih 
December 1968. 
1969 
39. Dapipan ýZhanbao (Great Criticism Battle Paper) Hohhot Workers Union et al, 
Hohhot, january- March 1969. * 
40. Zbengdou longxun (Dictatorsbip Newsletter) Hohhot Masses Revolutionary 
Command Centre, January 1969 onwards. * 
gdaibui dierfie buoxme-bmgong Mao Zedoý ,g iixiang 
41. LeiDagmtongZhi: ZaiHmhehaolegoý 
S de ýongiie bao xianjinfid bejýifen# daibioahujyi shan mr , gao 
(Summary Report of Co adc 
Lei Daoyu at the Meeting of the Activists and Vanguard in the Second 'Vigorously 
Study and Use Mao Zedong lbought'in Hohhot Congress. ) N. p., Hohhot, 21" 
March 1969. 
42.1--i Dagu ton , g! Zbi ýZai 
Huhehaotegon 
, gdaibui 
dierfie bmo-xue-huo: yong Mao Zedoq sixiang 
-ýdanjinfifi hejýifen# daibiaohujyi shang de! zonsde baogao (Comrade Lei Daoyu's Concluding Report at the Second Session of the Meeting of the Hohhot Workers 
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Union Vanguard and Activists Reprcscntatives Wigorously Study and Usc Mao 
Zcdong lliought. ý N. p. 23d March 1969. 
43. ftaolongiianbao (rransport Report) N. p. 1" April 1969. 
44. Teq Haiqin& Wm Tao, Ij Sbudexanwei tongZbiri yue jiri de laixin (Letter of 4" April 
from Three Comrades, Teng Haiqing, Wu Tao and Li Shude) Hohhot Worker's 
Union, Hohhot, 7th April. Published with Quan Xingivan toqýZbi. Zaý yijiu fiujiu nian 
ji yue wu ri ý-Zi! Zbip dianbua bujyisban ,g 
defiangbua (Speech Made During a Telephone 
Conference by Comrade Quan Xingyuan on 5' April 1969). 
45. Gaeju Mao Zedoq sixiaq weida bongqi cbedipoan Teq Haiqing ', --nvo'cefibuitbýyi Zwdan 
befandong de 'dmo Zbong xin lun'#kao buibian' (Collected Materials on Lifting High 
the Great Red Flag of Mao Zedong Thought, Thoroughly Criticizing Teng 
Haiqing's 'Left' Opportunist Line and His 'Theory of Many Centresý Fifth 
Section of the Mao Zedong Thought Great School IMAR Organization 'Criticize 
Teng Alliance. ' Hohhot, May 1969. 
46. Quanqu ivuchanjiýigemzngai hegeýZmgemiý g rrnmin tuanjieqiIai, _yamZhe 
jiu da'ýZh#in de 
guanghui chuanxiang Zhengqu genda de shen Sli (Proletarian Revolutionaries and 
Revolutionary People of All Nationalities in the Whole Region Unite and Follow 
the Glorious Course Stipulated by the Ninth Congress to Attain Ever Greater 
Victories) N. p. Hohhot, 5h May 1969. 
47. Guanym rrnýZhen chuanda guicbefiudafingsbenfianjue luosbi Mao Zbuxige xiang wucbanjiýi 
Zheqce defige wend de tongthi (Notice of Several Issues Concerning the 
Conscientious Dissemination of the Spirit of the Ninth Coilgress and Firm 
Implementation of Chairman Mao's Proletarian Policies) Standing Revolutionary 
Committee of IMAR Region, Hohhot, 14'h May 1969. 
48. Neimenggu! ýr. Zhiqugeweihuifu! ZburenHuo Daeymlong! Zhidefiangbua (Deputy Ixader of 
the IMAR Committee Conuade Huo Daoyu's Speech)N. p. Hohhot, 27 th May 
1969. 
49. Cbedipoan Ten 
, gsbi. ZuoqinS 
luxianfianjue cbaqbing Masbi. ýdaosbantou (Iboroughly 
Criticize Mr Teng's Leftist Line, Resolutely Sweep Away Mr Ma's Mountain 
Stronghold) PSB Revolutionary Big Criticism Alliance Station, and the Hohhot 
Criticize Teng Alliance Station, Hohhot, 29 th May 1969. 
5 0. Neimetý&u weývuanbui bexin xiao. Zu cbenýyuan Teng Haiqhýý Wlm Tao, Gao jingmiq loqt1ji 
fiýiian Ximeq kanbe sbanSfan gtuan defianbua (Speech of the IMAR Revolutionary 
Committee Core Members, Comrades Tcng Haicling, Wu Tao and Gao jingming 
Seeing the United Ximcng Delegation) N. p. 31't May 1969. 
51.801 tongxun ( 801 News Report) The Construction Department 8 th Division First 
Company jinggangsbanAlliance. Hohhot, June/July 1969. * 
52. Uuyue sbiji H Teq Haiqhý to)ý , gýZbi ýZai 
huocbelou ! Zongbu ýZbaokaipi-Ten g dabuisbang de biaofi (Conuade Tcng Haicling's Ibcmc at the 'Criticise Tene Meeting convened 
by the 'Railway Locomotive [group] on the 14' June), stenciled fragment. N. p, n. d 
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53.5.22 tongxun (22 nd May Newsletter) IMAR Revolutionary Conunittee to 'Criticize 
Teng Haiqing'AUiance Headquarters, Hohhot, 2 ndjUly 1969. * 
54.5.22pishixiadagemengshiqingkuang(Situadon Update for Leagues and Cities 
FoUowing the Handing Down of the '22 nd May Noticeý, N. p., Hohhot, 7' July 
1969. 
55. Neimenggu weýymanbuifuze ton SýZbifi! ýian Zbemeng Aanbe sbaý&ý , gtuan 
(Leading 
Comrades of the IMAR Committee Receive the Zhemeng League joint 
Petitioners) Hohhot Workers Union, Hohhot, 7 Ih July 1969. 
56. Dapoan ýZbanbao, wu sbige went4 Teng Haiqiýrg tongzbi Aujue ersheii ii defiantha. (Great 
Criticism Battle Newspaper; Fifty Problems: Comrade Teng Haiqing's 
Investigation on the 24th June) Volume 44, No 1. Hohhot Tocomotive'Army 
United Headquarters, and Hohhot Workers Union, Hohhot, 17 th July 1969. * 
57. Xuexi #Aao (Study Materials) Construction Department 8 th Division First Company 
jiý&aýgsban Alliance, Hohhot, 26h July 1969. 
58. Guanyu muqian xin , gsbi 
be 'ýdn Neirrndaýg'wenfituo tanbua tbongdianfaxin. (Letter 
Concerning Discussion of the Current Situation of the Problem of the New 
'IMPP) N. p., 1969. 
59. Teiýg Haiqhýý Wlu Taogei Gao fingming tongtbi de laixin (Letter Given to Comrade 
Gao jingmeng from Comrades Teng Haiqing and Wu Tao). Hohhot, 31 
October 1969. 
60. Gmajyu xmqian *gshi he *ýXin Neirmdangwentituotanhui. ZhongdYanfqyan (Concerning 
Discussions on the Current Situation and the 'New IMPT: Focal Statement) N. p., 
1969. 
6 1. Xuexi Chen YonSgui, ýZbicbi Liu Ge piq: Teq Haz, ýqiý S dianfm Sbanxigeming weivuanbui de 
! Zbenxiang (Study Chen Yonggui, Support Liu Geping - the Real Story of Teng 
Haicling's Subversion of the Shanxi Revolutionary Committee). Hohhot Third 
Headquarters IMAR Forestry College (Red Flag) Red Guards. Hohhot, 1969 
62. Wuji ýZhanbao Nay Fourth Battle Paper). Hohhot I'hird Headquarters, Hohhot, 
1969. * 
63. Wucbanjiý# wenbua dagemingsbengli wansui (Long Live the Victory of the Great 
Proletarian CR) Chinese People's University, September 1969. 
Post 1970 and undated 
64. Hmsbigeming weibmifxZbuirn Fan Zbenwu toý , gzbi. Zqi qmansbi anquan sbeqcban 
bmivishang 
defiangbua, (Vice Director of the Hohhot Revolutionary Committee Comrade Fan 
Zhenwu's Talk at the Secure Production Meeting for the Whole Town). N. p., May 
1970. 
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65. Ulanfu beihua: ZbaiIu (Excerpts from Ulanfu's Black [Counter-Revolutionary] 
Language) Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters Struggle and 
Criticize Ulanfu Alliance, Hohhot, N. d. 
gZb. ý ýZjg nýZy gesida ! Z. nnPh ti 66. Pidoufan gemi)ýg. =ýbe)ý p mzn. Zufenhe h ife Te hui hua ka ( ub ca on 
of Meeting to Criticize and Struggle Against Counter-Revolutionary Revisionist 
and Splittist Tegesi), Hohhot Special 'Black Hand'Alliance, and IMAR 'Pick-up 
Traitors' Alliance Headquarters, Hohhot, n. d. 
67. Ljuyue shbiri Teng Haiqing toýgZhi Zai Hushi huochetou! Zongbm Zbaokaipi Teng dahuishaýs 
de hiaepan (Speech Made by Comrade Teng Haiqing on the 14'h June at the 'Great 
Meeting to Criticize Teng'by Hohhot Railway Headquarters) N. p, n. d. 
68. Neimenggu ýZrZhiqu dangwei shuji De)ýg Cunlun toý , gýZhiju sipe sin sha, ý :Z ! 7_,,, 
hi 
, gwu ai qu 
jouxianguangbo dahui defiangbua (Speech by IMAR Party Committee Secretary 
Comrade Den Cunlun on the Afternoon of 4h April at the Autonomous Cable 
Broadcast Meeting) N. p, n. d. 
69. Daban Mao Zedotýg jixian g ,g xuexiban, 
bmZhuageming dapoan, ha ivo qu wa su dou. -then 
tmixiang., dnfiýi, (Set up Mao Zedong Thought Classes, Grasp the Revolutionary 
Great Criticism, Push the Dig and Cleanse Struggle of Our Region to a New Level) 
N. p, n. d. 
geii, Dening, Sidalin, Mao ýZhuxiguanju win. Zu wend de lunshu (Marx, Engels, 70. Makeii, Eý 
Lenin, Stalin and Chairman Mao's Theories about the Problem of Nationality) 
IMAR Revolutionary Committee Political Propaganda Group, Hohhot, July 1973. 
71. Mao Zedongxuanji (Collected Essays of Mao Zedong) Chinese People's Liberation 
Army, Shanghai, December 1969. 
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